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Since the early 1980s a popular threefold typology has been the dominant means 
for classifying theories of religious diversity within the Christian theology of religions 
and the Western philosophy of religion. Despite its popularity, this typology has also 
been widely criticized for being incoherent on account of including a theoretical type that 
is not real; namely, religious pluralism. Religious pluralism is considered unreal in the 
sense that it is not sufficiently different from the other two types, called religious 
exclusivism and religious inclusivism. Indeed, some critics have argued that there is only 
exclusivism, or only inclusivism, and so the threefold typology should be abandoned 
altogether. This work will review late twentieth century theories of religious diversity, 
and argue that religious pluralism is a real and distinct theoretical option for religious 
diversity theorists. More specifically, it will argue in favour of a fourfold typology that 
includes two different types of religious pluralism; humanistic-universalistic pluralism 
and metaphysical pluralism. Within this fourfold typology, both types of pluralism are 
characterized by an argument that pluralizes some particular idea of true religion. Thus, 
both types of pluralism advance the novel idea of true religions and, by extension, the 
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1. Conceptualization Theories of Religious Diversity: The Need for a New Typology 
Ten years ago I completed a work called ―Understanding Religious Unity and Diversity 
in Terms of Non-Dualism, Divine Unity, and Trinitarianism Together: A Tripartite 
Theory, Philosophy, and Theology of Religions.‖1 In this work, I made three 
complementary arguments that the three religious truths of non-dualism, divine unity, and 
trinitarian – though radically different – are equally true and equally ultimate since they 
are religious truths about the same Ultimate Reality
2
 generated from different points of 
identity, or different/perspectives, within the same (tripartite) ultimate reality. Upon 
completion, I believed that I had solved a major problem of religious diversity, if not the 
problem.  
Although I did not circulate ―Understanding Religious Unity and Diversity‖ very 
widely I did share it with a few academics and with the religious communities/persons 
that I sought to reconcile with my pluralistic arguments.  The response I got was 
discouraging: the religions were not interested and the academics seemed unable to form 
                                                          
1
 This work was completed as a dissertation for a PhD program in Religious Studies (Martin, 
(“Understanding Religious Unity and Diversity”).     
2
 Because I capitalize the term “God” I will also capitalize the term “Ultimate Reality” since I take these to 
be synonymous. Likewise, I will capitalize other terms that I take to be synonymous with these two, such 
as the Real, Transcendence, the great Other, the Divine, and the Trinity. I will also capitalize terms that are 
meant to signify aspects or dimensions of God/Ultimate Reality, such as the Father, Void, the Most Great 
Spirit, the Logos, Universal Spirit Energy, Cosmos, and Creativity. Moreover, I will capitalize terms used to 
signify identity with God/Ultimate Reality, such as Incarnation, Manifestation of God, God-Realizer, and 
Prophet of God.  I will not, however, capitalize conceptualizations about the nature of God/Ultimate 
Reality such as trinitarianism, non-dualism, panentheism, polytheism, and monotheism.  I will also not 
capitalize terms that signify religious communities – such as the sangha, the ummah, and the church – 
even though I recognize that these may be thought of as identified with (aspects of) God/Ultimate Reality. 
And, I will also not capitalize pronouns referring to persons believed to be identified with God/Ultimate 
Reality, even though this is the norm within religious communities. Finally, I will also not follow the 
capitalization conventions for “terms of art” used in particular traditions; for example, I will not capitalize 
terms such as “day of resurrection,” or “final divine revelation.”    
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an intelligible response. The only positive response came from Raimundo Panikkar who 
sent a note with the following message: ―Many thanks for your thoughtful study. I have 
written extensively on this….I could so far only glance at your pages. Would you say that 
you describe three perspectives–or that the one ultimately ‗includes‘ the other? I would 
encourage you to continue in this line.‖ The question Panikkar asks here is significant; he 
wants to know if I see the three religious perspectives as ultimately collapsing into a 
single religious perspective or as ultimately true with respect to their differences. In other 
words, he wants to know if my position is ―inclusivistic‖ or ―pluralistic.‖  
From my point of view, my position was truly pluralistic and, thus, overcame the 
limitations of traditional theories
3
 of religious pluralism – for example, the pluralistic 
theories of Wilfred Cantwell Smith, John Hick, and Paul Knitter – that do argue for the 
equality of religions on the basis of their participation in a religious commonality.  In 
other words, traditional theories of religious pluralism claim that religions are equal with 
respect to their sameness; I was arguing that they are equal in their differences.  
The uniqueness of my position made it difficult to classify. Since the publication 
of Alan Race‘s Christians and Religious Pluralism: Patterns in the Christian Theology of 
Religions, in 1983, his threefold typology has been the dominant means for classifying 
theories, philosophies, and theologies of religions – most especially within the Christian 
theology of religions and the Western philosophy of religion.
4
 Very basically, Race says 
                                                          
3
 I will sometimes use “theory” as generalized term for the theories, philosophies, and theologies of 
religions reviewed in this dissertation.  This is not meant to obscure the fact that in the broader 
examination of religion there has been, and still is, disagreement and an even animosity amongst 
scientists, philosophers, and theologians.    
4
 See Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism.  Race’s scheme is typically referred to as a typology, and so I 
will usually refer to my classifying work in this dissertation as typological.  A distinction can be drawn 
between typologies and taxonomies; the former sorts things out according to conceptual constructs 
known as “ideal types,” and the latter according to empirically observable characteristics. Typologies are 
more commonly used in the social sciences and taxonomies are more commonly used in biological 
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that there are three typical Christian responses to other religions; exclusivism, 
inclusivism, and pluralism.  Exclusivism says that Christianity is the only true religion; 
inclusivism says that Christianity is the best or superior religion, even though other 
religions may have elements of truth derived from Christianity; and, pluralism says that 
Christianity is one among many true religions.   
My position in ―Understanding Religious Unity and Diversity‖ was pluralist in 
the sense that it claimed there were multiple forms of true religion, but I saw it as a 
significant departure from the most well known ―pluralistic‖ theologies that Race 
reviewed in Christians and Religious Pluralism; namely, the theologies of Paul Tillich, 
John Hick, and Wilfred Cantwell Smith. It seemed to me, that Race‘s typology was in 
need of revision.  
Around the same time that I completed ―Understanding Religious Unity and 
Diversity‖ two Christian theologians – who had already published critical responses to 
pluralistic theologies – published their own theologies of religions. In 2000, Gavin 
D‘Costa (a Roman Catholic theologian) published The Meeting of Religions and the 
Trinity, and in 2001 S. Mark Heim (a Protestant theologian) published The Depth of the 
Riches: A Trinitarian Theology of Religious Ends.
5
 In The Meeting of Religions and the 
Trinity, D‘Costa argues that all theologies of religions are ―exclusivist‖ because they use 
truth criteria to determine what is and what is not authentic religion. Furthermore, he 
argues that his own (exclusivist) Roman Catholic trinitarian theology of religions better 
meets the stated goals of traditional pluralistic theologies, such as being tolerant of other 
                                                                                                                                                                             
sciences; see, K.B. Smith, “Typologies, Taxonomies.” Given this distinction it would probably be more 
accurate to call my work taxonomical, since the lines I draw are always and strictly based on observable 
characteristics of particular theories of religious diversity. Nonetheless, I will often refer to my 
classification scheme as a “typology” since this is conventional.         
5
 See D’Costa: Meeting of Religions; Heim, Depth of the Riches. 
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religions and open to the truth that they may possess. S. Mark Heim, identifies his own 
theology of religious ends as ―inclusivist‖ and, indeed, is of the view that all theologies of 
religions are inclusivist since there can be no meta-perspective from which to view 
particular religious perspectives.  But, even with this qualification, Heim believes that his 
own trinitarian theology of religious ends can serve as a useful tool for allowing 
Christians to see the truth of other religions, since it does not try to authenticate other 
religions by reducing them to a religious commonality, the way traditional theories of 
religious pluralism do. Heim says that the ends of other religions are true in and of 
themselves and, indeed, that Christians need to realize them in order to realize their own 
end.  
By claiming that all theories of religious diversity are ―exclusivist‖ or 
―inclusivist,‖ D‘Costa and Heim respectively raised questions about the coherence of 
Race‘s threefold typology, and even the ―reality‖ of religious pluralism itself. Paul 
Griffiths (a Christian philosophical theologian) contributed further doubt about the 
usefulness of Race‘s typology with his publication of Problems of Religious Diversity in 
2001.
6
 In this work, Griffiths contends that the classic threefold typology is only coherent 
as a means of dealing with the question of salvation, and specifically the question of who 
is saved. As such, it is not even capable of dealing comprehensively with the question of 
salvation because it does not handle the related question of whether or not all will be 
saved. And, like D‘Costa and Heim, Griffiths expresses doubt about the very reality of 
pluralism by suggesting that pluralists (such as John Hick) are only semi-pluralistic 
because they qualify their answer as to who is saved with a substantive definition of 
salvation that necessarily excludes some.  
                                                          
6
 See Griffiths, Religious Diversity.  
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In 2002, Paul Knitter (a pluralist theologian) tried to address these doubts about 
Race‘s typology by proposing a new fourfold typology in Introducing Theologies of 
Religions.
7
  Knitter‘s new fourfold typology is largely a reworking of Race‘s threefold 
typology with new names for exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism, and the addition of 
a new category. Knitter calls this new category ―the acceptance model‖ and constructs it 
to account for theories of religions, such as Heim‘s, that affirm the truth of other religions 
with respect to their deep differences.   
Knitter‘s category of the acceptance model provided me with a potential place for 
my own theorizing about religious diversity in ―Understanding Religious Unity and 
Diversity‖ and, indeed, I could see some profound similarities between Heim‘s work and 
my own. On the other hand, Heim and I had also come to very different conclusions. For 
Heim, even though he recognizes truth in other religions, this truth is ultimately 
integrated into Christian truth, or the Christian end of communion within the triune God. 
From my perspective, there was no singular final end – my three ends or truths were a 
permanent condition.  Thus, I was reluctant to place my work along side Heim‘s within 
Knitter‘s acceptance model.      
2005 saw the publication of two volumes on religious pluralism that revealed a 
divide in the ―pluralist camp‖; namely, Deep Religious Pluralism edited by David Ray 
Griffin, and The Myth of Religious Superiority edited by Paul Knitter.
8
 
David Ray Griffin, in Deep Religious Pluralism, argues that there are two types of 
pluralism: identist and deep. Identist pluralists are the traditional pluralists criticized by 
Heim and D‘Costa, and representative of pluralism, as such, in Race‘s typology.  
                                                          
7
 See Knitter, Introducing Theologies of Religions.  
8
 See Griffin, ed., Deep Religious Pluralism; Knitter, ed., Myth of Religious Superiority. 
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According to Griffin, the defining characteristic of identist pluralism is a religious 
commonality that is used to judge the authenticity of all religions. In contrast to identist 
pluralism there is deep religious pluralism. Deep religious pluralism claims that different 
religions are equally true because they are related to different, but equally ultimate, 
aspects of Ultimate Reality.
9
 Griffin presents John Cobb Jr. as an impressive 
representative of deep religious pluralism. John Cobb adopts Alfred North Whitehead‘s 
pluralistic metaphysics that conceives Ultimate Reality as a tripartite structure consisting 
of Creativity, God, and Cosmos to argue for the equal ultimacy of different types of 
religions – specifically acosmic religions (such as Buddhism) that are related to 
Creativity, theistic religions (such as Christianity) that are related to God, and cosmic 
religions (such as North American Native spirituality) that are related to the Cosmos.
10
 
Thus, the defining characteristic of deep religious pluralism is a pluralistic metaphysics 
that is used to authenticate the truth of different religions at the deepest level.
11
             
Finally, I had a legitimate conceptual category for the type of religious pluralism 
that I produced in ―Understanding Religious Unity and Diversity.‖ I had produced a 
version of ―deep religious pluralism‖; I used a pluralistic metaphysics to argue for the 
equal ultimacy of three very different types of religion.    
The Myth of Religious Superiority is largely an apology for traditional or 
―identist‖ religious pluralism, and the traditional threefold typology that supports it. It is 
also intended to be a platform for the expression of non-Christian forms of identist 
pluralism.  In the Myth of Religious Superiority, Perry Schmidt-Leukel provides a 
                                                          
9
 See Griffin, “Religious Pluralism.” 
10
 See Griffin, “John Cobb’s Religious Pluralism.”   
11
 In the body of this study, I refer to identist religious pluralism as “humanistic religious pluralism,” and 
deep religious pluralism as “metaphysical religious pluralism.”   
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religious defence of the idea of pluralism and the classic threefold typology of 
exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. In this defence, he ―defines‖ religion as that 
which, minimally, has the property of mediating salvific knowledge of ultimate reality; 
and pluralism as the claim that there are multiple forms of religion but that none among 
these is the ultimate form of religion. In contrast, inclusivism also recognizes that there 
are multiple forms of religion, but claims that among these there is one ultimate form. 
Exclusivism claims that there is only one form of religion.
12
  
Using these definitions, Schmidt-Leukel (I think accurately), classifies Mark 
Heim as an inclusivist, since, for Heim, Christian salvation is the ultimate end in which 
all other ends are fulfilled.  This shows a disagreement between two identist pluralists 
(Schmidt-Leukel and Knitter) about how to classify religious diversity theorists such as 
Mark Heim – Knitter thinks Heim warrants a new category and Schmidt-Leukel sees him 
as a typical inclusivist. But, in any case, neither Knitter nor Schmidt-Leukel formed their 
typologies in light of deep religious pluralism as articulated by Griffin.  
Obviously, part of the reason for this was that deep religious pluralism was 
practically invisible when Knitter formulated his fourfold typology and when Schmidt-
Leukel reformulated the classic threefold typology: Griffin‘s Deep Pluralism was not 
published until 2005; my own version of deep pluralism was not in circulation; and, 
otherwise, there was only one relatively unknown version of deep religious pluralism in 
print – Stephen Kaplan‘s Different Path, Different Summits (2002).13  
To my knowledge, there are no other versions of deep religious pluralism apart 
from Cobb‘s/Griffin‘s, Kaplan‘s, and my own.  Raimundo Panikkar should probably also 
                                                          
12
 See Schmidt-Leukel, “Exclusivism, Inclusivism, Pluralism.”  
13
 See Kaplan, Different Paths, Different Summits.  
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be included in this category, but it is very difficult to identify a concrete theory in his 
work.
14
 Nonetheless, even though deep religious pluralism is a very small steam, relative 
to identist pluralism, it is now extant. Thus, I believe any typology that tries to account 
for theories of religious diversity, within the Christian theology of religions or the 
Western philosophy of religion should include a category for, or at least a discussion of, 
deep religious pluralism.  
Obviously the threefold typologies of Race and Schmidt-Leukel do not make 
room for deep religious pluralism, and neither does Knitter‘s really. David Ray Griffin 
has, as indicated, distinguished between two types of pluralism; however, I do not believe 
that his descriptions of either identist pluralism or deep pluralism – or even his 
understandings of exclusivism and inclusivism – are sufficient to classify the sorts of 




Consequently, the intent of this dissertation is to provide a new (fourfold) 
typology for understanding theories of religious diversity that is useful for classifying late 
twentieth century theories of religious diversity. Thus, it may be thought of as an attempt 
to update Alan Race‘s Christians and Religious Pluralism, using theories of religious 
diversity that have appeared  since the publication of Race‘s study in 1983. This ―new‖ 
fourfold typology will obviously include a category for ―deep religious‖ pluralism, but 
will also try to establish more clearly the meanings of ―identist pluralism,‖ and even 
―inclusivism‖ and ―exclusivism.‖ This dissertation is not, however, an attempt to argue 
                                                          
14
 Perhaps, this is Panikkar’s intent.  
15
 Others have suggested the idea that there is a second type of pluralism but have offered little evidence 
to back this idea up; see May, “Baha'i Principle of Religious Unity”; McCarthy “Reckoning with Religious 
Difference”; Panikkar, “Religious Pluralism.” 
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for the validity or rightness of any particular type of theory; it is strictly a historical and 
taxonomic work based on a careful review of the literature (both theoretical/theological 
and taxonomic/typological) standing tall on the fields of the Christian theology of 
religions and Western philosophy religion in the late twentieth century.  
My original intent for this study was to produce a typology of theories of religious 
diversity that could be used ―cross-culturally,‖ or that could be used to understand types 
of theories of religious diversity that appear in different religious traditions. In the end, 
though, all of my theorists, are Christian, either by birth or confession, and Western 
academics so it would be presumptuous to suppose that this fourfold typology has cross-
cultural validity the way that I originally imagined it might. Nonetheless, I do believe that 
this typology is effective for classifying the representative theories that it does discuss, 
and that it can be effectively used to classify similar theories within the Christian 
theology of religions and the Western philosophy of religion.  Moreover, I believe that 
there is a need for such a typology given the current state of conceptual confusion within 
these fields, particularly with respect to the meaning of religious pluralism and its types.  
  
2. Chapter Summary 
This dissertation is divided into two parts: 1) The Historical Emergence Religious 
Pluralism in the Twentieth Century; 2) Late Twentieth Century Alternatives to 
Exclusivism and Inclusivism. 
Part 1 has three main objectives. First, to show the historical backdrop against 
which the concept of religious pluralism emerged in the second half of the twentieth 
century. Second, to sketch the historical emergence and development of religious 
10 
 
pluralism as a concept, and movement, within the Christian theology of religions and the 
Western philosophy of religion.  Third, to provide a new fourfold typology for theories of 
religious diversity, that is better able to understand recent developments in religious 
diversity theorizing than the threefold typology commonly used.    
Chapter 1: Historical Background to the Emergence of Religious Pluralism, is 
dedicated to the first objective and will focus on past attempts to understand religious 
diversity, with special attention given to shifts in ontological orientation that have 
precipitated concomitant shifts in such understandings. Other factors influencing the 
emergence of religious pluralism, particularly social ones, will be further discussed in 
Part 2. Nonetheless, my main focus in this section is not to forge strong causal links to 
explain why religious pluralism emerged, but to get a clear picture of the dominant 
perspectives that were in play before pluralism emerged; the perspectives that would be 
rejected by pluralists.   
Chapter 2: A Historical Outline of the Emergence and Development of Religious 
Pluralism is dedicated to the second objective of outlining the historical emergence of 
religious pluralism as a movement within Christian theology and the Western philosophy 
of religion. The lives and thoughts of the main characters introduced in this historical 
sketch will be the focal point of Part 2 of this dissertation.  
  Chapter 3:  A ―New‖ Fourfold Typology for Theories of Religious Diversity is 
dedicated to the third objective of developing a new typology for better understanding 
recent developments in theorizing about religious diversity. The third objective involves a 
―chicken and egg‖ scenario, wherein it is not obvious what should come first; the theory 
that explains the data presented in Part 2, or the data that has led to the theory. I have 
11 
 
decided to start with the theory (Chapter 3), but ask that this be read in a state of 
suspended judgement until the data that supports the theory is presented in Chapters 4, 5, 
and 6 (in Part 2).   
In Part 2, I will present the cases from which I derive my types or classes; or, 
more specifically, from which I develop the concepts of humanistic religious pluralism, 
neo-religious inclusivism, and metaphysical religious pluralism.  
In Chapter 4: Humanistic Religious Pluralism, we will examine the theories of 
three humanistic religious pluralists; namely, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, John Hick, and 
Paul Knitter. Using the criteria for identifying theories of humanistic religious pluralism 
developed in Chapter 3, I will argue that each of these theorists is a humanistic religious 
pluralist. More specifically, I will argue that they are humanistic pluralists because they 
exhibit the following three main features of humanistic religious pluralism: 1) the 
rejection of the idea of a singular (or uniform) ultimate form of religion, and the 
affirmation of the plurality of true religion; 2) the affirmation that God (or Ultimate 
Reality) is one, and the rejection of the idea of strong identity between God and religion; 
3) the employment of the idea of a religious universal, as opposed to the idea of a 
religious end or the idea of a religious essence.   
In Chapter 5: Neo-Religious Inclusivism, we will examine the work of three ―neo-
religious inclusivists‖; namely, Paul Griffiths, Gavin D‘Costa, and S. Mark Heim. 
Following Ernst Troeltsch‘s distinction between ―exclusive supernaturalism‖ and the 
―evolutionary apologetic‖ I affirm that all forms of inclusivism identify true religion with 
an idea about religion – either an essence or an end – and not with any particular form of 
religion. This conceptual move allows inclusivists to think in terms of absolute and 
12 
 
relative forms of religion.  And, following Perry Schmidt-Leukel to an extent, I affirm 
that the main claim made by inclusivists is that there are many religions but only one 
ultimate form of religion. Each of the inclusivist theologies reviewed in this chapter make 
this claim, either implicitly or explicitly. However, I also call these forms of inclusivism 
―neo-inclusivism‖ because they exhibit a characteristic not found in traditional Christian 
inclusivisms; specifically, they make the claim that non-Christians may have, or really do 
have, truths that Christians (and all others) need in order to attain the ultimate (Christian) 
end.   
In Chapter 6: Metaphysical Religious Pluralism I will examine the arguments I 
made in ―Understanding Religious Unity and Diversity,‖ as well as the metaphysical 
pluralisms of Stephen Kaplan and John Cobb Jr./David Ray Griffin. Like humanistic 
pluralists, metaphysical pluralists also reject the idea of a singular (or uniform) ultimate 
form of religion, and affirm that there is a plurality of true religions. But metaphysical 
pluralists make a different argument; they claim that there are multiple ultimate religious 
truths because religions reflect or manifest Ultimate Reality (i.e. there is strong identity 
between Ultimate Reality and religion), and Ultimate Reality is itself multiple or plural.     
I conclude with an argument for the comparative validity and usefulness of my 
conceptual categories, and some reflections on the possible future of the idea of religious 
pluralism.   
13 
 
PART 1  
THE HISTORICAL EMERGENCE OF RELGIOUS PLURALISM  




1   
Historical Background to the Emergence of Religious Pluralism 
 
David Ray Griffin traces the emergence of religious pluralism back to the work of Ernst 
Troeltsch in the early part of the 20
th
 century. For Griffin, religious pluralism entails two 
affirmations – one rejecting religious absolutism and the other accepting the presence of 
religious truth and values in other traditions.
1
 He also identifies four main bases for the 
emergence and growth of Christian pluralism: sociological, theological, ethical, and 
ontological.  
As for sociological reasons for the recent growth of religious pluralism, Griffin 
notes a twofold change. On one hand, there has been a vast increase in knowledge of 
other religions, be it through books and other forms of media or through personal 
acquaintance, which has led to an appreciation of the wisdom and beauty of other 
religions by Christians. And, on the other hand, Christians have become collectively 
more self-conscious of their own moral and spiritual shortcomings. Both of these 
developments have made it less plausible to hold the view that other religions have no 
value in terms of mediating salvation. (9-10) 
Theological reasons for the emergence of pluralism within Christianity are 
connected to the primacy of Christianity‘s doctrine of divine love. In other words, if love 
is the highest virtue of Christianity then it is very difficult to reconcile the notion of an 
all-loving God with the notion of this God privileging one particular religious community 
                                                          
1
  Griffin, “Religious Pluralism,” 3; cited in the text by page number hereafter.  
15 
 
with an opportunity for salvation while abandoning all others to a certain destiny of 
eternal damnation. (10-11) 
The ethical reason for the emergence of pluralism is also connected to the 
Christian doctrine of love, and in particular the commandment to love one‘s neighbour as 
oneself. For Christian pluralists, the notion of treating religious others as though they are 
inferior beings is incompatible with this commandment. (11-12) 
For Griffin, though, an ontological shift among modern Christian thinkers is most 
directly responsible for the emergence and current growth of religious pluralism. This 
ontological shift is, specifically, a move away from an ontology of supernaturalism and to 
an ontology of naturalism. Supernatural, is ―belief in a divine being that occasionally 
interrupts the world‘s normal causal processes‖ and, for Griffin, this ontology is the basis 
of all forms of Christian absolutism. (13) 
Therefore, pluralism – as the opposite of absolutism – must reject this ontology 
and Griffin suggests that this rejection could simultaneously be called the affirmation of 
naturalism. 
I agree with Griffin, that the work of Ernst Troeltsch marks the dawn of religious 
pluralism; however, I do not see Troeltsch‘s significance in what he accomplished as a 
pluralist – because he never became one – but in his efforts to clearly define the two 
traditional means used by Christians for understanding religious others. It is in opposition 
to these two traditional means for understanding the religious other that Christian 
pluralists would form their own positions. Troeltsch called these the supernatural 
apologetic (or supernatural exclusivism) and the evolutionary apologetic. The 
supernatural apologetic sees Christianity as the perfect form of religion and other 
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―religions‖ as a mass of human error – Christianity is the only religion. The evolutionary 
apologetic sees Christianity as the perfect realization of the essence of religion, and other 
religions as less perfect realizations of this same religious essence–Christianity is the best 
religion. The supernatural apologetic is now commonly referred to as exclusivism, and 
the evolutionary apologetic is referred to as inclusivism.  
The historical context in which inclusivism started to gain widespread appeal – 
late 18
th
 to early 19
th
 century Europe – is one in which intellectuals had awareness of vast 
religious diversity. The appearance of this diversity started to emerge in the 15
th
 century 
with the fracture of Western Christendom in the Protestant Reformation, and the exploits 
of the great western navel powers who were bringing home knowledge about the habits 
and customs of the peoples of the Far East and Meso-America. This process gained 




 centuries, and the awareness of ―religious 
diversity‖ led to the habit of thinking of Christianity as a token of a type called religion.2  
In this context it became increasingly difficult for Christian intellectuals to 
maintain the validity of the supernatural apologetic that reduced everything outside of 
Christianity to nothingness with respect to being religious – the evidence seemed to 
suggest that there was more than one religion. In 1799, Friedrich Schleiermacher‘s On 
Religion: Speeches to its cultured despisers appeared in Germany as an apology for 
religion to the sophisticated thinkers of the Enlightenment who had little use for the 
religion and its superstitions. On Religion is commonly recognized as the first time that 
religion was conceived, by a Christian theologian, as an idea – as a philosophically 
conceived essence. In this new way of thinking, Christianity is not religion itself but one 
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religious movement in which the essence of religion is realized – but, predictably, the one 
in which the essence of religion is seen to be most fully realized.  
This approach was novel and useful because it didn‘t require Christians to say that 
other religions were not religions – as the supernatural apologetic did – and it still 
allowed Christians to come to the conclusion that Christianity is the absolute religion, or, 
at very least, the best religion. It is important to recognize the logic at work here. No 
religion is, in itself, absolute – it is the essence of religion that is absolute. Nonetheless, 
the religion that perfectly realizes the essence is absolute, or, the religion that most 
perfectly realizes the essence is closest to the absolute. This is where the notion of 
Christianity being the superior, rather than the only, religion begins.  
It is hard to know if the first inclusivists employed the idea of an absolute essence 
in order to provide a more benign evaluation of other religions than they could with 
supernatural exclusivism; or, if they were just trying to preserve its life in a new form, 
now that the weight of ubiquitous religious diversity, and type-token logic, was 
threatening to make Christianity into just one religion among many. Probably the latter 
for the first inclusivists, and probably the former for ―post-pluralism inclusivists‖ who 
breathed new life into inclusivism two hundred years after Schleiermacher gave birth to 
it. In any case, we do know that inclusivism appeared as an alternative to exclusivism, 
and that it employed a very different strategy for understanding religion and religions.  
The strategy of inclusivism was to absolutize an essence of religion instead of a 
particular form of religion. Troeltsch rejected both forms of absolutism, and tried to 
establish, instead, a religious ―norm‖ based on an analysis of the history of religions. 
Troeltsch‘s quest first led him to a quasi-absolutism in the form of an historically derived 
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norm that looked suspiciously like Christianity; his conclusion was that Christianity was 
the ―focal point and culmination of all religious developments‖ and, therefore, the 
superior religion – at least for now and the foreseeable future.3  But, in the end, Troeltsch 
opted for relativism, or the position that there are no religious norms let alone religious 
absolutes, as the more reasonable conclusion.  
Nonetheless, in an effort to move beyond the supernatural apologetic, and, more 
especially the evolutionary apologetic, Troeltsch became very clear about the nature of 
these two positions. As far as I know, no one else has achieved comparable conceptual 
clarity in differentiating exclusivism from inclusivism; thus, Troeltsch will be our point 
of entry into this study of religious pluralism.   
 
1. Ernst Troeltsch: The Supernatural Apologetic and the Evolutionary Apologetic   
Ernst Troeltsch was drawn to the idea of Absoluteness in both its religious or 
supernatural form and its philosophical and essentialist form; he was drawn to the 
certainty that it conferred. But Troeltsch was also drawn to the human, the relative, and 
the historical – and his vocation was that of an historian.  In 1902 Troeltsch published a 
small book called The Absoluteness of Christianity and the History of Religions, in which 
he tried to unite the opposing tendencies of the religious/absolute and the 
historical/relative.  His aim was to establish the normative truth of Christianity through 
historical study, although in the end his final claim about the normativeness of 
Christianity rested on religious conviction.  
About twenty years after this (circa 1923), Troeltsch prepared a paper called 
―Christianity Among the World Religions‖ in which he reviewed and renounced his 
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former conclusion. His new conclusion was that Christianity is only valid, true, and 
normative in Europe and the Americas where Christianity had grown up. Other cultures 
have their own religions and value systems that are as true and normative to them as 
Christianity is to Europeans and those of the Americas. In other words, religious truth is 
relative. This was Troeltsch‘s final position, even though he insisted that what is true only 
―for us‖ is still ―very truth,‖ and held out the convergence of norms as a future ideal.4       
Religious pluralism is often linked with relativism,
5
 and, so, it might be natural to 
think that the theory of religious pluralism grew out of Troeltsch‘s relativism. 
Paradoxically, this is not the case, and theories of religious pluralism have as much in 
common with Troeltsch‘s earlier ―normativism‖ and perhaps even the philosophical 
essentialism that he also rejected. Indeed, the first pluralists did something that Troeltsch 
never thought to do; they tried to argue that there could be multiple forms of a religious 
norm.    
This novel conceptual move, of ―pluralizing a religious norm,‖ is at the heart of 
what I will call humanistic religious pluralism. But before turning our attention to this we 
will examine Troeltsch‘s conceptualization of the two positions he consciously rejected 
before trying to establish a historically grounded religious norm; namely, the 
―supernatural apologetic‖ and the ―evolutionary apologetic.‖ We will do this because, as 
said above, the supernatural apologetic and the evolutionary apologetic would later 
become known as exclusivism and inclusivism respectively, and pluralists would propose 
their own theories of religious diversity as alternatives to these.  
                                                          
4
 Troeltsch, “Christianity Among the World Religions,” 221-222. 
5




Troeltsch begins The Absoluteness of Christianity and the History of Religions 
(1901) by saying that the historical view of the world has become dominant; it is ―a 
dynamic principle for attaining a comprehensive view of everything human.‖6 Within the 
purview of history is everything from the past and everything across the broad spectrum 
of the present. Such a long and broad historical view of things allows for comparisons, 
and this poses a threat to cultures and value systems that have always assumed the 
obviousness of their validity. (46) 
Troeltsch continues by saying that because it is now possible to take a look at all 
cultures, it is now possible to establish criteria for value; in other words, we can now 
establish criteria that will tell us what human value systems are valid. And, this capacity 
brings to an end all past and naive attempts to prove validity based on either revelation or 
the truths of natural reason. History has replaced theology and philosophy as the means 
for determining value; it is ―the foundation of all thinking concerning values and norms. 
It is the medium for the self-reflection of the species upon its nature, origins, and hopes.‖ 
(47) 
Troeltsch recognizes that the historical method
7
 for determining values constitutes 
a threat to Christianity which has always naively assumed its own normative truth. But 
despite this assumption, Christians have from time to time felt the need to offer an 
apology for the normative truth of Christianity. The first of these apologetic reflections 
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 Troeltsch, Absoluteness of Christianity, 45; cited in the text by page number hereafter. 
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 Following is Troeltsch’s description of the modern idea of history and the historical method: “The 
modern idea of history, which depends on critical source-analysis and on conclusions derived from 
psychological analogy, is the history of the development of peoples, spheres of culture, and cultural 
components. It dissolves all dogmas in the flow of events and tries sympathetically to do justice to all 
phenomena first measuring them by their own criteria and then combining them into an overall picture of 
the continuous and mutually conditioning factors in all individual phenomena that shape the unfolding 
development of mankind” (Troeltsch, Absoluteness of Christianity, 46-47). 
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makes a sharp distinction between Christianity, as a ―divinely ordained institution‖; and, 
non-Christianity as a ―homogeneous mass of human error.‖ (47) The truth of Christianity 
is based on both the external miracle of Christ‘s incarnation in human history and the 
inner miracle of conversion (the recognition of the external miracle). On this same basis, 
ecclesiastical philosophy and theology would develop the concept of the church, and, 
thus, the church and church history came to be seen as derived from heaven in sharp 
contrast to ordinary history:    
 Ordinary history with its merely human and humanly conditioned truths is, 
according to this view, the sphere of sin and error. Only history as written by the 
church gives truth that is absolutely certain, though not absolutely exhaustive, 
because it works with powers that derive not from history but directly from God. 
(47) 
But the modern idea of history has radically undermined this apologetic by placing all 
history on the same plane. This meant that Christianity was just one religious 
phenomenon beside all of the others, and in this context it became impossible to authentic 
the validity of Christianity on the basis of miracle; other religions had their miracles too, 
and there was no justification for allowing Christian miracle (as a criterion for truth) and 
not the miracles of others.
8
   
When Christians realized it was no longer possible to validate Christianity by the 
traditional means of seeing Christianity as a miracle in history but not of history, it 
employed a different method; one taking the total history of humankind as its starting 
point. This alternative apologetic was, thus, playing on the same turf as the historian, 
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taking history as a ―dynamic principle in its own right.‖ (49) What was different about 
the historical approach of the Christian apologist, though, was that it assumed a single 
teleology or aim for all of human history. In other words, human history was moving 
towards a culmination and, of course, Christianity was the point of all this upward 
movement:  
The history of mankind was viewed causally and teleologically as a single whole. 
Within this whole the ideal of religious truth was thought of as moving forward in 
gradual stages, and at one definite point, namely, in the historical phenomenon of 
Christianity, it was deemed to have reached absolute form, i.e.,, the complete and 
exhaustive realization of its principle. (49) 
According to Troeltsch, this way of thinking was in line not only with a historical 
view of the world, but also the relatively new idea of thinking of Christianity as one of 
the religions of the world. The idea that Christianity is a type of religion, stems from the 




 The genealogy 
of this idea might be traced back to Rene Descartes who, in the 16
th
 century, wrestled 
authority away from the Church and enshrined it in the rational self.
10
 In any case, 
philosophers, and eventually theologians, after Descartes started to see religion as a 
philosophical concept, that was realized in varying degrees by different religions but not 
identical with any given religion: religion had become a ―species.‖   
Returning to Troeltsch‘s analysis in The Absoluteness of Christianity, it was 
hoped that this concept of a universal principle of religion, which enfolded all movement 
from the least to the most complete realization of itself, would be able to account for the 
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multiplicity of religious forms, since every religion could be located somewhere along 
the path towards realization of the principle. Moreover, it was hoped that this universal 
principle would show that Christianity, as the perfect realization or actualization of the 
principle of religion, was absolute truth or normative religious truth:  
There exists, in reality, only one religion, namely, the principle or essence of 
religion, and this principle of religion, this essence of religion, is latent in all 
historical religions as their ground and goal. In Christianity this universally latent 
essence, everywhere else limited by its media, has appeared in untrammeled and 
exhaustive perfection. If Christianity is thus identical with this principle of 
religion that is elsewhere implicit and that comes to complete explication only in 
Christianity, then the Christian religion is of course normative religious truth. (49-
50) 
This new apologetic found its first profound expressions in the theology of 
Friedrich Schleiermacher and the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel. These two thinkers 
generated the idea of religion as a philosophical concept – an essence – and the idea of 
this essence developing to fulfillment within the history of religions. These two ideas 
became the ―apologetic foundation of the so-called modern or liberal theology.‖ And this 
is particularly significant for our discussion because the theory of religious pluralism 
sprung from this school of liberal theology.
11
  
But, for Troeltsch, the ―modern apologetic‖ or the ―evolutionary apologetic‖ 
represents the primary opponent to his own argument that Christianity was normatively 
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true but not absolutely true.
12
  In order to establish this thesis it is necessary for Troeltsch 
to be clear about what is meant by ―absolute,‖ and he does this by differentiating the 
―absoluteness‖ of what he now calls the supernatural apologetic from the absoluteness of 
the evolutionary apologetic.    
He begins by pointing out the main similarity shared by the evolutionary and the 
supernatural apologetics; namely, that they are both set on proving the absolute truth of 
Christianity as a matter of course, or as a theoretical requirement. (51) In neither case is 
independent criteria set up against which the validity of Christianity and other religions 
can be evaluated. In the first case, it turns out that Christianity is revelation opposed to 
human error; and, in the second case, it turns out that Christianity is the fulfillment of the 
principle of religion and not one of its lesser forms.   
For Troeltsch, the only difference between the two is the path they take to the 
same goal; (52) the main difference here being that the supernatural apologetic employs 
―form‖ and the evolutionary apologetic employs the logic of ―essence and content.‖ By 
―form‖ Troeltsch is referring to the mode of seeing absolute truth in a specific form or 
embodiment, and seeing that as radically distinct from the opposing forms of non-truth in 
the world.  For the orthodox supernaturalist, the form of absolute truth appears as a 
miraculous cleavage within ordinary history and its relative truths; it is a direct issue of 
divine causality:  
Christianity has been defined in principle as something that stands in opposition 
to everything human and historical, in opposition to all merely relative truths and 
powers. Absoluteness here consists of miracle. It is the absoluteness of a Christian 
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Sunday causality in antithesis to the relativity and mediacy of a non-Christian 
weekday causality. (52)  
The supernatural apologetic is satisfied with this type of ―absoluteness‖ which, for 
Troeltsch, is an impoverished understanding of absoluteness because absoluteness 
signifies an end which other things approach and so these other things are not just 
nothing.
13
 In fact, Troeltsch says that the language of absoluteness isn‘t even native to the 
supernatural apologetic, and that its all or nothing attitude is better described as 
―exclusive supernaturalism‖:   
… the expression ―absoluteness of Christianity‖ was not coined by holders of this 
view [supernaturalism]. They fashioned only the theory of exclusively 
supernatural revelation, in contrast to which everything outside Christianity stands 
as the work not of God but of man. What this apologetic understands by the term 
―absoluteness‖ is actually exclusive supernaturalism. (53) 
Thus, Troeltsch sees absoluteness in its fullest sense only in the evolutionary apologetic, 
where the conceptual orientation is essence and content rather than form.  
Troeltsch says that the evolutionary apologetic grew out of recognition of the 
impracticality of arguing for the superior position of Christianity based on form. But the 
same favoured position could be maintained by arguing that Christianity was the 
―realization of the idea of religion itself.‖ (53) This idea allowed Christians to drop the 
notion of supernatural causality, because the normal causal processes of history (the 
structures of causality) could be seen as the context for the realization of the idea of 
religion in history.  
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Troeltsch continues by describing (in Hegelian terms) this new way of thinking 
about religion that is able to use normal history as the means for realizing the absolute 
religious end, instead of seeing it as the mere opposite of true religion which appears 
paradoxically and supernaturally within history. All finite beings move towards the 
realization of the ―idea‖–this is the ―movement of the divine life as a causal, teleological, 
and unitary life process.‖ (54) And, for finite consciousness (i.e., for human beings), this 
idea is always conceived as the idea of God or the idea of religion. Thus, religious life 
unfolds throughout history in the shape of ―content and essence‖ wherein historical 
reality is the content that strives to realize the essence of the idea of God or religion. For 
human beings, this content is a state of consciousness, and this consciousness gradually 
and continually moves from preliminary and circumscribed states toward its ultimate 
consummation or fulfillment in the perfect realization of the idea of God. (54)     
From the summit of perfect realization of the idea of God, all of religious history 
can be viewed as part of the evolutionary process wherein all is moving towards 
fulfillment of the universal principle of religion; in other words, all of the lesser forms of 
religion can be seen in their relative degrees of perfection and completion:    
A kind of religious geology teaches such a man to understand all lands and 
provinces in this realm as preliminary stages to the summit they all help to form, 
the summit that exists not in isolation from all else but simply as the crown of the 
whole. Of course this is not absolute knowledge of God – only God himself 
possesses that – but it is the absolute realization of all human knowledge of God, 
a realization that exhausts its principle and its substantive goal. This means it is 
the knowledge of God that man, as he proceeds from and returns to God, can 
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understand as the finite spirit which, though rooted in infinity, consumes and 
purifies its finitude in devotion. (54-55) 
At this point, Troeltsch is able to express the heart of the difference between the 
supernatural apologetic and the evolutionary apologetic; the former is grounded in 
supernatural revelation and the latter in human consciousness. The former creates a one 
and only proposition, while the latter allows for degrees of perfection; hence, it 
meaningfully employs the terms absolute and relative truth:    
Only in this context does the expression ―absoluteness‖ possess its full meaning. 
It signifies the perfect self-comprehension of the idea that strives for complete 
clarity, the self-realization of God in the human consciousness. It is the 
philosophical substitute for the dogmatic supernaturalism of the church. (55) 
For Troeltsch, the theories of the supernatural apologetic and the evolutionary 
apologetic are the only ones that can be taken seriously as a means for proving the 
―normative‖ truth of Christianity.  And even though the historically-minded theologians 
of his day were declaring supernatural exclusivism and Hegelian religious essentialism to 
be dead, Troeltsch maintains that they often employed the arguments of both in 
inconsistent ways that obscured their ―inner spirit.‖ Moreover, such theologians showed 
little capacity to distinguish between absoluteness in the supernatural sense and 
absoluteness in the philosophical sense, and therefore were unable to employ one of the 
most useful aspects of philosophical absolutism – the aspect that allowed for a positive 
recognition of other religions. For some of these theologians,   
the term ―absoluteness of Christianity‖ simply represents the claim Christianity 
makes to exclusive truth, a claim which, though it conflicts sharply with all 
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similar claims, nevertheless belongs to the very nature of Christianity and 
therefore must simply be accepted. They do not take this to mean that the 
interpretation of Christian thought should exclude a flexible consideration of other 
kinds of truths and other ways of understanding, such as those of the natural 
sciences. Unfortunately, however, this theology that makes so much of the 
Christian claim takes no account of the corresponding claims of other religions. 
56-57) 
After expressing his exasperation with the inability of contemporary theologians 
to think profoundly about these matters, stemming from an inability to distinguish 
supernaturally revealed truth from absolute truth in the philosophical sense, Troeltsch 
introduces a further notion of truth, which he says must be understood as distinct from 
both of these. This is the notion of ―simple normative value.‖ (57) To make the 
distinction between simple normative value or normative truth, as opposed to absolute 
truth in the philosophical sense, Troeltsch begins with a historical examination of the idea 
of absoluteness of Christianity. 
Troeltsch begins with a consideration of how early Christianity dealt with its 
religious environment, an environment populated with mutually hostile religions. In this 
environment, early Christianity was forced to make some theoretical and practical 
decisions about where it stood in relation to these other ―religions.‖ According to 
Troeltsch, the early church followed the lead of Saint Paul and adopted, for the most part, 
the Jewish, and particularly the ―Hellenized-Jewish apologetic against the heathen.‖ (57)  
But, he says this never really caught on because it relied too much on the idea of Paul‘s 
personal (and unrepeatable) experience of Christ and possession by the Spirit to be 
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comprehensible to later generations (who were not capable of understanding such lofty 
ideas). (57-58)  
Institutional Christianity, says Troeltsch, formed its definitive view of other 
religions in its debate with Gnosticism. In these debates, Christianity adopted the ideas of 
supernatural revelation and incarnation, and it would use these ideas which became 
doctrines to argue that Christian faith meant perfect and final knowledge of God, ―that it 
was something essentially new and ‗absolute‘.‖ (58) This was the theory of the 
uncultured element of the congregation. The more cultured members adopted a more 
philosophical idea for understanding Christianity's relation to other religions. In contrast, 
for the philosophers of the church, the ―moments of truth‖ in other religious-like-things – 
the cults, the mythologies, the philosophies, etc. – were expressions of divine Reason that 
are present in the natural world. But these instances of truth are comprehended in 
complete and perfect form in the incarnation of the Divine reason, Jesus Christ. As such, 
Christianity reveals all previously concealed divine mysteries and the truths of natural 
reason in ―absolute‖ form. (58)  
In both the un-cultured and the cultured forms of ― absoluteness,‖ absoluteness is 
grounded in the idea or theory of supernatural revelation. Troeltsch says that this way of 
thinking – which would eventually lead to the development of the idea that God revealed 
in Christ was the Divine Reason (the Logos) which enfolded natural reason – was unique 
to antiquity. Thus, the sense in which Christianity was absolute for early Christians was 
entirely different than it was, for the theologians of the Enlightenment who conceived 
absoluteness as the fulfillment of the causal processes of history. Early Christians saw 
religion as appearing in history but not of history; and later historically-minded Christians 
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saw religion as historical movement: ―In particular it [earlier Christianity] is far removed 
from considering the history of religion as history of religion.‖ (58)  
Troeltsch continues by saying that the breakdown of national religions (in 
antiquity) lead to the habit of thinking in unhistorical generalizations (presumably 
because everything historical was being uprooted). Thus, ideas of religious reform 
became highly rationalistic and syncretistic, and, in this environment, Christianity 
became the most successful religion. Christianity became an unhistorical supernatural 
revelation that interrupted the normal causal processes of history; it was the divine 
revelation of the divine Logos which became incarnate in Jesus Christ. This conception 
of Christianity made it impossible to attribute positive value to anything outside of 
Christianity; Christianity was supernatural revelation from God and other ―religions‖ 
were merely human:  
To Christianity the non-Christian religions were by no means religions in the true 
sense of the word, and it was utterly devoid of any concept of religion as a 
species. Christianity itself was revelation and not religion. Other religions were 
sporadic and distorted philosophical systems based on a natural knowledge of 
God. But in the clarity of the divine light these systems were fully comprehended, 
it was believed, in Christianity, though here they were set free of their otherwise 
natural instability because of the foundation provided by the miracle of revelation. 
(59)  
Troeltsch thought this rationalistic and syncretistic view of religion was 
understandable for the times, but he stresses that had little to do with the evolutionary 
apologetic‘s way of thinking. He even says that this view of religion, within the 
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supernatural apologetic, has been sublimated into ―religious drives and needs that are 
found in many universally and that play a part in every religion. It is sunk to the level of a 
set of questions that find their aim though only in the Christian revelation.‖ (59) 
In its modern form, the supernatural apologetic relies on the inner miracle of 
conversion to prove that Christianity is absolutely true, or ―on the absolute miracle of an 
inner renewal that transcends all natural powers.‖ (59) In contrast, the evolutionary 
apologetic sees in Christianity the realization of the essence of religion, and on this basis 
asserts its absoluteness. (59-60)   
At this point, Troeltsch argues against the more modern form of the supernatural 
apologetic that seeks to prove the absolute truth of Christianity by reference to the inner 
miracle of conversion. He says that it is impossible to claim that Christianity is uniquely 
true on the basis of a purely personal inner experience, and so the supernatural apologetic 
must always turn to the great external archetypical miracles connected with the origin of 
Christianity – the incarnation and the miracles performed by Jesus of Nazareth. But when 
it does this it introduces a dichotomy between the sacred and profane that is unacceptable 
to the modern historical way of thinking. Thus, for Troeltsch, the evolutionary apologetic, 
which is at least historically minded, is the more credible of the two traditional theories. 
(60)  
But he then asks if the idealistic and evolutionary theory of religion is a tenable 
answer to the  great modern religious problem of how to establish religious norms in the 
face of bewildering religious diversity, or ―How can we pass beyond the diversity with 
which history presents us to norms for our faith and for our judgments about life?‖ (61) 
Troeltsch would go on to answer this question negatively, but he does argue that it is 
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possible, on the basis of a study of the history of religions, to determine which religion is 
normatively true.  
The difference between the absolute truth of the evolutionary apologetic and 
Troeltsch‘s normative truth is primarily one of method. For Troeltsch, historical 
knowledge is unique because history is ―the sphere of the individual and nonrecurrent,‖ 
but within this transiency there is something ―universally valid‖ that makes itself known. 
The problem with the universal apologetic, for Troeltsch, is that it tends to focus 
exclusively of the universal and valid with little regard to actual historical multiplicity.  
Indeed, it vainly tries to control multiplicity with its grand metaphysical systems, and 
this, says Troeltsch, leaves it open to the ―the unlimited relativism of the present day.‖ 
(106) He believed that the Enlightenment‘s essentialist understanding of religion stood 
closer to the ―basic urgings of the human ethos‖ (the desire for absoluteness) and was 
better at discerning the ―main tendencies of history‖ than the microscopic modern study 
of history. On the other hand, there is something paradoxically profound about studying 
actual religions in all of their textured richness; indeed, such studies seem to ring truer 
than studies guided by religious essences that practically predetermine what one is going 
to see. For Troeltsch the secret to the study of religion is to combine these two 
tendencies:  
Thus the problem is to define the scope of the relative and individual with ever 
increasing exactness and to understand with ever increasing comprehensiveness 
the universally valid that works teleologically within history. Then we will see 
that the relative contains an indication of the unconditional. In the relative we will 
find a token of the absolute that transcends history. (106) 
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Troeltsch‘s historical study of religions – which was a search for the universal or 
the ―absolute that transcends history‖ within history – led him to the conclusion that 
Christianity is, at least so far, the most perfect historical manifestation of the religious 
universal. But, he insisted that this conclusion that Christianity is the truest religion is not 
the result of hanging historical facts on a religious history template that would 
predetermine it; this conclusion is derived from the evidence offered by a study of 
religious history.  
Despite Troeltsch‘s (Aristotelian) bottom-up approach to truth, opposed to the 
(Platonic) top-down approach to truth of the essentialists, his results – especially as seen 
in Chapter 4 of The Absoluteness of Christianity, called ―Christianity: Focal Point and 
Culmination of all Religious Developments‖– are remarkably similar.   
In Chapter 4, Troeltsch says that historical thinking does not preclude the 
possibility of discovering that Christianity is the highest religious truth; the question is 
whether or not it does include this.  For Troeltsch, the answer involves a personal 
conviction but not one that is ―determinative from the outset‖ the way the answers of 
essentialist historicizing are; it is a conviction derived from comparative ―observation and 
absorption in hypothetically adopted values.‖ It thus steps beyond being a mere 
―confession‖ of faith, and is able to satisfy the scientifically minded. (107-108) 
Authenticating the truth of Christianity scientifically was a major problem for the 
theologians of Troeltsch‘s day, but Troeltsch was calm and assured that the challenge 
could be met, so long as Christianity was recognized as the ―completely historical 
phenomenon it is.‖ (108) Troeltsch saw Christianity as a religion that combined many 
religious and cultural religious elements, including the following:  
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Israelite prophecy, the preaching of Jesus, the mysticism of Paul, the idealism of 
Platonism and Stoicism, the integration of medieval European culture in terms of 
a religious conception, the Germanic individualism of Luther, and the 
conscientiousness and activism of Protestantism. (108) 
As for challengers to the crown of the focal point and culmination of all religious 
developments, Troeltsch dismisses the various ―polytheisms and polydemonisms‖ and 
says that it is only necessary to consider ―the great world religions with their clearly 
supra-sensual world of absolutely transcendent religious values which enters into the 
world of the senses.‖ (109) The great virtue of these religions is that they transcend the 
blind reality of material existence, and allow the senses to be turned to higher spiritual 
reality:  
 It is these religions that free themselves from the natural confinement of religion 
to state, blood, and soil, and from the entanglement of divinity in the powers and 
phenomena of nature. It is in them that the world of the senses is solidly 
confronted by a higher, spiritual and eternal world, and it is in them, therefore, 
that the full, all–embracing power of religion first arises. (109) 
Having distinguished the great world religions from the rest, Troeltsch makes a 
further distinction amongst these: the religions of law are inferior to the religions of 
redemption. The religions of law – such as Judaism and Islam – are unable to make a 
profound distinction between the world of the senses and the ―world of higher, 




The religions of redemption are the ones that consummate this distinction 
between the two worlds. They sever men inwardly from the whole of existent 
reality, even from the nature of their own souls, in order to confront reality with 
divinely empowered men. Thus they provide the whole of existent reality not only 
with an example of those values that overcome the world and constitute its only 
worth but also with the sure hope of victory and of living for a higher world. 
(109) 
The religion of Christianity was derived (like Judaism and Islam) from ―the 
Israelite prophetic movement,‖ but surpassed it.  Christianity was able to make a radical 
distinction between God and soul, on one hand, and the world on the other, and this 
engendered in it the capacity to recognize or realize unconditional value. Following is 
Troeltsch‘s description of this loftiest of religious states:  
Here we find a complete and radical disengagement of God and of souls from the 
world; the elevation of both into the sphere of personality where nature is shaped 
and overcome and where unconditioned value is realized; and the overcoming of 
all that is merely given, merely existent, by an infinite and intrinsic value that 
bursts forth from the depths of the world and finds expression in practical 
conduct. (110) 
Having closed the door on the matter-bound religions of Judaism and Islam, 
Troeltsch realizes that he has left open the door for the Indian religions, which seem to 
assert an even more rarefied form of spiritual consciousness.  
Troeltsch‘s first move here is to claim that the Indian religions of redemption are 
very much like Neo-Platonism, and the religious movements of late antiquity known as 
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Gnosticism. Thus, he sees the Indian redemptive religions, on one hand, as growing out 
of natural religion and, on the other, as smothering the personalized and ethnicized 
religions of India that were grounded in polytheism.  The Indian redemptive religions did 
this because they took the idea of pure spirit too far, and thus sought the annulment of the 
world in their peculiar form of religion:  
Divinity now comes to mean pure, highest being, or the supreme order of the 
world, in relation to which the world process signifies that this being, this order, is 
made obscure and finite. Redemption means, accordingly, the annulment of the 
world process and the obliteration of everything personal in pure being, since the 
existence and value of the personal constitute no problem for this type of religious 
apprehension. (110)   
In this argument Troeltsch is preparing the way for the appearance of the religion 
that is neither hidebound to material existence nor obliterated in pure divinity – 
Christianity. But, first, he needs to account for Buddhism, which coincidentally, was the 
first religion that was recognized by Christians as another ―world religion.‖14 Buddhism – 
which Troeltsch calls ―Buddhist quietism‖ – is one form of Indian redemption religion, 
but one that is different from ―Brahmanic acosmism‖ which seeks the dissolution of the 
world – even though Buddhist quietism shares with Brahmanic acosmism ―ethical 
introspection‖ and likewise originated as a critical response to natural religion. (111)    
In Brahmanic acosmism (Advaita Vedanta), the divine is conceived as the 
Absolute One, and the only Reality. All else is finite, transitory, and ultimately illusory.  
But finite reality has a means of redemption; namely, absorption into the Absolute, 
                                                          
14
 For a discussion of the process whereby Buddhism came to be regarded as a “world religion,” by 
Western scholars of religions, see Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions, especially Chapter 4.   
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wherein the soul and the Absolute become an ―absolutely indistinguishable unity.‖ (111)  
In Buddhist quietism, the divine is the ordering power behind the sequences of cosmic 
cause and effect, and beyond this is ―the void of bliss that lies behind the world.‖ (111) In 
Buddhism, the path to redemption is twofold and involves; 1) the practical submission of 
the will; and 2) understanding the illusory nature and impermanence of finite reality.  
Both paths, like other forms of redemptive religion, use ethical ideas as a means of 
mastery over the self and world, and religious perception as a means of deeply 
comprehending the difference between the material and spiritual worlds, or the true and 
illusory worlds. But in contrast to Brahmanic acosmism – where the divine is a ―barren 
One, an ultimate abstraction from the existent,‖ and the only means to redemption are 
meditation and asceticism – Troeltsch conceptualizes redemption in Buddhism as ―sheer 
order, sheer fate‖ that is made possible by subduing the will in order to attain the true 
understanding of the nature of cosmic reality, and is fulfilled by participation in the void. 
(111)  
At this point, Troeltsch turns his attention to what is lacking in these Indian forms 
of redemption religion; specifically, he says, they lack ―the truth, power, and vitality of 
the higher world,‖ and therefore the higher world is not capable of ―uprooting and 
transforming men‖ and so redemption has to come from the bottom up, through self-
assertion or one's own natural spiritual endowments. (111) This, of course, is a lead into 
the great world religion that is not lacking in a similar regard – Christianity. 15 
Christianity does not have the defects of the Indian religions of redemption that 
effectively destroy the person – let alone the defects of the religions of Judaism and Islam 
                                                          
15
 Troeltsch and his famous student Karl Barth are often juxtaposed as polar opposites, but in this notion 
of Christianity being a case of the Absolute reaching down to transform human life, the two are 
profoundly similar and show their common Lutheran heritage.  
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that don‘t quite comprehend the distinction between spiritual and material reality – 
because Christianity is the ―strongest and most concentrated revelation of personalistic 
religious apprehension.‖ (112) Moreover, Christianity is unique in that it has worked out 
―in a radical way the distinction between the higher and lower worlds,‖ a distinction 
wherein the personal transcends the material to become an expression of the divine:  
It alone, by virtue of a higher world deriving from its own reality and inner 
necessity, takes empirical reality as actually given and experienced, builds upon 
it, transforms it, and at length raises it up to a new level. It makes this 
achievement possible by redemptively uniting souls that are ensnared in the world 
and in guilt with the outgoing and embracing love of God. Christianity represents 
the only complete break with the limits and conditions of nature religion. It 
represents the only depiction of the higher world as infinitely valuable personal 
life that conditions and shapes all else. It renounces the world, but only to the 
extent that its superficial, natural significance clings to it and the evil in it has 
become dominant. It affirms the world to the extent that it is from God and is 
perceived by men of faith as deriving from and leading to God. And renunciation 
and affirmation, taken together, disclose the true higher world in a power and 
independence that are experienced nowhere else. (112)  
For Troeltsch this conception of personalistic redemption demands a choice 
between it and the impersonal Indian forms redemption, and Troeltsch‘s own choice is 
clear:     
It is necessary to make a choice between redemption through meditation on 
Transcendent Being or non-Being and redemption through faithful, trusting 
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participation in the person-like character of God, the ground of all life and of all 
genuine value. This is a choice that depends on religious conviction, not scientific 
demonstration. The higher goal and the greater profundity of life are found on the 
side of personalistic religion. (112) 
As indicated in the passage above, it is at this point in the ―argument‖ that 
Troeltsch abandons the scientific study of religion that has lead him to see aspects of 
universal truth in the various great world religions, and rest his final claim on religious 
conviction. His final claim is that ―faithful, trusting participation in the person-like 
character of God,‖ or personalistic redemptive religion, offers the highest religious goal. 
And, thus, Christianity as the ―strongest and most comprehensive revelation of 
personalistic religious apprehension‖ is the focal point and culmination of all religious 
developments. (112)  But, again, it is normatively true opposed to absolutely true, insofar 
as its truth is discerned within the history of religions, rather than in a metaphysical 
religious conception that practically predetermines the absoluteness of Christianity.  
One of the most striking features of Troeltsch‘s theory of religious diversity is 
how much it resembles the evolutionary apologetic that it seeks to replace, especially the 
evolutionary apologetic of Friedrich Schleiermacher. As said above, Friedrich 
Schleiermacher is widely cited as being the father of modern liberal Protestantism, and 
the first theologian to conceptualize religion as an ideal or a philosophical concept, rather 
than use religion as a signifier of Christianity. This approach allowed Schleiermacher, 
and those who followed him, to ascribe positive value to religions other than Christianity. 
But, in the end, the ideal of all religions, as conceived by Schleiermacher, was 
transparently Christian; the teleological end for all religions was the ideal of Pauline 
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theology wherein the body is spiritualized and God is ―all in all,‖ or God is the living 
presence in all persons. Because Schleiermacher was so influential on later Christian 
thinking about religious diversity, we will now briefly review his early thinking about 




2. Friedrich Schleiermacher: The Essence of Religion  
Schleiermacher understood religion, and therefore Christianity, in terms of ―intuitions of 
the universe‖ of which there are as many varied forms as there are true individuals. 
Intuitions of the universe are rooted in feeling but are not vague; every intuition has its 
own particular content and its own particular relationship with other intuitions.
17
 An 
intuition of the universe is at root an intuition of the infinite in the finite; in other words, 
religions are instances when finite forms reveal something true about the infinite:  
...the basic intuition of a religion can be nothing other than some intuition of the 
infinite in the finite, some universal element of religion that may also occur in all 
other religions – and, should they be complete, must be present – but not placed in 
the centre of them. (210) 
Schleiermacher presumes the plurality of religions and finds them all rooted in 
this essential form of religion. (191) He says that if we want to understand what religion 
really is we must see the work of the ―world spirit progressing into infinity‖ and the 
―eternally rich womb of the universe‖ in its various forms in the course of human history. 
(192)  But the essence of religion is not diffuse and ubiquitous; it can only be found in the 
―determinate forms in which it has actually already appeared.‖ In short, we find religion 
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  The following is a modification of work that appears in my Master’s Thesis; see Martin, “Making Sense 
of Religion and Religions,” 46-53. 
17
 Schleiermacher, On Religion, 207; cited in the text by page number hereafter. 
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in the religions. (193) He makes a distinction between positive religions which are well 
formed, specific, determinate and consequently reveal something about the nature of the 
infinite and natural religions which are ill formed, vague, indeterminate and consequently 
reveal very little about the infinite. For Schleiermacher, the more determinate a religion is 
the more it is worthy of our attention. (193) Natural religions are vague feelings that 
precede real religion; they are ―dim imitations that precede that living intuition that opens 
up the religious life to a person.‖ (206)  
Every intuition of the universe that bursts forth out of its eternal womb appears in 
individuals, to become the focal point of a personal religion around which all subsequent 
religious feelings and views revolve. (202; 204) However, such personal religion can 
become collective if other persons revolve all of their religious feelings around this same 
intuition. Specific forms of religion (or determinate forms of religion) however are 
susceptible to corruption; over time the flame of the eternal that once shone forth in it can 
burn out: 
If you investigate them [religions] at their source and their original components, 
you will find that all the dead slag was once the glowing outpouring of the inner 
fire that is contained in all religions, and is more or less the true essence of 
religion as I have presented it to you. Each religion was one of the particular 
forms eternal and infinite religion necessarily had to assume among finite and 
limited beings. (194)    
Schleiermacher uses the idea of corruption to dismiss Judaism, as he also uses the 
idea of progress to dismiss it, by relegating it to the childhood of religion. (211) 
Christianity, on the other hand, while suffering its fair share of corruption stands as the 
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most advanced, or evolved, religion to have appeared within the history of religion. In 
contrast to Judaism he writes:  
The original intuition of Christianity is more glorious, more sublime, more worthy 
of adult humanity, more penetrating into the spirit of systematic religion, and 
extending farther over the whole universe. (213) 
Beyond this rhetoric Schleiermacher identifies the basic intuition of Judaism as 
―universal immediate retribution‖; of the infinite reacting against the finite through 
another finite instruments, or of God punishing and rewarding persons for their free acts 
through other persons or things that in this respect are not acting freely. As for the basic 
intuition of Christianity Schleiermacher describes it as follows:  
It is none other than the intuition of the universal straining of everything finite 
against the unity of the whole and of the way in which the deity handles this 
striving, how it handles the enmity directed against it and sets bounds to the ever 
greater distance by scattering over the whole individual points that are at once 
finite and infinite, at once human and divine. Corruption and redemption, enmity 
and mediation are the two sides of this intuition that are inseparably bound to each 
other, and the shape of all religious material in Christianity and its whole forms 
are determined through them. (213)  
Or, more simply:  
…it [the infinite] sends its ambassadors in whom its own spirit dwells in order to 
pour divine powers among humanity. (214) 
The infinite manifests itself in finite form so as to be present to other finite forms. 
These mediators of the infinite are infinite and finite, or divine and human. They redeem 
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the finite by linking it again to the infinite; which is to say they redeem corrupt finitude 
that is estranged or separated from the infinite. The enmity between the finite and the 
infinite is overcome through their mediation (through their coming together in the 
middle). But this is an ongoing, albeit progressive, struggle as mediations of the universe 
are corrupted by the word:    
Even while the finite wishes to intuit the universe, it strains against it, always 
seeking without finding and losing what it has found; ever one-sided, ever 
vacillating, ever halting at the particular and accidental, and ever wanting more 
than to intuit, the finite loses sight of its goal. Every revelation is in vain. 
Everything is swallowed up by earthly sense, everything is carried away by the 
indwelling irreligious principle, and the deity makes ever new arrangements; 
through its power alone ever more splendid revelations issue from the womb of 
the old; it places ever more sublime mediators between itself and the human 
being; in every later ambassador it unites the deity more intimately with humanity 
so that through them and by them we might learn to recognize the eternal being; 
and yet the old lament is never lifted that we do not perceive what is the spirit of 
God. (214)      
To look upon all aspects of the finite and see the infinite is the ―highest goal and 
virtuosity‖ in Christianity.‖ (217) Schleiermacher describes the mood accompanying the 
capacity to see the holy mixed with the profane and transitory as a ―holy sadness.‖ (219) 
He further says that this mood accompanies every other feeling in Christians and was 
present in its founder through and through. (217)  
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To be able to see the infinite in the finite requires ―higher mediation.‖ In 
Schleiermacher‘s precise words, ―...everything finite requires higher mediation in order to 
be connected with the divine.‖ (218) This, argues Schleiermacher, is the basic intuition of 
the universe that came to clarity in Christ‘s soul. Moreover, if everything finite requires 
higher mediation so as not to stray even further from the universe, then that which 
mediates must not be only finite. It must be both finite and infinite: ―it must be a part of 
the divine nature as much and in the same sense in which it is a part of the finite.‖ (219) 
Christ not only recognized that the finite was in need of higher mediation, but that he was 
in the best position to mediate the infinite to the finite beings in his world. In other words, 
he was also conscious of himself as a mediator, and this found expression in his 
affirmation that he was the son of God. (219)  
But even though the idea of Divine mediation is in Christ and applied to his own 
being, it is not limited in application to him only: There could be other mediators of the 
Divine. (219) Schleiermacher argues that all who take the intuition of mediation as the 
basis of their religion are Christians, but that Christians rooted in this basic intuition can 
be themselves mediators and thus produce new Christian scriptures because ―...not all 
that can be said within Christianity has been said.‖ (220)  
Nonetheless, Schleiermacher says that all religions do run their course; the 
―childish religions evaporate.‖ (221) Schleiermacher, as shown above, applied this 
principle to Judaism, but also to Christianity; it too was transitory, and even aware of this 




…there will come a time, it [Christianity] declares when there will be no more 
talk of a mediator, but the Father will be all in all. (221)  
As to when this will happen, Schleiermacher says that he fears it lies beyond time 
because of the pervasiveness of the other half of the basic Christian intuition i.e., the 
corruption of the divine in finite things or human beings. Schleiermacher actually 
guarantees that this corruption will be endless by affirming as a truism that nothing finite 
can wholly contain the infinite. Thus, only in an eschatological vision such as Saint 
Paul‘s can corruption be overcome entirely.  
Schleiermacher hopes that perceptions of the infinite in the finite would progress 
at such a steady pace that the occasional setback, wherein the finite corrupts the infinite, 
would hardly be noticed. He desires such a situation and says that at that point he would 
―gladly stand on the ruins of the religion I honour.‖ (222) In any case, corruption comes 
upon everything earthly and, consequently, Christianity is reborn in every generation 
with ―new messengers of God‖; to draw finitude to the infinite and thus purify what has 
been corrupted. In this sense there will always be Christianity. Again, the truism that 
nothing finite can contain the infinite in its entirety assures this.  
Schleiermacher asks, if Christianity – or the ―religion of religions‖ – will always 
exist does it not make sense that it should be ―universally disseminated‖ and rule all of 
humanity. He answers negatively saying that ―Christianity disdains this despotism‖ (222) 
Christianity cherishes each of its elements to the degree that it would wish to affirm each 
of them as its very centre. But more than seeking an endless array of variations within 
itself, it also seeks to recognize (intuit) religion outside of itself. Humbled by its own long 
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history of corruption, it is able to watch gladly as new forms of religion develop outside 
of this corruption:  
The religion of religions cannot gather enough material for the truest aspect of its 
innermost intuition, and just as nothing is more irreligious than to demand 
uniformity in humanity generally, so nothing is more unchristian than to seek 
uniformity in religion. (222) 
He goes on to add that all forms of worshipping and intuiting the universe must be 
allowed, including ever new formations of religion. In one sense Schleiermacher abhors 
religious uniformity in religion, in another his theory of religions demands it since higher 
religion is always and expression of the truest aspect of Christianities innermost intuition. 
If there is nothing deeper than Christianity‘s innermost intuition than there is nothing 
deeper, or beyond, Christianity – except, of course, the Christian ideal of the kingdom of 
God wherein ―God is all in all.‖    
For Schleiermacher, intuitions of the universe or the essence of religion, and 
Christianity‘s intuition of the universe that finite reality mediates infinite reality is 
conceived as the loftiest expression of the essence of religion. This loftiest expression of 
the essence of religion bears an uncanny resemblance to Troeltsch highest religious norm 
discovered through an historical study of the world religions – the norm of personalistic 
religion that blends the divine and the worldly such that the world becomes an expression 
of the divine.  
Briefly, for comparative purposes, it can be noted that Paul Tillich uses a similar 
idea when he conceived the inner aim of all religions to be the realization of the ―religion 
of the concrete spirit.‖ Tillich also followed Troeltsch in his pattern and mode of 
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typological thought. He saw religions such as Judaism and Islam placing too much 
emphasis on the finite or the concrete; religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism placing 
too much emphasis on pure spirit; and, Christianity uniquely combining the finite and 
infinite, the divine and the world, the concrete and spirit, and so on, into the highest type 
of religion. We will examine Tillich's theory of religious diversity more closely in a 
moment, but first we will end this review of Troeltsch by discussing his significance for 
the development of religious pluralism, and for understanding religious pluralism.     
As discussed above, Troeltsch would eventually reject the idea that Christianity is 
normatively true. This did not demand a complete rejection of his thinking about 
Christianity, but it did demand its circumspection. For the later Troeltsch, Christianity 
was very religious truth, but only for Europeans and Americans, or the culture is in which 
Christianity grew up. It was not true for everyone, and so Troeltsch‘s final stance was 
that religious truth is relative rather than normative or absolute. But neither the early 
Troeltsch, nor the later Troeltsch, was a pluralist. In fact, the   task he set before himself 
was not the same as the pluralist‘s task.  
Troeltsch‘s task was to prove the truth of Christianity scientifically, and in the end 
he decided that this could not be done. The task of pluralists is to prove the collective 
truth of what Troeltsch had called ―the great world religions.‖ So, in this respect, 
Troeltsch was never on the same page as later pluralists. But, as suggested, and shown 
above, Troeltsch is invaluable for understanding what religious pluralism is not – it is not 
the supernatural apologetic and it is not the evolutionary apologetic. Pluralists have never 
tried to argue that there is one exclusive religion (the supernatural apologetic), and they 
have never tried to argue that there is an absolute essence of religion (the evolutionary 
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apologetic). Indeed, these two positions represent the main foes of religious pluralists, 
just as they do for Troeltsch.   
In the modern polemics of pluralists – against what is now called exclusivism and 
inclusivism – Karl Barth and Karl Rahner are respectively the foes most frequently 
chosen. In the modern debate, Barth is well known for his idea that Christianity is 
revelation (i.e., true religion) whereas everything else is just religion (i.e., false religion); 
and, Rahner is equally well known for his idea that those of good faith in other religious 
traditions are actually Christians without knowing it, or are anonymous Christians. Thus, 
we will now review how these two prominent twentieth century Christian theologians 
thought about religious diversity, as a way of further clarifying the positions of 
exclusivism and inclusivism.   
 
3. Karl Barth: The Supernatural Apologetic in the Modern Era  
Karl Barth was a student of Ernst‘s Troeltsch, but despite his teacher‘s dismissal of the 
supernatural apologetic felt that it was defensible and so updated it for the modern era. 
The new element, in Barth‘s form of religious exclusivism, is that it is not only critical of 
non-Christian religions but is also highly critical of historical Christianity; nonetheless, 
he doesn‘t waiver on his position that non-Christian religions are categorically excluded 
from being recognized as true religions on account of not being revelation.  
According to Karl Barth, the revelation of God is both the judging and reconciling 
presence of God in the worlds of human religion, which is man‘s attempt to justify and 
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sanctify himself before a self-created picture of God. And the Church, insofar as ―though 
grace it lives by grace,‖ is the locus of true religion.18  
Although God‘s revelation is wholly in the being and action of God, it also 
encounters man and it is here that the problem of human religions arises.  
Barth accepts that man is innately religious, or innately aware of something 
greater than himself to whom he owes reverence. He also accepts that all of the world‘s 
Holy books are ―Bibles‖ in exactly the same way as the Old and New Testaments 
because they all deal with the same themes. He even places Christian piety on the same 
level as all other forms of piety. What then separates Christianity from these other 
religions? Barth answers that it is God‘s revelation which is the ―presence of God and 
therefore the hiddenness of God in the world of human religion.‖ (282)  
For Barth, religion is unbelief and unbelief is the exact opposite of faith which is 
the disposition in which one receives God‘s revelation.  
Revelation singles out the Church as the locus of true religion but this does not 
mean that Christianity as such is the fulfilment of human religion. In fact, it is not and it 
is only through grace that the Church distinguishes itself in the world of human religions. 
As such, its proper attitude towards other religions should be a ―strong forbearing 
tolerance, informed by the forbearance of Christ.‖(299) And such tolerance should never 
be confused with tolerance in the sense of moderation, superiority or scepticism which 
are the worst kinds of intolerance.  
Again, human religion is unbelief and Barth even describes it as the ―one great 
concern of godless man.‖ (300) The judgement that religion is unbelief – which must be 
considered from the standpoint of revelation – has two different elements. First, 
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 Barth, Chuch Dogmatics,  Vol. I.2,  280; cited in the text by page number hereafter. 
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revelation is God‘s self-manifestation: It ―encounters man on the presupposition and in 
confirmation of the fact that man‘s attempts to know God from his own standpoint are 
wholly and entirely futile.‖ (301) In revelation God tells man that he is God and that as 
such He is his Lord. Second, man is placed towards God so that he can know Him. And 
again, the activity which corresponds to revelation is faith, which is the recognition of the 
self-offering and self-manifestation of God.  
Revelation informs us that in ourselves we are in no position to apprehend the 
truth. In faith we should be willing to let the truth be told to us and therefore be 
apprehended by it. However, this is not our tendency, but rather it is towards unbelief 
even if our ―attitude and activity‖ is religious. In faith, man‘s religion is shown by 
revelation to be resistance to it. Faith is man‘s openness to and acceptance of the truth 
which is given to him; Unbelief is closure to God‘s self-offering and the effort to know 
God by one‘s own efforts.  
Yet this self-effort remains futile and the most that man can produce is a fiction 
but, of course, it is only recognized as a fiction when the truth comes. Revelation, when it 
comes, does not link up with religions that are already present; instead it replaces them as 
mistaken faith.  
The religious efforts of man are always self-contradictory and impossible per se. 
Religion recognizes this of itself but its ―critical self-turn‖ always becomes just another 
moment in the religious life. The two forms in which religion criticizes itself are 
mysticism and atheism. We will now look at how Barth saw religion taking form and then 
criticizing itself (but only such that it could re-create itself).   
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Human religion takes form as 1) the conception of the deity and 2) the fulfilment 
of the law. In these two forms religious need seeks its satisfaction, (which it already has). 
In a ―bold‖ bid for truth man creates the Deity in his own image, and then undertakes to 
sanctify and justify himself in conformity with what he takes to be the law. Both of these 
acts of course are completely unnecessary because they basically amount to making an 
outward idol in the form of one‘s inner self, or a ―law‖ out of one‘s own habits. 
Consequently, there is a ―definitive weakness‖ in all external satisfaction of the religious 
need, owing to the inward satisfaction which precedes it. Barth writes: ―At bottom, the 
external satisfaction will never be anything more or other than a reflection of what the 
man is and has who thinks he should proceed to the external satisfaction of his need.‖ 
(316) Thus, all attempts to create God in one‘s image or justify oneself before one‘s own 
standards, i.e., all attempts to be religious suffer, on one hand, from non-necessity and, on 
the other, from weakness.  
The critical self-turn of religion against itself recognizes its own non-necessity 
and weakness. It thus abandons all efforts to form itself while still hanging on to ―the 
formless conception of God already present in the soul.‖ (316) It no longer externalizes 
itself but it still holds on to its ―religious possession.‖(316) All the energy and effort that 
was formerly turned outwards to the production of religious forms is now turned inward 
as religion now prefers to live without expression or manifestation. The same non-needy 
religious need now seeks satisfaction in cessation of the soul, silence, and renunciation of 
self-expression. What is renounced is the effort to produce religious forms but what is not 
renounced is the will to make these forms. The critical turn of religion against itself, 
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which nonetheless still remains possessed of itself, eventually becomes a twofold path – 
in one direction it becomes mysticism and the other it becomes atheism.      
Mysticism is most basically the renunciation of religion with respect to its 
expression, externalization, and manifestation. We no longer think that we find God in 
our own conceptions of God or salvation in obedience to the law. However, in its 
relationship to religion mysticism is conservative. It does not openly attack religion, it 
subjects itself to prevailing doctrine and observances and even respects these. But, it also 
interprets all the outward forms of religion according to their inward or spiritual meaning; 
everything external gets reduced to parable.    
The mystic will even say dangerous things that seem to contradict the tradition; 
however, the mystic never seeks to supersede the tradition and only wishes to be free to 
interpret it. The mystic is aware that he lives parasitically upon the outward forms of 
religion and is therefore often careful to preserve them.    
Barth describes atheism as the ―artless and childish form of the critical turn‖ (320) 
because it fails to notice that it is entirely dependent on religion. It hurls itself against 
religion in an effort to destroy it without recognizing that it would thereby destroy itself 
because the entire reality of atheism is the denial of God and its law. Atheism however 
does not deny the reality of nature, history, civilization, or man‘s rational and animal 
existence. In fact, the atheist usually subscribes to these authorities, and thus atheist 
almost always means secularism. Moreover, in its efforts to undermine and destroy the 
authority of religion atheism often leaves the door open for new (disguised and not 
disguised) religions to arise behind its back and even with its help if possible.  
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Again, the critical turn in religion comes with the discovery of the weakness and 
non-necessity of religion. In mysticism the denial of religion comes with an implicit 
affirmation and if the critical turn tries to avoid this implicit affirmation of religion in its 
atheistic form it simply opens up the field for new religious constructs. Mysticism and 
atheism both want to negate God and his law but neither knows how to, even in theory. 
Therefore, if a religion has ever died this has not been because of either an atheistic or 
mystical negation, but because it was replaced by another religion. But what if atheism or 
mysticism really were able to complete its work? What would the great positive on the 
side of liberation from God and his law be?  
It would be only man‘s own power; man‘s own power to create gods and justify 
and sanctify himself. This power is the great positive behind all negation and therefore 
pure atheism and pure mysticism are never a real threat to religion. At most they can 
clear the ground for ever new religious constructions. Barth says that this power belongs 
to ―the magic circle of religion‖ which is its creative and formative centre and real point 
of departure.‖ (324) 
What then can break through the magic circle of religion? Only revelation which 
must ―rush into that inner chamber‖ and expose man‘s power to make gods for what it is. 
Only revelation can break the magic circle of religion and only from the outside, i.e., 
from outside man. Thus, only true religion or God‘s revelation to man is a real threat to 
religion.  
Barth says that we can only speak about true religion in the way we speak about a 
―justified sinner.‖  Religion is never true in itself and revelation denies that any religion is 
true or that it is ―in truth the knowledge and worship of God and the reconciliation of 
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man with God.‖ (325) Religion in and of itself is only falseness and lying. Revelation 
comes as a judgement against the world of human religion; it condemns it as unbelief. 
But revelation is also able to sanctify religion, by adopting it and marking it off as true 
religion. Moreover, not only can it do this but it does. Just as there are sanctified sinners 
there is true religion, and the true religion is Christianity.  
Barth‘s discussion of religion as belief is not, however, meant to distinguish 
Christianity as the true religion from all other religions.  It is first and foremost a self-
criticism of Christianity itself, for the Christian religion is only true insofar as it listens to 
Divine revelation. Moreover, he says that the statement that Christianity is the true 
religion can only be a statement of faith – ―a statement which is thought and expressed in 
faith and from faith, i.e., in recognition and respect of what we are told in revelation.‖ 
(326)  
As for Barth‘s attitude to other religions this would be characterized by the 
aforementioned strong forbearing tolerance, but also by the hope that they too will be led 
beyond their unbelief into faith. But again, his judgement that faith is unbelief is intended 
primarily for Christianity. On Christianity‘s need for this judgement he writes: ―What we 
have here is in its own way – a different way from that of other religions, but no less 
seriously – unbelief, i.e., opposition to the divine revelation and therefore active idolatry 
and self-righteousness.‖ (327) 
And regarding the negative implication that his theology of religions didn‘t allow 
for a positive theological evaluation of other religions, Barth apparently wasn‘t too 
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concerned. According to Wilfred Cantwell Smith, God created this problem and, 
therefore, it was God‘s problem to solve.19  
Paul Tillich was Barth‘s contemporary who, likewise, had a profound influence 
on twentieth century, English-speaking, academic, Christian theology. But unlike Barth 
he took a relatively benign approach in acknowledging the truth of other religions. Paul 
Tillich is widely recognized as the first ―full-blooded Protestant theologian‖ to take the 
problem of non-Christians seriously in the twentieth century; he engaged in a very public 
dialogue with a prominent  Buddhist; and, Alan Race, in his classic study on religious 
pluralism uses Tillich as a representative of the ―pluralist‖ point of view. I believe, 
though, that Tillich is better understood as an inclusivist and will now try to show this.   
 
4. Paul Tillich: The Evolutionary Apologetic in the Modern Era (Protestant 
Version)     
Paul Tillich called his approach to religious diversity, or the history of religions, 
dynamic-typological. This dynamic typological approach found its first popular 
expression in Dynamics of Faith; however, its genesis can be traced back as far as 
Tillich‘s very early work on Schelling, particularly, Mysticism and Guilt-Consciousness 
in Schelling’s Philosophical Development. Moreover, it was an evolving approach and 
didn‘t take its final form until the last public lecture of Tillich‘s life called, ―The 
Significance of the History of Religions.‖ In Tillich‘s early work on Schelling, 
―mysticism‖ and ―guilt consciousness‖ are presented as opposing religious tendencies, 
the former grounded in a consciousness of identity with the Absolute or God (God-
consciousness) and the latter in a consciousness of distinction from the Absolute or God 
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 Indeed, Tillich argues that these are the two opposing 
religious tendencies and that all forms of human religiosity fall somewhere between these 
two poles.  He also argues that the antinomy (between the two) is never fully overcome 
because neither complete identity nor complete distinction is possible in the Divine-
human relationship. Complete identity with the Absolute negates the human identity and 
complete distinction negates the Divine identity (at least insofar as it could be relevant to 
human beings). Tillich says these antipodes of religion find their fullest expression on 
one hand, in Greek religion (mysticism) and, on the other, in Jewish religion (guilt 
consciousness and morality). 
In Dynamics of Faith Tillich works out a dynamic typology based on the same 
basic antinomy of God-consciousness and creature-consciousness.
21
 In Dynamics the 
opposing religious tendencies are worked out as types of faith; specifically, as the 
ontological and moral types of faith. For Tillich, all types of faith are grounded in the 
―experience of the Holy‖ which is felt and experienced when the Divine breaks through 
and appears within, and through the medium of a particular piece of, existence – or, when 
the Infinite appears as the finite. The appearance of the Holy within ordinary reality has 
two different dimensions; the holiness of being and the holiness of what ought to be. The 
Holy stands both for and against human beings; on one hand, it represents the essence of 
our being and, on the other, it represents judgement against us, because it is what we 
ought to be. Tillich calls faiths (or religions) grounded in the holiness of being 
ontological types of faith and those grounded in the holiness of what ought to be moral 
types of faith.  
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21
 See Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, 55-73. 
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Among the ontological types of faith are the sacramental and mystical. To repeat, 
for Tillich, every piece of existence is capable of becoming a bearer of the Holy; these 
pieces of existence, as bearers of the Holy (or God), become sacred realities and focal 
points for worshipping the Holy (or God). The sacramental type of faith is, most 
basically, the worship of the Holy through one of its concrete mediums. (For Tillich, all 
religions contain sacramental elements.)  The great danger of the sacramental type of 
faith is ―demonization‖ which is the act of taking that which is a medium of the Holy to 
be the Holy Itself. Mysticism, as the attempt to locate pure divinity beyond any of its 
appearances within existence, is an attempt to overcome the demonization of the Holy in 
the sacramental type of faith. 
The other type of faith, the moral type, is experienced in terms of divine law 
which is both a gift and a demand. According to Tillich there are three types of moral 
faiths; the juristic, the conventional, and the ethical.  Talmudic Judaism and Islam are 
most representative of the juristic type. These faiths contain ritual laws which point to the 
sacramental stage of religion, but they also have social laws which transcend the ritual 
ones, creating a holiness of what ought to be. The conventional type of moral faith is 
characterized by a minimum of sacramental elements and a maximum of moral elements. 
Confucianism is an example of this type of faith, which is largely secular on account of 
its very few sacramental elements. The third and most influential of the moral types of 
faith is the ethical type of ―Old Testament Judaism.‖ In this type of faith there is a strong 
sacramental basis but this never overwhelms the holiness of what ought to be, and 
obedience to the law of justice always remains the way to God. The Jewish Prophets 
would criticize any reliance on the sacramental element of religion if it denied the moral 
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element. Tillich sees the ―world historical mission‖ of the Jewish faith as ensuring that 
the moral element, or justice, is a part of every faith. The great danger of the moral types 
of faith is complete secularization or the loss of the experience of the Holy.  
For Tillich, the unification of the two antipodal tendencies of religion (God-
consciousness and creature-consciousness), or of the ontological and moral types of faith 
represents the highest form of religion. This unification of the types of faith is the telos or 
inner aim towards which the history of religions is moving; the types of faith are in a 
dynamic play against one another as they move towards their ultimate unification. In 
Dynamics, Tillich cites St. Paul‘s doctrine or description of the Spirit as a conspicuous 
example of the union of the types of faith.      
In Paul‘s doctrine of the Spirit, the body is spiritualized or, in reverse, the Spirit is 
concretized. In the final version of his dynamic typology, Tillich (reluctantly) calls the 
highest form of religion towards which the dynamics of faith are driving, ―The Religion 
of the Concrete Spirit.‖22 This final version of his typology is simpler than the one in 
Dynamics. In it there are four types of faith; the sacramental, the mystical, the ethical, 
and the Religion of the Concrete Spirit. The sacramental type of faith stands as the basic 
form of all religion, as the felt and experienced presence of the Holy in ordinary reality. It 
is the universal form of faith which is ultimately transcended in the higher types of faith 
which overcome its tendency towards demonization. The two higher types of faith, which 
transcend the sacramental type of faith, are the mystical and the ethical; and the highest 
type of faith, which unites the two higher types of faith (and in fact all three types) is the 
Religion of the Concrete Spirit. As expected, the Religion of the Concrete Spirit is the 
goal or inner aim towards which all religions are dynamically driving.  
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In this final version of the typology Tillich remains enthusiastic about Paul‘s 
doctrine of the Spirit, calling it the highest expression (in the history of religions) of the 
unification or synthesis of the sacramental, ethical, and mystical elements of faith.
23
 
Nonetheless, he maintains that such fulfilment of the Religion of the Concrete Spirit is 
fragmentary and thus no religion, including Christianity, can claim to fully be the highest 
type of faith. We will now look more closely at the ways in which Tillich tried to apply 
his evolving typology.  
Some contend that Paul Tillich underwent a dramatic change in his thinking about 
other religions as a result of his ―encounter‖ with living Buddhism; however, it is 
probably more accurate to say that in the last few years of his life he finally began to 
think more seriously about religions other than Christianity and Judaism – particularly 
about Buddhism. Terence Thomas has pointed out that even though Tillich did, at the end 
of his life, express a wish that he could have given more time to the study of ―world 
religions‖ did not say that he wished to change anything about his life‘s work.24 This is 
not surprising. Tillich‘s understanding of religion (and religions) was formed in the 
context of his own Western religiosity, and by the time he did start thinking seriously 
about non-Western religions, his thinking amounted to trying to fit these into his already 
well-formed religious concepts. If Tillich expressed no wish to change anything about his 
work, in light of his exposure to living Buddhism and other world religions, this is 
probably because the force with which he met them (or his capacity to meet them) was 
such that it could not significantly change the trajectory of his own life‘s thought or work.  
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There is, however, some evidence to suggest that Tillich was, at least, beginning 
to question his own ―Christocentric‖ understanding of religion. In Systematic Theology 
Tillich presents Jesus (as the Christ) as the ―New Being‖ who has conquered sin or 
estrangement (from God) by maintaining union with God under all conditions of 
existence. As such, Christ is the central event in the history of religions and all religions 
are either preparation for, or reception of, this event.  Those who have received Christ are 
understood as the manifest ―Spiritual Community‖ whereas those who have not yet 




In his very last lecture, ―The Significance of the History of Religions for the 
Systematic Theologian,‖ Tillich identifies a number of presuppositions which must be 
accepted if the history of religions is to have any significance for theology. These include 
1) the presupposition that revelatory experiences are universally human; 2) that revelation 
is received by man in his finite human situation and is therefore prone to distortion; 3) 
that there is a ―revelatory process‖ in which these ―limits of adaptation‖ and ―failures of 
distortion‖ are open to criticism –  namely the mystical, prophetic, and secular; 4) that 
there may be a central event in the history of religions ―which unites the positive results 
of those critical developments in the history of religion and under which the revelatory 
experiences are going on – an event which, therefore, makes possible a concrete theology 
that has universalistic significance.‖26 Thus, the assertion in Systematic Theology that 
Jesus as the Christ is the central event in the history of religions is replaced by the 
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assertion that there may be a central event in the history of religions.
27
 But, of course, this 
late question mark was never able to translate into a real change in Tillich‘s 
understanding of other religions and I will now look at some of these particular 
understandings.      
As said, Tillich understood Judaism‘s world historical mission as ensuring an 
ethical element in every type of faith. However, in Systematic Theology he also 
understands Judaism as the religion which provided the direct historical preparation for 
the central event in religious history, i.e., God‘s self manifestation in Jesus as the Christ. 
Thus, given Tillich‘s position that all religions are either preparation for, or reception of, 
Christ the importance of Judaism in the history of religions is second only to Christianity. 
Tillich understood Islam as a ―religion of the law‖ like Judaism whose historical purpose 
was, and is, to prepare another human culture for the reception of Christ. Although 
Tillich may have implicitly regarded Buddhism and Hinduism as preparatory religions he 
also explicitly criticized them for being almost exclusively mystical. Tillich claims that 
Christ maintained his unity with God under all conditions of existence – both subjective 
and objective – whereas the ―enlightenment‖ of the Buddha, and the mystical experiences 
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not the Religion of the Concrete Spirit – understood as the reception of the Infinite under the conditions 




of Hindus and Buddhists, are merely subjective experiences. Thus Christ‘s union with 
God - and hence his offer of salvation – is more authentic or complete.  
In these judgements of Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Christianity the 
shape of Tillich‘s dynamic typology clearly emerges. Christianity as the complete way 
fulfills, and literally fills out, the other religions. Judaism and Islam are merely legalistic 
or ethical religions in need of God‘s gracious self-offering; Hinduism and Buddhism are 
merely mystical religions in need of God‘s concrete presence in objective reality. The 
―underpinnings‖ of Tillich‘s earliest conceptual antinomy between ―mysticism‖ and 
―guilt consciousness‖ are very apparent in this distinction between the mystical Eastern 
religions and the Western ethical religions. However, Tillich also uses these same lines to 
distinguish between, and ultimately to criticise, Catholicism and Protestantism. In 
Dynamics of Faith he contends that in Catholicism the sacramental elements of faith have 
predominated over and against the moral-personal ones, whereas in Protestantism the 
reverse has been the case and the mystical and sacramental elements of faith have been 
largely lost. Thus, both Catholicism and Protestantism have lost the ―Pauline experience‖ 
of the unity of all types of faith. Tillich maintains that unless Christianity can ―regain in 
real experience‖ the unity of the types of faith it will not be able to claim to fulfil the 
―dynamics of the history of faith in past and future.‖28 
Dynamics of Faith and the second volume of Systematic Theology were both 
published in 1957 and this generally marks the beginning of a more serious effort on 
Tillich‘s part to understand ―world religions.‖ In fact, during the Fall of 1957 Tillich 
participated in an ―East-West Dialogue‖ with Dr. Hisamatsu Shin‘ichi (a Buddhist) at 
Harvard University. Tillich‘s interest in Buddhism persisted, and this led to a trip to 
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Japan which precipitated a number of lectures later published in 1962 as Christianity and 
the Encounter of the World’s Religions.  
In this small booklet there is a lecture/essay entitled ―A Christian-Buddhist 
Dialogue‖ – wherein Tillich creates a dialogue in order to articulate his ―new‖ positions 
on Buddhism and Christianity. As mentioned, this work has been pointed to as 
representative of the great turn in Tillich‘s thinking about religions other than 
Christianity; however, a quick review of Tillich‘s new position on Buddhism reveals that 
it is basically the same old position. In A Christian Buddhist Dialogue Tillich once again 
sorts out different types of faith in terms of ethical and mystical elements which are 
found in every type of faith and ultimately united in the highest type of faith. It is no 
surprise that in this structure Buddhism is classified as a type of faith in which the 
mystical elements predominate over and against the ethical ones; however, it is somewhat 
surprising that Tillich classifies Christianity generally as a type of faith in which the 
ethical elements of faith predominate over and against the mystical ones. This is 
surprising because Tillich had hitherto found in Christianity all types of faith: in its 
Protestant form Christianity was largely ethical, in its Catholic form it was largely 
mystical and sacramental, and in its highest form it was a combination of these two types 
of faith.  
In some respects this does represent a significant change in that Tillich was 
willing to polarize Christianity with Buddhism and thus see these two types of faith as 
equal or, more precisely, as equally unbalanced and inadequate types of faith. And, 
perhaps, it is significant that a major Christian theologian was willing to put Buddhism 
(on the whole) on par with Christianity (on the whole) – even if this ―equality‖ remains 
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limited because the only example of the highest type of faith that Tillich can point to is 
Paul‘s doctrine of the Spirit, i.e., a form of Christianity.   
Still, Tillich‘s whole enterprise might be criticized as an attempt to ―put new wine 
into old skins.‖ Tillich‘s typology is clearly rooted in his own ―Pauline Christianity‖ 
wherein the moral ―Jewish‖ elements and the mystical ―Greek‖ elements are ―united.‖ In 
fact, Tillich‘s typology might best be understood as an argument for the ultimacy of 
―Pauline Christianity‖ over against the more exclusively mystical and moral forms of 
Christianity. As such, it offers a reasonably good typology for three different forms of 
Christianity, but not necessarily for the ―history of religions‖ altogether. 
This, I think, becomes most apparent when Tillich seriously tries to apply his 
typology to the case of Christianity and Buddhism. In order for Tillich to ―polarize‖ 
Christianity in relation to Buddhism he has to typify (or generalize) it as one of the 
polarized types of faith. And when he does this his assessment of the Christian situation 
becomes impoverished: Christianity becomes an ethical type of faith and is no longer 
appreciated in its own polarity of Catholicism and Protestantism. Buddhism suffers from 
this same over-generalization. It seems to me that Tillich abstracts a religious typology 
from his own Western/Christian religious situation and then uses this typology to try to 
make sense of a religious situation which is more expansive than this one. This is a 
negative ―move,‖ on one hand, because it deprives the old situation of a reasonably good 
typology and, on the other, because it provides the new situation with an inadequate one.  
Whether or not this is an accurate assessment, it is clear enough that Tillich did 
not evolve any new concepts in his handling of Buddhism. He continued to understand 
religion as  universally based in the experience of the Holy, or the appearance of the 
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Infinite in the finite; he continued to understand this universal religious experience as 
corruptible through human reception and, therefore, in need of critical purification; he 
continued to polarize two major forms of this critical element in similar terms; and, 
finally, he continued to posit as religion‘s highest form (or inner aim) the unification of 
these two critical elements. Moreover, Tillich‘s assessments of major world religions did 
not change – except for in the case of Christianity – which he became willing to include 
more fully in the domain of ―unfulfilled religions‖ wherein one element of faith 
predominates over the other. And, of course, it is this lowering of Christianity that makes 
Tillich‘s ―later approach‖ to religious diversity seem more egalitarian/pluralist and less 
absolutist/inclusivist than his earlier ones. 
But, in the end, Tillich developed a theory of religions based on a concept of the 
essential form of religion (The Religion of the Concrete Spirit) that all of religious history 
was driving towards.  His position was very much the same as Schleiermacher‘s except 
insofar as his essence had a different name, and the pathway towards it was more 
dynamic. This dynamism is actually foreshadowed in Troeltsch‘s thought, where the 
Indian religions (that put too much emphasis on the idea of pure spirit) and the Semitic 
religions (that are too bound to material reality) are fulfilled in Christianity which has a 
unique way of blending these two realities. This is Troeltsch‘s idea of personalistic 
redemptive religion; which is similar to Schleiermacher‘s idea of mediation of the Infinite 
within the finite; which is similar to Tillich‘s idea the Religion of the Concrete Spirit. All 
of these ideas about religion are, of course, Christian (even Lutheran), although not 
explicitly acknowledged as such.  
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We will now examine ideas, on religious diversity, of a prominent 20th-century 
Catholic theologian, who changed the way Catholic Christians think about ―non-
Christians‖; namely, Karl Rahner.  
 
5. Karl Rahner: The Evolutionary Apologetic in the Modern Era (Catholic Version) 
Karl Rahner, who is well known for his idea of the ―anonymous Christian,‖ is frequently 
cited as the quintessential inclusivist, or evolutionary apologist.
29
  Yet, with respect to 
Troeltsch‘s terminology, it is much easier to see Tillich as an evolutionary apologist than 
Rahner. Tillich employs the pattern of essence and content; the religion of the concrete 
spirit is the essencse of religion, and Pauline theology is the content that realizes this 
essence most fully. Rahner, on the other hand, does not employ the language of essence 
and content, but the language of form, which Troeltsch links with supernatural 
exclusivism. This begs two different questions: 1) Is Rahner‘s position really exclusivist; 
2) are inclusivism and the evolutionary apologetic the same thing? I answer negatively to 
the first question and positively to the second. Nonetheless, Rahner‘s evolutionary 
apologetic does not employ the logic of essence-content used by the Enlightenment 
theologians, but it does employ a similar logic; namely the logic of religion as a ―means 
to an end.‖ Before saying more about this, however, it is will be helpful to review 
Rahner‘s idea of the anonymous Christian.  
In this section we will review an address made by Karl Rahner to the Second 
Vatican Council in 1966, which discusses the problem of religious pluralism. 
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Rahner‘s starting point is the assertion that Catholics can no longer ignore the 
outside world; certainly much of it is bad but not all can be dismissed as ―worldly,‖ and 
these things need to be incorporated into the world-view of the Church. And, among the 
things that must be incorporated into Catholicism, religious pluralism or other religions is 
the most difficult thing. Moreover, for Rahner, pluralism is not just a difficult problem 
for Christianity, it is a positive threat. And it is a threat, especially to Christianity, 
because no other religion makes such a strong claim to absoluteness: ―…no other 
religion– not even Islam–maintains so absolutely that it is the religion, the one and only 
valid revelation of the one living God, as does the Christian religion.‖30      
Rahner finds the threat of pluralism particularly acute in the modern era on 
account of a sea change in the way different religions and cultures now interact with one 
another. In the past, Christians didn‘t have to think about alien religions and cultures 
because these literally were not in their world. But now, things are different and everyone 
belongs to the same world:  
Today everybody is the next-door neighbour and spiritual neighbour of every one 
else in the world. And so everybody today is determined by the 
intercommunication of all those situations of life which affect the whole world. 
Every religion which exists in the world is – just like all cultural possibilities and 
actualities of other people–a question posed, and a possibility offered, to every 
person. (290) 
But, despite his awareness of this new historical situation, Rahner has no interest 
in approaching the problem of religious pluralism as a scientist within the history of 
religions school. He is upfront that his approach of that of a Catholic dogmatic 
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theologian; therefore, his interpretation of pluralism is grounded in a self-understanding 
of Christianity. (290-291)  
Rahner builds his interpretation with four theses.  His first thesis is that 
Christianity is the absolute religion and nothing stands beside it as an equal. Unlike 
Troeltsch, Rahner feels no need to prove the absoluteness of Christianity empirically: 
―This proposition is self-evident and basic for Christianity‘s understanding of itself. 
There is no need here to prove it or to develop its meaning.‖ (291) Rahner‘s initial 
understanding of what constitutes valid religion is, is strikingly similar to Karl Barth‘s; 
religion is not human reflection on human existence, but God‘s self-revelation to 
humanity:  
Valid and lawful religion for Christianity is rather God‘s action on men, God‘s 
free self-revelation by communicating himself to man. It is God‘s relationship to 
men, freely instituted by God himself and revealed by God in this institution [i.e., 
the Church]. (291)   
Ever since Jesus Christ, the Word of God, entered the world and united humanity 
with God through his death and resurrection, he and his continued presence in the world 
(the Church) has been the religion for everyone. This thesis creates some problems for 
making sense of religions that existed before Christ‘s revelation and religions that came 
into existence after Christ‘s revelation – short of the traditional means of consigning them 
to the garbage heap of human sin and error. But, finding an alternative approach, while 
maintaining this thesis, is the task that Rahner sets himself. (291) 
As a prelude to his next second thesis, Rahner challenges the traditional position 
that the starting point for judging non-Christians to be guilty of their non-Christianity 
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should be the Apostolic age or Pentecost (marking the descent of the Holy Spirit upon the 
first followers of Christ). Instead, he suggests that this moment of judgment should not 
come into play until the non-Christian religions are confronted with Christianity as a 
concrete historical reality. This was the rule for those who first encountered Christ; they 
could not be judged guilty for rejecting God‘s self- revelation until they actually 
encountered this as a concrete historical reality. Thus, it seems reasonable, to Rahner, to 
extend the same courtesy to all non-Christians. (292)  With this argument Rahner is not 
attributing anything positive to non-Christian religions he is just saying that it is not 
reasonable to preclude this possibility right from the start by making the erroneous 
assumption that all non-Christian religions are, by definition, guilty of rejecting Christ.   
Rahner‘s second thesis is that non-Christian religions have, apart from natural 
knowledge of God mixed up with corrupting elements, supernatural elements as a gift 
from God, i.e., as a result of Christ‘s death and resurrection – and, on this basis, can be 
deemed lawful:  
It contains [the non-Christian religion] also supernatural elements arising out of 
the grace which is given to men as a gratuitous gift on account of Christ. For this 
reason a non- Christian religion can be recognized as a lawful religion (although 
only in different degrees) without thereby denying the error and depravity 
contained in it. This thesis requires a more extensive explanation. (293)  
Thus, Christians can assert that the non-Christian religions are valid or lawful–in varying 
degrees –and still affirm their depravity! Every abomination of the heathen still stands, 
and these must be protested against, but again this unlawfulness only comes into play 
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once the religion of the ―God pleasing pagan‖ comes into contact with the Christian Faith 
as a concrete historical reality. (293)  
Rahner continues by hanging his theses on a proposition that all Christians must 
accept; namely, that God‘s offer of salvation, through the sacrifice of Christ, was made 
for all human beings:   
But God desires the salvation of everyone. And this salvation willed by God is the 
salvation won by Christ, the salvation of supernatural grace which divinizes man, 
the salvation of the beatific vision. It is a salvation really intended for all those 
millions upon millions of men who lived perhaps a million years before Christ – 
and also for those who have lived after Chris – in nations, cultures and epochs of 
a very wide range which were still completely shut off from the viewpoint of 
those living in the light of the New Testament. (294) 
This proposition is important because it identifies a unity beyond religion – 
salvation, defined as the divinization of man and attainment of the beatific vision (the 
vision of God) – that allows Rahner to bifurcate religion. Or, said differently, it creates a 
situation is which religion can be seen to have two different elements or manifestations – 
and we will see shortly how Rahner employs this idea.   
But at this point, he continues by arguing that if Christians accept (1) the 
traditional view that there is no salvation except through Christ and (2) that God intends 
salvation for all human beings, then, they must accept that God makes Christ‘s offer of 
salvation available to every human being: ―every human being is really and truly exposed 
to the influence of divine, supernatural grace which offers an interior union with God and 
by means of which God communicates himself.‖ (294) Following this Rahner moves on 
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to address an easy to anticipate objection; the objection that the truly wicked and those 
bound up in primitive superstitions must be excluded from this offer. Rahner stands his 
ground by reaffirming that if Christians really believe in the power of God‘s universal 
salvific will then they must conclude that salvation is available to all human beings, no 
matter how wicked or corrupted their present, chosen religious vehicle. (295-96) 
Next, Rahner develops his second thesis even further by arguing that – not only is 
God‘s salvation through Christ made available to every human being – but that the ―pre-




A lawful religion means here an institutional religion whose ―use‖ by man at a 
certain period can be regarded on the whole as a positive means of gaining the 
right relationship to God and thus for the attaining of salvation, a means which is 
therefore positively included in God‘s plan of salvation. (296) 
Rahner‘s first example of a pre-Christian religion that can be deemed valid – 
despite its numerous theological and practical errors – is ―the Old Covenant‖ (i.e., 
Judaism). The understanding of this situation, however, is only available to Christians. 
Rahner‘s reasons here that because the Church is instituted by God it contains a 
permanent norm for determining what is right and what is wrong in the religious sphere; 
this feature is both a ―permanent institution‖ and an ―intrinsic quality‖ of Christianity. 
(296) 
No other religion has this feature, including Judaism; Rahner is intent on making 
this point. He concedes that the Prophets were able to distinguish the lawful God-given 
                                                          
31
 Remember that, for Rahner, this means religions that have not come into contact with Christianity as a 
concrete historical reality.    
32
 Part of this is based on Rahner’s earlier qualification that religion is necessarily social.     
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elements of religion from depraved elements born of human corruption, but the Prophets 
functioned charismatically rather than institutionally and so ―no permanent, continuing 
and institutional court of appeal‖ that could serve this same function developed. (296-
297) So, in short, Judaism (like all other non-Christian religions) is an admixture of truth 
and corrupting elements and has no institutional capacity for distinguishing one from the 
other.   
Nonetheless, this marks a sharp contrast from an exclusivist position, such as Karl 
Barth‘s, that makes a radical distinction between Christian revelation from God, and 
other religions constructed by human beings. Rahner is even dogmatic about rejecting the 
―prejudice‖ of exclusivism:  
We must therefore rid ourselves of the prejudice that we can face a non-Christian 
religion with the dilemma that it must either come from God in everything it 
contains and thus correspond to God‘s will and positive providence, or be simply 
a purely human construction. If man is under God‘s grace even in these religions 
– and to deny this is certainly absolutely wrong ….(297)  
Before moving on to his third thesis, Rahner continues by addressing potential 
objections to his novel idea. For example, what if a religion takes one of its false 
elements to be an essential part of its nature that must be explicitly declared as true? 
Rahner attacks this problem by suggesting that in reality this situation hardly ever 
obtains. This is so, first, because few religions have the power to elevate falsehood to 
truth the way the Catholic Church (in theory) does; and, second, because the followers 
won‘t always really assent to the interpretations of their leaders. But Rahner‘s real reason 
for rejecting the idea that non-Christian religions are unlawful is because this would 
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necessitate rejecting the idea that God makes salvation available to everyone. And 
Rahner won‘t do this because he is a ―universalist‖:  
Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that the individual ought to and must have 
the possibility in his life of partaking in a genuine saving relationship to God, and 
this at all times and in all situations of the history of the human race. Otherwise 
there could be no question of a serious and also actually effective salvific design 
of God for all men, in all ages and places. (298)  
Moreover, Rahner stresses, once again, that the non-Christian religions will necessarily 
be the loci of Christ‘s grace outside of Christianity because religion is not a private affair. 
(298-99) 
Continuing with the same theme Rahner stresses that Christians must be able to 
see elements of grace (lawful religion) in the non-Christian religions, and suggests that 
failure to do so may stem from Christians looking at other religions too superficially and 
with too little love. And, he insists that these religions must be seen as the bearers of 
supernatural revelation, and not just human philosophizing about God or, in Rahner‘s 
words, they must not be seen ―…new conglomerates of natural theistic metaphysics and 
as a humanly incorrect interpretation and institutionalization of this natural religion‘.‖ 
(299-300)   
After some qualifications as to why the Old Testament constitutes a purer form of 
religion than others – i.e., because of the Prophets and because it served as the immediate 
prehistory for Christ‘s part is salvation history – Rahner insists, once again, that the other 
religions are contexts for salvation and that human beings even have an obligation to take 
up these offers of salvation in their concrete historical context: 
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…by the fact that in practice man as he really is can live his proffered relationship 
to God only in society, man must have had the right and indeed the duty to live 
this his relationship to God within the religious and social realities offered to him 
in his particular historical situation. (300) 
Next, Rahner moves on to his third thesis; the famous one in which he develops 
the second in order to conclude that all non-Christians should not be regarded as non-
Christians but as anonymous Christians:    
If the second thesis is correct, then Christianity does not simply confront the 
member of an extra-Christian religion as a mere non-Christian but as someone 
who can and must already be regarded in this or that respect as an anonymous 
Christian. (300) 
Today, in our more pluralistic environment, this sounds remarkably arrogant and 
Rahner, himself, was aware that his thesis might be viewed as ―presumptuous‖; 
nonetheless, his intent was not to place other religions on par with Christianity, it was to 
include them in the realm of the religious so that the Christian mission might proceeded 
less arrogantly.  Thus, when approaching others with the news of Christ‘s revelation, the 
Christian missionary is not bringing something new; in fact, Christ‘s revelation in the 
anonymous Christian could already be developed quite profoundly. (301) 
Rahner continues to deepen the implications of this concept by claiming that the 
anonymous Christian might not only be someone on the way to salvation but someone 
who has actually found it. But even so it is still necessary for the missionary to try to 
convert this person‘s anonymous Christian faith into an explicit affirmation of Christian 
faith with its accompanying social expression in the life of the Church:   
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…proclamation of the gospel does not simply turn someone absolutely abandoned 
by God and Christ into a Christian, but turns an anonymous Christian into 
someone who also knows about his Christian belief in the depths of his grace-
endowed being by objective reflection and in the profession of faith which is 
given a social form in the Church. (301) 
In this, the anonymous Christian is participating in the development of their Christianity, 
moving from a higher form. (301)  
With the addition of this developmental element, Rahner anticipates and cuts off 
the obvious question: why should anonymous Christians become explicit Christians if 
they have already found salvation in their own religion?  Rahner says that this is like 
dismissing the significance of the sacraments of Baptism and Penance because a person 
can be justified through subjective acts of faith and a contrite heart even before the 
sacraments are given. Apart from this there are two positive reasons that demand 
conversion to an explicit form of Christianity. These are,   
 …(1) the incarnational and social structure of grace and of Christianity, and (2) 
because the individual who grasps Christianity in a clearer, purer and more 
reflective way has, other things being equal, a still greater chance of salvation 
than someone who is merely an anonymous Christian. (301)  
The first reason, here, we take to mean that Christ‘s incarnation in historical 
time, and the perpetuation of his presence in historical time through the Church, 
demands a historical recognition of Christ by non-Christians when they 
encounter Christianity as a concrete historical reality. The second reason is clear 
enough, but suggests another element of Rahner‘s theology of salvation; namely, 
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that although salvation is offered to all, and received by some, it is guaranteed to 
none. In any case, the practical upshot of the idea of the anonymous Christian is 
that it should, more accurately, orient Christian missionaries in their dealings 
with others. (301)  
Finally, Rahner advances his forth thesis, which is the classic expression of 
religious inclusivism: Christianity is not the only religion but it is the best one. This 
conclusion is based on the pessimistic fact that religious pluralism is likely to last a very 
long time, and the more optimistic fact that, in this context, it is permissible for Christian 
missionaries to try to covert implicit Christians into explicit ones; thus,  
the Church will not so much regard herself today as the exclusive community of 
those who have a claim to salvation but rather as the historically tangible 
vanguard and the historically and socially constituted explicit expression of what 
the Christian hopes is present as a hidden reality even outside the visible Church. 
(302) 
Moreover, this is the situation that will obtain until the end of time. Even though 
Christians deeply long for the unity of all human beings in the one true Church they know 
that this will not happen in historical time. And the Church knows this not through an 
historical analysis of religious diversity but because it knows that it is destined to suffer 
opposition until its final victory at the end of time. Rahner even expects that opposition to 
the Church will increase in the future. (302)  
Continuing, he argues that if this opposition moves beyond the social reality of 
individuals, then it will take on a universal rather than localized nature, owing to the fact 
that world history is now a unity. And this emergence of planetary unity has profound 
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significance for Christianity in itself, because if this unity can‘t be reversed then the 
Church in its current state of development as a homogeneous (medieval) culture can‘t 
continue to exist. Rahner, of course, doesn‘t think that this new historical context can be 
reversed and, hence, his deep interest in evolving the Church into the modern era. (302)  
In the same way that Rahner gives pride of place to the explicit Christian, 
opposed to the merely anonymous Christian, he regards the Church as having a special 
place within salvation history. It is not just one more religion, but it is the religion in 
which opposition to Christ‘s revelation has been overcome. As such, the Church is not 
the community that has received Christ‘s revelation, as opposed to those who have not, 
but it is the location where Christ‘s revelation has become fully conscious; it is ―the 
communion of those who can explicitly confess what they and the others hope to be.‖ 
(302)       
Rahner recognizes that seeing a non-Christian as ―one who has not yet come to 
himself reflectively‖ may be seen as presumptuous.  But he thinks it is the opposite. For 
Rahner, this is recognition that God is greater than man and, thus, the greatest source of 
humility for individual Christians and the Church. Rahner‘s position would be sharply 
criticized by pluralists for producing the wrong sort of attitude towards non-Christians, 
but he saw it as exactly the right one: ―humble tolerant and yet firm.‖ (303)   
Rahner‘s position is clearly not exclusivist. Rahner explicitly rejects the 
exclusivist position that (God‘s/Christ‘s) revelation is the exclusive property of the true 
Christian Church. Christ‘s revelation is in all religions and therefore all religions are 
included within the domain of religion/revelation. Rahner‘s position is inclusivist. And, 
yet, it also remains within the realm of supernatural form, rather than philosophical 
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essence and content (not to mention historical analysis and religious normativism). Other 
religions are religions by virtue of bearing Christ’s supernatural  revelation. Still, Rahner 
does make a philosophical or conceptual move, which allows for different forms of 
Christ‘s revelation – or, really, only two of these. Rahner does this by conceptualizing 
revelation or supernatural grace as a means to an end; namely, the end of Christian 
salvation, which he substantively defines as attainment of the beatific vision. Thus, with 
religion conceived as a means to an end it is possible to consider the theoretical 
possibility that there are different means to the same end. And, here, Rahner suggest that 
there are in fact two paths to salvation: (1) explicit Christian faith and (2) implicit 
Christian Faith as received in another religion. Rahner, though, is not willing to say that 
explicit and implicit Christian Faith are equally salvifically effective, even though both 
may lead to salvation. Explicit faith is better and implicit faith is worse; therefore, 
Rahner, employs a development model for understanding the relationship between these 
two types of faith. Implicit faith is the less developed form of faith that, hopefully, will 
come to fulfillment in explicit faith since this gives one a better shot at salvation.     
 
6. Inclusivism: My Religion is the Best Religion  
It is now possible to compare the ―evolutionary apologetic,‖ as exemplified by Tillich, 
and inclusivism as exemplified by Rahner. Tillich conceives religion philosophically as 
an essence;   the ―religion of the concrete spirit.‖ Ostensibly this essence is observed 
within the history of religions, but the fact that Tillich‘s best example of this ultimate 
form of religion is found in Saint Paul‘s doctrine of the spirit suggests something more 
substantive and Christian and less essential and universal. In any case, the important 
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thing is that Christianity can now be theoretically represented as different from religion 
as such, which allows for the possibility of different types of religion. Rahner comes to 
the same possibility via a different route. Rahner does this by placing salvation above 
religion; specifically by conceiving salvation as the goal of religion.  But Rahner feels no 
need to convert the final goal or teleology into a quasi-religious philosophy that is meant 
to look universal rather than Christian. Rahner has the security of a dogmatic theologian 
who knows that the beatific vision is the teleological hope of every human being under 
the sun.  
Tillich is philosophical in identifying the thing above Christianity and all other 
religions, that all human beings are striving for via these vehicles, and Rahner is 
theological in identifying this. But both have the totality of the history of religions or the 
totality of salvation history enfolded within their essence or end. And this willingness to 
include Christianity and other religions in the same framework of understanding is what 
separates religious inclusivism from religious exclusivism.  
Another way to distinguish these two thinkers is to say that both posit a universal 
teleology, or a universal end; but that Tillich's teleology is fulfilled within history and 
Rahner‘s is fulfilled outside of history. Thus, it is easier to see Tillich's framework of 
understanding as a logic of content and essence, because the essence is becoming the 
content in time. This gives Tillich more capacity to ascribe positive value to the content 
or to particular religions; and he does this by seeing them as components that unite to 
constitute a greater truth. In contrast, Rahner's teleology, which is fulfilled outside of 
history or outside of time, lends itself better to the logic of means to an end, wherein the 
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means have no inherent value in and of themselves. These means are not combined to 
constitute the fulfilment, they are left behind in the fulfilment.    
Let us now review how both Rahner and Tillich arrive at the quintessential 
inclusivist view that Christianity is the best religion, bearing in mind that one was 
working with a historical teleology and the other an ahistorical teleology, or that one was 
using the logic of content and essence and the other the logic of means to an end.  
For Rahner, the goal of religion is the beatific vision; this particular end is the 
only ultimate end for all human beings. Christianity is the only means for attaining this 
specific and only end. But, there are two Christian paths–the path of the Christianity‘s 
explicit form and the path of Christianity‘s implicit form. Of these two forms, explicit 
Christianity is the higher, more developed form, and offers a higher probability of 
attaining salvation. In other worlds, Christianity is not the only religion but it is the best 
religion.       
For Tillich, the goal of religion is the perfect realization of the essence of the 
religion of the concrete spirit; this particular realized essence is the inner aim of all 
religions and all human beings. The religion of the concrete spirit unites the two great 
religious tendencies of the mystical type of faith (as best exemplified by Buddhism) and 
the ethical type of faith (as best exemplified by Christianity). It thus stems from a 
dynamic evolutionary process that unites less complete and more fragmentary forms of 
faith into one complete, whole, and perfect form. As shown above Tillich was not willing 
to identify Christianity, on the whole, with the religion of the concrete spirit, but he did 
see its highest expression, so far, in Pauline Christianity. Thus, a particular expression of 
Christianity represents the apex of religious evolutionary development, so far. In this 
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regard, Tillich‘s position is identical to Schleiermacher‘s. Schleiermacher identifies 
mediation of the Infinite by the finite as the highest expression of the essence of religion, 
i.e., as the highest intuition of the universe. Mediation is the genius of Christianity and, 
therefore, Christianity is the highest form of religion, or the best religion (so far). 
Inclusivism always leads to the conclusion that one religion is the best religion or 
at least the best religion so far. Its logical structure guarantees this. What it doesn‘t 
guarantee is what religion will be deemed the best religion or the best religion so far. But 
evidence, so far suggests that it will usually be the religion of the religious person 
conceiving the ultimate religious end, or absolute religious essence.  
The different forms of Christian inclusivism, articulated by Tillich and Rahner, 
did not come to an end with the advent of religious pluralism. In 2001, S. Mark Heim 
articulated a rich dynamic-typological inclusivism in the mode of Tillich, and a year 
earlier Gavin D‘Costa articulated a rich theological inclusivism in the mode of Rahner. 
Nonetheless, the exclusivism of Karl Barth, the inclusivism of Karl Rahner, and to a 
lesser extent the inclusivism of Paul Tillich provided the theological backdrop for the 
emergence of religious pluralism, and we will now create an historical sketch of the 




A Historical Outline of the Emergence and Development of Religious 
Pluralism 
 
Again, what follows is necessarily a sketch, and that main characters in this historical 
outline will come to life more fully in Part 2.
1
   
 
1. Defining the Category: Alan Race’s Threefold Typology of Exclusivism, 
Inclusivism, and Pluralism 
Alan Race‘s, 1983, Christians and Religious Pluralism, is responsible for putting 
religious pluralism on the map, as a viable philosophical and theological option for 
Christians to understand religious others.
2
 He did this in two ways. First, he detected a 
pattern in a number of recent theological and philosophical responses to non-Christian 
religions that appeared to be distinctly different from the patterns of the supernatural 
apologetic and the evolutionary apologetic – which Race respectively called exclusivism 
and inclusivism. Second, he gave this new pattern a name – pluralism.   
Race‘s term exclusivism was already in circulation at this point3 and people 
seemed to know what it meant. The term inclusivism was unfamiliar, but the idea of the 
                                                          
1
 This historical sketch of religious pluralism will be limited to Christian thinkers, since these have 
dominated the conversation in the West. In the conclusion of the dissertation I will discuss the issue of 
whether or not theories of religious pluralism are exclusive to Western Christianity.   
2
 See Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism.   
3
 Remember, from Chapter 1, that Troeltsch also called the supernatural apologetic “exclusive 
supernaturalism” (Troeltsch, Absoluteness of Christianity, 53), and Wilfred Cantwell Smith referred to Karl 
Barth as a theologian in an “exclusivist tradition”(W. C. Smith, Meaning and End of Religion, 320).   
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evolutionary apologetic was not;
4
and, so, inclusivism which seemed an apt description, 
was also easy to understand. Pluralism was a different story; pluralism at this point was 
usually just a name for the fact that there were many different religions,
5
 so early 
pluralists had to make the point of saying that pluralism was about more than just 
asserting that there was religious diversity.
6
 But what exactly was it? Race tried to 
explain pluralism (as well as exclusivism and inclusivism) by showing representative 
biblical and theological positions for each approach.  
According to Race, exclusivism – which sees Christian revelation as the locus of 
truth and salvation and everything else as a mass of human error – has the strongest 
biblical roots (see Acts 4:12 and John 14:6), and has dominated Christian history. Race 
sees the summary expression of this attitude in the Catholic Church‘s (19th century) 
doctrine of Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus (no salvation outside the Church); and, its 
strongest expression in the theologies of the Neo-Orthodox Protestants, Karl Barth, 
Hendrik Kraemer, and Emil Brunner.
7
  
According to Race, inclusivism is predominantly found in Catholic post-Vatican 
II thought, but is also present in the Orthodox and Christian traditions.  And, like 
exclusivism, inclusivism also has deep biblical roots, which can be seen in Paul‘s efforts 
to come to terms with his Jewish and Greek heritage. Paul did not simply dismiss his 
Jewish and Greek roots but saw these as respectively preparatory and not fully conscious. 
(39-40) This captures the inclusive perspective from the start; other traditions are on their 
way to true religion – i.e., Christianity – but not yet there. Race cites Karl Rahner as the 
                                                          
4
  It was the new conciliatory language of the post Vatican II era.  
5
  See Rahner’s use above. 
6
 See Diana Eck, Encountering God, for an argument against the idea that pluralism is a mere affirmation 
of pluralism, or simply relativism.   
7
 Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, 2-3; cited in the text by page numbers hereafter.  
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preeminent post-Vatican II inclusivist, but also notices the same approach in the later 
Hans King, and in some less well-known Protestant and Catholic thinkers who were able 
to draw on their actual experience from living among different cultures when formulating 
their views of other religions; for example, J.N. Farquhar, Ramundo Pannikar and Bede 
Griffiths. (57-59)  
As for pluralism, Race identifies two defining characteristics: 1) tolerance of 
other faiths, and 2) relativism, by which he means a commitment to the view that 
knowledge of God is only partial in all religion. To understand these two related ideas it 
is first necessary to understand the distinction Race makes between moral tolerance and 
theological tolerance. Moral tolerance is a willingness to let others adhere peacefully to 
their own religion, while theological tolerance is recognition that religions are coworkers 
in the task of seeking common truth. Race notes that those who embrace religious 
exclusivism – such as Karl Barth and Hendrik Kraemer – while opposed to the very idea 
of theological tolerance are still morally tolerant. Thus, for Race, relativism necessarily 
follows theological tolerance because it is logically impossible to seek religious truth, 
with those from other religious traditions, while believing that one‘s own tradition 
embodies the only truth.  Race saw pluralism as a movement that emerged out of the 
Liberal stream of Protestant Christianity in the twentieth century, and so his prototypical 
pluralists are Ernst Troeltch, Arnold Toynbee, and William Hocking; followed by Paul 
Tillich, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, and John Hick
8
. (72)  
 
                                                          
8
 John Cobb is also mentioned in connection with the pluralist camp and is credited for the term 
“debilitating relativism” – i.e., having no norms whatever to evaluate religious traditions – which Race 
takes as a potential danger of pluralism (Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, 156).   
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2. Embracing the Category of Religious Pluralism: John Hick, Paul Knitter and the 
Myth of Christian Uniqueness    
Race‘s typology met with instant success and was soon being adopted by, or confirmed 
by, others – most especially by those now identifying themselves as ―pluralists‖ such as 
John Hick, Paul Knitter, and Dianna Eck.
9
  
Race‘s new term pluralism and the threefold ―typology‖ seemed to galvanize 
those who were struggling to articulate a new Christian response towards other religions. 
―Pluralists‖ embraced their new identity as pluralists, and were quick to name their foes 
exclusivists and inclusivists. One of the more dramatic examples of this can be seen in 
John Hick‘s ―A Philosophy of Religious Pluralism,‖ in Problems of Religious Pluralism, 
which is largely a rewrite of an article that Hick published over a decade earlier called, 
―The Copernican Revolution in Theology‖; the only substantial difference being that the 
later article employs the terms exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism.  
In 1985, Knitter wrote No Other Name?: A Critical Survey of Christian Attitudes 
Toward the World Religions.
10
 This book was similar to Race‘s Christians and Religious 
Pluralism; indeed, Knitter notes that Race‘s types of exclusivism, inclusivism, and 
pluralism, and his models ―evince an amazing and confirming similarity.‖11 The 
difference in Knitter‘s mind was that he offered more nuanced accounts of the theological 
content of each type, and of the theologians who represented them. But despite these 
more nuanced accounts, it was still fairly easy to locate Knitter‘s models within Race‘s 
types. 
                                                          
9
 See especially, Hick, Problems of Religious Pluralism, 28-45; Knitter, No Other Name?; Eck, Encountering 
God.     
10
 Knitter, No Other Name? 
11
 Ibid., xvi. 
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Even one self-identified inclusivist embraced, and contributed to the popularity of 
Race‘s threefold typology. In 1986, Gavin D‘Costa published Theology and Religious 
Pluralism which gives an account of the ―pluralists paradigm,‖ the ―Exclusivist 
Paradigm,‖ and the ―Inclusivist Paradigm.‖12 It follows the same pattern of Race‘s work 
insofar as it shows the types with representative thinkers, but it departs from Race in the 
order of the ―paradigms.‖ For Race, pluralism, which is the best position, comes at the 
culminating end; for D‘Costa, inclusivism, which is the best position, comes at the 
culminating end. 
 Race‘s typology gained momentum a somewhat clearer, and somewhat more 
consistent, view of the three types started to emerge. According to this view, exclusivism, 
inclusivism, and pluralism were characterized as responses to a cluster of problems 
related to religious diversity – most notably the problems of salvation, truth, and the 
religious other. Moreover, it became assumed that the three types would respond to the 
particular questions in this cluster, in ways that were always consistent with their types; 
thus, broad paradigms formed.  
Exclusivism became an intolerant view of other religions, maintaining that only 
the ―home religion‖ housed truth and delivered salvation. 13  Inclusivism became a 
moderately tolerant view of other religions, maintaining superiority but not monopoly for 
the home religion with respect to truth and salvific efficacy; Pluralism became an open 
and tolerant view of other religions, maintaining that all of the great religions provide 
truth and equally effective pathways to salvation.  
                                                          
12
 See D’Costa, Theology and Religious Pluralism. 
13
 I will use Paul Griffin’s term “home religion” to connote a religion to which one belongs (Griffiths, 
Religious Diversity, xiv).    
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This description of the three types blends together different aspects from a 
relatively formal description of the types by S. Mark Hein, and a more substantive 
description by Gavin D‘Costa.  Heim explicates the types as follows:  
Exclusivists believe the Christian tradition is in sole possession of effective 
religious truth and offers the only path to salvation. Inclusivists affirm that 
salvation is available through other traditions because the God most decisively 
acting and most fully revealed in Christ is also redemptively available within or 
through those traditions. Pluralists maintain that various religious traditions are 
independently valid paths to salvation.
14
     
And D‘Costa says the following:  
Roughly speaking, pluralism is the position which claims that all religions, more 
or less are equally valid ways in helping men and women find their way to God. 
Pluralists are usually critical of exclusivists, who hold that only Christianity (and 
often, a particular denominational version) is true, and exclusively capable of 
helping men and women to a full relationship with God. Pluralists usually argue 
that exclusivists have no grounds for real openness and tolerance towards other 
religions, nor have they anything to learn from these religions. The resultant 
attitude is politically translated into empire, imperialism, and aggressive mission. 
…Inclusivism is often characterized as holding to the definitive truth of 
Christianity, but recognizing that other religions may be ―lawful religions‖ 
(Rahner), even if in a provisional manner. 
15
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These passages indicate a number of interesting things about the typology: 1) it 
was usually applied to Christianity (where it developed among its theologians and 
philosophers); 2) it typically revolved around the problem of ―salvation‖ or the highest 
religious end; 3) when truth entered in to the equation it did so as a means to salvation 
which, in effect, conflated the terms; and, 4) it suggested that the propositions held about 
truth and salvation in other religions conditioned attitudes towards other religions, some 
of which (such as religious intolerance) deserved moral condemnation.       
As said above, the threefold typology was especially popular with pluralists, 
perhaps because it afforded them a clear conscience with respect to their relations with 
religious ―aliens.‖16  Nonetheless, those who were now being labelled as exclusivists and 
inclusivists were not so sanguine about this new classification system, but did not mount 
a strong opposition to it until the mid 1990s, and so the early 1980s to the mid 1990‘s 
may be seen as something of a ―honeymoon‖ period for religious pluralism.  
During this period John Hick and Paul Knitter emerged as the dominant 
representatives of religious pluralism. Hick and Knitter championed the cause of religious 
pluralism with vigour, calling on all religious persons to make a paradigm shift – away 
from exclusivism and inclusivism, towards pluralism:  
A pluralistic model represents a new turn – what might be called a ―paradigm 
shift‖ – in the efforts of Christian theologians, both past and present, to 
understand the world of other religions and Christianity‘s place in that world.17 
The above passage is taken from The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Toward a 
Pluralistic Theology of Religions. This volume, edited by Hick and Knitter, is based 
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largely on papers presented at a conference held at Claremont Graduate School, March 7-
8, 1986. The conference and subsequent volume were something of a coming out party 
for religious pluralism, as a legitimate theological option for Christians in their relations 
with religious others. In an effort to underscore this point the authors of the volume 
where asked to revise their conference talks, for publication, with the following four 
questions in mind: 
why…the contemporary context was pressing Christianity toward a new 
pluralistic approach toward other religions, how such an approach might be best 
elaborated, whether it was in line with past tradition and present Christian 




Clearly the editors wanted the contributing authors to think seriously about how 
pluralistic theologies would impact traditional Christian doctrines and practices, and 
whether or not this could be done legitimately within the tradition itself. But, they also 
felt that the changing times necessitated the paradigm shift and, indeed, saw a failure to 
make this shift as morally reprehensible.  
This message comes out loud and clear in Hicks‘ contribution to The Myth of 
Christian Uniqueness called ―The Non Absoluteness of Christianity,‖ wherein he 
discusses some of the ―large scale ways in which Christian absolutism has lent itself…to 
the validation and encouragement of political and economic evil.‖19 Specifically he 
identifies Christian absolutism as a contributing factor to 1) European anti-Judaism and 
eventually anti-Semitism; 2) colonial exploitation in ―Africa, India, Southeast Asia, 
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China, South America, and the Pacific Islands‖ by European nations; and, 3) racist 




Even so, the editors of The Myth of Christianity – despite their conviction that it 
was imperative for Christians to move to a pluralistic framework – did not insist that a 
particular pluralistic framework had to be adopted by all; they recognized that there were 
several variants of the  ―pluralist move‖ or that there was a plurality of pluralisms. In the 
end, though, the editors saw fit to organize the main contributions to The Myth in terms of 
three main approaches: 1) the historico-cultural, 2) the theological-mystical, and, 3) the 
ethico-practical. And, here, they evoked the image of the Rubicon such that each of the 
approaches was seen as a bridge to help one cross over from exclusivism and inclusivism 
to pluralism.   
For the most part, the ―bridges‖ identify different commonalities – be they 
historical, theological, or ethical – that are, according to pluralists, present in all of the 
great religious traditions. These bridges or points of commonality became as, we will see 
shortly, focal points for the critics of religious pluralism.        
The polarizing rhetoric of pluralists, such as Hick, which cast exclusivism and 
inclusivism in a very dark light may have helped pluralists feel justified in the radical 
theological moves they were making, but it did very little to strengthen the conceptual 
foundation of religious pluralism and, so, it eventually came under attack by those 
refusing to ―cross the Rubicon‖ or adopt the pluralist paradigm.  
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3. Critical Responses to Religious Pluralism: Gavin D’Costa, S. Mark Heim, Paul 
Griffiths, and John Cobb  
The first serious challenge to the pluralist paradigm came in 1990 with the publication of 
Christian Uniqueness: The Myth of a Pluralistic Theology of Religions.
21
 There are four 
articles in this volume of particular interest because they would continue to evolve into 
more serious challenges to the idea of religious pluralism  
The first, by editor Gavin D‘Costa, called ―Christ the Trinity and Religious 
Plurality‖ argues that the doctrine of the Trinity can be used to construct an inclusivist 
approach to religious plurality that meets the concerns of pluralists with regard to 
openness and tolerance for other religious traditions. D‘Costa would even suggest that 
pluralist theologies of religions aren‘t even that good at what they propose to do, i.e., at 
affirming the equality of all (authentic) religions. In 1995, D‘Costa would develop this 
idea that pluralists aren‘t really doing what they claim to be doing, by making the 
surprising claim that pluralists are really exclusivists because they use specific truth 
criteria as the organizing principle of their theories of religions – just like exclusivists and 
inclusivists.
22
 The most significant ramification of this is that the traditional threefold 
criteria is incoherent because exclusivists, inclusivists, and pluralists all use truth criteria 
to decide what is and what is not religious and therefore exclude some phenomena; if 
they did not do this they would have to include violent ―cults‖ such Jim Jones‘ Peoples 
Temple in the category of religion. Thus, pluralists are exclusivists and there really is no 
such thing as pluralism – and no coherent threefold typology.  
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Second, an article, by J.A. Dinoia called ―Pluralist Theology of Religions: 





DiNoia shows how pluralistic theologies tend to downplay or even 
obliterate the particulars of religions, by reducing them to a common denominator. He 
questions the legitimacy of reducing all religious ends to one religious end, and asks if all 
religions really have the same end. For example, is Christian salvation the same things as 
Buddhist Enlightenment, and can this be reduced to one substantive form without doing 
violence to one or the other?
24
 This article may have inspired D‘Costa‘s later idea that 
pluralists are really exclusivists, but the more thoroughgoing extension of DiNoia‘s 
critique is found in S. Mark Heim‘s Salvations: Truth and Difference in Religion. In 
Salvations, Heim critiques the pluralist theologies of Wilfred Cantwell Smith, John Hick, 
and Paul Knitter. In each case he attacks the supposed common denominator of all 
religions. For Smith, this is the universal quality called faith that is put into the hearts of 
all men by God and expresses in various ways the different religious traditions of 
humankind; for Hick, this is salvation in the form of turning from self-centredness to 
God-centredness; and, for Knitter it is effectively contributing to the ―Kingdom of God‖ 
through positive social action. In each case, Heim asks the same difficult question – is 
this what all religions (or even all of the great world religions) are really about or really 
aiming for?  Picking up on DiNoia‘s work, Heim proposes the idea that maybe different 
religions actually have deeply different religious ends or ―salvations‖ – and, possibly, 
different authentic salvations. After critiquing what he takes to be the superficial and 
distorting nature of pluralist theories of religion, Heim sets himself the task of developing 
                                                          
23
 See, DiNoia, “Pluralistic Theology of Religions.” 
24
 See also, DiNoia, Religious Diversity.  
93 
 
a more pluralistic theory of religious pluralism – one that would save the particularities or 
―thick‖ diversity of religions. In this constructive work, Heim maintains that his position 
is inclusivist rather than pluralist, even though he also claims that it is ―more pluralistic‖ 
in the sense that it is better at authenticating actual religious diversity.  
Third, Paul Griffiths contributed an article called ―The Uniqueness of Christian 
Doctrine Defended.‖25 Later, Griffiths would that say that the contributors to Christian 
Uniqueness Reconsidered ―argue that claims to uniqueness are deeply woven into the 
grammar of religious discourse, and that a philosophical defence of some aspects of them 
can be given.‖26 This is an apt description of Griffiths‘ contribution to the volume, and in 
the future he would go on to make an even more profound defence of 
exclusivism/inclusivism.  
Fourth, John Cobb Jr. contributed an article called, ―Beyond ‗Pluralism‘‖ that 
expresses dissatisfaction with popular theories of religious pluralism.
27 
In this article, 
Cobb notes the irony of him contributing to a book meant to oppose a book in support of 
religious pluralism (i.e., The Myth of Christianity) since he had always seen himself as 
something of a defender of religious pluralism. But Cobb, chose to contribute to 
Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered – just as he chose not to contribute to The Myth of 
Christianity – because he was opposed to the ―narrow‖ and ―erroneous‖ way in which 
pluralism was being represented in The Myth.  In 2003, in what was billed as a sequel to 
the conference at Claremont Graduate School in 1986, a second conference, at 
Claremont, was held on religious pluralism. This conference would lead to the 
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publication of Deep Religious Pluralism, edited by David Ray Griffin.
28
 None of the 
participants of the original conference participated in the second one. Presumably they 
didn‘t participate because they were not invited since this conference, and the subsequent 
publication of Deep Religious Pluralism, revolved around John Cobb‘s religious 
pluralism. Cobb‘s pluralism is grounded in the pluralistic metaphysics of Aflred North 
Whitehead who conceived of the totality of Reality as God, Creativity, and Cosmos; for 
Cobb, religious differences are rooted in these three different ―Ultimate Realities.‖    
At this point, I will continue this history of religious pluralism by interjecting 
some of my own history with the topic.   
In 1998, I completed a master‘s thesis called ―Making Sense of Religion and 
Religions: The Value and Limitation of Religious Unity and Diversity.”29 
The starting point of my argument was a very broad definition of religion that was 
capable of enfolding a lot of specificity; I defined religion as ―relationship with God.‖  
From this point, I defined pluralism as a claim that there are many forms (or at least more 
than one form) of true human relationship with God. And, I defined exclusivism as a 
claim that there is only one form of true human relationship with God.  
I then moved on to rename both exclusivism and pluralism. I renamed 
exclusivism as universalism because it seems like a more natural descriptor of a position 
that was the opposite of pluralism; and, I introduced and renamed inclusivism as 
universal pluralism, because I saw this as a middle ground between universalism and 
pluralism. I dismissed the term inclusivism because this seemed to connote the opposite 
or exclusivism.   
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Next, I reintroduced the terms exclusivity and inclusivity as qualities of 
universalism, universal pluralism, and pluralism. With respect to universalism I argued 
that it was strongly exclusive; I wrote that ―universalism asserts that there is one, and 
only one, true form of religion (i.e., relationship with God). Thus, all other forms of 
religion are necessarily not true, or false. This means that all other forms of religion are 
excluded from religious truth, or that religious truth is exclusive to only one form of 
religion. The universalist‘s religious truth is absolute.‖ At the other end of the spectrum, 
and with respect to pluralism, I wrote: ―Pluralism asserts that there is more than one true 
form of religion. But more than this, it denies that there is one absolutely true form of 
religion and, consequently, affirms a plurality of partially true religious forms. All 
partially true forms of religion are included in religious truth. Pluralism affirms that 
religious truth is the inclusive possession of all.‖ The middle ground ―universal 
pluralism,‖ claims absolute truth for one religion but partial truth for many others and, 
thus, an ―exclusive inclusivity.‖  
Continuing, I suggested there is no such thing as ―pure pluralism‖ or ―pure 
exclusivism.‖ By this I meant that no religions hold the view that all (partially true) 
religions are included in religious truth. All pluralisms circumscribed the category of 
religion such that only some religions are deemed to be true religions. Likewise, there is 
no such thing as ―pure universalism.‖ And, here, I meant that no religions claim that their 
tradition is the only one with any semblance to what is called religion. For example, even 
the staunchest universalist admits ―false religions‖ into the category of religion – albeit 
only nominally. Indeed, without this admission there is no basis to compare the two types 
of religion.    
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  Finally, I argued that universalism and pluralism are both better understood as 
different forms of what can be called ―unity and diversity,‖ since both posit a religious 
unity and understand all diversity of religion in terms of this unity.  Universalists see only 
one ―true‖ instance of what is taken to be true religion, and pluralists see multiple 
instances of this – but both admit a category which, on one hand, allows the possibility of 
diversity and, on the other, circumscribes the sort of diversity possibly. Thus, both 
pluralists and universalists include and exclude religions within their category of religion 
(whatever this may be). Likewise, those that I called ―universal pluralists,‖ also include 
some and exclude other religions with their category of religion. This group was different 
only insofar as it tended to see one religion as the embodiment of true religion plus many 
religions as the partial embodiments of this, and in this respect appeared a little more 
balanced.  
Nonetheless the main point I was making, with respect to pluralism, was that 
pluralists are not free – as many seemed to supposed themselves to be – from the 
exclusion that is inherent to any process of category making. In this regard, pluralists 
employ the exact same logical structure as exclusivists and inclusivists, despite 
employing a different strategy within this logical structure. Having established this, I also 
wished to point out that there was both ―upside‖ and ―downside‖ to the specific strategy 
employed by pluralists within their ―inclusive exclusionary logic.‖ On the upside, 
pluralism is broadly egalitarian and so seems to provide a solid foundation for positive 
interfaith relations. On the downside, no pluralism seems to have a strong reality base for 
its proposed foundational unity. One did not, for example, have to be a great comparative 
religionist to see that John Hick‘s definition of the religious common denominator – i.e., 
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the ―turning from self-centredness to God-centredness‖ – might have troubles gaining a 
foothold outside of liberal Protestant circles.   
Just after completing my thesis, I found a copy of Gavin D‘Costa‘s ―The 
Impossibility of a Pluralist View of Religions.‖ I was delighted to have found someone 
else that had seemed to notice the same thing about pluralism that I had just noticed; 
namely, that it collapses all real religious diversity, and therefore isn‘t very good at 
authenticating the equal validity of religions with respect to their actual differences. 
Pluralism requires religions to be converted into something that they are not in order to 
say that they are equal. Certainly it achieves equality but is this an equality of the 
religions as they really are?  
The original version of my Master‘s Thesis had a second part, called ―Beyond 
Religious Unity and Diversity.‖ It had two subsections that were called ―Beyond Unity 
and Diversity: A Radical Approach to the Problem of Religious Diversity,‖ and ―Religion 
is Three: a Radical Theory of Religion.‖ I was using the word radical here in the more 
traditional sense of ―down to the roots‖ rather than the colloquial sense of ―way out 
there.‖ In these preliminary constructive efforts to develop a theory of religious diversity 
that was more pluralistic than traditional theories I grounded religious diversity in a 
pluralistic metaphysics based on the mathematics and metaphysical work of George 
Spencer-Brown. As such, I was developing a theory of religions much like John Cobb‘s. 
I didn‘t include this constructive element in my thesis, but after reading D‘Costa 
was convinced that I was on to something, and so entered a PhD. program with the intent 
of constructing a genuine theory of religious pluralism – one that could authenticate 
religious diversity without reducing it to a commonality that would destroy true diversity.  
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I completed this theory of religious pluralism in June 2000. It was called 
―Understanding Religious Unity in Diversity in terms of Non-Dualism, Divine Unity, and 
Trinitarianism Together: A Tripartite Theory, Philosophy and Theology of Religions.” I 
made a historical argument, a philosophical argument, and a theological argument that it 
was possible to see non-dualism, divine unity, and trinitarianism (my names for three 
broad religious types) as equally valid religious truths, since each of these truths is about 
the same tripartite ultimate reality, from one of the three possible points of view within 
ultimate reality.  
I saw non-Dualism as the great truth of Hinduism and Buddhism; I saw divine 
unity as the great truth of Zoroastrianism, Islam, and Baha‘i, and I saw trinitarianism (or 
―the religion of divine relationship‖) as the great truth of Judaism and Christianity (with 
some obvious qualifications). Thus, I believed that the most intractable religious truth 
claims could be accounted for, and affirmed, as equally true, because each was 
knowledge about the same Ultimate Reality from a different point of view within the 
same Ultimate Reality. I was elated because I was convinced I had solved the problem, of 
religious diversity. I had found a way to affirm a multiplicity of true religions with 
respect to their actual differences.  But, as mentioned in the Introduction, I received little 
positive response to my solution, whether religious or academic.  
In any case, we will now return to the more public history of religious pluralism, 
which at the turn of the century saw a flurry of activity directed at the renewal of 
Christian inclusivism – perhaps driven by millennial hopes?  
 




The Rebirth of Religious Inclusivism  
In 2000, Gavin D‘Costa put together his final critique of pluralism and his own positive 
efforts to construct a Trinitarian theology of other religions in The Meeting of the 
Religions and the Trinity.
30
 Even though he called his effort exclusivist it is better 
understood as inclusivist, and it is an inclusivism that almost looks pluralistic. Here the 
world religions are the embodiments of the Holy Spirit, as distinct from the Church 
which is the embodiment of Christ or the Logos. It is Christ that is ultimately leading 
everyone to the Father (salvation) but the religions (through the Holy Spirit) are leading 
the Church and everyone else to a fuller and more explicit knowledge of Christ, making 
salvation more effective. Thus, the religions and the Church are co-equals in leading 
humanity to salvation – an interesting twist on Rahner. This is what makes D‘Costa‘s 
position look like pluralism. But, in the end, all is fulfilled in the Kingdom of God, and 
this is what makes his position inclusivist. The Kingdom of God is the singular ideal that 
stands above the religions and the Church.  
In 2001, Mark Heim published The Depth of the Riches: a Trinitarian Theology of 
Religious Ends – a theory of religious inclusivism that appears to be even more pluralistic 
than D‘Costa‘s.31 Here, the religions are providing true and authentic knowledge about 
different aspects of God, which lead to different encounters with God. Since God is triune 
there are three possible profound encounters with God: ―one marked by impersonal 
identity, one marked by iconographic encounter, and one marked by personal 
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communion.‖32 Advaita Vedanta is one of the best examples of an encounter marked by 
impersonal identity; Islam typifies iconographic encounter; and, Christianity typifies 
personal communion. But even though each is an authentic encounter with God, Christian 
communion is the ultimate end because it unites all three aspects of the Trinity in 
communion. Thus, Heim is a pluralist almost to the end, where all religions are 
consummated in Christian communion.
33
  
In 1991, Paul J. Griffiths published a book called An Apology for Apologetics: A 
Study in the Logic of Interreligious Dialogue in which he argues that apologetics is a 
reasonable mode of communication for interreligious dialogue.
34
 Ten years later Griffiths 
would use apologetics to profoundly defend exclusivism/inclusivism. In 2001, Griffiths 
published Problems of Religious Diversity which is ostensibly about the various options 
available with respect to different questions related to religious diversity, but may more 
accurately be thought as a comprehensive philosophical apology for religious 
exclusivism/inclusivism and simultaneously a critique of religious pluralism.
35
   
Griffiths deals with 1) the question of religious truth; 2) the question of how 
awareness of religious diversity affects the epistemic confidence one has in one‘s 
religious truth; 3) the question of the religious ―alien‖ (the religious other); and, 4) the 
question of salvation (which combines the other questions). On all fronts, Griffiths is 
critical of the pluralist responses, and defends exclusivist/inclusivist responses. His 
arguments will be discussed in the next chapter, but I will briefly talk about his criticism 
of pluralism with respect to the question of salvation.  Griffiths says that the central claim 
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of pluralism is that one does not have to belong to the home religion in order to be saved 
– this is the opposite of exclusivism which says that belonging to the home religion is 
necessary (although not necessarily sufficient) for salvation. From here he says there are 
two versions of pluralism; negative pluralism which says there is no connection between 
religious membership and salvation, and positive pluralism which says it is necessary to 
belong to some religious community in order to be saved (The latter is the more common 
option for religious people who choose to be pluralists.)  Positive pluralists will thus 
circumscribe the conditions of religious life that are conducive to salvation, usually 
claiming that this condition obtains in all religions. But when they do this they are doing 
two things that they don‘t generally acknowledge; 1) they exclude certain religions from 
the category of what is religious or what is salvific, and 2) they strip down their own 
tradition so that it fits into the category of religion – and demand that other religions do 
likewise. Thus, like exclusivists, they exclude others from the category of religion on a 




Thus, the millennium ended with a bold and comprehensive philosophical defence 
of religious exclusivism/inclusivism (Griffiths); a profound typological inclusivism in the 
Protestant tradition of Tillich (Heim); and a profound Catholic inclusivism in the tradition 
of Rahner (D‘Costa).  In other words, inclusivism had been renewed, in response to the 
rise of religious pluralism, and, thus, I will refer to this movement that culminated at the 
end of the twentieth century as ―neo-religious inclusivism.‖     
 
The Birth of “Deep Religious Pluralism” 
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Another alternative to religious pluralism started to emerge around the same time. The 
central figure in this movement was David Ray Griffin. Griffin spearheaded the 2003 
Claremont conference and edited Deep Religious Pluralism. The first part of this volume, 
written by Griffin, is especially important for the emergence of this alternative to 
pluralism because it philosophically defends the idea of a different kind of religious 
pluralism; namely, deep religious pluralism. And, it provides an impressive exemplar of 
this type of pluralism – the venerable John Cobb Jr. whose reputation as a Christian 
theologian is impeccable, and whose dedication to problems of religious diversity is well 
recognized. Thus, he created a new category and legitimized it with a well respected 
representative.  
Griffin argues that religious pluralism, in the generic sense, rejects religious 
absolutism and affirms the value of other religious traditions.  All forms of pluralism 
have this generic base, but from here there are two variations. One, identist pluralism, 
which says there is a commonality in all religions, and participation in this commonality 
is what legitimizes a religion. Two, deep religious pluralism, which roots religious 
difference in a pluralistic metaphysics; religious differences are deep because they are 
rooted in the very structure of ultimate reality.
37
  As discussed earlier, John Cobb 
(Griffin‘s exemplary pluralist) based his religious pluralism on the idea that there are 
three Ultimate Realities, which he grounds in the tripartite metaphysics of Alfred North 
Whitehead consisting of God, Creativity, and Cosmos.  Religions are different because 
they are grounded in different aspects of Ultimate reality; for example, Christianity is 
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primarily grounded in the reality of God, Buddhism in the reality of Creativity, and native 
spiritual traditions in the reality of Cosmos.
38
   
In 2002, another version of deep religious pluralism was published – Different 
Paths, Different Summits, A Model for Religious Pluralism by Stephen Kaplan.
39
 
Kaplan‘s main concern is with the theoretical problem involved in asserting the truth of 
multiple absolutes. In the end, Kaplan is satisfied that his model makes this a theoretical 
possibility, even if it does nothing to authenticate the actual truth of the truths it 
accommodates. Kaplan proposes a threefold typology that allows one to affirm as true the 
theistic notion of communion with God, the adviatan notion of identity with an 
impersonal Absolute, and the Buddhist notion that recognizes the interconnectedness of 
all Reality.  
  John Cobb Jr. reviewed Kaplan‘s book in 2005, and the important thing for Cobb 
about this work, is that it allows for the affirmation of different ultimates, and so 
overcomes relativism: ―The real importance of his model is to show that reality as a 
whole can have multiple features each of which is just as ultimate as the others.‖40  
This idea of multiple Ultimate Realities, or at least multiple ultimate religious 
truths, is the basic idea of deep religious pluralism. These multiple ultimates, because 
they are the ground of religious diversity, allow the deep pluralist to overcome the 
superficiality of traditional pluralist theories; deep pluralism is rooted in the depth of 
Ultimate reality, because Ultimate Reality is itself pluralistic.  
The religious pluralism of my own Understanding Religious Unity in Terms of 
“Non-Dualism,” “Divine Unity,” and “Trinitarianism,” Together is a version of deep 
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religious pluralism. What is different now, as compared to when it was completed in 
2000, is that now it can be seen as belonging to a school of thought. This ―school‖ is 
small, but it does exist now. It has been given a profound philosophical defence by a 
highly credentialed theologian; it is represented by preeminent religious pluralists in John 
Cobb and Raimundo Pannikar
41
, and it has a published book-length argument in Different 
Paths, Different Summits.        
Thus, two similar movements have appeared as a critical response to the first 
versions of religious pluralism.  The neo-inclusivism of D‘Coata, Heim, and Griffiths, 
wherein non-Christians are validated as true and valuable in and of themselves –and at a 
very deep level – but wherein all are finally consummated in an explicitly Christian end. 
And the deep religious pluralism of Griffin/Cobb, Panikkar, Kaplan, and myself, wherein 
different religions are affirmed equally and ultimately true with respect to their 
differences – but never merge into one because Ultimate Reality (the terminal of all 
religions) is itself diverse.  
The aim of neo-inclusivism and deep religious pluralism is the same, and this is 
the same as the aim of traditional religious pluralists; to affirm the equal validity of 
multiple religions or to affirm that there are multiple true religions. Both neo-inclusivists 
and deep pluralists don‘t like the way that traditional pluralists try to do this, and both 
think they have a better way. From this perspective, the problem of traditional religious 
pluralism is that it reduces all forms of diversity to one form, which has the effect of 
validating all of the religions, but only denuded forms of the ones it is willing and able to 
validate. The solution of both neo-inclusivists and deep pluralists is to ground religious 
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diversity in the deepest structure of ultimate reality. Neo-inclusivists use the Trinity to do 
this and deep pluralists use something very similar in a tripartite metaphysical concept of 
Ultimate reality. Both neo-inclusivists and deep pluralists affirm that different religions 
are true and valuable, despite, and even because of, their deep differences. But neo-
inclusivists finally dissolve the true and valuable non-Christian religions – and, indeed, 
Christianity itself – into a Christian end. In contrast, there is no single end for the deep 
pluralist; the end is itself diverse, so there is no structural possibility for uniformity in the 
end.  
 
The Reaffirmation of Traditional Religious Pluralism 
Traditional pluralists did not roll over in the face of neo-inclusivists who where saying 
that the pluralism wasn‘t real and deep pluralists who were saying that this pluralism was 
superficial and a wrong turn. Thus, in 2003 Hick and Knitter rallied the troops again for 
another conference on religious pluralism, as the legitimate successor to the first 
Claremont Conference of 1986. This conference took place in Birmingham, England, 
September 6-9, and resulted in a publication called, The Myth of Religious Superiority: A 
Multifaith Exploration, that was edited by Paul Knitter.
42
 The main difference between 
the first and second conferences of the traditional pluralists is that the second was self-
consciously multi-faith rather than intra-Christian.  The intent here was to show that 
religious pluralism is not just a way for Christians to affirm the legitimacy of non–
Christian religions but a way for all of the great world religious traditions to validate each 
other; indeed, if it could not do this it had little practical value.      
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The first part of The Myth of Religious Superiority lays down the ―foundational 
perspectives‖ of religious pluralism – and, somewhat ironically, the foundational 
perspectives are laid by three white, Western, Christian academics.
43
 In the second part, 
we see pluralist perspectives from representatives of the great world religions (Hindu and 
Sikh, Buddhist, Jewish, Christian, and Muslim). The order of these perspectives follows 
the typical pattern of a world religions text; the ―eastern traditions‖ appear first in 
chronological order followed by the ―western traditions‖ in chronological order. The non-
great world religions are excluded from the conversation.
44
   
The three ―foundational perspectives‖ offered by John Hick, Perry Leukel-
Schmidt, and Paul Knitter are all apologies for traditional religious pluralism. Of these, 
Hick‘s is the least accommodating to the critics – he simply can‘t see any reasonable 
alternatives (and he doesn‘t see this as blindness). Paul Knitter, in contrast, shows a deep 
understanding of what the critics find problematic about religious pluralism and sincerely 
tries to defend pluralism against these criticisms. Perry Leukel-Schmidt offers a rigorous 
philosophical defence of religious pluralism – and specifically its bulwark, the threefold 
typology of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism – by reinterpreting the classic 
threefold typology.  
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Continuing, John Hick was incredulous in response to Gavin D‘Costa‘s idea that 
exclusivism and pluralism share the same logic,
45
 but his apology in the Myth of 
Religious Superiority is aimed at Heim.  Hick‘s response to the challenge of what he calls 
―ultra-pluralism‖ (deep pluralism) is not so much an argument as an expression of shock 
at how such a preposterous idea could be taken seriously; he just can‘t see it as plausible 
alternative to his own position. For Hick, the idea that there are multiple Ultimates, that 
ground religious diversity, is simple polytheism – he even coins a new term and calls it 
―polyabsolutism.‖46 As said, Hick‘s criticism of ―ultra-pluralism‖ is directed specifically 
at Heim‘s trinitarian theology of religions in The Depth of the Riches, but shows a poor 
understanding of Heim‘s position, which is trinitarian rather than polytheistic, and 
(therefore) inclusivist rather than ―ultra-pluralist.‖  We don‘t know if Hick has responded 
directly to deep pluralism but suspect that he would, similarly, likewise dismiss it as 
polytheism. In any case, Hick does not seem to have a good grasp of the positions that 
have emerged as alternative to his own and, therefore, his ability to respond to his critics 
is limited.    
Paul Knitter, in contrast, in his contribution to The Myth of Religious Superiority, 
called ―Is the Pluralist Model a Western Imposition?‖ shows a profound understanding of 
what the critics of pluralism find problematic about religious pluralism. Specifically, they 
object to the notion that all religions can be reduced to a common language; that they can 
be ―boiled down to a system, or common essence, or common ground.‖47 And, not only 
this, but that the language pluralists want to reduce everything to – and impose on 
everyone else – is a Western language; some critics, such as D‘Costa, Heim, Griffiths 
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would even say it is the language of Western Christianity capitulated to the 
Enlightenment‘s critique of religion. Knitter takes these criticisms seriously, but in the 
end thinks they are ―warning signs rather than road blocks‖; and, thus, the main objective 
of his apology is to defend the idea that pluralism is a Western imposition. This defence 
is critical to the success of The Myth of Superiority because otherwise all of the other 
―supposedly‖ Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu/Sikh, Jewish and Christian perspectives on 
religious pluralism are necessarily based on grossly reduced and distorted versions of 
these religious traditions.  This is a theme that we will reflect on in the Conclusion, but 
now will discuss another work, by Knitter, that clearly shows that he was affected by the 
critics of religious pluralism; Introducing Theologies of Religions. 
Introducing Theologies of Religions (2002) may be thought of as an update of 
Knitter‘s No Other Name?  As discussed earlier, the organizing pattern of No Other 
Name? does not follow the exact pattern of Race‘s threefold typology, but it is close and 
Knitter‘s material could easily be fit into Race‘s typology. Introducing Theologies of 
Religions is a new typology for understanding theologies and theories of religious 
diversity. It is largely Race‘s threefold typology with new names and a forth type added. 
This change came about as a direct result of the critical and constructive work of Mark 
Heim, who was Knitter‘s principle representative of the new type of pluralism that he 
calls the ―acceptance model.‖48    
Here are Knitter‘s four types: (1) ―the replacement model: only one true religion‖; 
(2) ―the fulfillment model: the one fulfills the many‖; (3) ―the mutuality model: many 
true religions called to dialogue‖; (4) ―the acceptance model: many true religions, so be 
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it.‖49  The replacement model, the fulfillment model and the mutuality model are clearly 
new names for exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism respectively; and, the new model 
is, as said, based on Heim‘s work. That Knitter was willing to add a new model to the 
traditional three models shows that he was willing to take seriously the critics of religious 
pluralism, acknowledge an alternative to traditional religious pluralism, and move away 
from the traditional threefold typology.      
Perry Schmidt-Leukel, on the other hand was satisfied that the traditional 
threefold typology could be salvaged, and in his contribution to The Myth of Religious 
Superiority, called “Exclusivism, Inclusivism, Pluralism: The Tripolar Typology – 
Clarified and Reaffirmed,” he reworks and defends the traditional threefold typology. 
Schmidt-Leukel is of the view that the positions of exclusivism, inclusivism, and 
pluralism exhaust the religious possibilities for understanding religious diversity.  
Schmidt-Leukel defines religion as having –   at least but not exclusively – the 
property of mediating a salvific knowledge of ultimate reality,
50
 and he argues that there 
are logically only four possible answers to the question of whether or not religion does, in 
fact, mediate salvific knowledge of ultimate reality.
51
 The first possible answer is ―no‖ 
that it does not and this position is called (1) atheism/naturalism. The next three answers 
are all variations on a positive response to the question. The first of these affirms that 
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but by having some  characteristics of religion taken from a longer list of characteristics of religion, that no 
religion fulfils completely. This works on the same principle as using a cluster of symptoms associated 
with a disease to diagnose it. In this case, the patient need not have all of the symptoms to be diagnosed 
with the disease, and most patients with the disease will not have the same symptoms. See, Oxtoby, “The 
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looser working definition of religion like this one, they will always end up boiling it down to one thing that 
religions must have or must do – even if they have and do other things – and this one thing becomes the 
criteria for evaluating which phenomenon are religion and which are not.    
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―religions‖ do mediate salvific knowledge of Ultimate Reality but further claims that 
there has been (and can be) only one instance of this. This view that there is only one 
religion is called (2) exclusivism. The final two positions are variations on the position 
that holds (a) that religions mediate salvific knowledge of Ultimate Reality and (b) that 
there is more than one instance of religion. The first of these positions further claims that 
there is ―one singular maximus‖ or one ultimate form of religion. This position is 
inclusivism.  The second of these positions further claims there is no singlar maximus. 
This is pluralism. (19)  
Schmidt-Leukel also discusses and rejects various criticisms of the threefold 
typology, including Heim‘s criticism that the threefold typology ―does not do justice to 
the radical diversity of religions. (This is actually Heim‘s criticism of pluralism; his 
criticism of the typology is that it is incoherent because everyone is an inclusivist.) In any 
case, Schmidt-Leukel criticizes Heim for making the faulty assumption that all of the 
types, including pluralism, rest on an ―unequivocal‖ concept of salvation. Paul Griffiths 
makes this point most clearly when he criticizes John Hick‘s pluralism for using a 
substantive rather than a formal definition of salvation. Hick says that salvation is turning 
from self-centredness to God-centeredness; a formal (or a more formal) definition would 
say that salvation is an ultimate religious end, however conceived.  Schmidt-Leukel 
overcomes this problem in his reworking of the threefold typology by defining salvation, 
more formally, as salvific knowledge of ultimate reality. It is, however, disingenuous of 
Schmidt- Leukel to criticize Heim on this point because pluralists have typically 
employed substantive, or unequivocal, definitions of salvation, and didn‘t seem to realize 
this until Heim and others pointed this out to them. Nonetheless, Schmidt-Leukel is right 
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in saying that pluralism does not need to hang its hat on a highly substantive definition of 
―salvation.‖ Compare Hick and Schmidt-Leukel on this point: For Schmidt –Leukel, 
pluralism is the claim that there is no ―singular maximus‖ with respect to salvific 
knowledge of Ultimate Reality (however this is defined.) Hick says that pluralism affirms 
that all of the great world religions are equally effective at turning people from self-
centredness to God-centredness. Schmidt-Leukel‘s religious end is more formal. 
Schmidt-Leukel goes on to criticize Heim for ultimately claiming that Christianity 
supplies the superior religious end: ―Thus, despite being real, the soteriological goals of 
other religions remain deficient and inferior, being at best related to some particular 
aspects of the comprehensive reality of the Trinity.‖ (26) Here, Schmidt-Leukel accuses 
Heim of being an inclusivist, and a rather mean-spirited one at that, and consequently 
feels justified in reaffirming the threefold typology: ―He himself holds an inclusivism of 
the less generous sort, not allowing the non-Christian religions to lead their adherents to 
the highest eschatological fulfillment, or in total to a sort of hell, but to a new, post-
modernist kind of pre-modern limbo.‖ (27)         
In Part 2, we will review Heim‘s Trinitarian theology of religions, where we will 
see that he bends over backwards to ascribe positive religious value to other religions; the 
other religious traditions know things about God better than Christians do, and Christians 
had better attend to this knowledge if they hope to attain salvation which is communion 
with all of the aspects of the Triune God. Heim never refers to these deep and rich 
religious traditions as ―deficient‖ or ―inferior‖ – these are being (falsely) attributed to 
Heim by a polemical pluralist for whom the very idea that there is a ―singular maximus‖ 
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is, not just the defining characteristic of an alternative take on religious diversity, but a 
terrible error.  
The pluralist critic, in this case, seems unwilling to admit any sense of degree. 
Heim‘s affirmation that other religions have knowledge of God that Christians need for 
salvation, is just as bad as Hegel saying that Hinduism, Buddhism and Persian religion 
(Zoroastrianism) are natural religions which are transcended in the spiritual religions of 
the Greeks, the Romans, and the Jews, which, in turn, are transcended by the 
consummate religion – Christianity. For Hegel, the non-Christian religions were simply 
inferior and transcended by Christianity; for Heim, the non-Christian religions are 
essential for salvation.  Both are inclusivist but Heim clearly places a higher value on 
non-Christian religions than Hegel does. But for Schmidt-Leukel, the new inclusivism is 
just the old inclusivism.  
In any case, in the minds of pluralists, they had stood their ground against the 
attacks of the neo-inclusivists.  The neo-inclusivists were simply inclusivists, or worse, 
polyabsolutists; the threefold typology was on solid conceptual ground; and, pluralism 
was not an imposed Western language but the universal language of open and tolerant 
interfaith dialogue. 
  David Ray Griffin, likewise, envisioned deep religious pluralism – and 
specifically Whitehead‘s pluralistic metaphysics – as the common language of religious 
traditions. Thus, Deep Religious Pluralism includes Buddhist, Chinese, Christian, Hindu, 
Islamic, and Jewish versions of deep religious pluralism. And, like, traditional pluralism, 
deep religious pluralism is polemical towards other languages: identist pluralism is a 
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superficial wrong turn and neo-inclusivism is a conceptually confused state, unable to 
distinguish itself from traditional inclusivism.
52
  
Both traditional pluralists and deep pluralists see themselves as the vanguard of 
the pluralism movement; they are critical and dismissive of each other,
53
 and use their 
own language as the common language of future interfaith interactions.  
Similarly, the neo-inclusivists harbour negative feelings towards their main 
competitors, and contend that their language is the most conducive to open and tolerant 
interfaith relations. Neo-inclusivists continue to dismiss traditional pluralism as unreal 
and not very pluralist, and presumably will follow D‘Costa‘s pattern in criticizing 
Panikkar‘s work for not being properly Trinitarian, i.e., not properly Christian.54        
We will for now move on to the final chapter of Part 1 where we will argue in 
favour of a ―new‖ fourfold typology for theories and theologies of religious diversity. 
This typology will include the following four types: 1) exclusivism, 2) (neo) inclusivism, 
3) traditional pluralism, and 3) deep pluralism.
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A  Fourfold Typology for Theories of Religious Diversity 
1. The Idea of “True Religion”  
The idea of true religion is at the base of the classic threefold typology. For Race true 
religion is salvific religion; for Schmidt-Perry true religion is salvific knowledge of 
ultimate reality. Exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism are truth claims about true 
religion. In Race's typology, exclusivism claims that there is only one true religion, 
inclusivism claims that there are many relatively true religions but only one absolutely 
true religion, and pluralism claims that there are multiple true religions. In Schmidt-
Leukel‘s typology, exclusivism claims that only one religion has the property of 
mediating salvific knowledge of ultimate reality; inclusivism claims that many religions 
have this property but there is only one religion that mediates salvific knowledge of 
Ultimate Reality maximally or absolutely; and, pluralism claims that no one religion 
mediates salvific knowledge of Ultimate Reality absolutely and, therefore, there are many 
instances of equally valid religion.  
Paul Knitter uses the idea of true religions explicitly in his new fourfold typology 
in Theologies of Religions. His four types or four models are summarized as follows: 1) 
The replacement model: only one true religion. 2) The fulfillment model: the one [true 
religion] fulfils the many. 3) The mutuality model: many true religions called to dialogue. 
4) The acceptance model: many true religions, so be it. In each case a different answer is 
formed about the commonly understood theme of true religion.  
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The fourfold typology that I will now propose adopts the idea of true religion as its base.
1
 
I will do this in order to capture religious forms, religious essences, religious ends, 
religious universals and religious norms. These notions are often conflated by those who 
produce theories and theologies of religions – but this does not matter so long as it is 
understood that the essence, the end, the universal, etc. is taken to be ―true religion.‖ It 
will be assumed that all theories of religions – or all answers to questions about true 
religion – have a common understanding about what is meant by true religion,  even if all 
will have a different take on how exactly true religion should be understood.
2
  
Thus, when a pluralist says that there are many true religions and an exclusivist 
says there is only one true religion, these differences cannot be reconciled by saying that 
they are working with a totally different sense of what is meant by true religion – even if 
they change its ―common‖ sense in framing their positions. It is never the case that 
exclusivists don‘t understand what pluralists mean when they say that there are many true 
religions, or that pluralists don‘t understand what exclusivists mean when they say that 
there is only one religion; they understand each other but reject each others claims about 
true religion (which, again, will likely involve modifying exactly what this means).
 The notion of true religion is the common language of the dominant players in the 
pluralism drama that emerged in the twentieth century in the Christian West – the players 
that will be discussed in Part 2. All of these Christian authors employ an understanding of 
true religion even if they employ different dialects; the main dialects being true religion 
as form, essence, end, universal, and norm.  
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 In making this designation I am not linking true religion with making true propositional statements – 
even though someone might claim that a true religion as one that makes only true propositional 
statements.  
2
 I don’t know if some concept of true religion is necessary for a theory of religions, but such an idea is 
present in all of the theorists examined in this work.   
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In making this decision we are fully aware that some perspectives are being 
excluded from this particular discussion of religious diversity. For example, the latter 
Ernst Troeltsch, who gave up on the idea of true religion, will be excluded. When I say 
that Troeltsch gave up on the idea of true religion, I mean he gave up on the idea that a 
particular understanding of religion could be recognised as true by everyone. In the end, 
Troeltsch gave up on this idea even if the common understanding of religion was derived 
from historical study of religions rather than metaphysical reflection or dogmatic 
theology. Religious truth is just too culture specific to identify one particular form of 
religion as universally normative; Troeltsch didn‘t even think about the possibility that all 
of the ―great world religions‖ might be validated as equally true. 
Religious relativism is simply a different language from the language of true 
religion adopted by traditional pluralists, neo-inclusivists, and metaphysical pluralists, 
and therefore this typology – which assumes the idea of true religion as its base – does 
not account for relativistic approaches to religious diversity. 
The idea of true religion also excludes several post-modern thinkers who reject, 
not only the idea of true religion but also, the very idea of religion. For example, religious 
studies scholar Russell T. McCutcheon, says that religion (as a communicable reality) 
does not have a transcendental referent and, therefore, cannot be regarded as a sui generis 
reality radically distinct from other cultural realities or constructs.
3
 Similarly, Timothy 
Fitzgerald argues that religious studies as an academic discipline is indefensible because 
there is no identifiable reality called religion that can ground it.
4
 Such thinkers would not 
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involve themselves in a project that involves making truth claims about true religion, and 
consequently are not serious participants in this particular conversation. 
Pluralism has rarely been linked with post-modernism, and its frequent corollary 
naturalism which denies transcendental reality or at least the possibility of using it as a 
meaningful referent. Moreover, those in the pluralism discourse - traditional pluralists, 
neo-inclusivists, and deep pluralists consciously reject the deeper insights of some post-
modernists who challenge the very idea of religion. John Hick identifies his position as 
religious rather than naturalist; David Ray Griffin, rejects forms of naturalism that are 
sensationalist, atheist, and materialist; and Paul Griffiths has written several articles that 
are positively hostile to this post-modern idea.
5
 
This does not mean that those who are not willing to speak the language of ―true 
religion‖ have nothing valuable to say about religious diversity or that their insights 
would not lead to better interreligious understandings – it‘s just that they are speaking a 
different language from the one spoken by Christian pluralists, and the discussion here is 
primarily about different ideas about true religion. 
Likewise, it does not mean those who are employing the notions of ―true religion‖ 
in radically different ways – different from the Christian and Western notions of true 
religion as form, essence, end, universal, and norm – have nothing to add to a richer 
conversation about religious diversity.  
In any case, the new fourfold typology that I will now develop is self-consciously 
grounded in the idea of true religion in the same way that Race's threefold typology is, 
Schmidt-Leukel's threefold typology is, and Paul Knitter's fourfold typology is.  
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2. The Argument of Religious Exclusivism   
Gavin D‘Costa believes that religious pluralism and religious inclusivism share the same 
logic as religious exclusivism. I disagree with this but do believe it is important to 
understand the premises, conclusion, and logic of religious exclusivism – or, really, its 
argument. Both religious inclusivism and religious pluralism reject the conclusion of 
religious exclusivism that there is only one religion; consequently, neither of these 
positions can accept the argument of religious exclusivism either. 
The presumed argument (premises, conclusion, and logic) of religious 
exclusivism is captured by John Hick in his preface to the Metaphor of God Incarnate:  
The traditional Christian understanding of Jesus of Nazareth is that he was God 
incarnate, who became a man to die for the sins of the world  and who founded 
the church to proclaim this. If he was indeed God incarnate, Christianity is the 




It is not, however, possible to see the full argument, until we see the unstated premise that 
Hick simply takes as true and understood; namely that God is one. Hick has never felt the 
need to defend the idea that God, or to use his preferred term ―the Real,‖ is one or 
singular, and did not do so until he responded to Mark Heim after the turn of the century:  
I suggest that the best religious account we can give of the global situation is that 
of a single ineffable Ultimate Reality whose universal presence is being 
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Denying that Ultimate Reality is single leaves only one incoherent option – 
claiming that all of the ―God-figures and non-personal absolutes‖ are equally real. Such 
would be polytheism and ―polyabsolutism.‖ Hick doesn‘t elaborate on why this is a bad 
thing, but it clearly is in his mind. 
In any case, when we see Hick's assumed premise we can see the argument of 
religious exclusivism – or at least the argument of exclusivists as perceived by Hick. The 
two premises of religious exclusivism are as follows: 1) God is one, and 2) a particular 
form of religion is God. And, by the force of simple transitive logic – if A=B and B=C 
then A=C – it comes to the conclusion that a particular form of religion, like God, is one. 
Or more accurately, this particular religion is, like God, one and only (exclusive). The 
idea of oneness according to this mode of thought excludes the possibility of seeing the 
one religion identified with God as one among others: The religious form identified with 
God is wholly other and wholly exclusive to all else, just as God is. Troeltsch provided a 
useful insight when he distinguished this position from absolutism – which assumes the 
reality of relative religions in contrast to the absolute religion – by calling it supernatural 
exclusivism. 
This is one way to look at the argument of religious exclusivism, and it is evident 
that this is how John Hick understood ―the logic‖ of exclusivism, or the exclusivist 
argument. The other way to look at Christian exclusivism is in explicitly trinitarian terms.   
The Christian doctrine of the Trinity states that God is both one and three, and 
that the Persons of the Trinity are God the Father, God the Son (the divine Logos), and 
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God the Holy Spirit. Trinitarians reject the idea that God can be reduced to one aspect of 
the Trinitarian God, and they also reject the idea that trinitarianism is tri-theism.
8
 
Within the trinitarian framework there is absolute identity between God the 
Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit. Within the Christian tradition Jesus Christ 
is conceived as the incarnate form of God the Son, and his church is conceived as his 
body. Thus, the church (or Christianity) is a part of the Holy Trinity which, although 
three, is also singular and exclusive. 
In both arguments, a particular form of Christianity is conceived as the only or 
exclusive religion.   
Karl Barth, our representative exclusivist from above, can be understood in terms 
of either argument.  Barth was a trinitarian: Christ is the incarnation of the Logos; the 
true church is his body. The true church is identified with the life of the Triune God and, 
therefore, is the only religion.  The transitive argument can also be employed: God is one; 
Christ and his body are God; therefore, Christ and his body are one. 
 
3. The Differences between Religious Exclusivism and Religious Inclusivism 
I will now try to show that Christian inclusivism does not employ the same argument as 
Christian exclusivism. Here I will follow the insight of Ernst Troeltsch who said that 
exclusivism (the supernatural apologetic) follows the logic of ―absolute‖ form (the 
incarnation of the Logos), and inclusivism (the evolutionary apologetic) follows the logic 
of essence and content. 
Inclusivism, like pluralism, is an attempt to escape the argument of religious 
exclusivism; its way of doing this is by conceptualising an idea of religion that transcends 
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all particular forms of religion. It is similar to exclusivism insofar as it employs a very 
similar argument; but instead of seeing true religion as a particular from of religion it sees 
true religion as an idea of religion – specifically the idea of true religion as essence. For 
Hegel this is the idea of the consummate religion; for Schleiermacher it is the idea of 
mediation as the highest intuitions of the universe; for Tillich it is the religion of the 
concrete spirit. In all three cases, no particular religion is true religion except insofar as it 
conforms to the idea or the essence of religion; and, conversely, every particular religion 
is true religion to the extent that it conforms to the essence of religion. The religion that 
conforms perfectly to the essence of religion is absolutely true, as compared with other 
religions that are only relatively true. Or, in cases where it is admitted that no one 
particular religion conforms perfectly to the essence, the religion that comes closest to the 
essence is conceived as being the relatively best religion. 
Thus, inclusivism, by abstracting religion from all particular forms of religion, 
introduces an element into thinking about religious diversity that is absent in religious 
exclusivism. Exclusivism thinks in terms of the only religion; inclusivism thinks in terms 
of the absolute religion opposed to the relative religions, or of the best opposed to lesser 
forms of religion. Other notions, that are born of this idea include: the superior religion as 
compared to the inferior religions, the highest religion as compared to the lower religions; 
the most evolved religion as compared to the more primitive religions, the ultimate 
religion as compared to the penultimate and elementary religions, and so forth. 
A variation on the logic of essence and content is the logic of means to an end. 
This is the logic employed by Karl Rahner. For Rahner, Christianity, like other religions, 
is a means to the end of salvation which he conceives as the attainment of the beatific 
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vision.  Here the religious end is explicitly Christian, but it does the same work as an 
essence, in that it allows different particular forms of religion to be conceived as religion. 
And, like content-essence logic, means-end logic allows for the possibility of thinking 
about religiosity in degrees. There is lower implicit Christian faith as compared with 
higher explicit Christian faith; there is unconscious faith opposed to fully conscious faith, 
and so on. Here too, the ultimate religious end, functions in the same way as the 
particular religious form in religious exclusivism; it is one and only; the difference being 
that this one and only is the endpoint for all particular religions, and not a particular 
religion. 
The main difference between exclusivism and inclusivism, then, is that the former 
identifies a particular form of religion with God and the latter identifies a particular idea 
of religion with God or absolute religious fulfilment.  Exclusivism creates the sense that 
the particular form of religion identified with God is exclusively religious; inclusivism 
creates the sense that all religions have relative worth, up to the point of absoluteness, to 
the degree that they manifest the essence or lead to the ultimate end of religion. Thus, 
inclusivism employs the exact same argument as exclusivism, but what it sees as 
exclusively religious is not a particular form of religion, but an idea of religion that can 
enfold multiple particular religions. 
In the same way that Karl Barth can be identified as an exclusivist within this 
emerging typology, Paul Tillich and Karl Rahner can be identified as inclusivists within 
it. Tillich employs the logic of essence-content, and Rahner employs the logic of means 
to an end. Tillich‘s essence of religion is the religion of the concrete spirit, and though he 
could not see an absolute fulfilment of the essence in the history of religions, he was able 
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to see a highest form of this in St. Paul‘s doctrine of the Spirit. Karl Rahner‘s ultimate 
religious end is the beatific vision. Christianity, in implicit forms and explicit form, is the 
means to this ultimate religious end, (even if explicit Christian faith gives one a better 
chance of realizing the end). 
It can also be argued that the same transitive argument used by exclusivists is also 
used by inclusivists; the only difference being that a concept of religion rather than a 
particular form of religion is being identified with God. In this case, the ultimate form of 
religion is one and only because it is identified with God, and God is one and only.  
But in the case of Christian inclusivism, I suggest that ―Trinitarian logic‖ is more helpful 
for understanding what is going on. In all forms of Christian inclusivism that we have 
examined, and will examine, the ideal of communion with God – be it in explicitly 
Christian and triune terms or more philosophical terms – is the essence of religion or the 
ultimate end of religion. We see this explicitly in Mark Heim's ideal of communion with 
the Triune God, in Gavin D‘Costa‘s ideal of the Kingdom of God, and in Rahner's ideal 
of the beatific vision. And we see it implicitly in Paul Tillich‘s ideal of concrete spirit, in 
Schleiermacher‘s ideal of mediation; in Hegel‘s ideal of the consummate religion as 
―consciousness of essence,‖ and even in Troeltsch‘s ideal of personalistic religion. 
In all cases, religious fulfilment is realized in communion with the Trinity or 
participation in the trinitarian structure of Reality. And in all cases fulfilment is, in the 
end, one and only in the same sense that the Trinity is one and only.      
 
4. The Differences between Religious Inclusivism and Religious Pluralism, and 
between the Different Types of Religious Pluralism  
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Pluralists and inclusivists, alike, are willing to concede that exclusivism and inclusivism 
are close relatives – even though they frequently miss or don‘t acknowledge the 
conceptual move made by inclusivists to avoid the harshest implications of exclusivism. 
Troeltsch, of course, noticed, and this is why he is still relevant to this discussion. But, in 
contrast, pluralists see pluralism as something radically distinct from 
inclusivism/exclusivism – as a bold shift to a new paradigm. While neo-inclusivists argue 
that there is really no such thing as pluralism at all; pluralisms are just religiously 
anaemic versions of inclusivism or exclusivism. 
As mentioned in the historical outline in Chapter 1, pluralists have fired back at 
this dismissal of religious pluralism by the neo-inclusivists. Thus, before trying to 
articulate the differences between religious inclusivism and religious pluralism, we will 
review the two most thorough-going attempts to defend the idea of religious pluralism. 
Specifically we will review David Ray Griffin's ―Religious Pluralism: Generic Identist 
and Deep,‖ and Perry Leukel- Schmidt's ―Exclusivism, Inclusivism and Pluralism the 
Tripolar Typology – Clarified and Reaffirmed.‖ 
 
David Ray Griffin's Defence of Religious Pluralism 
David Ray Griffin argues that the acceptance of religious pluralism requires two 
affirmations. The first of these is negative and is the rejection of religious absolutism 
which he says entails an a priori assumption that one‘s own religious tradition is ―the 
only one that provides saving truths and values to its adherents, that it alone is divinely 
inspired, that it has been divinely established as the only legitimate religion, intended to 
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replace all others.‖9  The second affirmation, in contrast, is positive and is the idea that 
religions, apart from one‘s own, provide saving truths and values to their adherents. For 
Griffin, this is the essence of religious pluralism in the generic sense, meaning that all 
forms of religious pluralism are built upon this foundation even though there are different 
types of religious pluralism. (3) 
Griffin believes that religious pluralism is vitally important to the future of 
humanity, insofar as it is able to promote mutual respect and cooperation among the 
religions of the world, which in turn can motivate the peoples of the world to transform 
human civilization in a positive way. He also believes that the embrace of pluralism is 
especially important for Christians, since Christianity has traditionally tended towards 
absolutism, and this tendency combined with the current economic, military, and cultural 
strength of those who are Christians creates a situation that is especially ripe for violence 
and exploitation. And this, in part, explains why most of Griffin‘s discussion of religious 
pluralism revolves around Christianity, even though his arguments would presumably 
hold in different religious contexts. (3-4)   
Griffin argues that in order for Christians to embrace religious pluralism - in the 
generic sense - they must reject Christian absolutism, and he identifies two forms of 
Christian absolutism: exclusivism and inclusivism. According to absolutism only 
Christians can be saved, and according to inclusivism, those in other traditions may be 
saved in the context of their own tradition but only because salvation has been effected in 
this tradition by Jesus Christ. (5)  
As discussed, at the beginning of this chapter, David Griffin suggests four main 
bases for the emergence and growth of Christian pluralism: sociological, theological, 
                                                          
9
 Griffin, “Religious Pluralism,” 3; cited in the text by page number hereafter.  
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ethical, and ontological. For Griffin, the ontological shift from supernaturalism to 
naturalism was the most significant of these, and so I will continue here with Griffin‘s 
discussion related to naturalism as distinct from supernaturalism. (12-13)  
Griffith is reluctant to make a strong correlation between naturalism and pluralism 
without first qualifying what exactly he means by naturalism. Griffin distinguishes the 
naturalism embraced by pluralism from another type of naturalism that he calls 
Naturalism SAM. The S here stands for sensory perception or the belief that non-physical 
or non-sensory perception is impossible; the A stands for an atheistic worldview; and, the 
M stands for a materialistic world view that identifies the brain with the body and 
therefore rejects any possibility of life after bodily death. Griffin does not accept that 
rejecting the idea of supernaturalism, in the sense of a divine being interrupting the causal 
processes of the world, is dependent on accepting sensationism, atheism, and/or 
materialism. He contends that it is possible to be a naturalist in the more limited sense of 
rejecting the idea that the world‘s natural causal processes are susceptible to being 
interrupted, and he calls this form of naturalism NS, (wherein NS stands for 
nonsupernaturalist). (13-14)  
Griffin goes on to say that naturalism NS is a negative ontological doctrine 
insofar as it asserts that events of certain types never take place – for example natural 
miracles – but more important for our concerns here he also maintains that naturalism NS 
serves as the foundation for religious pluralism. And even though he does not go so far as 
to claim a necessary relation between pluralism and naturalism NS, he does maintain that 
there is a very strong correlation between the two. Griffin provides proof of this 
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correlation by showing its presence in the work of several prominent pluralists including 
John Hick, Paul Knitter, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, and John Cobb. 
Hick, for example, has reinterpreted traditional Christian doctrines, especially the 
Incarnation and Trinity, to make Christianity compatible with pluralism (i.e., with 
naturalism NS). For Hick, these doctrines suggest ―that Christianity, alone among all the 
religions, was founded by God in person,‖ (34) and, according to Griffin, these represent 
a supernaturalistic Christology that guarantees the a priori superiority of Christianity. In 
addition, Hick has also reinterpreted the supernaturalistic doctrine of salvation (or 
Christianity‘s soteriological supernaturalism) whereby Christian salvation ―involves a 
divine decision, based on arbitrary standards, that saves one from eternal damnation.‖ 
(16)  For Hick, salvation entails the human act of turning one‘s attention from the self to 
The Real and being morally transformed by this. Wilfred Cantwell Smith has likewise 
moved away from supernaturalism and towards naturalism as epitomized in his view that 
to believe God constructed or authored Christianity or the Church is idolatry; instead, it is 
more accurate to think of religious traditions (and not just Christianity) as constructed by 
humans who were inspired by God. (59) Likewise, Griffin cites Paul Knitter‘s, very 
explicit rejection of the supernatural foundation of religion and his affirmation that all 
religions are necessarily limited by their historical specificity as an example of the 
naturalistic foundation of pluralism: ―Although each religion is a manifestation of the 
Absolute, there can be no absolute religion. This is of the very nature of historical 
process: it allows no absolutes, it admits only individual, concrete and therefore relative 
realities. No religion can affirm that it stands above this all-embracing relativity…No 
religion can entirely step outside history.‖ (26) In other words, Christianity did not 
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descend directly from God in perfect form, which would justify the claims of 
exclusivists. John Cobb, likewise, rejects supernatural Christologies – wherein Jesus is 
viewed as the transcendent, all-powerful ruler of the world walking about the earth in 
human form – and encourages Christians to embrace and integrate (into Christianity) 
universal scientific truths, including the truth of naturalism that says the normal causal 
processes of the world are never interrupted. 
But despite his belief that it is very important for religious communities to 
embrace naturalism NS and religious pluralism, Griffin also believes that pluralism has 
gone down the wrong path in its development. Thus, he introduces S. Mark Heim‘s 
critique of pluralism and largely concurs with the main points of Heim‘s critique of 
pluralist theologies of religions: 1) that they presume a false neutrality when they are 
really Christian theology capitulated to the modern Western critique of religion; 2) that 
they are not really Christian on account of their modernist reinterpretation of fundamental 
Christian doctrines; 3) that they are not really pluralist since they presume a 
quintessential form for all religions; and, 4) that they entail a ―debilitating relativism.‖10 
(21-35) 
However, he also argues that this critique only applies to one type of pluralism, or 
one genus of the species pluralism and not the entire species. And, here, he introduces a 
distinction between identist/superficial pluralism and differential/deep pluralism. Identist 
and differential pluralism are both grounded in the rejection of absolutism and naturalism 
NS, but both forms of pluralism have different ontological and soteriological theses about 
how the various religions are related to one another.  
                                                          
10
  John Cobb defined conceptual relativism (which he deemed to be “debilitating”) as a situation in which 
“each tradition is best judged by its own norm and there is no normative critique of norms” (Cobb, 
“Beyond ‘Pluralism’," 85).  
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According to identist pluralism, all religions are oriented towards the same 
religious object, even if this object goes by different names in different traditions; 
moreover, all religions are oriented towards the same religious end (or the same form of 
―salvation.‖) In other words, there is a quintessential form of religion – with the same 
origin and the same terminal – that all religions participate in, albeit in different forms. 
Thus, the religious plurality in this form of pluralism is relatively superficial because all 
religions are simply different forms of the same thing. Griffin notes that Hick, Smith, and 
Knitter are all identist pluralists. (24) 
According to differential pluralism, different religions promote or seek different 
ends or different forms of salvation. And, they may also be directed towards different 
religious objects, possibly thought of as different ultimates. Thus, differential pluralism is 
pluralist soteriologically and perhaps also ontologically, and suggests that religions are 
different at a very deep level. (24) 
Thus, Griffin does not entirely agree with Heim in his contention that identist 
pluralists are not really pluralist; instead, his point is that they are pluralist insofar as they 
reject absolutism and supernaturalism and promote the value of religious traditions other 
than their own, but their pluralism is relatively superficial on account of the claim that all 
authentic religions are essentially the same in their ontology and soteriology. For Griffin, 
identist pluralists are real pluralists, and are even to be lauded for their efforts to move 
Christianity away from absolutism, but they also represent the ―wrong turn‖ mentioned 
earlier. For Griffin, differential or deep religious pluralism represents the vanguard of the 
pluralism movement, since it is a deeper more pluralistic form of religious pluralism. 
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For Griffin, Heim‘s own efforts to construct a pluralistic theology of religions 
apparently belong within the deep pluralism movement, (24) even though Heim was 
evidently not able to conceptualize the nature of his efforts. Nonetheless, for Griffin, John 
Cobb stands out as the prime representative of deep religious pluralism. As mentioned, 
Cobb was originally asked to contribute to the Myth of Christian Uniqueness, but 
declined this offer on account of his reservations about the idea (held by other 
contributors to the volume) that religion has a ―normative essence,‖ that can be used to 
evaluate religions. Cobb was not convinced that all religions had the same end, or even 
the same origin. Consequently, he contributed to the critical volume that followed The 
Myth of Christian Uniqueness. Cobb‘s critique, again, was not against pluralism per se 
but against the narrow way in which it was being defined.
11
  
Griffin‘s critique of pluralism, and his re-conceptualization of it, stems from the 
same misgiving about ―traditional‖ forms of religious pluralism that Cobb had. And, I 
believe it is largely successful in making a case for pluralisms such as Cobb‘s which 
ground religious pluralism in both deep soteriological differences and deep ontological 
differences in religions. 
 
Perry Schmidt-Leukel’s Defence of Religious Pluralism and its Threefold Typology 
As discussed above, Schmidt-Leukel defines religion as having the property of mediating 
a salvific knowledge of ultimate reality,
12
 and he argues that there are logically only four 
possible answers to the question of whether a religion does in fact mediate salvific 
knowledge of ultimate reality. The first possible answer is ―no‖ that it does not and this 
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 Cobb, “Beyond ‘Pluralism’," 81. 
12
 Schmidt-Leukel, “Exclusivism, Inclusivism, Pluralism,” 18-19; cited in text by page number hereafter.  
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position is called (1) atheism/naturalism. The next three answers are all variations on a 
positive response to the question. The first of these affirms that ―religions‖ do mediate 
salvific knowledge of Ultimate Reality but further claims that there has been (and can be) 
only one instance of this. This view that there is only one religion is called (2) 
exclusivism. The final two positions are variations on the position that holds (a) that 
religions mediate salvific knowledge of Ultimate Reality and (b) that there is more than 
one instance of religion. The first of these positions further claims that there is ―one 
singular maximus‖ or one ultimate form of religion. This position is inclusivism.  The 
second of these positions further claims there is no singular maximus. This is pluralism. 
(19) Following is Schmidt-Leukel‘s account of the four types: 
(0)
13
  Atheism/Naturalism: Salvific knowledge of a transcendent reality is 
mediated by none of the religions (because a transcendent reality does not exist). 
(1) Exclusivism: Salvific knowledge of a transcendent reality is mediated by only 
one religion (which naturally will be one‘s own).   
(2) Inclusivism: Salvific knowledge of a transcendent reality is mediated by more 
than one religion (not necessarily by all of them), but only one of these mediates it 
in a uniquely superior way (which again will naturally be one‘s own).  
(3) Pluralism: Salvific knowledge of a transcendent reality is mediated by more 
than one religion (not necessarily by all of them), and there is none among them 
whose mediation of that knowledge is superior to all the rest. (19-20)  
For Schmidt-Leukel, each of these positions says something about true religion 
which is defined in terms of having the property of mediating salvific knowledge of 
                                                          
13
  Schmidt-Leukel identifies atheist/naturalism as the “0” position to emphasize that there are only three 
religious responses to the question of whether or not religion mediates salvific knowledge of Ultimate 
Reality; it also helps to preserve the traditional threefold quality of the typology.  
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ultimate reality. Naturalism says there is not religion in this sense, and is therefore 
dismissed as a nonreligious response. Exclusivism says there is only one true religion; 
inclusivism says there are many true religions but one that is uniquely superior to the rest; 
pluralism says there are many true religions. Leukel- Schmidt continues his argument by 
showing what each of these positions looks like in the context of Christian theology:  
Christian exclusivism, would mean saving revelation is found only within 
Christianity and not within any other religion. This does not necessarily entail that 
all non-Christians are lost. Soft or moderate exclusivists could hold that there are 
ways by which God could save non-Christians as individuals (for example, 
through post-mortem encounter with the gospel).  
Christian inclusivism would hold that non-Christian religions sometimes entail 
elements of revelation and grace that are capable of supporting salvific life. But 
since – according to Christian inclusivism – all salvation is finally through Christ, 
the revelation to which Christianity testifies is in a unique sense superior to any 
other form of knowledge of God, which in comparison with the Christian 
revelation remains necessarily fragmentary, incomplete, implicit, obscure. 
Christian Pluralism would entail that some other religions – usually the major 
world religions (but perhaps only one other religion) – are in a theological sense 
on par with Christianity. According to Christian pluralism these other religions 
testify to the same ultimate transcendent reality despite the different forms this 
testimony takes, and they do so with the same genuine authenticity and equal 
salvific potential. (21) 
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In this tradition- specific version of the typology, Christianity, as the home 
religion, is identified with true religion; as the only religion (exclusivism), the best 
religion (inclusivism), and one among many true religions (pluralism).  
 
Insights from David Ray Griffin and Perry Schmidt-Leukel 
Schmidt-Leukel differentiates inclusivism and pluralism on the basis of a claim that each 
makes with respect to true religion. Inclusivism says that there are many forms of true 
religion but, among these, there is a singular maximus. Pluralism, like inclusivism, says 
that there are many forms of true religion but, among these, there is no singular maximus.  
Moreover there are implications following from these claims.  
The claim that there is a singular maximus – which according to Schmidt-Leukel 
will always be identified with the home religion – leads to the conclusion that the home 
religion is the uniquely superior, or the best religion. The claim that there is no singular 
maximus, in contrast, leads to the conclusion that at least some other religions are on par 
with the home religion with respect to being true; which here means being productive of 
salvific knowledge of ultimate reality. (It is assumed here that the home religion is a true 
religion.) 
I am in superficial agreement with Schmidt-Leukel that inclusivism and pluralism 
can be differentiated in terms of the former postulating a singular maximus, and the latter 
in rejecting the idea of a singular maximus – and, here, I understand a ―singular 
maximus‖ to be the same thing as a singular absolute religious essence or an ultimate 
religious end.
14
  But Schmidt-Leukel does not adequately explain how the pluralist gets 
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from rejecting the idea of a singular maximus, to the positive idea that there are many 
true religions. It seems just as plausible that one could come to the conclusion that there 
are no true religions. Thus, pluralists must necessarily be taking another step in order to 
arrive at the conclusion that there are many true religions; and, for understanding this step 
Griffin's defence of pluralism is more helpful than Schmidt-Leukel‘s.  
If we begin by limiting our discussion to identist pluralism, Griffin says that this 
form of pluralism involves the (generic) rejection of absolutism and affirmation of the 
value of other religious traditions. But, the means for validating the truth of other 
religions is, for identist pluralists, the identification of a religious commonality. This 
religious commonality allows (identist) pluralists to affirm the truth of at least some other 
religions, and avoid the undesirable consequence of a ―debilitating relativism.‖ But this is 
the sticking point on which the neo-inclusivists have argued that pluralists are just like 
exclusivists or inclusivists; the religious commonality excludes certain religions from the 
category of true religion (like exclusivism), and it includes religions in the category of 
true only so long as they conform to the religious commonality (like inclusivism). 
Griffin argues that the identification of a religious commonality is what makes 
pluralism superficial. It doesn't acknowledge the truth of different religions with respect 
to their deep differences, only their shared commonality; something like recognising the 
differences between a chocolate ice cream cone and a strawberry ice cream cone. Deep 
religious pluralism overcomes this problem by grounding religious diversity not, in a 
religious commonality, but in the deep structural differences inherent to Ultimate reality. 
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I agree with Griffin that a pluralistic metaphysics is at the heart of what he calls 
deep religious pluralism and what I will, henceforth, call metaphysical religious 
pluralism. But I am only in partial agreement with his analysis of identist pluralism. 
First, I suggest that the rejection of the idea that religion can be identified with 
God, or even with a divine concept of religion – an absolute religious essence or ultimate 
religious end – is a defining characteristic of identist pluralism. The idea of strong 
identity between God and religion is present in forms of Christian exclusivism wherein 
Christ is identified with God as one person of the Triune God, and by extension the 
Church as the body of Christ is also identified with God. And, it is present in forms of 
Christian inclusivism wherein religion is fulfilled in an ultimate end or an absolute 
essence – an end which is ultimate because it is communion with the Triune God, or an 
essence which is absolute because it is the consummation of the trinitarian movement of 
existence.
15
 Let us briefly consider the case of John Hick as representative. 
John Hick is not a Trinitarian but a Unitarian, and though he gave some 
theological attention to rejecting the idea of God as Trinity, he was more concerned with 
rejecting the idea of the incarnation of Christ. Returning to the passage quoted above, if 
God founded Christianity, then there is no question for Hick that Christianity is the one 
and only religion. Hick comes to this conclusion by assuming that God or Ultimate 
Reality is one. If God is one and Christ is God, then Christianity as the body of Christ 
must be God – and, like God, exclusive and wholly other. Therefore Hick must reject the 
doctrine of the incarnation of Christ in order to avoid the conclusion that Christianity is 
exclusively true.  
                                                          
15
 See Lai, Trinitarian Theology of Religions, especially Chapter 9, and Tillich, Systematic Theology III to see 
how Tillich understood “the Trinity” as a way of thinking about the movement from essence to existence 
rather than as “stagnant” Persons.      
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In other words, John Hick must reject the idea that religion can be identified with 
the Real, or with some sort of ultimate/absolute participation in the Real; otherwise, 
religion like the Real is one and only. I will call concepts of religion that posit a strong 
identity between religion and God, ―divine religion.‖ Hick rejects the idea of divine 
religion – that is the ground of all forms of exclusivism and inclusivism – and posits, 
instead, a humanistic concept of religion. A humanistic concept of religion rejects the 
idea of strong identity between God and religion. For Hick, religion is human perception 
and conception, of Ultimate Reality that can never be identified with Ultimate Reality as 
such. The referent of religion is the Real but it never becomes the Real. 
Thus, we can say that the rejection of the idea of strong identity between God and 
humanity – and a humanistic concept of religion – is characteristic of ―identist‖ 
pluralism.  And, thus, we will call identist pluralistic humanistic religious pluralism.  
Second, I also disagree with Griffin‘s characterization of humanistic religious 
pluralism as superficial because it reduces all religions to a commonality – or, at least I 
suggest that we can say something more precise about this commonality. 
I believe Perry Schmidt-Leukel is right in his assertion that pluralists reject the 
notion of a singular maximus, or a singular ultimate religious end or essence. Thus, we 
can conclude that the common religious reality identified by humanistic religious 
pluralists is not a singular maximus. A singular maximus is a particular religious end or 
essence that is not exclusively identified with any particular religious tradition, but is the 
singular fulfilment for all religious persons and all religions. 
Humanistic religious pluralists reject, in principle, the idea that there is a singular 
fulfilment for all religious persons and all religions; and the accompanying idea of divine 
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religion. Thus, the religious commonality identified by humanistic religious pluralists 
cannot be the singular fulfilment of all religious persons and all religious traditions; it 
cannot be an absolute essence and it cannot be an ultimate end. 
What is it then? I suggest that that it is best understood as a religious universal 
that takes shape in multiple forms in the various religious traditions. This is the main 
difference between inclusivists and humanistic religious pluralists: the religious 
commonality for inclusivists is an absolute essence or an ultimate end, and the religious 
commonality for humanistic pluralists is a universal that is the ground of multiple 
particular religious expressions. 
The inclusivist‘s religious commonality is the divine and singular end point of 
religion; the humanistic pluralist‘s religious commonality is the ―origin‖ of religion. 
Religious diversity comes to an end in the inclusivist‘s commonality; religious diversity 
has its beginning in the humanistic pluralist‘s commonality. 
To be sure, a religious universal excludes some things from the category of being 
religious by limiting what can be counted as a religion (by virtue of participating in the 
universal). But all religions are not collapsed into one fulfilment the way they are with an 
ultimate end or an absolute essence; rather, they simply express the universal in a 
diversity of ways. Thus, true religion, or the religious commonality, functions similarly to 
universal virtues such as kindness – kindness is something that we only see in particular 
acts and every act of kindness no matter what it looks like is equally an act of kindness. 
Humanistic religious pluralism rejects the idea of a supernaturally revealed and 
exclusive religion, as well as the idea of a singular absolute essence or a singular ultimate 
end; instead, it employs the idea of a religious universal which finds equal expression in 
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the various religions of the world. Thus, we will also refer to humanistic religious 
pluralism as humanistic-universalistic religious pluralism.
16
   
As for the other type of religious pluralism – metaphysical religious pluralism –  it 
also rejects the idea of a supernaturally revealed and exclusive religion, and the idea of a 
singular absolute essence or a singular ultimate end; instead it employs the idea of a 
pluralistic absolute essence or a pluralistic ultimate end, which allows it to affirm the 
equality of different religions with respect to their deepest differences. Instead of 
rejecting the idea of divine religion, like humanistic pluralism does, it rejects the idea of a 
unitary metaphysics. Here, we are still in agreement with Schmidt-Leukel that pluralism 
rejects the idea of a singular maximus but, in this case, it is the idea of ―singular‖ rather 
than ―maximus‖ that is rejected. Humanistic pluralists reject the ―maximus,‖ and so posit 
a religious universal which generates religious diversity, rather than bring it to an end. 
Metaphysical pluralists reject the ―singular,‖ and so posit a ―pluralistic maximus‖ that 
never collapses into a singular. 
Metaphysical pluralists can conceive of a ―pluralistic metaphysics‖ in different 
ways. Cobb and Griffin employ a Whiteheadian metaphysics that conceives of Ultimate 
Reality as having three different aspects, wherein each ―Ultimate Reality‖ is capable of 
generating a different, but potentially equal, ultimate religious experience. Stephen 
Kaplan‘s metaphysical model of Ultimate Reality allows reality to be seen from three 
different perspectives - each prospective is of the same reality and therefore equally true. 
My own version of metaphysical pluralism employs the tripartite metaphysics of  British 
mathematician George Spencer Brown. Using this metaphysics, the totality of Reality is 
conceived as a tripartite structure that can be perceived, necessarily differently, from each 
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 In most cases, I will use the short form of “humanistic pluralism.”   
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of its three different aspects. Each different perspective offers an equally true vision of 
the same Reality, but a different vision since each is constructed from a different vantage 
point within the same Reality. 
If the problem of religious exclusivism is summarised as a transitive argument – 
wherein God is one and only, religion is God, and therefore religion is one and only – 
metaphysical pluralism attacks the problem from the opposite side of humanistic 
pluralism. Humanistic pluralism challenges the notion that religion can be God or that 
there can be strong identity between religion and God – and, it uses this idea to avoid the 
conclusion that religion, like God, is one and only. From the other side, metaphysical 
pluralism challenges the notion that God or Ultimate Reality is one. Its basic argument, 
expressed in similar terms, is that Ultimate Reality is plural, religion is identified with 
Ultimate reality, and therefore religion, like Ultimate Reality, is plural. 
It might be asked if the positing of a tripartite Ultimate Reality, is not just a 
philosophical version of the Trinitarian God. This would account for the profound 
similarities that will be seen between, for example, my tripartite theory of religious 
diversity, and Mark Heim's Trinitarian theory of religious diversity. The main difference 
between these two is that the Trinitarian theology collapses all ends into a singular 
(Christian) end; whereas the tripartite philosophy insists that there is no ultimate 
perspective that unites all perspectives. 
Both humanistic religious pluralism and metaphysical religious pluralism, make a 
radical departure from traditional Christian doctrine. Humanistic religious pluralism 
rejects the strong identity between Christ and his Body (Christianity) and God, i.e., it 
rejects the doctrine of the incarnation in order to avoid the conclusion that Christianity 
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like God is one and only. Metaphysical religious pluralism rejects the idea that Ultimate 
Reality is one, i.e., it rejects the doctrine of the Trinity in order to avoid the conclusion 
that religion finds its consummation in a singular essence or end, or in communion with 
the Triune God. 
It is therefore not surprising that religious pluralism is rejected by traditional 
Christians. And not only by exclusivist Christians who claim that Christianity is the one 
and only religion, but also by old and new inclusivists who also reject exclusivism by 
rejecting the idea that religion as such is tied to a particular form of religion. Inclusivists, 
by submitting particular religion, to an absolute religious essence or an ultimate religious 
end, allow for the affirmation of religious diversity; indeed, they allow for a very positive 
affirmation of religious diversity. But all forms of religious inclusivism conceptualise the 
absolute religious essence or ultimate religious end in either explicitly Christian 
Trinitarian terms, or philosophical terms that are implicitly Christian – and more 
importantly, for this discussion, as participation in something that is singularly ultimate.  
I will now try to state, precisely, where I disagree with Schmidt-Leukel in 
distinguishing between inclusivism and pluralism. For Schmidt-Leukel, inclusivists say 
that there are many religions and a singular maximus; pluralists, in contrast, say that there 
are many religions but no singular maximus. If a singular maximus is understood as a 
singular ultimate form of religion conceived as an essence or an end, then I agree that 
pluralists reject this idea. But if singular maximus is understood more broadly as the 
―ultimate‖ form of religion, then, I maintain that all pluralists affirm this idea, with the 
significant qualification that the ultimate form of religion is pluriform or multiform. For 
metaphysical pluralists, the ultimate form of religion may still be an end or essence, but 
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the end or essence is inherently plural. For humanistic pluralists, the idea of a religious 
universal replaces the idea of an end or essence altogether, as the ultimate form of 
religion, and the religious universal is inherently plural.
17
  
 In short, pluralists, like inclusivists, affirm the idea of an ultimate form of religion 
– but, unlike inclusivists, reject the idea that the ultimate form of religion is uniform, in 
favour of the idea that the ultimate form of religion is multiform or pluralistic.   
 
Summary of Differences between Inclusivism and Pluralism   
At this point it is possible to summarize the main differences between religious 
inclusivism and religious pluralism. First, inclusivism and pluralism are both grounded in 
the common idea that there is an ―ultimate‖ form of religion. Second, inclusivism and 
pluralism make different claims about the nature of the ultimate form of religion: 
Inclusivism says that the ultimate form of religion is uniform or singular; pluralism says 
that the ultimate form of religion is multiform or plural. Third, pluralists never accept 
both the metaphysics and the concept of religion employed by inclusivists: Inclusivists 
employ both the concept of divine religion and a unitary metaphysics, and thus come to 
the conclusion that religion, in the end, is one; pluralists necessarily reject either the 
inclusivist‘s concept of divine religion or their unitary metaphysics. Humanistic religious 
pluralists reject the concept of divine religion; they replace this with a concept of human 
religion, and then posit a religious universal in order to come to the conclusion that 
religion is plural. Metaphysical religious pluralists reject the unitary metaphysics; they 
                                                          
17
 I realize that my use of “ultimate” in this context denudes it of its usual meaning as the fulfillment or 
final realization of a process of becoming; or, at least it does with respect to the religious universals 
employed by humanistic pluralists.  In this case, it would be more accurate to speak of the universal form 
of religion that is inherently diverse.      
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replace this with a pluralistic metaphysics in order to come to the conclusion that religion 
is plural.  
And, now it is also possible to summarise the fourfold typology of theories of 
religious diversity.  
 
5. A Fourfold Typology: Exclusivism, Inclusivism, Humanistic-Universalistic 
Pluralism, Metaphysical Pluralism  
Religious exclusivism is an argument based on the premises that God is one and only, 
that religion is identified with God, and therefore religion like God is one and only. In 
Christianity, religious exclusivism takes form within a Trinitarian concept of God. The 
Triune God is Father Son and Holy Spirit. The Christian church is the body of the 
Incarnate Son of God, Jesus Christ. The Christian church is enfolded within the Triune 
Reality of the one and only God, and so is itself one and only.  
Religious inclusivism rejects the idea that there is one exclusive religion; it 
therefore rejects the idea that a particular religious form of religion, as such, can be 
identified with God. It does this by relating particular religions to a religious ideal; 
particular religions are attempts to realize an absolute religious essence or the means to 
achieve an ultimate religious end. Thus, all religions are religions to the degree that they 
realize the essence or lead to the end. This logical structure creates the idea of degrees of 
religiousness, that move between the relative and the absolute, the incomplete and the 
complete, the elementary and the ultimate, the natural and the consummate, the inferior 
and the superior, the primitive and the evolved, and so on. Within Christianity religious 
inclusivism, the absolute religious essence, or the ultimate religious end is Christian, 
143 
 
whether explicitly acknowledged or only implicitly obvious. Specifically, the end is 
communion with the Triune God, or relationship with God that is characterized by neither 
complete separation from God nor complete dissolution in God. In either case, religions 
lead up to the singular end or essence, and all religious diversity ceases in the fulfilment 
of the final end or consummation of the absolute essence. The main idea is that ―in the 
end‖ or in the ―final consummation‖ religion is one because here religion participates in 
the absolute and ultimate reality of God; hence, religion, like God is one and only. Thus, 
inclusivism comes to the same conclusion as exclusivism – but unlike exclusivism which 
is rooted in a timeless moment – it (literally) takes time for inclusivism to reach this 
conclusion. 
Neo-Christian religious inclusivism is different from traditional Christian 
religious inclusivism insofar as it places greater emphasis on the value of non-Christian 
religions, with respect to realising the absolute essence or attaining the ultimate end. 
Other religions are not begrudgingly recognised as mere way stations on the road to the 
ultimate end (similar to apes on the way to humanity) but are positively affirmed as 
necessary participants in the movement towards final salvation; or, their insights are not 
dismissed as irrelevant errors, but as building blocks of absolute and true religious 
understanding. 
Both forms of religious pluralism reject the idea of a singular maximus, or the 
idea that there is a singular absolute religious essence, or a singular ultimate religious 
end. They do, however, affirm the idea that there is an ultimate form of religion – as an 




 Humanistic-universalistic religious pluralism, assumes the oneness of God or 
Ultimate Reality. It therefore, must reject, the idea of strong identity between religion and 
ultimate reality; in other words, it must reject the idea of divine religion. This means 
rejecting the Christian doctrine of the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ. If this idea is 
accepted along with the idea that God is one and only, one cannot avoid the conclusion 
that Christ and Christianity are also one and only. Humanistic-universalistic pluralism, 
likewise, must reject the idea of an absolute religious essence, because this too, when 
fulfilled leads to the conclusion that ultimately there is no religious diversity – in the end 
God is all in all; in the end is the Kingdom of God; in the end is consciousness of the 
essence of religion, and so on. All of these are singular realities that bring religious 
diversity to an end in one fulfilment. Nonetheless, humanistic pluralism is not simply 
about rejecting the idea of a singular religious essence or end. Positively, it is about 
affirming the plurality of true religion, and it does by employing the idea of a religious 
universal, that is only visible in its multitude of (equally authentic) manifestations.       
Metaphysical religious pluralism, attacks the other premise of the exclusivist and 
inclusivist argument that now or eventually leads to the oneness of religion. It accepts the 
idea of strong identity between religion and Ultimate Reality or the idea of divine 
religion, but it rejects the idea that Ultimate Reality itself is one and only or a unitary 
metaphysics; thereby, it is able to  avoid the conclusion that religion must also be one and 
only. It rejects the idea of one God, and it rejects the idea of a singular absolute religious 
essence or a singular ultimate end that is grounded in the idea of one God. It argues, 
instead that, Ultimate Reality is itself plural, and therefore there is a plurality of ultimate 
ends and a plurality of absolute essences. This metaphysical plurality guarantees religious 
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diversity at the deepest level, and the equality of different religions with respect to their 
deepest differences.  
We will now use these typological definitions to categorise various theories, 
philosophies and theologies of religious diversity that emerged in the late twentieth 
century, which are difficult to classify using the traditional threefold typology.  
As discussed, this difficulty has led some to the conclusion that the threefold 
typology is incoherent and needs to be abandoned.  I believe that the foundation of the 
classic threefold typology is useful – but, this foundation needs to be strengthened, 
through a better understanding of its types, and it needs to be built upon to accommodate 
recent developments. It is my hope that I have now sufficiently fortified the foundation of 
the threefold typology and added a usable new fourth ―floor‖ with the above distinctions 
between, and definitions of, exclusivism, (neo)inclusivism, humanistic pluralism, and 
metaphysical pluralism. And, now, we will put this new typology to the test by using it to 
try to better understand recent Western theories of religious diversity. 
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PART 2  
LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY ALTERNATIVES TO  






Humanistic-Universalistic Religious Pluralism 
 
1. Introduction  
I have argued that the main idea of religious pluralism is that the ultimate form of religion 
is multiform of plural.  
Both exclusivism and inclusivism are premised on the idea that one can speak of 
God or Ultimate Reality as one, and the idea that there is strong identity between religion 
and God – and, these two ideas necessarily lead to the conclusion that true religion, like 
God, is one or singular. It is logically impossible to hold both the idea that God is one and 
the idea that there is strong identity between God and religion, and come to the 
conclusion that true religion is plural. Consequently, pluralists – those who claim that 
religion is plural – must reject either the premise that God is one or the premise that there 
is strong identity between God and religion.  
Those who I designate as humanistic-universalistic pluralists, are those who 
maintain the idea that God is one, and consequently reject the idea that there is strong 
identity between God in religion. Thus, humanistic-universalistic pluralists reject ideas – 
such as incarnation, supernatural revelation, and divine manifestation – that suggest 
strong identity between God and religion. Instead, they prefer to see religion as a natural 
or human construct, or as a human response to the Real/Transcendence,  so as to avoid 
the conclusion that some religion is singularly true because it is ―founded by God.‖1  
                                                          
1
 I am using the term “humanistic” in a very restricted sense.  It is used to connote the rejection of the 
idea of strong identity between God and religion, and nothing else typically associated with the term.     
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Also, I have argued that humanistic-universalistic pluralists do not employ the 
idea of a single religious end or a single religious essence; this is an idea that belongs to 
religious inclusivism. Instead, they employ the idea a religious ―universal,‖ or a concept 
of religion that unifies multiple forms of religion without reducing them to a single form. 
A religious essence reduces all forms to one form; a religious end terminates all religions 
in one destination; a religious universal has no form or substance apart from its manifold 
instances and, thus, may be conceived as a point of origin for its manifold instances or 
multiple manifestations. 
I suggest that, in most cases, the idea of a religious universal employed by 
humanistic-universalistic religious pluralists can be understood as an ―Aristotelian‖ 
universal as opposed to a ―Platonic‖ universal.  An Aristotelian universal has no form, 
except insofar as it is ―instantiated‖ in particular forms. A Platonic universal, in contrast, 
has a singular (and perfect) form above and beyond all particular instantiations. Thus, an 
Aristotelian universal is both inherently singular and plural, while a Platonic universal is 
inherently singular. The critics of humanistic-universalistic religious pluralism are fond 
of saying that (humanistic-universalistic  pluralists – like exclusivists and inclusivists – 
reduce religion to one common end, one common essence, or one common universal 
form of religion and, thus, are no different from exclusivists and inclusivists. This is not 
accurate: these terms cannot be conflated. A religious essence and a religious end are 
similar in that they both reduce religious diversity to a single point – to a single perfect 
form, or a single final destination, (a ―singular maximus,‖  in Schmidt-Leukel‘s term). In 
contrast, the common universal form of religion, that humanistic-universalistic pluralists 
employ, is a form that has no content except insofar as it is instantiated – or except 
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insofar as it is seen in particular forms of religion. Thus, there is no formal content to a 
religious universal, meaning it is not an essence. And since there is nothing substantive in 
this ―end‖ it is more typically conceived as a single point of origin for its multiple 
manifestations. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, I will typically shorten humanistic-
universalistic pluralism to humanistic religious pluralism. This does not, however, 
suggest that the rejection of the idea of strong identity between Ultimate Reality and 
religion is the most important feature if this type of pluralism. Indeed, I maintain that the 
employment of a religious universal is just as important, and is perhaps in more need of 
emphasis, since this is the feature of humanistic-universalistic religious pluralisms that 
has typically gone unnoticed, by its critics, and led to misunderstandings about this type 
of pluralism.  
Thus, the three main features of humanistic-universalistic religious pluralism are 
as follows: 1) the rejection of the idea of a singular maximus, and the affirmation of the 
plurality of true religion; 2) the affirmation that God (or Ultimate Reality) is one, and the 
rejection of the idea of strong identity between God and religion; 3) the employment of 
the idea of a religious universal, as opposed to the idea of a religious end or the idea of a 
religious essence, as the ultimate form of religion.
2
 
In addition to these three main features of humanistic religious pluralism, I would 
also like to suggest that contact with religious others is a contributing social factor to the 
emergence of humanistic religious pluralism. 
                                                          
2
 This first feature is shared with metaphysical pluralists; the second two features are unique to 
humanistic-universalistic pluralists.   
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We will now examine the pluralisms of three humanistic religious pluralists: 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith, John Hick, and Paul Knitter. My presentations of these three 
authors will not try to give comprehensive accounts of their theologies/philosophies of 
religions; instead, I will simply try to show that their pluralisms have been influenced by 
contact with religious others, and that they exhibit the three main features of humanistic 
religious pluralism outlined above. 
 
2. Wilfred Cantwell Smith: Religious Pluralism by Definition  
Smiths’s Encounter with the Religious Other  
Wilfred Cantwell Smith‘s gateway to encounter with religious others was Christian 
mission.
3
 Smith was born (1916) and raised in Toronto, Ontario. The Toronto that Smith 
grew up in was unlike the cosmopolitan city that it is today. Called ―Toronto the Good,‖ 
the city was very British, conservative, observantly religious, and ―clannish.‖ It was 
clannish insofar as those not born in Canada (i.e., immigrants from the British Isles) 
tended to not form close social ties with Canadian born Torontonians.  Citizens of the city 
exhibited ―earnestness and seriousness of purpose, honesty and quality in workmanship, 
and a quiet courtesy and dignity in conduct.‖4 These characteristics were emphasised in 
Smith‘s household and consequently became a part of his own character. The only thing 
atypical of the Smith‘s household, with respect to its cultural setting, was a spirit of 
―internationalism‖ wherein guests from other cultures were warmly welcomed. 
Moreover, Wilfred himself was encouraged to embrace the world, as reflected in the year 
he spent in Spain and Egypt prior to attending university.  
                                                          
3
 The following biographical material is taken from Willard Oxtoby’s introduction to Smith, Religious 
Diversity.  
4
 Oxtoby, “Editor’s Introduction,” ix.  
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As for religion, Smith was raised as an active Presbyterian, and his religious 
commitment involved both belief and practice. Religious feeling also became significant 
for Smith, perhaps on account of his mother‘s Methodist background. Indeed, it could be 
said that feeling as faith – or the quality of an individual‘s personal relationship with God 
– is the core of religion for Smith. Smith would later go on to argue that belief is an 
expression of faith, of which many types of expression are possible. Such an attitude 
towards Christian beliefs and doctrines would allow Smith to form some relatively 
unorthodox beliefs of his own – particularly his belief that God‘s grace and salvation was 
not limited to Christians. But despite being unorthodox, Smith remained grounded in a 
constant orthopraxy that could be seen in his strict personal morality and regular church 
attendance. 
Yet, despite being raised as a Presbyterian, Smith identified himself more strongly 
with the Christian community at large. Thus, as an undergraduate student at the 
University of Toronto, Smith became involved in activities that crossed denominational 
lines. Smith was member of both major interdenominational groups on campus at the 
time; the Toronto branch of the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, and 
the Student Christian Movement of which he became the president in 1937. As a result of 
this involvement, Smith‘s main social network while at the University of Toronto 
consisted of the children and grandchildren of Christian missionaries to Asia – including 
his future wife, Muriel MacKenzie Struthers. 
In 1939, Smith went to Britain for post-graduate studies, where he pursued studies 
in both Christian theology, and Arabic and Islamic Studies. In 1941, Smith went to India 
to become the representative among Muslims of the Canadian Oversees Mission Council. 
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He was stationed in the Islamic city of Lahore where he taught Indian history at Forman 
Christian College. In 1943, while still in India, Smith was ordained as a minister to an 
interdenominationally supported assignment.  This ordination was recognized by the 
Presbyterian Church of Canada and subsequently Smith was an ordained Presbyterian 
minister. In 1945, Smith returned to North America to complete a doctorate in the 
Department of Oriental Languages at Princeton University.
5
  
Smith obviously received an elite Western education – from a year at the Lycee 
Champollion in Grenoble, France, to his high school years at Upper Canada College, to 
his undergraduate studies at the University of Toronto, to his graduate studies at 
Cambridge University and Princeton University. Smith would eventually come to see the 
sort of humanistic education that he received as belonging to a tradition that could be 
traced back to ancient Greece; indeed, as one of the world‘s great cumulative traditions 
that could be thought of as running parallel to other religious traditions such as 
Christianity. 
Nonetheless, Smith‘s living contact with religious others certainly influenced his 
thinking about religious diversity as much as his education. This experience, with 
religious others, influenced Smith‘s thinking in at least two significant ways. First, it kept 
him from thinking about other religions (and Islam in particular) in terms of broad 
generalizations; Smith saw some of the diversity of the Islamic world firsthand and, 
                                                          
5
 Smith’s academic career did take one unexpected detour when the work he submitted for his doctoral 
dissertation was rejected at Cambridge University. The work – latter published as Modern Islam in India: a 
Social Analysis  – was rejected on account of being too Marxist (private conversation with Professor Sheila 
McDonough of Concordia University).  According to Oxtoby, Smith had become attracted to Marxist 
thought in his late teens and twenties on account of his concern for social welfare and his training as an 
historian.  After the war, Smith became more critical of Marxism but continued to view history as a 
process and maintained the moral concern that had originally drawn him to Marxism (Oxtoby, “Editor’s 
Introduction,” xii-xiii).      
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therefore, knew that Islam was not a uniform reality. Second, it allowed Smith to form 
relationships with religious others, and come to the conclusion that these others were not 
unsaved and without God, but had a religious quality to their lives just as Christians did.  
In the early sixties, Smith would reconcile these two observations about the religious 
other into a new definition of religion. This definition of religion would allow for the 
recognition of both religious diversity and the authentic religiosity of the religious other. 
In 1949, Smith returned to Canada to accept a teaching position at McGill 
University. Smith was the first W.M. Birks Professor of Comparative Religion – a new 
non-ecclesiastical position that came into being with the formation of McGill‘s Faculty of 
Divinity in 1949. In 1951, Smith, while continuing to hold his divinity chair, organized 
McGill‘s Institute of Islamic Studies, and served as its first director.  In this role, Smith 
was able to put his stamp on the study of religion. The Institute was structured, by Smith, 
such that half of the faculty members and half of the graduate degree candidates would be 
Muslims. The idea here was that through dialogue, and their common commitment to the 
Western academic tradition, the Western and Islamic students would come to mutually 
acceptable representations of Islam. 
When Smith took up his position at McGill, he and his family participated in a 
United Church congregation. The United Church of Canada formed in 1925, as part of an 
ecumenical movement, and saw about half of the Presbyterians in Canada join Canada‘s 
Methodists and Congregationalists. Smith was raised in, and ordained as a minister in, the 
―continuing‖ Presbyterian Church. In 1961, Smith decided to take a more active 
theological role in the church, and consequently had his ordination transferred to the 
United Church of Canada – which he felt was a more fertile ground for establishing 
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positive relations with non-Christian religions.  During this time Smith began to develop 
his ideas about religious diversity in earnest and this culminated in the publication The 
Meaning and End of Religion (1963), wherein he proffered a new definition of religion 
(as cumulative tradition and faith) that could account for both religious diversity and the 
presence of authentic religiosity in non-Christians – and the publication of The Faith of 




In 1964, Smith accepted a position at Harvard University as the second Director 
of the Center for the Study of World Religions (est. 1957). At the Center, Smith‘s 
concern with the religious other expanded to include not just Muslims, but all of the other 
―cumulative traditions‖ in our ―religiously plural world.‖ In 1973, Smith took up a five 
year post at Dalhousie University that afforded him more time to write. This resulted in 
the publications of Belief and History (1977), Faith and Belief (1979), and Smith‘s most 
developed writings on religions pluralism, Towards a World Theology (1980).      
We will now examine some of Smith‘s literature starting with a piece, originally 
delivered as his inaugural lecture to the Birks Chair in Comparative Religion at McGill. 
This lecture was later published as ―Comparative Religion: Wither – and Why?‖ in a 
volume on methodological issues in the comparative study of religion. 
 
Two Types of Religious Studies Scholarship  
In ―Comparative Religion: Whither – and Why?‖ Smith argues that a new, more 
advanced, form of comparative religion is on the horizon. This new form of comparative 
                                                          
6
 Even though the coining of the term “pluralism” is commonly attributed to Alan Race, the idea of a 
“religiously plural world” can be traced back to this publication by Smith.   
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religion transcends that of the 19
th
 century which preoccupied itself with the externals of 
religion, with the ―accumulation, organization, and analysis of facts.‖7 Instead of merely 
―searching out material, recording it carefully, scrutinizing it systematically, interpreting 
it‖ –  and thus producing an abundance of information about the externals of religion – 
the new form of comparative religion has begun to concern itself with the meaning of 
these externals for those involved with them, or with the faith in men‘s hearts. (32)And, 
for Smith, the faith in men‘s hearts is what religions themselves are about. 
Smith insists that the study of religion cannot be based on direct observation like 
the physical sciences, but must be made by inference: We can infer a human or religious 
concern from an observable manifestation of it but we cannot say that the observable 
manifestation of it is the concern itself.
8
 Smith does not deny that the externals of religion 
– the ―symbols, institutions, doctrines, [and] practices‖ – can be studied separately, or 
apart from the meaning they have for believers; as said, he saw this approach to the study 
of religion as typical of the 19
th
 century. (10) Moreover, he does not deny the value of 
this approach and, indeed, sees it in a kind of ―dialectical‖ relationship with the new more 
―personal‖ approach, of the 20th century, that deals with religions themselves: 
Certainly there has been and remains a great deal of preliminary work to be done 
in the realm of tangible data, of what I have called the externals of religion. It is 
only as these are accurately established, that the study of religions themselves can 
proceed; and this latter must continually be revised as the former becomes more 
exactly known. (35) 
                                                          
7
 W. C. Smith, “Comparative Religion,” 31; cited in the text by page number hereafter.  
8 For Smith, this is the fundamental error of the social sciences. 
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Smith contends that there is no point in debating the relative value of these two 
forms of religious scholarship because both are needed. However, it is very clear that he 
sees scholarship which contents itself with the realm of tangible data as inferior to 
scholarship which deals with this data but then also ventures into the realm of the 
meaning of religions themselves:  
Our plea would be that from now on any study of externalia recognize itself as 
such; that only those deserve to be accepted as studies of religion that do justice 
to the fact that they deal with the life of men. (37, emphasis added) 
For Smith, the study of religion is shifting from a study of data to a study of 
people insofar as a religion‘s ―institutions, formulations, and overt history‖ are being seen 
as ―clues to a personal quality of men‘s lives,‖ i.e to their faith. (38) And, to the extent 
that religious scholars are now concerned not only with understanding religious facts but 
religious faith they can certainly be aided in their understanding by having ―adherents of 
that faith as informants.‖ (38-39) In fact, Smith goes so far as to contend that scholars in 
this new age must 1) be conscious that they are writing for a ―world audience‖ (or in the 
presence of those who they write about, and 2) be willing to have any statement they 
make about a religion be validated by that religion‘s believers, or accept ―that no 
statement about a religion is valid unless it can be acknowledged by that religion‘s 
believers.‖ (40; 42) 
This second proposition gives the power to confer meaning exclusively to the 
―insider‖ or religious devotee and, thus, leaves the ―outsider‖ or religious scholar 
dependent on the insider for a true understanding of their religion. Smith stands by his 
principle but makes it clear that what he means by ―religion‖ is the faith in men‘s hearts, 
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and not the externals of religion which are equally accessible to a diligent scholar (who in 
this type of knowledge may well exceed the insider). But, again, as for the meaning of the 
external data or religious system the outsider cannot go beyond the insider:  
But about the meaning that the system has for those of faith, an outsider cannot in 
the nature of the case go beyond the believer; for their piety is the faith, and if 
they cannot recognize his portrayal then it is not their faith that he is portraying. 
(43)  
Non-Christians might write an authoritative history of the church but however 
clever, erudite, or wise they can never refute Christians on what the Christian 
faith is. The only way that outsiders can even ascertain what Christianity is, is by 
inference from Christian work art or deed; and they can never be better qualified 
than those Christians to judge whether their inferences are valid....We recognize 
also that a similar point applies to all religions. Anything I say about Islam as a 
living faith is valid only in so far as Muslims can say ―amen‖ to it. (43)    
Nonetheless, Smith does not go so far as to say that a true understanding of a 
religion requires acceptance of it. He maintains that an outsider can come to a true 
understanding of another faith through a sympathetic appreciation of it; indeed, he 
maintains the possibility of a scholar writing a history of all religions, in the sense of a 
history of faith:  
When a work does appear worthy of typifying achievement in this realm, we 
predict it will be written by a person who has seen and felt, and is morally, 
spiritually, and intellectually capable of giving expression to the fact that we - all 
of us - live in a world in which not they, not you, but some of us are Muslims, 
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some are Hindus, some are Jews, some are Christians. If he is great, he will 
perhaps be able to add, some of us are Communists, some inquirers. (58)   
For Smith, ―[all]men are brothers‖ belong to the single ―human community‖ – the 
only community there is. (59) And within this total community, the ―two matters of 
supreme importance‖ are 1) ―relations among persons‖ and 2) ―relations between men 
and God.‖ (59) This final statement, about the two matters of supreme importance, is 
significant insofar as it reflects Smith‘s Christian commitments. More specifically, it 
shows his commitment to the two greatest Christian commandments – to love God with 
all your heart, soul and mind, and to love your neighbor as yourself (Matthew 22:36-40) 
– and this, in turn, influences how Smith handles problems of religious diversity. 
This short essay is seminal. In 1963, Smith would publish his influential The 
Meaning and End of Religion wherein he develops his distinction between the internal 
and external aspects of religion into a new definition of religion, as cumulative tradition 
and faith. In 1965, Smith would publish The Faith of other Men wherein he develops the 
idea of the ―brotherhood of man‖ under (one) God, into a moral and theological 
imperative for Christians to acknowledge the work of God in other (non-Christian) faiths. 
And finally, in 1980 Smith would publish Towards a World Theology, wherein he 
develops the idea that there is only one human community into the idea that there is only 
one religious history and, thus, the possibility of developing a world theology. We will 






Religious Pluralism by Definition  
In The Meaning and End of Religion Smith rejects the idea of conceptualizing religion as 
a system of beliefs. This way of thinking distorts the reality of religion in two ways. In 
one direction, it fails by reifying religion as a uniform, unchanging reality instead of 
seeing it in its manifold diversity with its ever changing expressions. And, in the other 
direction, it fails by confusing particular expressions of faith (particularly faith expressed 
as belief) with faith itself – or with the personal quality that obtains in the hearts of all 
religious persons as a consequence of their relationship with God. 
Smith proffers a dualistic interpretation of religion to account for the two 
dimension of religion that are typically distorted when religion is understood as a system 
of belief. For Smith, religion is on one hand ―cumulative tradition,‖ and, on the other, it is 
―faith.‖ We will now examine more closely how Smith understands these two terms. 
Smith‘s dualistic interpretation of religion is grounded in his dualistic perception 
of reality. According to Smith, a religious person lives between two worlds, ―the 
mundane realm of limiting and observable and changing actuality and a realm 
transcending this.‖ (154-55) Smith is reticent about the theological or metaphysical link 
between these two worlds, but says that from a historical perspective the link is clear – it 
is ―man‖ or the ―living person.‖ Thus, religion is about a person‘s involvement in both a 
context of observable reality and a reality that is not observable by the historian. But 
Smith insists that any history of religion that omits either side of this equation, or tries to 
combine the two, distorts what it tries to report on. Thus, he suggests that we work with 
two separate concepts – cumulative tradition and faith. (154-56)  
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Smith initially defines faith as ―an inner religious experience or involvement of a 
particular person; the impingement on him of the transcendent…‖ (156) In contrast, 
cumulative tradition is the observable stuff of religion: ―temples, scriptures, theological 
systems, dance patterns, legal and other social institutions, conventions, moral codes, 
myths, and so on….‖ (156-57) Cumulative tradition is observable to the historian; faith is 
not. Cumulative tradition ―crystallizes the material form of faith of previous generations,‖ 
and these crystallizations of faith serve present generations as ―windows through which 
they see a word beyond.‖ But the faith in each generation – indeed of every living person 
– is always new. The world beyond or the ―transcendent‖ is initially mediated by a 
person‘s received religious tradition, but then each person modifies and adds to this 
tradition. This is so because each person brings their own unique personal quality into 
their relationship with transcendence and, thus, will necessarily express this (i.e., their 
faith) in unique and different ways. These different expressions add to the tradition that 
initially serves as a window to the world beyond, and in this way religious traditions 
grow, develop, and accumulate. This is why Smith calls religious traditions ―cumulative.‖ 
(156-60)  
Smith insists that cumulative tradition is wholly historical, but that history is not a 
―closed system‖ because the living person stands in history, and the spirit of the living 
person is, to some extent, open to transcendence. Religion is an ever changing human 
―construct,‖ but one that is formed in response to transcendence. Thus, Smith is critical of 
any history of religion that tries to reduce religion to the merely mundane. (161) 
Nonetheless he is also critical of religions, such as Christianity and Islam, which 
err in the other direction by conflating mundane expressions of faith with faith itself. In 
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these traditions, faith consists ―not only in an immediate relation with transcendence but 
also in the conceptualization of the mundane.‖ (162) For example, Muslims see ―time and 
eternity‖ or the mundane and transcendence connected not only in the living person of 
faith, but also in the pages of the Qur‘an. Similarly, Christians are not content with the 
personal experience of a transcendent Christ, but see the historical Jesus as the divine on 
earth. Here, Smith is unwilling to cave to the old sort of comparative religion that is only 
able to see the mundane dimensions of Islam and Christianity, but is equally unwilling to 
simply equate the Qur‘an or Jesus with God or transcendence.  Smith‘s solution to this 
problem is, of course, his dualistic understanding of religion as both faith and cumulative 
tradition. This allows one to see the historical dimension of religion, particularly the fact 
that religions change and are influenced by their environment – something that, in his 
view, religious believers ignore. And, it also allows one to see the other-worldly 
dimension of religion, particularly the fact that religion only persists because it is a 
human response to transcendence – something that naturalistic historians ignore. (162)  
Smith shows how his concept of religion can be used to understand the complex 
issue of Islamic law or shariah.  Many Muslims, according to Smith, see their religion as 
a system. From, this perspective, ―…Islam is a transcendent truth, stable, free from the 
vicissitudes and contingencies, and it includes a law (shariah).‖ (163) But modern 
historical research is able to show that there was a time when Islam existed without the 
law. Thus, from a historical perspective, the legal system of the shariah was constructed 
by persons – such as the legal thinker al-Shafi`i – who can be studied.  But from Smith‘s 
perspective, al-Shafi`i was not simply an instrument in the hand of God or a strict product 
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of his historical context, he was one who approached faith through the tradition he grew 
up in, and then transformed this tradition through his own unique expressions of faith:  
al-Shafi`i, like the founder of every other major or minor innovation in Islamic 
history, was a person of a particular time and place, of a particular temperament 
and personality, who found himself in a milieu including a particular part of the 
always changing Islamic cumulative tradition; and that the interaction within his 
spirit of that environment with the transcendent to which that tradition introduced 
him, enabled him to produce the innovation by which the tradition was thereby 
modified. (166)  
In the same way that Muslims have identified the shariah with transcendence 
itself, Christians have tended to view Christian expressions of faith – particularly creedal 
beliefs – as wholly transcendent realities.  Smith handles such perceptions in the same 
way as he handles the perception that the shariah is a wholly transcendent reality; by 
maintaining a strict duality between faith and cumulative tradition such that every 
expression of faith is seen as having a mundane dimension, and no expression of faith is 
seen as a wholly transcendent reality (paradoxically appearing within the mundane 
world). Every form of Christianity appears within a given historical context, and then 
modifies this from the vantage point of its unique relationship with transcendence, and so 
on. Thus, Christian faith appears in ever new forms in every different time and place, and 
this adds to the ever-changing Christian cumulative tradition. (166-67)  
As for the other side of the equation – faith – Smith begins by stressing that it is 
beyond the view of the outside observer, and by emphasizing the diversity of humanity‘s 
faith. Moreover, he does not begin his explication of faith by trying to understand its 
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nature, but by trying to understand the role it has played within religious history. On the 
basis of his position that one cannot see another‘s faith but only expressions of it, Smith 
says that one thing is clear about faith: ―that faith finds expressions in many forms.‖ (171, 
emphasis added)  
Throughout religious history faith has been expressed in countless forms, in both 
word and deed.  Smith stresses that such expressions must be understood as expression of 
religious faith, in the sense that through these expressions human beings come into 
contact with something greater than themselves.  But, the closest Smith actually comes to 
saying what faith is, is that it is ―some personal and inner quality in the life of some men‖ 
– and that for these ―men‖ the observable expressions of faith are religiously significant. 
Having clarified the meaning of faith, to this extent, Smith proceeds to discuss 
some of the different forms that expressions of faith have taken. He begins with what he 
takes to be incontrovertible examples of expressions of faith – first in art, second in 
community, third in character. (172-77)  
Smith‘s explication of expressions of faith in human character is illuminating with 
respect to his stance on the equality/inequality of various religions. He suggests that the 
capacity of a faith to produce good character may be the most legitimate way to assess a 
religious tradition; but qualifies this by saying no one is in a position to make such 
judgements. (178) This dual view that other religions produce good people but that we 
ought not to make judgements about other people‘s character/religiosity reveals Smith as 
a reticent pluralist at this point. 
Having shown how faith finds expression in art, community, and human 
character, Smith advances (progressively) to more abstract expressions – those of ritual 
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and morality. And, finally, Smith moves on to the ―thorny question of faith‘s expression 
in ideas and words.‖ This presents a thorny question since religious words and ideas – in 
creeds and doctrine – are frequently conflated with faith itself.9 
As with other expressions of faith, Smith insists that expressions of faith as 
religious statements are connected to human beings (i.e., they are personal) and that they 
are connected to transcendence: ―My particular hypothesis here is that religious 
statements express the faith of persons, who as persons are involved in transcendence.‖ 
(183) But, even though these statements are connected to transcendence they are also 
thoroughly historical; they appear, disappear, and reappear at particular times and places; 
they ―serve each generation anew, and concretely in each town, each hamlet, ultimately 
each human heart, as an expression of faith by which those particular persons are 
oriented, within their mundane situations, to transcendence.‖ (183) Moreover, and 
significantly, Smith submits that there is no difference, in principle, between faith 
expressed as creed and doctrine, and faith expressed as art, religious community, good 
character, or any other way. (184)  
Continuing, Smith suggest that no intellectual religious formulation (and 
presumably no other expression of faith) refers directly to the transcendent; the 
transcendent is referred to only indirectly and only though the ―inner life of persons.‖ 
(184)  Smith suggests that this position should be particularly agreeable to Christians 
since ―Christians have claimed that they (as persons) are (through faith) in touch with 
Truth, absolute and final.  Yet this truth for them is not a theological system, but is itself 
a Person.‖ (184)The ultimate upshot of this, for Smith, is that no religious doctrine or 
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creed is sacrosanct since all such intellectualizations of faith are necessarily ―historical 
human constructs.‖ (185)An intellectual expression of faith can never capture 
transcendence – it can only indicate it. And, it can only indicate transcendence in faith or 
in the hearts of men: ―Theology is part of the traditions, is part of this world. Faith lies 
beyond theology, in the hearts of men. Truth lies beyond faith, in the heart of God.‖ (185) 
The passage just quoted reveals Smith‘s ontology. This consists of the 
world/mundane, God/transcendence, and human beings/persons of faith. Persons of faith 
participate in both realms simultaneously, but never in only one. To neglect one‘s 
relationship to transcendence is to neglect the full extent of one‘s humanity – it is to be 
not fully human.
10
 And, from the other direction, to claim complete identity with 
transcendence is to step beyond the limits of the human condition.  In one case, the 
person claims too little divinity, and, in the other, too much.  
In the end, Smith conceives of faith as a personal quality of the human being (who 
stands between the mundane and the transcendent) that has ―many sorts of expression.‖ 
(185) By way of analogy he likens faith to love. Love can be expressed in many ways – 
in words and deeds – and yet love itself, beyond its expressions, is located in persons. 
(186) 
Smith makes one final point about faith, and this point ties it back into his concept 
of cumulative tradition. This point is that all expressions of faith become the ―ground of 
faith‖ for all subsequent expressions of faith. In other words, they become a part of the 
cumulative tradition that serves as a window into the world of transcendence for those in 
each new generation, and so on. (186) 
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 The same logic is in play when Smith contrasts the greater and lesser forms of comparative religion – 
the latter being inferior because it neglects faith. 
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Despite his claim that the world of faith is blocked to the historian who only 
attains to the externals of faith, Smith contends that it is possible (at least in principle) to 
become aware of the faith of others:  
We should be able to arrive at a point where we can understand, not with 
complete assurance but with reasonable confidence, and not fully but in 
significant part, what the faith of other persons, other groups, even other ages, is 
and has been. (187) 
Smith envisions the (new sort of) scholar of comparative religion taking up this challenge 
– because only such a scholar is in touch with both dimensions of religion. This scholar 
will squarely face the myriad of religious expressions in all of their historical detail, but 
will then look beyond these expressions to see the faith that they indicate in the hearts of 
living persons. This is a process that Smith imagines will take years of ―disciplined 
investigation‖ to produce results. (189)  
Smith‘s assertion that faith is a living personal quality (of the human standing 
between this mundane world and another transcendent one) does not satisfy the 
requirements of a tangible definition. And, yet, Smith remains elusive because he is 
trying to avoid turning faith into something substantive such that it cannot take on a 
multitude of forms. Here is one formula that he employs to this end: ―To see faith truly is 
to see it actually, not ideally.‖ (189) In other words, because faith cannot be seen, except 
though its various expressions, it has no substance in itself or no singular form. In this 
regard, Smith‘s thought is Aristotelian rather than Platonic: The universal of faith cannot 
be grasped apart from its instantiations or particular expressions. There is no Platonic 
Form of faith, no essence of faith – beyond particular expressions of faith – for Smith. 
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Smith takes his perspective to the extreme, insisting that no one person‘s faith is 
the same as any other person‘s faith, and, in fact, a single person‘s faith is never the same 
from day to day:  
My faith is an act that I make, myself, naked before God. Just as there is no such 
thing as Christianity (or Islam or Buddhism), I have urged, behind which the 
Christian (the Muslim, the Buddhist) may shelter, which he may set between 
himself and the terror and spendour and living concern of God, so there is no 
generic Christian faith; no ‗Buddhist faith‘, no ‗Hindu faith‘, no ‗Jewish faith‘. 
There is only my faith, and yours, and that of my Shinto friend, of my particular 
Jewish neighbour. We are all persons, clustered in mundane communities, no 
doubt, and labeled with mundane labels but, so far as transcendence is concerned, 
encountering it each directly, personally, if at all. In the eyes of God each of us is 
a person, not a type. (191) 
Thus, not only is there no final essence of faith, and no ideal form of faith, there is no 
ideal form of any type of faith.   
But even though Smith refuses to ground his Christian faith – or any faith – in an 
essential form, his theology does have an ultimate ground. Smith‘s ultimate ground is 
God – and humanity:   
There is no ideal faith that I ought to have. There is God whom I ought to see, and 
a neighbour whom I ought to love. These must suffice me; and my faith is my 
ability to see that they abundantly more than suffice.  
168 
 
The ideal towards which I move is not an ideal of my own faith but is God 
Himself, and my neighbour himself. Faith is not part of eternity; it is my present 
awareness of eternity. 
Similarly the Muslim‘s faith is his personal awareness, which takes place on 
earth, in history, that outside of history there is only God, and that inside of 
history on earth his duty is to obey only God. This faith has varied across the 
centuries, and continues to vary, which is another way of saying that it is real. 
(192)  
Faith is not an essence, an ideal, an end, a part of eternity, or outside of history – 
such descriptors characterize God only. So, while it may seem that cumulative tradition 
represents diversity and faith represents unity in Smith‘s thought, this is not accurate. 
Faith is singular, but because it has no form except insofar as it is instantiated in 
particular forms, it is also always plural and varied. 
The common ground of religion, then, is not the cumulative tradition that 
introduces a person to transcendence, and it is not faith by which a person responds to 
transcendence – it is transcendence itself: ―The traditions evolve. Men‘s faith varies. God 
endures.‖ (192) 
Although The Meaning and End of Religion does not deal with the issue of 
religious diversity directly, in the sense of constructing a theology of religions from a 
particular religious perspective, it does proffer a pluralistic definition of (true) religion. 
Thus, it is possible, even at this early stage, to classify Smith as a pluralist according to 
our criteria. I will pause to argue this point here. 
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I suggested above that contact with religious others is a contributing social factor 
to the emergence of humanistic religious pluralism. Contact with others – particularly 
Muslims in the Muslim world – clearly contributed to Smith‘s thinking about religion and 
religions. 
 As for the main features of humanistic religious pluralism, the first is the 
rejection of a ―singular maximus,‖ and the affirmation of the plurality of true religion.  
Smith clearly rejects the idea of a singular maximus –and he clearly conceives of true 
religion as plural (by definition.) True religion, for Smith, is cumulative tradition and 
faith; both cumulative tradition and faith vary, which is to say that religion is plural. Faith 
is also, in a sense, singular but it is in no way an essence, an ideal, or an end. In Smith‘s 
thought, God, or transcendence itself, is the only (common) ideal or end. Faith is that 
through which religious persons respond to transcendence but the two are never identical. 
Faith functions like an Aristotelian universal – it is singular but has no form apart from its 
instantiations in particular expressions of faith – meaning faith is inherently plural. 
The second feature of humanistic religious pluralism is the affirmation that God 
(or ultimate reality) is one, and the rejection of the idea of strong identity between God 
and religion. Smith does not explicitly say that God, or transcendence, is one – but 
certainly this is because he doesn‘t feel the need to state the obvious. Smith does speak of 
God and transcendence in the singular, and he does identify this reality as the common 
and enduring element in religion; we can infer from this that he conceives Ultimate 
Reality as one. The rejection of the idea of strong identity between God and religion is 
very clear in Smith‘s thought. Faith, as a human response to transcendence, is the closest 
that a person can come to transcendence; but faith is not the same thing as transcendence 
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itself. Faith (and so religion) is necessarily bound to the mundane world; transcendence is 
entirely beyond the mundane word. Religion is a human enterprise; only God is God. 
The third, and final, feature of humanistic religious pluralism is the employment 
of the idea of a religious universal, as opposed to the idea of a religious end or the idea of 
a religious essence. This ground has already been covered but further clarification is in 
order. As said above, when I claim that humanistic religious pluralism employs the idea 
of a universal opposed to the idea of religious end or essence, I am using ―universal‖ in 
an Aristotelian sense. In this sense a universal cannot be identified except insofar as it is 
instantiated, or seen in particular manifestations. This is exactly the sense is which Smith 
uses the term ―faith.‖  Faith is the singular and universal element of religion that cannot 
be seen apart from its various forms, and is indicated by its various expressions. 
Thus, even now, I am confident in classifying Wilfred Cantwell Smith as a 
humanistic religious pluralist. 
 
Conceptualizing the Religious Other in a “Religiously Plural World”   
In 1965, Smith published The Faith of Other Men in which he introducers the germane 
term of ―a religiously plural world,‖ and argues that other religions ought to be 
recognized as authentic ―divine revelations.‖ 11 It had become common in some 
Protestant theological circles (influenced by Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, and Hendrik 
Kramer) to see Christianity as faith, i.e., the true religion, and other religions as religions, 
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 Even though The Faith of Other Men was published in 1965, it was based on public talks given in 1961 
and 1962. Thus, we cannot see The Faith of Other Men as a simple application, to the topic of religious 
diversity, of Smith’s pluralistic definition of religion as worked out in The Meaning and End of Religion.  It 
seems as though the ideas in both books grew up together and, indeed, they are complementary.  For this 
discussion I will focus the concluding chapter of The Faith of Other Men called “The Christian in a 
Religiously Plural World” but will site this article from Religious Diversity, edited Willard Oxtoby.     
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defined as vain human attempts to reach God. Thus, Smith‘s very title was provocative 
because he was saying that ―other men‖ had faith, and not just religion. 
Part Two of The Faith of other Men consists of an essay called ―The Christian in a 
Religiously Plural World‖ in which Smith urges Christians to move away from 
―exclusivist‖ attitudes towards other religions and towards a more ―ecumenical‖ attitude.  
The launching point for Smith‘s argument is the recognition of a great historical change; 
specifically of ―a true cosmopolitanism‖ wherein all the world‘s communities, including 
its religious communities, are coming to see that they belong to the one world of 
humanity. This  great transformation was impacting Christian mission to the point where 
the Church was no longer just trying to convert the irreligious and merely religious, but 
was confronting the ―mankind‘s other faiths.‖12  
From Smith‘s perspective (at the time), traditional Christian mission was in severe 
crises, if not already dead:  Christians no longer wanted to proselytize to non-Christians, 
and non-Christians certainly didn‘t want to be on the receiving end of such efforts.  As 
for Christian theology, Smith contends that traditional isolationist or separatist theology – 
wherein the theologian formulates his or her views unaware of the entire history of 
human faith – is also coming to an end. He imagines that Christian theologians, if they 
are to be taken seriously, will now have to form their views in light of other faiths, in 
much the same way that traditional Christian theologians have formed their views in light 
of Greek philosophy. (5-8)  
But Smith isn‘t interested in accurate theology per se; he is interested in laying 
the theological/religious foundation for a ―world fellowship‖ that will enable people to 
live in a ―world of religious and cultural plurality‖ and face the world‘s joint problems 
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 W. C. Smith, “The Christian in a Religiously Plural World,” 5; cited in the text by page number hereafter.  
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together. He insists that ―coexistence‖ and ―reconciliation‖ among religions – rather than 
unity – is the great need for today, if not the ―final truth of man‘s diversity.‖ (12)  
Consequently, Smith puts forth an explicitly Christian argument for religious coexistence. 
Smith begins his argument with the affirmation that ―revealed truth‖ – in this 
case, Christian revelation – has both conceptual and moral implications; in other words, if 
Christians truly believe that Christ‘s life and sacrificial death embodies the ―ultimate 
truth and power and glory of the universe‖ then they also ought to hold certain moral and 
intellectual positions. (12)  
On the moral front, Smith contends that being a Christian entails a moral 
imperative towards unity and harmony amongst all peoples of the earth:  
We strive to break down barriers, to close up gulfs; we recognize all men as 
neighbors, as fellows, as sons of the universal father, seeking Him and finding 
Him, being sought by Him and being found by Him. At this level, we do not 
become truly Christian until we have reached out towards a community that turns 
mankind into one total ―we.‖ (13)   
As for the intellectual consequences of being a serious Christian, Smith momentarily 
defers this issue – except insofar as to say that traditional intellectual formulations, that 
conceptualize religious others as non-religious, have ―encouraged Christians to approach 
other men immorally.‖ (13) Smith, on the basis of his more than twenty years of studying 
other religious traditions, contends that Christians have approached their non-Christian 
neighbours with arrogance – despite the Christian imperative to approach others with 
humanity. Smith introduces the following United Church of Canada‘s statement as an 
example of such arrogance: ―Without the particular knowledge of God in Jesus Christ, 
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men do not really know God at all‖ – as typical of such Christian arrogance. From 
Smith‘s perspective it would be morally intolerable to approach religious others in the 
real world with such an intellectual formulae – whether true or not:     
But except at the cost of insensitivity or delinquence, it is morally not possible 
actually to go out into the world and say to devout, intelligent, fellow human 
beings: ―We are saved and you are damned,‖ or, ―We believe that we know God, 
and we are right; you believe that you know God, and you are totally wrong.‖ (14)   
Smith finds such an approach intolerable from ―merely human standards‖ and doubly so 
from a Christian perspective. Such an approach is intolerable because, again, Christians 
are morally obliged to reconcile rather than alienate, to promote harmony rather than 
segregation, and so on. (14)   
Smith goes on to make a second moral point; this being that it is wrong for 
Christians to hang their salvific hopes on the eternal damnation of others. Smith, says that 
he has actually seen and heard Christians with a vested interested in the damnation of 
others. This particular way of thinking stems from the following logic: If Christianity is 
true and salvifically effective, then other religions must be wrong and pathways to 
perdition – and, inversely, if there is truth and salvation in other religions then this must 
be absent in Christianity. Thus, Christians who see themselves as saved become logically 
―dependent‖ on seeing others as damned. From Smith‘s perspective, Christians ought to 
regard the salvation of other human beings in other religions as good news, and hoping 
for their damnation is neither Christian nor tolerable. 
Having expressed his objections to the moral consequences of holding the 
intellectual view that non-Christians are non-religious, and even damned, Smith moves 
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on to articulate a view of religious others that is more in keeping with serious Christian 
faith, or to theologically address the fact of religious diversity.
13
 Smith begins by saying 
that any serious intellectual statement of Christian faith must now include a doctrine of 
other religions, or a theology of religions – and, that this theology must reject 
―exclusivism,‖ or the view that it is impossible to know God except through Christ, as a 
position worthy of Christian faith. Smith qualifies this by saying that he is fine with 
exclusivism insofar as it is a positive expression of the truth and saving power of 
Christian faith, but maintains that it must be rejected if it necessitates seeing other 
religions as false and leading to perdition. (15-16)  
Smith begins his argument against exclusivism by saying that it entails 
epistemological difficulties – particularly in proving that other religions do not lead to 
salvation and are not true. Smith is satisfied that the truth and salvific efficacy of 
Christianity is self-evident through Christian experience: ―…we ourselves find in our 
lives, by accepting and interiorizing and attempting to live in accordance with it, that it 
[Christian faith] proves itself. We know it to be true because we have lived it.‖ (16) 
Moreover, in Smith‘s view, the validity of Christianity is proved by the fact that hundreds 
of millions of people, for almost two thousand years have ―staked their lives upon it , and 
have found it right.‖ (16) But, in contrast, he finds little evidence to support the idea that 
other religions are false. He says that most Christians simply come to this conclusion by 
way of logical inference: if my faith is true then yours must be false.  Smith thinks that 
consigning others to Hell is far too weighty a matter to leave to logical inference – and 
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 Smith is willing to conceptualize the problem of religious diversity in terms of questions about truth and 
saving power in other religions: “as to whether or how far or how non-Christians are saved, or know God” 
(W. C. Smith, “The Christian in a Religiously Plural World,” 15).    
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points out that, in the past, conclusions drawn from logical inference have turned out to 
be wrong in light of ―practical investigation.‖ (16-17) 
Indeed, Smith says that practical investigation, or empirical observation, of other 
religions leads to a second epistemological problem for religious exclusivism; namely, 
that empirical observation seems to suggest that religious others do in fact know God, 
independent of knowledge of Christ:  
…so far as actual observation goes, the evidence would seem overwhelming that 
in fact individual Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims, and others have known, and do 
know, God. I personally have friends from these communities whom it seems to 
me preposterous to think about in any other way. (17)  
Smith concludes from this that those who wish to maintain exclusivism – or the 
view that religious others do not know God – must do so in the face of contradictory 
evidence. In this regard Smith sets himself against ―neo-orthodox‖ theologians who claim 
that they know other religions to be merely human attempts to reach God, because of 
what they know about God as revealed in Jesus the Christ; indeed they know this a priori 
or before any study of religious others. Smith places himself in the camp that draws 
conclusions about religious others after studying them, and even enjoys fellowship and 
personal friendships with them. Smith‘s main conclusion, drawn from such contact, is 
that other religions are ―channels through which God himself comes into touch with these 
His Children‖ – and he thinks this demands a better formulation of the religious other 
than that proffered by religious exclusivism. (18)  
But before trying to articulate a better formula for understanding other religions, 
Smith tires to further discredit exclusivism by saying that it is not even consistent with 
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Christian doctrine; specifically, the doctrine of the Trinity. Smith uses the doctrine of the 
Trinity to suggest that it must be possible to know God in his creation, and that God must 
be active in history – including the history of other religions. (19)   
Smith also deals with the position that has become known as inclusivism, or the 
view that other religions may know God in part but not fully. Smith‘s way of dealing 
with this problem is to put all traditions, including Christianity, in the same boat – no 
religious tradition is capable of knowing God fully:  
I personally do not see what it might mean to say that any man, Christian or other, 
has a complete knowledge of God. This would certainly be untenable this side of 
the grave, at the very least? The finite cannot comprehend the infinite. (19)    
For Smith, it is only possible to know God in part, but he avoids relativism by 
quickly closing the loop on this partial knowledge of God. He does this by affirming that 
part of what we know about God is that ―He does not leave any of us utterly outside of 
His knowledge.‖ (19) This knowledge, presumably drawn from empirical observation, is 
the foundation of Smith‘s theology of other religions, and Smith goes on to give this 
knowledge Christian roots. 
Smith suggests that Christians can know that God does not leave anyone outside 
of his knowledge – or that God can be known in other religions – because they know that 
is how God, as revealed by Christ, would arrange things, or, ―because God is the kind of 
God who Jesus Christ has revealed him to be.‖ (20) In other words, it is impossible to 
think of God, as the Loving Father of all human beings, and then imagine that this God 
would only respond to his children in one religious tradition, and consign all others to 
eternal damnation. (20)  
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Finally, Smith turns what he knows about God into positive statements about the 
nature of salvation and other religions.  In a characteristic personal key, Smith says that 
salvation is not about knowledge, church membership, or anything external – salvation 
issues from the ―anguish and the love of God‖ and is located in ―men‘s hearts.‖ Smith 
contends we cannot finally say how God acts in the lives of religious others, and so 
cannot make final pronouncements about them; moreover, he suggests that we should not 
place limits on God‘s salvific activity in the world. But even though we cannot say 
anything ―final‖ about religious others, Smith thinks that we can say something about 
them; specifically, we can say (because of what we have come to know about God 
through Christ) that God‘s salvific activity reaches out to all human beings:  
The God whom we have come to know, so far as we can sense His action, reaches 
out after all men everywhere and speaks to all who will listen. Both within and 
without the Church men listen all too dimly. Yet both within and without the 
Church, so far as we can see, God does somehow enter into men‘s hearts. (20)   
In this final statement, Smith positively affirms religious plurality, or a pluralistic 
Christian theology of religions.  It must be remembered that, for Smith, there is no 
complete of final knowledge of God, and presumably no complete or final salvific state, 
on ―this side of the grave.‖ Smith draws a sharp distinction between the finite and the 
infinite and maintains that the finite can never be or know the infinite. This means that 
religion, or faith, is never identified with God or the infinite; and, so, is never final, 
perfect, complete, or one. On the other hand, there is faith (and cumulative tradition) and 
this, for Smith, constitutes true religion. God‘s saving action in the hearts of persons is 
faith, and faith cannot be seen, except in its various expressions within different 
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cumulative traditions.  This understanding of religion, as articulated in The Meaning and 
End of Religion, is plural – and, above, we classified Smith as a pluralist based on this 
pluralistic definition. But in this final statement Smith is affirming religious plurality 
personally and theologically. He is confessing that there is, in fact, faith, or the presence 
of God, within religious others; in other words, religion is plural. Thus, we continue to 
hold our view that Smith is a pluralist. 
It might be argued that Smith is not a true pluralist because he never comes out 
and says that all (or a number of different) religions are equal. Nonetheless, I think, the 
idea of equality among the world‘s ―living religious traditions‖ is implicit in at least three 
different areas of Smith‘s thought. First, Smith‘s insistence that no finite expression of a 
human being‘s encounter with the infinite, will ever be identical to the infinite itself 
guarantees that no religion will ever become wholly other and completely true – in the 
same sense that the infinite is wholly other and completely true as compared with the 
finite. Thus, all expressions of faith or all religions remain more or less, and permanently, 
on the same plane. Second, despite his claims that faith is inherently diverse, Smith never 
speaks of faiths – faith is always singular.14 In saying that other religions are expressions 
of faith, Smith is admitting these others into a category that, on one level, has no diversity 
and, therefore, has no means for making evaluations.  Smith would not say that all 
expressions of faith are equally true (or equally beautiful) but in saying that faith is 
multiform, he is saying that these diverse expressions of faith are equal, insofar as they 
are all expressions of faith. Finally, Smith would eventually come to see the religious 
history of humankind as a singular process, wherein expressions of faith frequently cross 
the border lines of cumulative tradition.  The ground for this singular historical process, is 
                                                          
14
 Oxtoby emphasizes this point in his introduction to Smith’s Religious Diversity.  
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the singular reality of faith, and beyond this the singular reality of God or transcendence. 
This image of one religious history suggests equality among the different religious 
traditions that contribute to this multiform history.  This idea of a single religious history 
is developed in one of Smith‘s later works, called Towards a World Theology, and we 
will now close this presentation of Smith‘s religious pluralism with a brief review of this 
work. 
 
Generic Religious Terms: Towards a World Theology   
Towards a World Theology (1980) may be thought of as the final work of a trilogy that 
includes, The History of Belief (1977) and Faith and Belief  (1979). In the earlier two 
works, Smith hammers home an idea that he introduced in The Meaning and End of 
Religion – the idea that belief and faith are not the same thing; that belief is an expression 
of faith and, indeed, only one type of many possible different types of expression that 
faith can have. Towards a World Theology, then, is an effort to articulate a view of 
religious history, or to do comparative religion, that is not encumbered with this false 
understanding.  More specifically, it is an attempt to argue for the unity of humankind‘s 
religious history – both historically and theologically. 
Smith contends that the unity of humankind‘s religious history is both a historical 
fact and a theological truth, although neither has been widely recognized and therefore 
must be demonstrated. Smith takes up this challenge, first as a historian and then as a 
theologian, in part because he sees himself first and foremost as an historian. But, as 
Smith notes, this simplifies matters, since Smith belongs to the new breed of religious 
historian who recognizes that human beings live their lives in relation to transcendence. 
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This means, on one hand, that human history has an ―empirical base of metaphysical 
truth,‖ and, on the other, that truth necessarily has a historical dimension:  
The history of religion, by which I understand the history of men and women‘s 
religious life, and especially of their faith, lived always in a specific context, is 
intrinsically the locus of both the mundane and the transcendent, unbifurcated.
15
 
Thus, even though Smith makes a conceptual distinction between historical and 
theological work, his ideal mode of study is in between both; a history of religion that 
accounts for transcendence and a theology that recognizes the historical dimension of 
faith. Smith actually coins a new term for this new mode of studying religion – he calls it 
―humane science.‖ Humane science is the study of human beings by human beings and, 
for Smith, such a science is ideal for studying religion because religion is a human 
knowledge of transcendence formed in response to transcendence.
16
  
In any case, Smith begins his argument for the unity of humankind‘s religious 
history, with a historical argument – hoping to, perhaps, convince those unable to see this 
unity as a theological truth. Smith supposes that those who believe in the unity of 
humankind and the unity of God, as he does, should also believe in the unity of 
humankind‘s religious history.  But neither (Christian) religious doctrine nor empirical 
observation has led to the discernment of such unity; religious doctrine locates religious 
unity far in the future, and empirical observation sees only bewildering diversity. (4) 
Smith, however, does not make his task easy because, on one hand, he refuses the 
vision of those  (theologians) who see religious unity coming to fruition ―one day,‖ and, 
on the other, he acknowledges the reality of all of the bewildering religious diversity seen 
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 W. C. Smith, Towards a World Theology, 3; cited in the text by page number hereafter.  
16
 For Smith’s conception of humane science see Smith, Towards a World Theology, especially Chapter 4.   
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by the historian.  Smith rejects the theological view of religious unity by claiming that he 
is not an advocate of religious unity, but an advocate of the unity of religious history – 
two very different things in Smith‘s mind. This move allows Smith to align himself with 
a historical perspective that sees that ―not even one religion is the same, century after 
century, or from one country to another, or from village to city.‖ (4)  But, of course, 
Smith does not stop at seeing only diversity, as does the unenlightened historian of 
yesteryear. He moves forward to carry out the task of the new religious historian; the task 
of seeing unity or coherence in humankind‘s religious history:  
It is only the historian who can hold all the evolving diversities of any one 
religious community‘s developments in interrelated intelligibility; and a fortiori, 
all the evolving diversities of all religious communities. (4)   
Smith emphasizes that it is only the historian – the enlightened humane scientist 
dwelling in both the mundane world and in transcendence – who is able to discern the 
unity of religious history. The old type of historian is too bound to the mundane, and the 
theologian does not fully recognize the mundane dimension of the human encounter with 
transcendence. Smith also disqualifies philosophers, as fit for this task, on account of 
their tendency to do violence to actual religions by reducing them to ―anhistorical‖ 
essences or ―emaciating abstractions.‖ (5) For Smith, history is the locus of religion, and 
thus his view that the historian is the one to uncover the truth about religion/religious 
history: ―History is the domain of the specific, the multifarious; of recalcitrant fact; of the 
human. It is the domain of personal faith, in its depth and vitality and diversity.‖ (5)  
Given Smith‘s commitment to the reality of religious diversity, it is impossible for 
him to say that different religions are the same. What he does say, though, is that 
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different religions (i.e., different expressions of faith) are ―historically interconnected.‖ In 
other words, religious history is united or singular because the various expressions of 
faith throughout the world are interconnected. Smith affirms the interconnectedness of 
religious traditions in the following terms:  
Rather, it is to affirm that they are historically interconnected; that they have 
interacted with the same things or with each other, or that one has ‗grown out of‘ 
or been ‗influenced by‘ the other; more exactly, that one can be understood only 
in terms of a context of which the other forms a part. (5)   
Smith notes that such interconnectedness is well established in particular 
traditions; for example, Christians recognize that what they have is a ―shared common 
history‖ despite the fact that Christianity is an ―ever-changing multiformity.‖ Smith 
wants us to recognize that this exact same situation obtains on a larger scale – in the ever-
changing multiformity of mankind‘s religious history: ―What they have in common is 
that the history of each has been what it has been in significant part because the history of 
the others has been what it has been.‖ (6) Smith insists, that the singularity of religious 
history has always been the case, that this truth is being ―newly discovered‖ by the 
historian of religion. (6)  
To make his case, Smith provides two vivid examples of mutual influence among 
different religious traditions. One of these is the ―fable‖ of Barlaam and Josephat, as 
encountered by Leo Tolstoi in nineteenth century Russia, which Smith traces through its 
various incarnations in different religious traditions – tracing it all the way back to a 
second to fourth century composition in Sanskrit known as the Lalitavistara. But Smith 
doesn‘t stop at showing how Tolstoi was influenced by an ancient Sanskrit text; he goes 
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on to show how the thought of Tolstoi would have a profound influence of the thinking of 
M.K. Gandhi, and how the thinking of Gandhi influenced the great civil rights activist 
Martin Luther King. Smith‘s point in all of this is to show that religious influence does 
not flow in one direction but is more like a web of mutual interconnections wherein 
various traditions are continually borrowing and transforming expressions of faith from 
one another. Or, as Smith puts it: ―every religious tradition on earth has in fact developed 
in interaction with the others; not in isolation, in some watertight compartment.‖ (15)  
Smith notes that his two illustrative examples of historical interconnectedness (the 
second being the development of prayer beads) are relatively superficial. Yet, he 
maintains that his perspective holds up even when dealing with more profound 
expressions of faith, such as the Christian concept of God. Smith, of course, begins his 
analysis of the concept of God by insisting that the concept of God must not be identified 
with God – the concept of God is just another expression of faith or one‘s personal 
relationship with God. And from there he frames the particular Christian concept of God 
as ―a part of the world history of the idea of God on earth.‖ Christians, like others, have 
participated and contributed to this total history. 
For Smith, this total view of human religious history is closer to truth than the old 
way of seeing each tradition developing in isolation; indeed, he sees this as the way that 
God has seen things all along. But, again, this God‘s-eye view of religious history is new 
to human beings as it is being newly discovered by historians only now.
 
(19) 
Smith seems to suggest that even historians blind to the transcendent dimension of 
human religion, would be able to see the unity or interconnectedness of humankind‘s 
religious history – in the historical dimension.  Nonetheless, such blind historians would 
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not be able to say anything about the theological unity inherent to humankind‘s religious 
history. This is a task for the religious historian, and so Smith closes Towards a World 
Theology with some reflections on the theological dimension of the unity of humankind‘s 
religious history. (19) 
Smith frames the task of the new historian/theologian (or humane scientist) in 
terms of ―conceptualizing the whole‖ or making the total of humankind‘s religious 
history intelligible. Such a conceptualization would be a ―world theology.‖ Smith makes 
no pretence of being able to articulate such a universal truth, but he does think that he can 
move towards it. And he attempts this on three distinct fronts: vocabulary, truth, and 
history.‖ (181) Smith‘s movement towards a world theology, might lead some to question 
whether of not he is really a pluralist, and we will close out our examination of Smith by 
addressing this question. But first, let‘s examine Smith‘s interim vision of a world 
theology. 
With respect to language, Smith briefly discusses four conceptual categories or 
terms that he thinks may function ―generically‖ within a world theology. Today, we 
might refer to such terms as being ―cross-cultural,‖ but the idea is that these singular and 
common terms can be used to accurately signal what may appear to be different religious 
expressions in different religious traditions (to use Smith‘s language). 
As might be expected, the first generic term proposed by Smith, for use in a world 
theology is faith.  Having just published a substantial volume on faith (and belief) Smith 
says little more about it in this context, but does express the hope that ―others will find its 
subsuming of several specifics persuasive and helpful.‖ (182) This statement tells us 
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something of how Smith‘s generic terms function; they function as unifying conceptual 
categories that can subsume (all) specific instantiations of the category. 
The second term that Smith considers is salvation. In this case, Smith‘s only 
conclusion is that this term needs some work before it can function generically within a 
world theology: ―Those of us who know what we wish to say in this realm have a 
distance yet to go before we have found or constructed a way of saying it intelligibly.‖ 
(182) This statement tells something about how Smith understands the situation and task 
of the world theologian. The world theologian is situated in a world of seemingly 
disconnected manifestations of religion, and the task of such a theologian is to see how 
these different manifestations are actually different versions of the ―same‖ reality.  By 
identifying the commonality, and finding a suitable term to express it, the world 
theologian brings intelligibility to an otherwise unintelligible situation. The unintelligible 
situation is one of raw diversity: the intelligible situation is one of diversity subsumed 
within a great unity. 
Smith‘s third term is theology. Smith realizes that the term theology might have to 
give way to something else on account of cumulative traditions such as Buddhism and 
Western humanism that find it problematic. But, right now, the only viable alternative he 
sees is philosophy, and Smith prefers theology to philosophy for at least three reasons. 
First, he sees philosophy/the Greek tradition as one among other cumulative religious 
traditions, meaning that philosophy is particular rather than universal. Second – and 
apparently because Smith‘s first point is not well understood – theology has the 
advantage of keeping the problem of finding a suitable generic term in the forefront 
(because it is obviously not agreeable to everyone). In contrast, calling oneself a 
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philosopher might generate the illusion that one has ―already attained universalism.‖ 
(182) Third, on a related note, calling theology philosophy might lead to a tendency to 
approach religion from the outside (in the manner of the old comparative religion). Even 
so, Smith recognizes that Buddhists and humanists are unlikely to accept theology – just 
as many Christians and Muslims are unlikely to accept philosophy. Moreover, coming up 
with a new term is not easy because it would have to ―subsume the past‖ but not 
―supersede‖ it. Smith closes by reluctantly tossing out ―transcendentology‖ as a possible 
alternative. (182-183) 
Finally, Smith considers the term God. Smith begins by explicitly affirming his 
view that the term God is a symbol. He is less explicit about saying what it is a symbol 
for but we can gather that it is for ―the transcendent dimension within and around 
humankind.‖ (183) Smith contends that among those who use the concept of God (i.e., 
theists) there has been a tendency to emphasize different things. Some have emphasized 
that God transcends all human conceptualizations of Him, and others have emphasized 
the aspects of God that can be positively known. Smith confesses that the term God has a 
positive connotation for him, but recognizes that this is not the case for others – 
particularly those from non-theistic religious traditions. As a way beyond this impasse, 
Smith suggest that we mean the following by the term God: ―a truth – reality that 
explicitly transcends conception but in so far as conceivable is that to which man‘s 
religious history has at its best been a response, human and in some senses inadequate?‖ 
(185)  
Smith is willing to admit that there is much in religious history that is 
―repugnantly perverse‖ but he insists that these need not ―eclipse the divine.‖ (185) At 
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this point, Smith does not try to sort out the perverse from the divine, in religion. But he 
does seem to assume that his reader will see divinity in their own religion, and he does 
assume that divinity is in all religions and so makes the claim that ―If any [religion] is to 
be taken seriously, all are.‖ (185) His aim here is to move towards a better generic term 
for what some have traditionally called God – to make this concept ―more corporate and 
more historical.‖ (186) For Smith, this means transforming it into a term that can (ideally) 
be used by all of the world‘s cumulative religious traditions, and that gives accurate 
expression to the reality that is responded to in each different tradition.  Indeed, Smith‘s 
hope is that the world theologian will work diligently to produce a whole new vocabulary 
that will ―bridge the gap between specific and generic‖ and so make better sense of 
humankind‘s religious history. (186)     
 
Is Smith Really a Pluralist?   
It may seem that Smith could go on and on, if not for the limits of time, in identifying 
terms that would need to become more corporate in order to make sense of our 
religiously plural world. Thus, we might imagine Smith‘s preliminary steps evolving into 
a rich world theology that would make humankind‘s religious history intelligible. But 
Smith‘s insistence that terms such as transcendence/God and theology (or derivatives of 
these) must be preserved, and his insistence that these terms must be ―anchored in 
history‖ suggest that his world theology is well past nascent form. Indeed, I will now 
argue that Smith‘s theology leaves no room to develop generic terms beyond the few he 
has outlined – or, at least, there is no room to develop generic terms that have relevance 
for the entire religious ―world.‖ 
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Smith understands what he means by God/transcendence, 
theology/transcendentology, history, and, of course religion (faith and cumulative 
tradition). These are the unmovable pillars of Smith‘s world theology, however much he 
may insist that a lot of work is yet to be done to develop one.  
Although, Smith insists that no concept of transcendence is transcendence itself, 
there is no doubt in Smith‘s mind that there is transcendence.  Transcendence is the 
opposite of the mundane world; religion is a human response to this great reality; 
consciousness of this ―surpassingly great Other‖ is what keeps religion from being mere 
collective subjectivism; transcendence is the source of divinity in the human world. 
Smith does not think of ―history‖ as a symbolic or critical term similar to the 
terms God and theology. History is an objective domain in Smith‘s thought – it is the 
truly human world where the mundane and the transcendence meet. And Smith has 
painstakingly articulated his view that this convergence of the transcendent and the 
mundane, in human beings, is a personal quality known as ―faith.‖ Thus, humanity ―at its 
best‖ is a faith community. 
This idea of faith is, of course, central to Smith‘s concept of religion. Faith, or the 
personal quality of a human being‘s response to transcendence, can only be seen in 
expressions of faith. Such expressions of faith become the means for others to first come 
into contact with the transcendence – but this personal contact must then be expressed in 
its own way. In this manner, expressions of faith are perpetually developed and 
accumulated.  The deposit of various related expressions of faith, constitute a cumulative 
tradition. Thus, there is a Christian cumulative tradition, a Hindu cumulative tradition, 
and so forth. Since, faith can only be seen in its various expressions, it can be thought of 
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as a multiform reality, such that we can think of Christian faith,  Hindu faith, and so on. 
But, on the other hand, faith is a singular reality, and so it is wrong to think that there are 
faiths. Faith is one, in the sense that it is always a human response to transcendence 
(which is one), and Smith would eventually come to the conclusion that cumulative 
tradition, or humankind‘s religious history is also one. Thus, there are no radically 
separate cumulative religious traditions, even though conceptual divisions amongst them 
can be made; there is one cumulative religious tradition of humankind. This unity can be 
seen by the historian who is able to see interconnected expressions across religious 
boundaries. But more importantly it is seen by the theologian, or trascendentologist, or 
humane scientist, or the historian with an eye for faith.  
The theologian – the world theologian – is able to see the unity of humankind‘s 
religious history at a deeper level. This theologian is not only able to see similarities in 
expressions of faith across religious borders, but is able to discern faith in these various 
expressions of faith – and realize that this faith is a genuine response to the one 
transcendent reality that appears in human history in the hearts of human beings. 
Ultimately the world theologian understands transcendence, not perfectly but 
meaningfully. And in this cosmopolitan era the task of the theologian is not just to see 
God/transcendence in one‘s own tradition, but in human life altogether:  
[Theology]…is not simply of the history of religion, but of that to which the 
history of religion has at its best been a response. (These two amount to the same 
thing, if the former be taken authentically, listened to seriously.) That response 
has been human and in many senses inadequate, but not ultimately inadequate 
since sinners and derelicts and the undistinguished, as Shinran and Luther and 
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others have noted, are saved—or more generically, since human history, human 
life as lived in history, is and has been not inane. (186)  
 
Thus, Smith knows what true religion is – it is faith and cumulative tradition.  
This entails knowing what faith is – it is a personal quality in the heart of one responding 
to the transcendent that is shown through expressions in the mundane world. And, it 
entails knowing what cumulative tradition is – it is the accumulative of various 
expressions of faith throughout the world. This understanding of religion entails a 
tripartite ontology consisting of 1) the world of transcendence, 2) the mundane world, 3) 
the human world wherein the mundane and the transcendent meet.  The human world is 
synonymous with the historical domain; thus, it is within history that one can see the 
convergence of the transcendent and the mundane in the human heart (in faith) and the 
embodiment of this convergence (in expressions of faith). And, it is the world theologian 
who can see this process taking place across all of human life – in all human faith 
communities. Indeed, the world theologian can see that there is only one faith community 
and is charged with the task of making this community intelligible to others. 
But what more is needed to make Smith‘s vision of a world theology more 
intelligible? It might be suggested that the generic terms, or categories, suggested by 
Smith would need to be further developed – along with many others – in order to have a 
functional world theology. But do the parameters set by Smith even allow for this? In 
other words, if we accept Smith‘s definition of religion, his ontology, and his view about 
who is in the best position to know the truth about such matters, is there any room left to 
introduce further generic religious terms? I think we can answer this question, negatively, 
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by reflecting on Smith‘s handling of the generic term ―salvation‖ above, and considering 
how we might develop the term salvation within Smith‘s world theology.  
Smith offers practically nothing in terms of a more corporate understanding of the term 
salvation – he simply leaves the task to future world theologians. But I suggest his 
deferral to the future had nothing to do the limits of time, and everything to do with 
structural limitations imposed by Smith‘s definition of religion. For Smith, every 
religious ―thing‖ is an expression of faith – all religious art, all religious practices, all 
religious rituals, all religious doctrines are expressions of faith. Salvation is a term that 
for many is synonymous with true religion. (See, for example, John Hick below.) For 
Smith, though, true religion is faith (in the singular) and expressions of faith (in the 
plural). Thus, for Smith, salvation must be an expression of faith. This means that, even if  
salvation (or a like term) is used, generically, to account for specific instances of 
―salvation,‖ the term salvation itself must still be subsumed under the meta-generic 
heading of faith. Indeed, within Smith‘s theology no religious term could be generic in 
the same universal sense that faith is universal.  
Terms, such as theology and God, might give the impression that Smith‘s world 
theology could accommodate generic/universal terms akin to faith, but theology and God 
are used by Smith in order to explicate faith; they are respectively the condition of faith 
and the mode of understanding faith. 
But apart from the conditions under which faith is obtained (Smith‘s tripartite 
ontology of the mundane world, transcendence, and the historical human world), and the 
mode of understanding faith (theology/transcendentology), every other religious thing 
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must be an expression of faith. Salvation belongs in this category and this, I suggest, 
explains why Smith didn‘t even make a start with this generic term.  
Nonetheless, the larger question raised by Smith‘s steps towards a world 
theology, is whether or not he remained a pluralist in making these. Would it not be more 
accurate to think of him as an inclusivist in light of his insistence that faith is singular, 
that religious history is singular, and his efforts to incorporate universal/generic terms 
from his own tradition that can account for this singularity?  
I still maintain, that Smith is still best understood as a pluralist because he does 
not change his view that faith can only be discerned in particular expressions of faith. 
This means that faith, though singular, is also always plural. To repeat, true religion, can 
never be reduced to a singular form of religion, but can only be discerned in its multiform 
expressions. Smith‘s very definition of religion continues to make him a pluralist.  
 
2. John Hick: The Pluralist Hypothesis   
As with Smith, I will not try to present a comprehensive view of John Hick‘s thinking 
about religious diversity, but will present enough to argue that his thought exhibits the 
three main features of religious pluralism, and to show how this thought stems from 
contact with religious others. 
John Hick may be thought of as one of the ―founding fathers‖ of religious 
pluralism.  Hick‘s religious pluralism is primarily about recognizing non-Christian 
religions as equally valid to Christianity. For Hick, true religion, is religion that effects 
salvation; thus, Hick‘s pluralistic claim is that all of the ―great world religions‖ – 
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including Christianity – are coequal is terms of salvific efficacy. In other words, there are 
several true religions – or, religious pluralism is the case. 
Hick never raises questions about the validity of Christianity; he always assumes 
that it is salvifically effective. The question, or problem, for Hick, is authenticating the 
other religions. Hick‘s solution to this problem is to define salvation (religion) in such a 
way that it can assume different traditions-specific forms. His critics have argued that his 
definition of salvation reduces all religions to essentially the same form, and thereby 
eliminates the very diversity it is meant to authenticate. Hick‘s particular solution to ―the 
problem‖ of religious diversity is easier to understand if we understand the personal 
context in which his pluralistic theorising arises. Thus, we will begin our examination of 
Hick‘s theology of religions by examining an autobiographical account of his 
involvement in three theological controversies, since each controversy tells us something 
about Hick‘s perception of, and solution to, the problem of religious diversity.  
 
Hick’s Encounter with the Religious Other  
Hick begins his autobiographical account by identifying himself as conservative by 
nature, but something of an intellectual radical:  
My mind showed a wilful propensity to philosophy, and to the asking of 
questions, together with an unsociable habit of noticing flaws in arguments and 
inconsistencies in accepted belief systems and, to make matters worse, and 
obsessive respect for facts.
17
    
Hick self-identifies as a liberal, historically-minded philosopher who is willing to 
challenge the intellectual status quo when it is flawed or inconsistent. In this respect, he is 
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194 
 
the opposite of fundamentalists, evangelicals, and the ―church-going masses‖ who hold 
traditional religious beliefs no matter how much they are disproved by the facts of 
history. Hick‘s questioning and challenging disposition has led him into three significant 
theological controversies. 
The first controversy took place when Hick tried to move his ministry 
membership from a Presbytery in England to a Presbytery in the United States in 1959, 
since he was taking a teaching position at Princeton Theological Seminary.  According to 
Hick, the American Presbytery (of New Brunswick, in New Jersey) had a strong 
fundamentalist contingent. One of the questions that Hick was asked in his interview was 
whether he had objections to anything in the Westminster Confession of 1647. Hick 
mentioned several points in this document that he took exception to, including the 
creation of the world in six days, the predestination of many to Hell, the verbal 
inspiration of the Bible, and the virgin birth of Jesus. Hick‘s questioning of the virgin 
birth led the committee to reject his request for transfer or to bar him from the Presbytery. 
(1-3) Hick didn‘t actually positively deny the doctrine; his position was that there wasn‘t 
any historical evidence in support this view, and moreover that it was non-essential to the 
more important Christian doctrine of the Incarnation (which Hick did assent to at the 
time).  
The decision by the New Brunswick Presbytery to bar Hick from the Presbytery 
was upheld by a higher governing body of the Presbyterian Church (the Judicial 
Commission of the Synod of New Jersey) in 1962, but was then overturned by an even 
higher body (the Permanent Judicial Commission of the General Assembly). Despite 
finding this whole situation ridiculous, Hick also saw it leading to some positive changes 
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in the Church. First, the Church upheld the principle of toleration on subsidiary 
theological issues (such as the virgin birth); second, it subsequently became more 
difficult for conservative faculty at the Princeton Theological Seminary to force their 
views on liberal students; and, third, the Princeton Seminary came to be seen as more 
liberal within the Church.  What Hick, no doubt, learned from this experience is that there 
is room for liberal views, such as his own, within the Church. 
In 1964, Hick returned to England to teach at Cambridge University, and, then, in 
1967 took up a chair in the Philosophy of Religion at Birmingham University. It is in 
Birmingham that Hick encountered religious pluralism in a concrete way, and become 
immersed in a second theological controversy. Hick describes Birmingham as a 
―fascinating and challenging place.‖ (4) It was fascinating on account of its rich racial, 
cultural and religious diversity that emerged from large scale immigration in the 1950s 
and 1960s. When Hick arrived in 1967, about 10 percent of the population of one million 
was ―black.‖ As for religious diversity there were ―Muslims from Pakistan and, later 
Bangladesh; Sikhs from the Indian Punjab; Hindus from Gejerat and other parts of India; 
and fervent Pentecostal Christians from Jamaica, Trinidad, and other Caribbean islands.‖ 
(5) And it was challenging on account of ―a pervasive racism‖ that, according to Hick 
had ―become deeply ingrained in the British mind during the centuries of colonialism.‖ 
(5) 
Official government policies, at the time, were non-discriminatory – but, in 
practice, there was pervasive colour discrimination throughout Birmingham and other 
parts of England. This led to the emergence of several official and voluntary 
organizations whose aim was to produce a more just and equitable society. According to 
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Hick‘s description, these groups were made up of ―black and white liberals and as the 
Establishment would say) radicals.‖ Hick himself became seriously involved in both an 
official and a voluntary group. (6) 
The voluntary group that Hick became involved with was called All Faiths for 
One Race (AFFOR); in fact, Hick was a co-founder of this group and served as its first 
chairperson. Members of AFFOR were Christian, Jewish, Sikh, Hindu, and even 
humanist and Marxist. The group was largely involved with social issues – helping 
immigrants to navigate social assistance programs,  seeking out local radio time for 
immigrant groups, encouraging local churches to become involved in these issues, and so 
on. But it eventually became embroiled in an issue of some theological significance. (6) 
The issue involved the publication of an AFFOR pamphlet, produced by Hick, 
wherein he exposed the racist intensions, and Nazi ties, of two political groups in 
England (the National Front and the National Party). AFFOR decided that it would like to 
publish this pamphlet, with a preface written by local church leaders commending it to its 
members. As things turned out, the local church leaders were not willing to write such a 
preface on account of the possibility of being sued for defamation; they even refused 
when AFFOR revised the pamphlet so that it contained no personal references. In the 
end, the pamphlet was published as The New Nazism of the National Front and National 
Party with a preface written by a well-know Christian leader from outside the 
Birmingham community, who wrote as an individual rather than in his official capacity as 
President of the Methodist Conference. (8-9) 
Despite the refusal of church leaders, to contribute to the pamphlet, it did receive 
wide circulation and attention within church circles. Hick attributed this to the time being 
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right; in fact, he says that the late 1970s mark a turning point in favour of pluralistic 
society:  
The late 1970s were something of a turning point in the mobilisation of Christian 
opinion in Britain against organised racism, and saw a growing commitment to 
the creation of a just pluralistic society (9) 
Hick says that this new Christian consciousness is growing, even though it is still belongs 
to the minority within the churches. He also says that this consciousness is connected to a 
―new openness‖ to people from other faiths, and a new interest in ―Islam, Judaism, 
Sikhism, Hinduism, and Buddhism‖ – and that this has many practical implications. (9) 
Hick experienced the practical implication of this new openness to other religions 
in the official group that he was involved with – the Religious and Cultural Panel of the 
Birmingham Community Relations Committee. The panel was involved in trying to 
establish a new multi-faith ―Agreed Syllabus‖ to replace the (then) current Agreed 
Syllabus, or the exclusively Christian religious education curriculum that was mandatory 
for all students in the State-school system.  Hick chaired the multi-faith committee that 
organized this work, and eventually a new Syllabus was produced, that had students learn 
about more than one faith while still being able to ―specialize‖ in their own. (10)  
Hick attributes the success of this project to changing attitudes in the ―host 
community‖ to those of other faiths - and says that among the minority of church goers, 
who are concerned with religious pluralism there is ―an open and accepting spirit and a 
real desire to seek justice.‖ (10) Hick even goes so far as to say that in practice there is an 
acceptance of the sort of religious pluralism he envisions:  
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In practice it is accepted that the other great streams of religious life and thought 
are independently valid areas of divine revelation and salvation, and that the 
traditional policy of trying to convert all mankind to the Christian way should be 
abandoned. In the experience of meeting people of other faiths many Christians 
have thus been led by the Spirit into significantly new attitudes and practices. (10)     
Thus, Hick sees religious pluralism as a ―grassroots‖ movement that stems from 
meeting people of other faiths. I think it is significant that Hick‘s experience of religious 
diversity has been one of being in a dominant religious group that is ―hosting‖ minority 
religious groups. In such a situation, any recognition of validity that the minority groups 
receive comes unilaterally from the dominant host group. In contrast, the dominant host 
group needs no such recognition of validity from the minority groups – its validity is 
taken for granted. This, attitude is, I think, reflected in Hick‘s philosophy of religious 
pluralism, wherein non-Christian religions are recognized as true religions on account of 
being just like Christianity (as understood by Hick). 
Nonetheless, being able to see other religions as ―independently valid areas of 
divine revelation and salvation‖ – or as true religions – required Hick to interpret religion 
and reinterpret traditional Christian theology. Hick felt justified in this enterprise since he 
saw traditional theology lagging behind the ―new practical outlook‖ of religious 
pluralism; it was out of step with the times and creating a disjunction between how 
Christians were acting and how they were thinking:  
Most Christians still adhere to the traditional theology according to which there is 
only one way of salvation from which follows the duty to try to bring all human 
beings into that way. The old conception of the unique superiority and soul saving 
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power of Christianity is still enshrined in the liturgies and hymns… . Thus many 
Christians find themselves behaving in one way whilst still thinking theologically 
in another. And it is then one of my locations as a theologian to work for the new 
kind of theology of religions which is implied by the new praxis. This seems to 
me to involve a frank recognition that there is a plurality of divine revelations and 
contexts of salvation. (10-11)    
This work, of reinterpreting traditional Christian theology, to fit the ―new praxis‖ of 
religious pluralism has made Hick‘s work controversial amongst Christian theologians – 
and Hick discusses this with his third controversy. 
This third controversy revolves around Hick‘s reinterpretation of the Christian 
doctrine of the Incarnation. Hick says that he was stirred to think about the ―logical 
character of incarnational language‖ in light of the problem of religious pluralism and 
came to the conclusion that Christ‘s incarnation should be understood mythically or 
metaphorically rather than literally. Hick was not alone in this view, and in 1977 edited – 
and, along with six British academic colleagues, contributed to – a volume called The 
Myth of God Incarnate. Hick identifies three themes in this volume: 1) historically, Jesus 
did not teach that he was God incarnate or the Second Person of the Trinity; 2) the idea 
that Christ is God incarnate can be seen as a doctrinal development that didn‘t take full 
form until the forth and fifth centuries – in the decades after Jesus‘ death he was seen as a 
―prophet appointed by God in the last days to usher in the Kingdom‖; 3) seeing 
incarnational language as mythic or metaphorical allows for a ―genuine acceptance of 
religious pluralism.‖ (11-12) 
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Although these ideas were not new, The Myth of God Incarnate created a ―furor‖ 
in British church life. The contributors to the volume were vilified as enemies of Christ, 
and soon a counter-volume called The Truth of God Incarnate was published. Hick 
attributed the controversy, at least in part, to a disjunction between scholarly research on 
religion and parish preaching. According to Hick, the ideas of The Myth were ―already 
familiar to and largely accepted within the scholarly world‖ (13) – but they were 
unknown to the ―average occupant of the pews‖ since such things weren‘t being taught in 
the churches.  The Myth helped to change this situation by bringing what scholars had 
known for a long time to the ―body of church people and the general public.‖ (13)  
Hick obviously makes a distinction between the average church goer, and those in 
the churches who are sensitive to the issue of religious pluralism. The former are 
removed, both in practice and theory, from the reality of religious pluralism; while the 
latter are pluralists in practice who need to be brought into the modern era in terms of 
theory and theology. Hick represents the best of both worlds: he is a pluralist, in practice, 
who is dedicated to bringing the insights of modern scholarship to bear on Christian 
thinking about other religions. 
For Hick, thinking about the doctrine of the Incarnation as a language of myth or 
metaphor, used to express an experience of God, opens the door for Christians to be 
positively related to other religions – or their mythical and metaphorical expressions of 
their experiences of God: 
…the realisation that religious language expresses apprehension of the divine in 
pictures and that these pictures are human and culturally conditioned has opened 
up for some the possibility that the different mythologies of the great religious 
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traditions may constitute alternative, or perhaps even complementary, rather than 
rival ways picturing the divine reality. (13-14)          
But even though Hick says he is interested in reading the doctrine of the 
Incarnation as myth rather than as a historical reality, he is also interested in dismantling 
particular myths and replacing them with different (seemingly more historically realistic) 
accounts. Thus, on one hand, he is willing to see the myths of God‘s incarnation in Christ, 
and Christ‘s atoning crucifixion and resurrection as having ―an imaginative unity and an 
emotional and moral impact which have powerfully affected millions of people over 
many centuries.‖ But, on the other hand, he wants to ―dismantle‖ these myths and replace 
them with alternatives:   
We can… speak instead of Jesus as the man who was startlingly open to God and 
who saved people by making real to them the divine presence and the 
transforming divine claim upon their lives, thus setting up a new way of salvation 
within history – the way of discipleship to Jesus as he is mediated to us through 
the Bible and the Church. (14)  
Thus, even though Hick wants us to think of religious language as myth, he does 
not shy away from ―demythologizing‖ myths that he thinks are out of date. Whether or 
not Hick sees the above demythologized account of Jesus as a new myth is not clear.  It 
seems that this would have to be his position in order for him to remain consistent about 
the nature of religious language; moreover, it does seem that Hick is hopeful of a 
pluralistic theology of religions emerging as a new framework, or new myth, for 
understanding religion – for both Christians and those of other faiths. (14) 
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I have presented this autobiographical account, primarily, to show how Hick‘s 
pluralism is born from his encounter with religious others; or, in Hick‘s words, how his 
theory of pluralism grew out of his practice of religious pluralism. This account, 
however, also shows Hick holding a number of views consistent with humanistic 
religious pluralism. First, Hick clearly affirms that there is not only one true religion but 
many – there ―is a plurality of divine revelations and contexts of salvation.‖ Second, Hick 
does not affirm the unity of God (probably because he takes this idea as unassailable), but 
he does clearly present a humanistic concept of religion.
18
  He speaks of religions as 
human and culturally conditioned expressions of divine reality; he speaks of Jesus as a 
man who was open to God; and, he rejects the idea that Christ is the Incarnate Son of 
God, seeing this as a late theological development that altered the earlier understanding 
of Jesus as a prophet appointed by God. Third, Hick does not conceptualize true religion 
as an end, but as a universal form that can be expressed in a multitude of ways. Religion 
is a human and culturally conditioned expression or an authentic experience of God – 
these expressions of the divine revelation constitute divine revelations and contexts for 
salvation. 
Nothing more needs to be said to make the point that Hick rejects the idea that 
there is one ultimately true religion, and promotes the idea that there are many true 
religions. It is also clear from the autobiographical account above, and the discussion in 
Chapter 3 that Hick holds both a unitary metaphysics and a ―humanistic‖ concept of 
religion – so as to avoid the conclusion that there is one ultimately true religion. To 
repeat Hick‘s words: ―If he [Jesus] was indeed God incarnate, Christianity is the only 
religion founded by God in person, and must as such be uniquely superior to all other 
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 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of how Hick has typically assumed that Ultimate Reality is one.   
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religions.‖19  What needs further explication, though, is how Hick‘s theology of religions 
employs a religious universal, instead of a religious end or essence – and is, thus, pluralist 
rather than inclusivist or exclusivist. To this end we will now review one of the most 
accessible forms of Hick‘s pluralistic hypothesis, as given in The Rainbow of Faiths: A 
Christian Theology of Religions.
20
     
 
The Pluralistic Hypothesis  
Hick‘s argument begins with the juxtaposition of two incompatible ideas: 1) there are a 
number of great world religions amongst which it is impossible to affirm the moral 
superiority of any particular one (including Christianity); and, 2) Christians must be 
morally superior to religious others because Christianity was founded by God in person – 
as implied by the doctrines of the Incarnation and Trinity – and because God offered a 
salvific pathway to all of humanity through the atoning death of his Son, Jesus, the 
Christ.
21
 For Hick, moral superiority is the sign of being saved and, therefore, the salvific 
advantage of being a Christian guarantees that Christians will be morally superior to 
others. 
Hick concludes from these seemingly contradictory ideas that Christian religious 
concepts or doctrines, leading to the conclusion that Christians are morally superior to 
others, must be wrong. He comes to this conclusion because he sees no way that he can 
be wrong about the fact that it is impossible to empirically determine the moral 
superiority of Christianity; thus, doctrines that do lead to this impossible conclusion must 
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 Hick, Metaphor of God Incarnate, IX. 
20
 For the most philosophically rigorous presentation of Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis, see Hick’s, An 
Interpretation of Religion. 
21
 Hick, Rainbow of Faiths, 15-16; cited in the text by page number hereafter.  
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be wrong. Hick‘s logic is questionable here because the conclusion he should come to is 
not that the Christian claim of superiority is wrong, but that it is impossible to tell if this 
claim is right or wrong, since it is impossible to empirically determine moral superiority 
amongst religions.
22
  Nonetheless, in Hick‘s mind, Christian claims of moral superiority, 
and all religious concepts that support such claims must be wrong, and so he sets himself 
the task of reinterpreting these concepts. 
Most important, on his revisionary list, is the Christian doctrine of salvation that 
claims salvation is made available to human beings exclusively through the atoning death 
of Jesus Christ on Calvary around 30 CE/AD. Hick rejects this notion of salvation by 
arguing that, if true, it would manifest in the overall moral superiority of Christians – and 
since this is nowhere to be seen, this notion of salvation is necessarily false. Thus, Hick 
suggests the following alternative salvific formula: Salvation is the transformation from 
self-centredness to Reality-centredness. (17-18) Hick is even so bold as to claim that this 
is real concern of all of the great world religions, and he later goes on to show how this is 
realized. (17)  
At this point in his argument Hick, discusses the concept of Christian exclusivism 
with respect to salvation. Exclusivism is the affirmation that salvation (henceforth 
understood in Hick‘s terms) is only available through Christian identity. Hick rejects this 
position out of hand on the ethical grounds that it would be cruel of God to withhold 
salvation – and consequently damn – countless numbers of people, past and present, who 
had no opportunity to become Christian. (19) 
After this dismissal of exclusivism, Hick discusses Christian inclusivism with 
respect to salvation or, more specifically, two forms of Christian inclusivism. The first 
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 For a similar criticism of Hick, see Griffiths, Religious Diversity, 149.  
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type asserts that the saving grace of Christ may be present in other religious traditions but 
in order to be saved a person must become Christian, either in this lifetime or the next. 
The other type of inclusivism asserts that a person may be saved within the context of 
another religious tradition, but still maintains that the salvific power in other traditions 
really comes from Christ. (20-22)  
Hick contends that it is difficult for Christian inclusivists to maintain the 
traditional Christian salvation narrative because of the mental gymnastics required to 
discern a salvific impulse, generated around 30 CE, in religious traditions predating 
Christianity. The typical manoeuvre of such inclusivists is to locate the Christ‘s saving 
power not in the historical event at Calvary but in Christ‘s identity as the eternal Logos, 
the Second Person of the Trinity. Hick seizes on the opportunity presented by this move 
to suggest that this transcendental source of salvation – called the Logos by Christians – 
is the same transcendental source of salvation that is present in the other world religions, 
where it is known by different names such as the Dharma, Allah, the Tao, etc. (22-23) 
With this groundwork laid, Hick then introduces his full fledged theory of religious 
pluralism or his pluralistic hypothesis, and in this process reinterprets or revisions 
Ultimate Reality and religion.  
Hick begins this process by addressing the subject of truth-claims and the related 
thorny issue of conflicting truth claims in world religions; specifically, the point raised by 
Bertrand Russell that if the world religions disagree not more than one of them can be 
right. (24) To tackle this problem Hick introduces three analogies – 1) the ambiguity of 
optical illusions,  2) Bohr‘s complementarity principle as applied to the observation of 
light, and 3) the use of technical distortions by cartographers to create different types of 
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maps for different purposes – to show how it is possible to see or map the same reality in 
different but equally valid ways.  Hick uses his cartography analogy to argue that 
different theologies are different finite conceptual maps of the Infinite or the Real; these 
conceptual mappings, though different, are equally true and equally effective at leading 
human beings to salvation. (24-27)  
Hick then begins his reinterpretation of the Christian concept of God by saying 
that his three analogies suggest that there is an ultimate ineffable Reality which is the 
ground and source of everything – including the different human conceptions of it, the 
correspondingly different experiences of it, and the correspondingly different forms of 
life lived in response to it. Moreover this Reality (the Real) is such that when the 
religious traditions are in proper or soteriological alignment with it (through their 
concepts, experiences and responses) they are contexts of salvation. (27) 
But this raises the question of how we know if the concepts (truth claims), 
experiences, and responses are true and authentic – or, in soteriological alignment with 
the Real? Hick‘s answer is given earlier in his claim that salvation shows itself in the sign 
of spiritual fruits such as love, patience, and kindness; in other words, it can be seen in 
moral excellence or ―saintliness.‖ (16-17) Consequently, if we see moral excellence in a 
religious tradition we know that its truth claims are true and more broadly it is a tradition 
in soteriological alignment with the Real.  This, then,  is how Hick deals with the difficult 
problem of conflicting truth claims; by reducing truth-claims to a means of achieving 




By this point in his argument Hick is confident that he can pronounce the fact of 
multiple religions – or, religious pluralism, in the sense of multiple equally effective 
contexts of salvation. This fact would seem to prove that no particular religion is 
identified with the Real as such, but Hick feels the need to ground this proposition in 
ontological reality. Consequently, Hick, distinguishes between the Real in itself and the 
real as experienced within the various religious traditions, using Kant‘s distinction 
between the noumenal and phenomenal. Nonetheless, once having established that it is 
not possible to conceptualize the Real, in itself, he asserts that there are two basic 
religious categories for understanding the Real – ―deity‖ (the Real as personal) and ―the 
absolute‖ (the Real as impersonal). (29) 
This conceptualization of Ultimate Reality is significant for Hick because it 
allows him to undermine religious perspectives that claim to be ultimate on account of 
coming from the ―one true God‖ or from a point of perfect identity with Ultimate reality.  
Hick‘s solution is simple: the one true God is a persona of the Real and the One identified 
with Ultimate Reality is an impersona of the Real. Both are human conceptions of the 
real; neither is the Real in itself. 
Hick closes by asking what impact his hypothesis might have on religions. He 
says that in some respects it won‘t change much, but in others it will change quite a lot. 
Things won‘t change insofar as religions will continue on their own unique cultural paths 
to salvation – but they will change insofar as religions will be forced to give up their 




When Hick rejected the Christian doctrine of the virgin birth in 1959, he was 
temporarily banned from being a Presbyterian minister, but was eventually vindicated. 
When Hick went public with his view that the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation of 
Christ should be read as mythic or metaphoric language, rather than a literal account of a 
state of affairs, he caused something of an uproar in the life of the church, and some bitter 
theological reaction. When Hick, spearheaded a movement toward the development of a 
pluralistic theology of religions, with the publication of The Myth of Christian 
Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic Theology of Religions in 1987 – and when he fully 
articulated his own pluralistic hypothesis or theology of religions with the publication of 
An Interpretation of Religion in 1991 – he generated a storm of criticism against the very 
idea of religious pluralism. 
In Chapter 5, we will examine some of the criticisms that have been launched 
against Hick‘s pluralistic hypothesis, and pluralism in general, as well as the creative 
efforts of these critics to formulate a better Christian response to religious diversity. 
These critics object to Hick‘s pluralism from two different directions. First, they criticize 
him for his innovative reinterpretations of Christianity – particularly his reinterpretations 
of God, Christ, and religion – which they claim turns Christianity into something other 
than Christianity. Second, they claim that Hick‘s theology – apart from not being really 
Christian – is not really pluralist because it only acknowledges other religions as true 




I will now summarize the main features of Hick‘s theology of religions, and then 
argue that it deserves to be called pluralist, primarily, because it employs a concept of 
true religion that can be pluralized.  
 
Is Hick a Pluralist?  
Hick‘s concept of God, religion, and salvation are all connected. He conceives of God as 
one, unknowable, and ineffable. Or, rather, he conceives of ―the Real‖ as having these 
(mostly negative) characteristics. He uses ―God‖ to designate the Real perceived and 
conceived as personal – in contrast to ―the Absolute‖ which designates the Real 
perceived and conceived as impersonal.  
Because the Real cannot be fully known or fully experienced, no religious 
knowledge and no religious experience of the Real is complete, final, or perfect. This 
means there is no strong identity between any religious experience or reality, and the 
Real as such. Thus, such ideas as ―divine revelation,‖ ―divine incarnation,‖ 
―identification with the absolute,‖ and so on, cannot be taken at face value. They must be 
understood as limited, human, culturally conditioned experiences/perceptions and 
consequent expressions/conceptions of the Real. In other words, Hick employs a 
―humanistic‖ opposed to a ―revelatory‖ concept of religion, or a concept of ―divine 
religion.‖  
But humanly constructed religion is constructed in relation to the Real – which is 
real – and, this is why Hick thinks of his theology as religious rather than naturalistic.23 
The fact that it is impossible to identify religion with God means that it is impossible for 
there to be one perfect religion. It also makes it possible for there to be many different 
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religions, or many different ways of perceiving of and conceiving of God. But, it does not 
guarantee that there will be many equally true religions. 
To introduce this idea into his theology of religions Hick needs to have not only a 
concept of religion but, a concept of true religion.
24
 True religion for Hick is a religion 
that produces salvation: if a religion is salvifically effective it is a true religion. Hick 
defines salvation as the turn from self-centredness to God-centredness/Reality 
centredness; thus, if a religion effectively creates Reality-centeredness in its adherent it is 
a true religion. 
As for detecting Reality-centred individuals Hick says that these are revealed by 
―fruits of the spirit‖; basically, true religions will produce saints, or people manifesting 
moral excellence. Jesus, in Hick‘s view, is a profoundly Reality-centred human being 
who serves as a spiritual exemplar for those who follow him. 
Finally, Hick makes the claim that the great world religions seem to produce 
saintly characters with, more or less, the same degree of effectiveness; thus, the great 
world religions are equal with respect to being true religions. 
Whether Hick is right about any of this does not interest me. What interests me is 
the nature of Hick‘s idea of true religion. I suggest that Hick‘s idea of true religion (i.e., 
salvation) is best understood as a religious universal – and, thus, as something distinct 
from a religious end or a religious essence.  It functions in the same way as Smith‘s 
religious universal ―faith‖ since it has no reality except insofar as it is instantiated in 
particular forms of religious salvation – in Christian salvation, Buddhist salvation and so 
forth.  
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Nonetheless, Smith and Hick seem to come to their universals by different means 
– Smith by feeling the personal quality of faith and then discerning this same (universal) 
quality in the religious expressions of others, and Hick by observing multiple forms of 
religion and abstracting from these a universal form of religion – and this warrants further 
investigation into Hick‘s universal(s). 
Allow me to begin this process by quoting at length from An Interpretation of 
Religion:  
The soteriological transformation normally occurs within the context of a 
particular tradition – indeed in the past probably almost always so – taking a form 
made possible by that tradition and being identified by criteria developed within 
it. There are accordingly Buddhist saints, Muslim saints, Christian saints and so 
on, rather than simply saints. However there is an all important common feature 
which we can both observe today and find reflected in the records of the past. 
This is a transcendence of the ego point of view and its replacement by devotion 
to or centred concentration upon some manifestation of the Real, response to 
which produces compassion/love towards other human beings or towards all life. 
This shift from self-centredness to Reality-centredness is capable of expression in 
quite diverse forms of life. I have myself observed it in the very different lives of, 
for example, a Buddhist monk living in a forest hermitage in Sri Lanka and a Sikh 
doctor involved in a range of practical social activities in the Punjab. It can also 
occur in many different degrees.
25
 
This passage is taken from a section of An Interpretation of Religion that it trying 
to establish a criterion for discerning those who are truly saved or Reality-centred from 
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those who are not (in relative terms), or for discerning true religion from false religion. 
Hick needs to do this because his ―God‘s-centredness‖ is very much like Smith‘s faith 
insofar as it can‘t be detected in and of itself but only in ―clothed‖ form. 26  For Smith, 
faith is clothed in its manifold expressions; for Hick God-centredness is clothed in the 
idea of ―the saint‖ – a God-centred person who manifests love towards all sentient 
beings. These expressions of love or ―fruits of the spirit‖ can take many different forms 
but can generally be divided into more outward acts aimed at social transformation and 
more inward acts aimed at spiritual edification.
27
 Thus, Hick‘s salvation is not an end 
point that obliterates all religious diversity, but a point of origin for multiple expressions 
of religion: As Hick says above ―This shift from self-centredness to Reality-centredness 
[i.e., true religion] is capable of expression in quite diverse forms of life.‖  This means 
that for Hick true religion is, by definition, pluriform or plural.  
Nonetheless, Hick‘s conceptualization of pluriform true religion is more 
complicated than this, primarily because Hick is not willing to make a causal connection 
between particular forms of religion and particular expressions of sainthood. For Hick, 
religion in its most basic form is an attempt to perceive and conceive the Real – and there 
are endless instances of religion as such. Moreover, these various perceptions and 
conceptions of the Real, born of this basic religious effort, may be ―authentic‖ and 
                                                          
26
 Paul Griffiths criticizes Hick for using a substantive, rather than a formal, definition of salvation – which 
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therefore serve as a context for salvation. Remember: salvation is a person‘s turn towards 
Reality-centredness and therefore must involve an authentic representation or 
Manifestation of the Real. (The Real itself is, of course, not available as a soteriological 
referent.)  
But the only way to know if the manifestation of the Real, that one is using to 
become Reality-centred, is an authentic manifestation of the Real – and, therefore, that 
one actually is Reality centred – is by visible fruits of the spirit that can be generalized as 
a saintly character. The saint is the sign of both real salvation and of an authentic 
manifestation of the Real. For Hick, the saint is a generalized universal, abstracted from 
various sorts of saints, and this is all apparently plain to see. But even if it is, Hick is not 
willing (as said above) to identify particular manifestations of sainthood with particular 
religions. Thus, for Hick, a (true) religion is primarily an authentic manifestation of the 
Real and subsequently a context for actual salvation – which might be thought of as the 
fulfillment of true religion.  
At the pinnacle of true religion we find Reality-centred persons of different sorts 
– we find Buddhist and Christians and so forth because these have used Buddhist 
perceptions and conceptions of the Real and Christian perceptions and conceptions of the 
Real as contexts for salvation. But this high point of religion – which is pluriform – is 
relatively mute, unexpressed, invisible.  It is only when Christians and Buddhists are 
dressed as saints that we can see them as truly saved and therefore, deduce that their 
religious contexts are authentic. There is, however,  nothing Buddhist or Christian in the 
clothing of a saint – so even though we are able to deduce that one‘s unexpressed God-
centredness is Buddhist or Christian – we cannot properly say that there are Buddhist 
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saints and Christian saints. The most that we can say is that there are Buddhists and 
Christians who are (also) saints.  
Consequently, I see Hick‘s pluralism limited in two ways. First, the domain in 
which Hick establishes religious plurality, or a pluriform religious universal (by way of 
seeing saints using  different religions as contexts for God-centredness) is largely 
invisible.  Here, there are God-centred persons not yet discernable, as such, because they 
are not clothed in sainthood. At most, we see figures that are vaguely distinct to the 
extent that their Reality-centredness casts a shadow of their particular context of salvation 
or the particular manifestation of the Real that their saved life is centred on. But when it 
comes to expressing this God-centredness – which makes up a great deal of what is 
regarded as religious diversity – the figure of the saint practically reduces all diversity to 
a skeletal uniformity. Or, at least it is not as rich as the diversity which remains in a 
―shadowy‖ state at the level of Reality-centredness.  At the level of expression, Hick is 
only willing to say that there seems to be broad types of soteriological expression – the 
―spiritual‖ inward sort and the ―political‖ outward sort. 
But even with these criticisms, Hick should still be classified as a pluralist, or a 
humanistic pluralist.  First, he makes the basic claim made by all pluralists that true 
religion is plural rather than singular; he rejects the idea of a singular maximus. Second, 
he denies the idea of strong identity between religion and the ―one God‖ so as to avoid 
the conclusion that religion is one. And, third, as just discussed, he employs religious 
universals rather than religious ends or essences in his conceptualization of true religion. 
Hick employs two universals: 1) the universal of salvation or God-centredness, 
and 2) the universal of the saint. The saint acts as the ―visible‖ form of God-centredness.  
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But, even so, God-centredness does have its own vague appearance because concrete 
particular religions serve as contexts for salvation. This allows Hick to speak 
meaningfully about different contexts of salvation, such as Buddhist and Christian, but 
not so concretely and specifically about the various expressions of these different 
contexts of salvation. Still, Hick does acknowledge that there are significantly different 
expressions of salvation or different forms of the saint, and so his concept of the saint is a 
universal. The saint is universal because there is no one substantive form of the saint that 
can be realized; the saint is abstracted from different forms of the saint and is, therefore, 
inherently pluriform. Likewise, Hick‘s idea of God-centredness (taking into account that 
it is a relatively invisible and unformed reality that has to be authenticated by the concept 
of the saint) does not have a substantive form that can be realized. It is also an abstraction 
that cannot be seen apart from particular instantiations; it, too, is inherently pluriform. In 
short, Hick‘s universals have limitations – saints do not reflect the depth of religious 
diversity, and the saved do not show the breadth of religious diversity – but they are still 
universals. 
Thus, I remain confident that Hick is best classified as a religious pluralist.  
 
3. Paul Knitter: Religion as Eco-Human Well-Being    
Paul Knitter is among the most vocal advocates of religious pluralism – and is perhaps its 
most passionate advocate. Knitter‘s passion stems from a positive correlation he makes 
between religious pluralism (the mutuality model) and the alleviation of human suffering, 
along with positive correlations between exclusivism (the replacement model) and 
inclusivism (the fulfillment model) and the promotion of human suffering.  Because of 
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this Knitter finds exclusivism and inclusivism immoral and therefore unacceptable.  
Among the advocates of pluralism (or the mutuality model), Knitter may also be the most 
sensitive to the criticisms of religious pluralism – and the most responsive as he 
continually tries to refine the meaning of religious pluralism in light of such criticisms. 
But Knitter is first and foremost a pluralist, and more specifically a pluralist Christian 
theologian and, thus, in order to understand his passion for pluralism and his apology for 
pluralism it is necessary to first understand his theology of religions. 
To this end, we will exam parts of two of Knitter‘s books that may be considered 
companion volumes: 1) One Earth Many Religions: Multi-Faith Dialogue and Global 
Responsibility in which Knitter articulates his pluralistic, or correlational, model of 
interfaith relations that calls for the religions of the world to unite around the ―relative-
absolute‖ criterion of ―eco-human well-being‖ (soteria) in order to collectively address 
the suffering of the earth and its inhabitants; and, 2) Jesus and the Other Names: 
Christian Mission and Global Responsibility in which Knitter takes up some of the 
theological questions and challenges that Christians would face in adopting his pluralistic 
model. Both of these volumes begin with the same autobiographical account of Knitter‘s 
journey from exclusivism to inclusivism and from inclusivism to pluralism – and since he 
felt it was important to introduce both his generic theology of religions and his explicitly 
Christian theology of religions with this autobiography we will begin our examination of 






Knitter’s Encounter with the Religious Other  
Knitter calls his autobiography a ―dialogical odyssey‖ to emphasize how much his life 
and thought – particularly as a Christian and theologian – have been shaped and changed 
by unanticipated encounters with others. Knitter conceptualizes two others that have 
especially affected his life and theology: the religious other and the suffering other.
28
 The 
religious other served as the primary influence on Knitter‘s theology up until the early 
1980‘s – and this influence is recorded in Knitter‘s No Other Name?: A Critical Survey of 
Christian  Attitudes Toward the World Religions (1985). But after the early 1980s, 
Knitter became increasing exposed to, and influenced by, ―a bigger neighbourhood of the 
other‖ as he came into contact with Central American refugees who, for Knitter, came to 
represent the thousands of people throughout the world who are suffering needlessly on 
account of injustice. Knitter would eventually come to understand, and feel, the suffering 
other to be all sentient beings and the earth itself, and this suffering other would become 
an even greater concern for Knitter than the religious other: This concern is reflected in 
One Earth Many Religions and Jesus and the Other Names.
29
   
Knitter frames his dialogical odyssey in terms of Race‘s exclusivist, inclusivist, 
and pluralist approaches to other religions – and insists that these types are not mere 
―academic play things‖ but represent different perspectives obtained through genuine 
personal spiritual struggles. Moreover, Knitter attributes his personal spiritual struggles – 
as he moved from exclusivism to inclusivism and from inclusivism to pluralism – to his 
encounters with the religious and the suffering others. (4)  
                                                          
28
 Knitter will typically capitalize “other”; for the sake of consistency in this work I will not follow this 
pattern.     
29
 Knitter, Jesus and the Other Names, 1-3; cited in the text by page number hereafter.  
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Knitter describes his first encounter with the religious other as more of a 
monologue than a dialogue. He didn‘t want to converse with religious others but to 
convert them; he wanted to be a missionary. Knitter took his first step in this direction by 
joining the Divine World Missionaries, following four years of seminary high school and 
two years as a novitiate. Knitter says that concern, even love, for others was his prime 
motive in becoming a missionary but says that his love and concern was akin to the love 
and concern that a doctor might have for a sick patient and not that between friends.  As a 
missionary he had the healing medicine of God‘s Word, and the heathens, mired in sin, 
were in desperate need of this medicine. (4)  
Knitter recounts that his (Roman Catholic) missionary training, in the late 1950s 
early 1960s, involved becoming familiar with ideas such as ―accommodation‖ and 
―missionary adaptation.‖ Theses ideas involved using points of similarities between 
Christians and non-Christians as a starting point for the latter‘s spiritual transformation. 
In retrospect Knitter could see that, although this was a self-interested concern for others, 
it was also a positive first step towards positively recognizing religious others. (4-5)  
Missionaries in training at the Divine Word Missionary houses would come into 
contact with a steady stream of missionaries returning from the field. But contrary to 
what Knitter was expecting, the experienced missionaries typically spoke about what was 
good, profound, and beautiful in these other religions, and not their sinful depravity. 
Knitter also had his first exposure to Buddhism at this time as a consequence of 
completing a project on the history, culture, and religion of Japan – one of the ―mission 
countries‖ of the Divine Word Missionary. Here, too, Knitter was surprised by what he 
learned and that there was much in Buddhism that he liked. Thus, by the end of his 
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college studies in 1962 Knitter was beginning to seriously doubt the exclusivist tenet that 
only we have religious truth while they are mired in sin and error; the facts didn‘t seem to 
support this idea. (5)  
In 1962, Knitter was sent to Rome to finish his theological studies and there 
would find the key to moving beyond exclusivism – the theology of Karl Rahner. Knitter 
arrived in Rome two weeks before the start of the Second Vatican Council on October 11, 
1962.  The Second Vatican Council saw the Roman Catholic Church become more open 
to the modern world, and this included greater recognition of the truth in other cultures 
and religions. Karl Rahner (see Chapter 1) played a key role in formulating the Church‘s 
new attitude toward ―non-Christian‖ religions, and while in Rome Knitter had the 
opportunity to take courses about, and by, Rahner. Knitter found Rahner‘s view that the 
Church must recognize other religion as authentic and ways of salvation radically 
refreshing; it was a way of moving beyond the official line of exclusivism taught at 
missionary school and of squaring Church doctrine with his experienced reality. (6) 
After earning his Licentiate in Theology in Rome, Knitter decided to complete a 
dissertation, at the University of Muster under the supervision of Karl Rahner, on 
Catholic attitudes toward other religions. After about a year Knitter discovered that 
someone else had just published a dissertation on this topic, and so decided to transfer to 
the University of Marburg to complete a similar dissertation on Protestant attitudes 
toward other religions. In his dissertation, Knitter argued that Protestant theologians did 
not go far enough in overcoming the exclusivism of Karl Barth‘s theology of religions. 
These theologians would acknowledge that other religions were ―revelation‖ but would 
not acknowledge them as ―salvation.‖ From Knitter‘s Rahnerian perspective this 
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amounted to going only half way in recognizing the authenticity of other religions. Even 
so, Knitter would eventually come to think that his own perspective was limited, since it 
saw the saving grace that was present in other religions as a reflection of the saving grace 
that was fully present only in Jesus the Christ.
 
 (7) 
Knitter would eventually come to see his Rahnerian inclusivism as a ―bridge‖ – 
specifically as a bridge from exclusivism to pluralism. And, for Knitter, the motivation to 
getting off this bridge and to the ―other side‖ was encounter with the religious other. 
While completing his doctoral studies in Germany, Knitter had met Rahim, a fellow 
student from Pakistan who was majoring in chemistry and was a devout Muslim. Rahim 
and Knitter became close friends and often discussed religion. Two things about Rahim 
impressed Knitter: 1) he was ethically superior to most Christians that Knitter knew, and 
2) he was perfectly content to remain a Muslim. Consequently, Knitter found it difficult 
to uphold his view that Rahim would ultimately need to be ―fulfilled‖ in Christianity. His 
inclusivism was waning, and it waned further as he began his teaching career at Catholic 
Theological Union (Chicago) and Xavier University (Cincinnati). At these institutions, 
Knitter taught not only theologies of religions and interreligious dialogue but also courses 
in world religions, especially Hinduism and Buddhism. This required Knitter to become a 
serious student of these religions, which he approached with both an ―intellectual-
historical and personal-experiential‖ method. The upshot of this study and teaching was 
that Knitter became even less convinced that other religions were ultimately fulfilled in 
Christianity. (7-8) 
Knitter realized that he needed a new theoretical map to sort out his spiritual 
universe and consequently turned to guides such as Raimon Panikar and Thomas Merton, 
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both of whom had experience with multi-religiosity. Knitter himself even entered into 
this new world of multi-religiosity by re-embracing the practice of daily meditation – but 
now in the form of Zen Buddhist meditation or zazen.
30
 Knitter describes this new 
awakening to the truth of other religions, that was reshaping his theological perspective 
as follows:  
From such study, conversations, and practice, I realized that a dialogue of 
discovery and theological insight was unfolding – sometimes exploding – within 
me. There were particular experiences and insights that shook and then rearranged 
my theological perspectives: when I realized that perhaps the Hindu claim of non-
dualism between Brahman and Atman was not just an analog, but perhaps a more 
coherent expression of what Rahner was trying to articulate with his notion of the 
supernatural existential or when I realized that the Buddhist experience of Anatta 
(no-self), as much as I had understood and felt it, enabled me to better understand 
and, I think, live, Paul‘s claim ―It is now no longer I who live but Christ who lives 
in me‖ (Gal 2:20).  (8) 
Knitter finally moved away from his Rahnerian inclusivism by writing a book – 
No Other Name? (1985) – in which he surveys different ―models‖ for understanding 
other religions within Christianity, and begins to lay the foundation for his own new 
model based on dialogue.  
                                                          
30
 In this respect, Knitter is more engaged in religious diversity than either Smith or Hick; he not only 
acknowledges the validity of the religious other he participates in the religious life of the religious other. 
This, I would suggest is what makes Knitter most reluctant, among humanistic religious pluralists, about 
applying essences or universals that compromise religious diversity.    
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Following the lead of John Hick, Knitter grounded his new approach to religions 
in theocentrism rather than Christocentrism; in others words, he wanted Christians to 
recognize that God rather than Christ was the origin of religion:  
Though we Christians claim Jesus the Christ as our necessary and happy starting 
point and focus for understanding ourselves and other peoples, we must also 
remind ourselves that the Divine Mystery which we know in Jesus and which we 
call Theos or God, is ever greater than the reality and message of Jesus. (9)    
The fact that God transcends religion, allows Christians to see other religions as possible 
responses to the Divine Mystery. Knitter, at this point wasn‘t positively affirming that 
other religions were genuine responses to the Divine Mystery or Ultimate Mystery – this 
would come later – he was only saying that other religions may be authentic responses to 
this reality.  And, if this was the case, then other religions would not be fulfilled in 
Christianity but would be related to Christianity, since all religions (including 
Christianity) move towards God, or ―continue their efforts to discover or be faithful to 
inexhaustible Mystery or Truth.‖  (9) 
Knitter would eventually go on to positively affirm that other religions are, like 
Christianity, authentic but not exhaustive responses to the Divine Mystery (in One Earth 
Many Religions and Jesus and the Other Names). But to understand the particulars of this 
pluralistic affirmation it is helpful to learn more about Knitter‘s life experience.  
As mentioned above, after writing No Other Name? Knitter‘s focus turned more and 
more to the suffering Other. This turn began in 1983 when Knitter met, in Cincinnati, two 
Salvadoran students who had become refugees as a consequence of speaking up about 
human rights in their native land. This meeting inspired Knitter to become involved with 
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the Sanctuary Movement in Cincinnati – an ecumenical group that, in defiance of 
American policy, was providing shelter to Central American refugees.  And it also 
inspired him to embrace liberation theology in order to make sense of religion and be a 
faithful Christian. From this point on, Knitter could no longer do theology unless it was 
connected to liberation (theology) – and we see this in all of Knitter‘s work in the 
theology of religions starting with his contribution to The Myth of Christian Uniqueness 
(1987) called ―Toward a Liberation Theology of Religions.‖ (10) 
  This need to fuse concern for the religious other with concern for the suffering 
other was enforced in Knitter‘s mind when he had the opportunity to take a five month 
sabbatical to India in 1991: ―If there was ever a country that has housed, so graphically 
and tensely, the ‗many religions‘ and the ‗many poor,‘ it is India.‖ (11) India proved to 
Knitter that dialogue and liberation must go hand in hand. By this time Knitter, like many 
others, was becoming sensitive not only to the suffering of other human beings but also to 
the suffering of all sentient beings and the earth itself. Thus, Knitter felt it necessary to 
conceptualize justice and liberation very broadly as ―ecohuman justice and liberation.‖ 
And this is particularly significant for our discussion here because ecohuman justice and 
liberation, or ecohuman well-being would become Knitter‘s universal criteria for judging 
true religion. Religions that promote ecohuman justice are true religions and those that do 
not are not. 
This universal criterion – placed on top of his ―agnostic‖ theocentrism – is at the 
heart of Knitter‘s theology of religions, and so we will now turn to Knitter‘s generic 
articulation of this universal criterion of religious truth in One Earth Many Religions, and 




A Generic Theology of Religions  
In One Earth Many Religions, Knitter connects global responsibility with being religious: 
―to know the Sacred is to care for the Earth; to care for the Earth is to be touched by the 
Sacred.‖31   Knitter uses this connection to establish a common ground for interreligious 
dialogue; more specifically, he suggests that the earth can be used as 1) a basis for 
understanding religious beliefs cross-culturally, and 2) a basis for evaluating all religious 
beliefs. In other words, Knitter suggests that ―justice or ecohuman well-being can serve 
as a universal criterion for truth without becoming a new foundational or absolute norm 
for truth.‖ (118) 
Knitter forms his view that justice or ecohuman well-being can serve as a 
universal criterion for judging religions in conscious opposition to the postmodern view 
that any attempt to establish such an ethical criterion will drown in a sea of diversity. 
And, his quest for commonality or universality on the ethical front begins with a claim 
that the Earth provides human beings with a common story that can help us to understand 
and unify our various religious experiences. Most significantly – as noted by several 
visionary philosophers, scientists, and theologians – recent (scientific) discoveries about 
the origins of the universe and its workings provide all religions with a ―common creation 
myth.‖ (119)  Knitter believes that this common myth can serve a ―hermeneutical 
framework‖ for linking various religious creation stories and showing the deep 
connectedness of all living beings:  
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The scientific enterprise has eventuated in a creation myth that offers humanity 
deeper realization of our bondedness, our profound communion not only within 
our species, but throughout the living and non-living universe. (120)     
Knitter emphasizes that this common myth not only connects all living creatures 
by identifying their common origin and heritage, it also connects them by showing how 
the universe works, i.e., by showing that the universe is deeply interrelated and organic: 
―What one is and what one makes of oneself takes place through dependence on others, 
through relationships and connectedness.‖ (120)  
For Knitter, this common story can serve as a meeting place for all religions and 
nations, and it suggests that the Earth – rather than any religion or nation – should 
demand the primary loyalty of all human beings. Nonetheless, Knitter‘s main concern is 
not with remythologizing this story into a religious story, but with attending to the 
common ethical task that it implies. He believes that it is on the ethical level that this 
common story can most practically unify the religions. The common ethical task that 
Knitter sees before all peoples and all religions is care for the Earth and our species in the 
face of impending ecological disaster – and he believes that this must impel the peoples 




In short, ―our Earth‖ now understood as ―one Earth,‖ on account of the common 
creation myth of modern science, is the common ―place‖ where all religions can come 
together to share their myths of origin – and, it is also an ethical community in which 
persons can come together to ―identify and defend common criteria of truth.‖ (123) 
Knitter sees these two spheres working in concert – the religions will come together to 
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communally affirm (in different ways) the new creation myth, and these will provide the 
―materials and perspectives‖ to fashion ―global ecological norms.‖ (123) Indeed, Knitter 
believes that the religions will have a ―determinative role‖ in responding to the global 
ecological crises because only they can articulate the sacredness of the Earth, without 
which care for the earth can never be effective: ―If we regard the Earth and all its 
creatures as merely finite, as disposable tools to achieve our own good, we will not dispel 
our ecological nightmares.‖ (123) 
Knitter believes that all of the ―wisdom traditions‖ (religions) teach such things as 
respect for human life, the interconnectedness of all beings, the need to overcome self-
aggrandizement and so forth – and that spokespersons for the world‘s religious 
communities are forming a common front to criticize the ethical failings that are leading 
to ecological destruction.  Moreover, Knitter believes they must form a common front 
because they face a common problem; namely, the well-being of human beings and our 
one Earth. (124) 
But even though Knitter recognizes that all nations and religions share a common 
problem, he also recognizes that they certainly do not share a common solution to this 
problem. Following David Tracy, Knitter affirms that religions are not the same – there is 
no single essence of religion or a single way to salvation, but that there are common 
criteria that allow religions to talk to one another and overcome incommensurability. 
Tracy identifies mystical, reasonable, and ethical points of commonality in all religions 
and Knitter believes that all of these must come into play in interreligious dialogue, but 
he suggests that the ethical is the best starting point for making ―shared assessments of 
truth.‖ (126) For Tracy, ethical truth criteria is about the ―personal and social 
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consequences of our beliefs,‖ and so Knitter proposes a universal criterion for universal 
truth based on ethical fruits. More specifically, he says that we can judge a religion (a 
religion‘s beliefs) to be true and good if it removes suffering and promotes well-being. 
Thus, religions can judge the validity of each other‘s beliefs on the basis of whether or 
not they promote ecohuman well-being and reduce ecohuman suffering. For Knitter there 
is something raw and universal about ecohuman suffering that defies interpretation, and 
this validates the quest for universal solutions. 
Despite his claim that ecohuman well-being might serve as a criterion for 
religious truth, Knitter is ever mindful of the postmodern warning against a particular, 
culturally conditioned notion of justice masquerading as an absolute criterion of justice. 
Thus, he tries to conceptually validate his claimed universal criterion by calling it a 
―relative-absolute criterion.‖ (129) By calling his universal a relative absolute Knitter is 
trying to walk a line between the extremes of absolutism (one and only) and relativism 
(anything goes). Knitter‘s way between these two extremes is to claim that his norm of 
ecohuman justice, on one hand, demands that we follow and defend what we see as true, 
but, on the other, demands that we be open to seeing the truth more fully. This middle 
path requires us to embrace absolutely what we have (by acknowledgement) grasped only 
relatively. (129) 
Knitter claims that this situation, wherein one embraces absolutely a relative 
norm, is paradoxical, and uses Langdon Gilkey‘s reflections on the finite and Infinite, and 
on absolute and relative truth to explain this paradox. For Gilkey, the absolute requires 
the relative in the same way that the Infinite needs the finite. The Infinite comes into 
contact with the finite by becoming ―finitized,‖ and likewise absolute truth becomes 
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known to us in relative forms. In other words, human beings can only know Divine truth 
insofar as it assumes relative form – and, yet, the relativized Divine never becomes the 
merely relative but always also remains the Divine and so reveals absolute truth. (130) 
In short, Knitter understands truth as having different aspects and this is 
especially evident at the level of ethical practice:  
In what truth calls us to do, in the liberating praxis it generates, it can be absolute; 
yet when we reflect on how we have known this truth and the limitations of our 
knowing it, we feel the relative aspect of truth. (130) 
Knitter even sees this dynamic taking place in us bodily: the heart takes full 
possession of truth and commits to it fully, but the head, when it tries to grasp the truth 
realizes that truth is so much bigger than it is, and that there must be more truth. (130) 
But, of course, Knitter is most interested in seeing this dynamic at play in 
interreligious dialogue that is directed towards the universal goal of ecohuman well-
being. Here Knitter claims that when we recognize something as true because it promotes 
ecohuman well-being we must be willing to stand up for it absolutely, but at the same 
time we must be open to other claims about what justice is and how it might be realized. 
Thus, Knitter imagines the religions, through a dialogical process, coming to ever greater 
realizations of justice. In this dialogue the religions will be ever open to new ways of 
realizing the human good or justice: 
It requires that we be genuinely open to brand new ideas, to utterly different ways 
of realizing, or even conceiving, the human good. We have to be ready to be 
surprised, stretched, maybe humiliated. (131) 
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Thus, justice or the human good can be realized in many different ways – and Knitter 
makes this a permanent condition by insisting that the project of ecohuman well-being 
will always stand incomplete – it will ―always be beyond our comprehension and our 
actualization.‖ (131) 
Knitter believes that this relative absolute criterion of ecohuman justice would be 
acceptable to Christians, since Jesus provided the same criterion with his proclamation of 
the ―reign of God‖ (also called the Kingdom of God) that functions as an absolute insofar 
as it is already here (within us) and as a relative since it is not yet established in the 
present. Let us now look more closely at how Knitter adapts his universal criterion to the 
Christian tradition in Jesus and the Other Names. 
The section from Knitter‘s Jesus and the Other Names that we will now examine 
is meant to show what is unique about Jesus or the message of Jesus –and, as indicated 
above, the uniqueness of Jesus‘ message is framed as a unique form of Knitter‘s religious 
criterion of ecohuman well-being. 
 
Knitter‘s Generic Theology of Religions in Christian Form   
Knitter begins his quest to find what is unique in the message of Jesus by denying that he 
is looking for an essence of Christianity or an inner core that never changes. Moreover, 
he insists that by unique he does not mean something that no one else has, but rather that 
which makes something special or distinctive.
32
 These qualifications allow us to think of 
Jesus‘ message as a unique form of something more universal. 
Knitter, in a manner similar to Smith, says that Christianity does have a ―unique 
core‖ but that this is not static and ahistorical – ―to get at it and to feel its transformative 
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power, one has to approach it and apply it with the interpretative tools of one‘s own 
historical and cultural context.‖ (85) As with Smith‘s faith, this core of Christianity 
cannot be viewed naked, but can only be seen when clothed in the languages of different 
peoples and different times.  And, also like Smith‘s faith, Knitter‘s core is both uniform 
and pluriform:  ―the core of Christian revelation is a pluriform, adaptive, changing 
reality.‖ (85) Knitter would also make the same claim about religion in general and so in 
this regard is, like Smith, a pluralist by definition. 
Knitter begins his quest for the pluriform core of Christianity with scholarship on 
the historical Jesus, even though he recognizes that he is entering a mine field of 
theological controversy.  Moreover, Knitter recognizes that the historical Jesus can never 
provide the whole story about Jesus because Jesus, within his community (the church), is 
also the Christ of faith. And, on top of this, the message of Jesus is not only found in the 
gospels, but also in the guidance of the Spirit which may or may not be embodied 
ecclesiastically. (86-88) 
But even with these qualifications, Knitter claims that there is a surprising 
consensus among biblical scholars regarding the central message of Jesus; according to 
these scholars, the central message is of the coming Reign of God into this world. This 
means that Jesus‘ ultimate concern is not – as it is for many Christians – Jesus himself.  
And, it also means that Jesus‘ ultimate concern is not simply God. For Jesus, there is 
something that mediates the absolute truth of God, and so serves as a criterion for 
judgment, but this divine mediator is neither the church nor the ―Kingdom of heaven.‖ 




This means that the message of Christ is not christocentric, theocentric, or 
ecclesiocentric. In No Other Name? Knitter identifies pluralism with theocentrism, and so 
requires further explication of his new position that is not theocentric. Knitter claims that 
Jesus would have seen his message as incomplete if it only called for belief in, and 
worship of, God – for Jesus, God could not be known or worshipped apart from the Reign 
of God. Thus, for Jesus, in order to be God-centered one had to be Kingdom-centered, 
and so we can call his message Kingdom-centered. (89-90) Thus, the Kingdom of God is 
the divine mediator that serves as the ultimate criterion for judgment. 
As for what Jesus meant by the Kingdom of God, Knitter says that the meaning of 
this symbol can never be fully exhausted; nonetheless, he is willing to indentify certain 
features of the Kingdom. First off, the Kingdom of God is a this-worldly reality that 
effects a transformation in human beings and human societies:  
…Jesus intended the betterment, the well-being, the fuller life of people around 
him, especially those who were suffering. It was a reality that would change both 
human hearts and human society. (90) 
The Reign of God will take concrete form in justice and peaceful relations 
between the peoples of the world, and in the disappearance of sickness, injustice and 
oppression. It will entail that human beings will have a new relationship with God and 
that this relationship will be manifested in new relationships among human beings that 
are characterized by a harmonious human society and a peaceful natural environment. 
(90-91) 
Consequently, for Jesus, God is present in any ―Kingdom activity‖ or in anything 
that promotes human well-being and removes suffering. The symbol of the Kingdom of 
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God is, for Knitter, the core of Christianity – and this, of course, is identical to his core of 
religion which is expressed more generically as ecohuman well-being. (91) Thus, it 
would be fair to say that Knitter conceptualizes the message of Jesus (Christianity) as a 
unique, but not exclusive, expression of the relatively absolute norm of ecohuman well-
being. 
Having concluded that the core of Jesus‘ message is the announcement of the 
Kingdom of God it becomes necessary for Knitter to reinterpret understandings of Jesus 
that deflect away from this conclusion. Knitter argues that after the resurrection of Jesus, 
his community turned away from his original message by turning away from Kingdom-
centeredness and becoming Christ-centred. Consequently, Christian conversion became 
about believing in Christ rather than embracing Jesus‘ social message.  This focus on 
Jesus led to a ―litany of titles‖ being ―heaped upon‖ Jesus, the most the most central 
being ―Son of God.‖ For Knitter, this turn away from Kingdom-centeredness to Christ-
centeredness represents a wrong turn:  
…christocentrism was not meant to replace but to enhance Kingdom-centrism. 
Being centered on Christ is the Christian way of being centered on the 
Kingdom. As Jesus would remind us: It is more important to focus on the 
Kingdom than to focus on him. (92) 
In the above passage we see Knitter‘s understanding of ―unique‖ in play: Jesus provides 
the unique Christian path – but not the only path – to the Kingdom.  
In any case, Knitter‘s main concern is to find a title for Jesus that is more in 
keeping with the bearer of a message about God‘s coming Kingdom. The title that Knitter 
suggests as a replacement for those that encourage exclusive focus on Jesus (by 
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emphasising his divinity) is ―Spirit-filled Prophet.‖ Knitter claims that this title is 
grounded in what can be known with ―relative certainty‖ about the historical Jesus. 
Drawing on the work of Marcus Borg Knitter summarizes the characteristics of the 
historical Jesus as follows: 
1. The historical Jesus was a spirit person, one of those figures in human history 
with an experiential awareness of the reality of God.  
2. Jesus was a teacher of wisdom who regularly used the classic forms of wisdom 
speech (parables and memorable short sayings known as aphorisms) to teach a 
subversive and alternative wisdom. 
3. Jesus was a social prophet similar to the classical prophets of ancient Israel. As 
such, he criticized the elite (economic, political, and religious) of his time, was an 
advocate of an alternative social vision, and was often in conflict with authorities.  
4. Jesus was a movement founder who brought into being a Jewish renewal or 
revitalization movement that challenged and shattered the social boundaries of his 
day, a movement that eventually became the early Christian church. (93) 
Knitter then boils this down to characterize Jesus as a ―spirit-filled mystic and a 
social prophet‖ (93)  – or, a Spirit-filled Prophet. For Knitter, titles for Jesus must evoke 
or enable (1) the power of the Spirit of Jesus, and (2) prophetic action in the social world, 
or action that helps bring about the Kingdom of God. If titles such as ―the only Son of 
God‖ fail to do this they are ineffective, and should be dropped in favour of more 
effective titles such as Spirit-filled Prophet which would actually be more orthodox on 
account of being more in line with the original message of Jesus. (93) 
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Having established the pluriform core of Christianity and a congruent identity for 
Jesus, Knitter moves on to indentify the aspects of Christianity that make it unique, or the 
―essential ingredients in the Christian religious experience.‖ (94) Knitter identifies three 
essential ingredients and each is tied to a characteristic of God, as God is made known 
through Jesus. First, Christians must be actively engaged in the struggles of this world – 
since God is known in history. Second, Christians must give special concern to the 
suffering other – since God seeks the well-being of the oppressed. Third, Christians must 
carry out their task of bringing justice into the world with hope that their efforts, despite 
inevitable failures and setbacks, will make the world a better place – since God is faithful 
to those who work to establish his Kingdom. (94)  
Knitter‘s first essential ingredient of Christianity reveals his theology and 
ontology, and establishes the conditions for the other two essential ingredients. This first 
ingredient is the claim that God is a God of history. Even though God is a transcendent 
reality, God cannot remain transcendent and must become involved in the finite world of 
history: ―By the very divine nature, God must get involved (express God‘s self) in the 
finite, in history.‖ (94) Knitter calls this relationship between the Divine and the 
historical a ―non-duality.‖33 Within this ontological state, the Divine becomes involved in 
the historical, with the corollary that participation in the Divine requires participation in 
history. 
In more Christian terms, one feels the Spirit of God through involvement in 
history, and most specifically through the practice of loving one‘s neighbor. Indeed, 
Knitter clearly sees love of one‘s neighbors (acts of justice) as an expression of one‘s 
                                                          
33
 I suggest that “relational unity” would be a more accurate term and would avoid confusion with forms 
of nonduality found in Hinduism and Buddhism that envision the finite ultimately dissolving into the 
Infinite.   
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mystical experience of God, since he sees mystical experience as ―somehow maimed, 
inadequate, even dangerous‖ if it is not fulfilled in historical praxis. Knitter summarizes 
the relationship between the historical and transcendent elements of Christian faith as 
follows: 
Christian existence contains a historical element – the Reign of God, justice, 
knowledge, and service to human beings – and a transcendent element – God and 
the knowledge of God. The transcendent element is not directly accessible but 
must be reached through its historical mediation. (95)  
In other words, God and the knowledge of God is mediated through Kingdom activities – 
love of neighbour/acts of justice.  Thus, from Knitter‘s perspective, one does not have a 
religious or spiritual life unless one is actively working for the Kingdom or for the 
transformation of this world into a better more just world. 
Knitter‘s thought runs along similar lines when considering the first two 
commandments for Christians; namely, love of God and love of neighbour. For Knitter, 
the two are inseparable and it is through love of the neighbour that one loves God. (95)  
The other two essential features of Christianity, identified by Knitter, follow 
directly from the idea that being religious means working for the Kingdom. The first is 
that the oppressed or the suffering other ought to be given priority in one‘s activities to 
establish the Kingdom. In other words, Christians must give special attention to 
improving the conditions of those affected most grievously by the injustices and 
inequities of this world. The second is that Christians must hold out to other religious 
communities the hope that this world actually can be made better and saved; for Knitter, 
this may be the most unique feature of the  ―Judeo-Christian convent.‖ (96-98) 
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Knitter closes his account of the uniqueness of Christianity by drawing it into a 
comparison with Buddhism and Hinduism to emphasize its uniquely relational 
characteristics. This comparison seems to suggest that Christianity is relatively better 
than these Eastern religions in some regards, and, on the surface, this would seem to be 
incompatible with Knitter‘s pluralistic view that all religions have their own unique ways 
of bringing justice into this world (i.e., of being religious.) But here it must be 
remembered that Knitter always frames ―Kingdom activity‖ in relative terms and so has 
no need to shy away from saying that the uniquely Christian way of manifesting 
ecohuman justice is better than some other religious ways. However, such claims are 
always part of an interreligious conversation – a conversation that is meant to lead all of 
us closer to the Kingdom. 
That said, Knitter claims that Buddhism and Christianity both emphasize 
wisdom/knowledge of God and love/compassion, but that Buddhism gives priority to 
wisdom and Christianity gives priority to love. The Buddhist turns inward to find 
wisdom, and as a consequence of wisdom manifests compassion for others. In contrast, 
the first move for Christians is out towards the neighbour, and through love for the 
neighbour the Divine is experienced. Knitter is even willing to suggest that this pattern is 
typical of Asian and primal religions as compared to Semitic religions. (99)  
Knitter also notices differences in the way that Christians diagnose and seek to 
remedy the ills of this world.  Buddhist and Hindus tend to see a person‘s problems 
stemming from the way they see and feel the world (from their relative state of 
enlightenment). In contrast, Christians see that human beings create structures of injustice 
(e.g., apartheid in South Africa) that cause suffering for other human beings. Thus, the 
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world‘s problems are not merely manifestations of internal states but are rooted in social 
conditions that themselves must be addressed. For the Christian, allowing or participating 
in unjust social structures is spiritual failure. (99-100) 
What is most unique about Christianity then, as compared with other religions 
(and particularly the Asian religions) is that it is a form of religiosity that demands 
relationship with others – all others. This, of course, includes all religious others – and for 
Knitter the Christian ideal is to work with all other religions to move ever closer to the 
unreachable goal of the Kingdom of God or ecohuman well-being. (100-101) 
Having now examined the basic elements of Knitter‘s pluralistic model – in both 
generic and Christian form – we will look at some of his later work that focuses on 
defending the pluralist model.       
 
Knitter’s Defence of Religious Pluralism  
I began this section by saying that Knitter is one of the most passionate advocates of 
religious pluralism, and one of the most responsive pluralists to the critics of religious 
pluralism. These two characteristics of Knitter come out strongly in Knitter‘s introduction 
to, and contribution to, The Myth of Religious Superiority.  
Knitter‘s passion for pluralism stems from his belief that pluralism is necessary 
for the establishment of a just and peaceful world – and that there is a causal link between 
claims of religious superiority and religious violence. He agrees with Hans Kung that 
there can be no peace in the world until there is peace among the religions, but he adds to 
this that there can be no dialogue among the religions (a prerequisite for peace among the 
religions) unless religions drop their claims to religious superiority. In other words, the 
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religions must drop their (exclusivist) claims to be the only religion and their (inclusivist) 
claims to be the best religion, and adopt a pluralist model wherein many different 
religions are acknowledged as equally true.
34
 Knitter subtly links exclusivism and 
inclusivism to violence by calling those who refuse interreligious dialogue, on account of 
their claims of superiority, ―militants‖ – but is equally critical of hypocritical 
―peacemakers‖ who are no different from these militants so long as they maintain (even if 
only in their hearts and minds) their own superiority while at the dialogue table. In short, 
to condone claims of religious superiority is to condone religious violence and other 
forms of injustice:  
We are acutely aware that throughout history almost all human conflicts have 
been validated and intensified by a religious sanction. God has been claimed to be 
on both sides of every war. This has been possible because each of the great world 
faiths has either assumed or asserted its own unique superiority as the one and 
only true faith and path to the highest good – in familiar Christian terms, to 
salvation. These exclusive claims to absolute truth have exacerbated the division 
of the human community into rival groups, and have repeatedly been invoked in 
support of oppression, slavery, conquest, and exploitation.
35
 
The only way beyond this violence and injustice, in Knitter‘s mind, is to embrace the 
pluralist model.
36
 Knitter is passionate about eradicating violence and injustice and, 
consequently, passionate about religious pluralism.   
                                                          
34
 Or, rather, instead of simply dropping exclusivist and inclusivist claims, Knitter would like to see 
pluralists from all traditions reinterpret these claims as mythic or symbolic expressions of a truth that 
cannot be finally expressed; see, Knitter, Myth of Religious Superiority, viii.    
35
 Knitter, Myth of Religious Superiority, x. 
36
 Knitter identifies the following six planks of the pluralist model: 1) all religions have internal resources 
that allow for a pluralistic interpretation of religion; 2) pluralisms must affirm that there are deep religious 
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In his contribution to the Myth of Religious Superiority called ―Is the Pluralist 
Model a Western Imposition: A Response in Five Voices‖ Knitter shows his 
responsiveness to the critics of religious pluralism by trying to further clarify the meaning 
of religious pluralism in light of their criticisms. 
Knitter focuses particularly on the criticism that the pluralist model is an 
―ultimately exploitative Western imposition‖37 and he identifies this criticism with 
―postmodernism‖ or ―postliberalism.‖ According to the critics, pluralism is an imposition 
because it ignores the reality of language – or the reality that one must always speak in a 
particular language that necessarily determines and limits what one tries to express or 
understand. This means that whenever we try to understand or judge another religious 
language, we do so from within our own religious language. Pluralists, however, have 
tried to find a common language within all religions, and in the process have simply 
imposed their own language on others (without acknowledging this). Think of Smith‘s 
―generic‖ religious terms such as faith, Hick‘s particular definition of salvation, and even 
Knitter‘s concept of the ―Reign of God.‖ The critics claim that by using such terms, 
pluralists are reducing all religions to a common essence or common ground and, thus, 
eliminating the religious plurality that they aim to authenticate. (28-29) 
My position is, of course, that the critics of pluralism have missed an important 
characteristic of the language of humanistic religious pluralism; namely, that it speaks in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
differences and avoid reducing all to a common essence; 3) all religions must recognize that the Ultimate 
Mystery can never be fully grasped by human beings and so by any religion; 4) pluralism is not the same 
as relativism – pluralists, in dialogue, make judgements about harmful religious practices; 5) ethical 
concerns have priority at the dialogue table; 6) interreligious encounters and dialogue must respect 
freedom of conscious, i.e., religious persons must be free to share what they find to be true in their 
religion (witness), although they must not assume that their witness is superior (i.e., they must not 
proselytize) (Knitter, Myth of Religious Superiority, x-xi).   
37
 Knitter, “Western Imposition?,” 28; cited in the text by page number hereafter.   
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terms of religious universals that allow for multiple expressions, instead of religious 
essences or ends that eliminate religious multiplicity.  Thus, in the eyes of humanistic 
pluralists, their generic terms, or universal terms, capture all and distort none. But, in the 
eyes of the critics, the so-called generic terms of pluralist are simply a case of one 
religious language imposing itself on all others – or of (mis)understanding the other in 
terms of the self.  More specifically, it is the imposition of a Western language, since the 
originating, motivating ideals of pluralism were ―all originally packaged in the 
European Enlightenment – universal truth linked to the universality of reason, evolution 
toward ever greater unity, e pluribus unum (out of many, one), liberal democracy.‖ (30)  
The obvious concern here is that some religious voices will be marginalized and silenced 
as Western elites – who are already politically and economically advantaged – use their 
―universal terms‖ to decide what does and does not count as an authentic expression of 
religion. 
Knitter is sobered by these postmodern criticisms, but as said earlier sees them as 
warning signs rather than roadblocks, and consequently tries to defend and clarify the 
pluralist project.  Knitter articulates his defense of pluralism in five different ―voices‖: 
the voice of religious believers and teachers; the voice of religious mystics/teachers; the 
voice of religious philosophers; the voice of religious friends; and, the voice of religious 
activists. 
Each of these voices reveals a truth about the nature of religious pluralism and our 
religiously plural world. The believer tells us that religious pluralists expound universal 
religious truths. The mystic tells us, though, that there are no absolute truths because 
finite beings can never fully grasp the Infinite. The religious philosopher tells us that 
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religions are deeply different. But the religious friend and the religious activist show us 
that there is common religious ground. The religious friend shows us this when we see 
truth/God in their starkly different expressions of religion. And, the activist shows us this 
by identifying the suffering other as a cause of common concern for all religions. 
In evoking the voice of (pluralist) religious believers and teachers – who expound 
universal truth – Knitter is trying to distance pluralism from both relativism and the 
postmodern affirmation of mere religious diversity.  Knitter claims that all religions make 
universal truth claims – claims that are true for everyone and that together constitute a 
comprehensive framework for understanding reality.  For Knitter, the belief that what is 
true for me is true for everyone is what makes every religious believer a teacher or 
preacher. And, the belief that one‘s religion provides  a comprehensive framework for 
understanding reality – in conjunction with the understanding that one cannot transcend 
one‘s own religious particularity – is what makes every religious believer an ―inclusivist‖ 
(in some sense). (31-32) 
In saying that religious persons claim to have a comprehensive framework for 
understanding reality, or a ―universal understanding power,‖ (32) Knitter is 
distinguishing pluralism from postmodernist perspectives that see universal truth as both 
impossible and dangerous. But, he also acknowledges that pluralists – in order to avoid 
the intolerance associated with absolute truth-claims – have not done a good job of 
affirming universal truth-claims. This has led to the (inaccurate) perception that pluralists 
reject the idea of using criteria to judge religions and, thus, effectively affirm that all 
religions are true. For Knitter, recognizing the truth of every religious claim ensures that 
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no religious claim can be taken seriously, and he insists that such relativism is not what 
pluralism is about. (32) 
Knitter associates the problem of vacuous religious truth with relativism, but 
associates the related problem of isolated religious truth with postmodernism or 
postliberalism.  Postliberal thinkers such as George Lindbeck and William Placher (and 
perhaps Mark Heim
38
) see religions as locked into their own conceptual universes with 
no means of communicating with, or relating to, those in other religious universes. For 
Knitter, the pluralist model affirms, and tries to encourage, relationships of mutuality 
between the different religions.  Indeed, creating a context of dialogue or of mutual 
sharing of truth between religions is so central to pluralism from Knitter‘s perspective 
that he prefers to call pluralism ―mutuality.‖ (33)  
But while pluralists affirm the possibility of universal truth claims, they 
emphatically reject the possibility of absolute truth claims. According to the critics of 
religious pluralism, all religions do, in fact, make absolute truth claims; thus, when 
pluralists deny the possibility of absolute truth claims they are critiquing religious world 
views from their own world view. More precisely, they are using a (Western) tenet of the 
Enlightenment – i.e.,, that all truth is historically conditioned and so relative – to judge 
the truth claims made by (all) religions.  Knitter acknowledged that the critics are right in 
recognizing that pluralists reject absolute truth claims, but goes on to argue that they are 
wrong to ground this rejection (solely) in the Enlightenment. (33-34) 
To make this argument, Knitter evokes the voice of religious mystics/teachers in 
all religions. According to Knitter, the ―mytico-theological traditions within all religions‖ 
                                                          
38
 See Chapter 5 for an alternative reading of Heim’s theology of religions.   
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maintain that absolute truth claims can only be made in a qualified sense. (34) This is so 
because finite human beings can never fully and finally grasp the Infinite mystery:  
…there is broad agreement that what the religions are seeking is beyond human 
comprehension and that therefore all human speaking about it can never be more 
than ―relatively adequate.‖ In different ways and in different contexts, religions 
recognize that what they are after they can never fully find. Yes, they find 
something, and that something transforms their lives, but they never find 
everything. Religion deals with that which can never be totally known or 
definitively grasped by human beings. So if religious practitioners can be utterly 
certain that they have experienced God or Truth or Enlightenment, they also are 
utterly certain that this Reality is more than what they have experienced. (34)  
Knitter qualifies ―absolute‖ truth claims in religions by insisting that such claims are 
never complete, full, or final, since they can never be identified with the infinite reality 
that they seek to grasp. What religions seek always remains an ―absolute mystery‖ and so 
no religion can claim that its experience of, or revelation from, this ineffable reality is 
absolute truth. Moreover, this truth about the ―relative adequacy‖ of all religious truth is 
recognized within all religions and so this ―plank of the pluralist model‖ is not a Western 
imposition. It is a deep seated truth found in all religious traditions that can thus serve as 
a means to break down the isolating effect of absolute truth claims: ―…it grows out of 
respect for the humanity everyone has in common with everyone else and the limits of 
finite human existence.‖ (36)  
 Thus, we might say that, for Knitter, a universal truth claim is a claim about the 
infinite that is true but not final or complete. Knitter‘s dictum that there can always be 
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more always converts absolute religious truths into ―relatively adequate‖ religious truths. 
But Knitter‘s conviction that real truth is never complete truth does not prevent Knitter 
from searching (collaboratively) for truth that is comprehensive and true for all of us, i.e., 
universal truth. But, before moving in this direction Knitter calls on the voice of the 
religious philosopher to make the point that religious pluralists are also very serious 
about affirming religious diversity. 
In the same way that Knitter recognizes the failings of pluralists in affirming 
universal religious truths (and so appearing to be relativists), he also recognizes 
the failings of pluralists in affirming deep religious differences (and so appearing 
to be essentialists). Knitter even acknowledges his own past failings in this 
regard:  
I confess that in my eagerness to bring my fellow Christians to recognize the 
validity of other religions, in my efforts to find common ground for a more 
authentic dialogue of religions, and in my way of speaking of the Ultimate Reality 
that connects the different religious families, I did not make sufficient room for 
the real, deep, distinctive, perhaps irreducible differences among the religions. 
(37)   
 Knitter now recognizes (and thinks others pluralists should too) that any effort to 
speak in terms of a common ground or a common Ultimate Reality raises questions about 
whose common ground and whose Ultimate Reality is ordering the universe of faiths. 
Still, Knitter refuses to let deep religious differences balkanize the religions; he says that 
at very least these differences create a context for religions to discuss how they will 
manage their differences: ―How should we manage our differences? How can we make 
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genuine connections in the midst of real differences? How can we measure 
incommensurables?‖ (37)  Knitter suggests, here, that the work of ―pluralists‖ such as 
John Cobb with his concept of multiple Ultimates, and Raimundo Panikkar with his 
concept of Ultimate Reality itself being pluralistic might be helpful. But as helpful as 
such ―paradoxical‖ ideas might be for authenticating deep religious differences, they still 
seem to perpetuate a problem that is central for Knitter; namely, the problem of how 
radically different religions can connect and speak with one another. (37-38) Thus, even 
though Knitter is willing to acknowledge that religions are very different, he is not 
willing to say that they are merely different. Knitter seeks connection, common purpose, 
universality for the religions, and thus completes his clarification and defense of 
pluralism with two further voices that address this theme. 
 The first voice that Knitter calls on to locate a point of contact between different 
religions is the voice of the ―religious friend.‖ According to Knitter, those with radically 
different religious perspectives can connect and learn from one another as friends. Knitter 
comes to this conclusion on the basis of what he has seen in his own dialogue with 
religious friends. Religious friends do, in fact, communicate and learn from one another 
and, therefore, there must be ―something‖ that allows for this connection. Knitter is 
reluctant to be too specific about the nature of this common something, but does suggest 
that the ―image of Ultimate reality‖ might be an appropriate signifier of a ―Universal 
Mystery that enables connection and communication.‖ (39) 
 In saying, on one hand, that religious pluralists should be wary of identifying a 
common religious essence or speaking of a common Ultimate Reality since religions are 
so different – and, on the other, that religious friends know that ―there is something 
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common, something universal‖ (39) that serves as the ground of all religions, Knitter 
seems to want to have his cake and eat it too. Knitter wants to say that there is 
―‗something‘ between and within the religions‖ (39) but is unwilling to call this the 
essence of religion, or the Ultimate Reality to which all religions refer. Nonetheless, 
Knitter‘s ―Ultimate Mystery,‖ of which ―Ultimate reality‖ is a limited conceptualization 
is really no different from John Hick‘s ―the Real‖ of which God and the Absolute are 
limited conceptualizations.  Knitter‘s Ultimate Mystery looks even more like Hick‘s ―the 
Real‖ when he implies that this reality – which is recognized by pluralists – is also the 
grounding reality of the universal truth claims made by religious persons in various 
traditions. For Knitter, religious persons see this (same) reality or this great ―Other‖ in 
their own traditions but also in religious others: ―In the face of the other I see or sense the 
face of the Other that shines within and beyond us all.‖ (40)  
 Having suggested that there is a great Other or an Ultimate Mystery that connects 
the different religions, Knitter evokes one final religious voice – the voice of the religious 
activist – in order to identify a more tangible commonality amongst the religions of the 
world. Knitter suggests that the ―suffering other‖ is, or ought to be, the common concern 
of all religions, indeed, of all religions acting together or interreligiously. The suffering 
of all human beings, and of the earth itself, ought to bring religions together to fight for 
social justice in order to relieve this suffering and promote peace. In this, Knitter suggests 
that interreligious dialogue should start in the ethical realm. More precisely, he suggests 
that it should start in the realm of suffering caused by religiously motivated violence 
since it is intolerable that religious people should stand by when gross human suffering is 
caused in the name of God. But, more significantly, Knitter concludes that pluralism is 
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inherently interreligious (i.e., something that is found in or can be adapted to all 
religions) by arguing that concern with social justice and religiously motivated violence 
is inherently interreligious. Knitter‘s conclusion is based on the assumption that pluralism 
is causally connected to social justice and peace in the same way that claims of religious 
superiority (i.e., inclusivism and exclusivism) are causally connected to social injustice 
and religiously motivated violence.  In other words, pluralism is interreligious because 
pluralists are concerned with social justice and concern with social justice is 
interreligious. (41-42) 
 
Is Knitter Really a Pluralist?   
Once more, I suggest that contact with the religious other is a contributing social factor to 
the emergence of humanistic religious pluralism, and that the three main features of this 
type of pluralism are 1) the rejection of the idea of a singular maximus, and the 
affirmation of the plurality of true religion; 2) the affirmation that God (or Ultimate 
reality) is one, and the rejection of the idea of strong identity between God and religion; 
3) the employment of the idea of a religious universal, as opposed to the idea of a 
religious end or the idea of a religious essence.  
For Knitter, contact with the religious other allows one to see the Ultimate 
Mystery that is the ground and animating force within the religions of the world. Indeed it 
was contact with the religious other that precipitated Knitter‘s ―dialogical odyssey‖ from 
exclusivism to inclusivism and finally to pluralism or mutuality.  
This existential experience of the authenticity of religious others means, for 
Knitter, that the plurality of true religion is a fact. And this, in turn, means that there 
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cannot be one superior form of religion or a singular maximus. Thus, Knitter‘s theology 
conforms to the first main feature of humanistic religious pluralism. 
The presence of the second main feature of humanistic religious pluralism is 
somewhat more ambiguous in Knitter‘s case, but I suggest it is still present. This 
ambiguity stems from the fact that Knitter is a Trinitarian, and uses the Trinitarian 
concept of God to argue for the plurality of religions. But Knitter also emphasises that the 
different persons of the Trinity are related and one – and, in the end, contends that all 
religions are grounded in a singular Ultimate Mystery. Then, in order to ensure that there 
are multiple religions or multiple ways of knowing and responding to the Ultimate 
Mystery, Knitter insists that there is no way to finally or completely grasp the Ultimate 
Mystery. Thus, just like Smith and Hick, Knitter posits a transcendent reality that is the 
source and focal point of all religions, but cannot ever be grasped or contained by 
religion. Smith prefers to call this reality Transcendence, Hick prefers to call it the Real, 
and Knitter prefers to call it the Ultimate Mystery – but I suggest that these are 
synonymous concepts since each acts in the same way – as the ultimate ground of 
religious plurality. 
The concept of an Ultimate Reality that is finally unknowable, of course, leaves 
the door to relativism wide open – if we cannot know final truth about Ultimate Reality 
then all truths about Ultimate Reality must be judged as equally true and equally false. 
Smith, Hick, and Knitter all reject this conclusion and, thus, all establish a criterion for 
true religion. For Smith, the criterion for true religion is faith, for Hick the criterion is 
salvation, and for Knitter the criterion is ecohuman well-being. 
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I have argued that Smith‘s concept of faith does not function in the same way as a 
religious end or religious essence, and is better understood as an Aristotelian universal. It 
is a universal that can only be seen in its various instantiations and so is also inherently 
plural. Likewise, I have argued that Hick‘s concepts of salvation and the saint function as 
universals, insofar as they can both assume multiple forms, and neither can be indentified 
with one particular form; these universals are formless in their uniformity and inherently 
plural when they assume form.  Knitter‘s theology of religions does not, however, fall so 
neatly into this pattern – at least not in all respects. 
When Knitter speaks of mystical experience finding expression in historical 
involvement, or love of God finding expression in love of the neighbour, his thought runs 
along the same lines as Smith and (to some extent) Hick. Love of God must be ―clothed‖ 
in love of the neighbour; otherwise, it has no (positive) reality. Thus, we see love of God 
when it is shown in love of the neighbour, in the same way that we see faith when it is 
shown in expressions of faith. 
But for Knitter the locus of true religion is not love of God – such that religions, 
understood as various attempts to express this love in acts of loving one‘s neighbour, 
could be judged. For Knitter, the locus of true religion is love of neighbour, and religions 
are understood as various attempts to realize this ideal.  Knitter articulates love of 
neighbour in two different ways: 1) as the religious symbol Kingdom of God, and as the 
relatively absolute truth criterion of ecohuman well-being. Each of these terms means the 
same thing in Knitter‘s theology of religions. 
What is different about Knitter‘s religious universal of eco-human well-being – as 
compared with Smith‘s universal of faith and Hick‘s universals of salvation and the saint 
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– is that it is a concrete social reality. There is nothing concrete about Smith‘s faith, and it 
can‘t even be seen until it is expressed. Hick‘s salvation is almost as indiscernible until it 
shows itself in saintly character – and the saint is, in some respects, inherently diverse on 
account of being a person. Again, Knitter‘s universal is a concrete social reality; thus it 
can‘t manifest in diversity because it is already a manifestation (of love of God), and it 
implicates everyone.  In short, Knitter‘s universal doesn‘t leave very much room for 
diversity – and so we might ask if it is better understood as a religious end rather than a 
religious universal. 
On one level, I would suggest that Knitter does employ an end rather than a 
universal, and so his theology of religions leans more towards inclusivism than pluralism. 
However, Knitter does something with his religious end that makes it function more like 
a universal (that enfolds diversity) than an end (that terminates religious diversity). 
Specifically, he claims that his end can never be attained.   Though Christians must strive 
for the Kingdom of God with all their might, they must also realize that the Kingdom will 
never finally come. And though all religions should strive, in concert and with absolute 
determination, to realize ecohuman well-being, they must realize that they can never 
completely reach their goal.
39
 
By putting his concrete social goal permanently out of reach, Knitter creates a 
situation in which no one (i.e., no religion) can ever claim that it has attained the goal, or 
that it is the exclusive path to the goal: It is always possible to get ―closer‖ to a goal that 
can never be reached. Given this context, it is possible to acknowledge that there are 
multiple paths to the goal – and sometimes Knitter even talks about their being multiple, 
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 Knitter does not say why the goal of religions and all human beings can never be achieved, but 
presumably this is related to his conviction that Ultimate Reality can never be exhausted.   
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albeit partial, realizations of the goal. In other words, there are multiple (partially) true 
expressions of true religion.  So, by identifying an end that can‘t be achieved Knitter 
creates something akin to a religious universal – a single reality that admits diversity – 
and, consequently, I think his theology of religions is still best classified as pluralist. 
Nonetheless, Knitter does not really uphold the idea of religious diversity as an 
ideal. Admittedly, there are many hands building the Kingdom, but the best circumstance 
is for these many hands to work together – so that we all might move closer to the 
Kingdom. And, on this account, I would be willing to assign to Knitter his preferred 
designation of ―mutualist.‖   
 
4. Conclusion 
One of the most obvious criticisms that can be aimed at all three forms of religious 
pluralism discussed above is that their universals do not capture all religious diversity. 
For example, one might be hard pressed to find a Zen Buddhist who would agree to see 
their experience of satori, as either faith or an expression of faith; as a turn towards God-
centredness that will necessarily manifest in a saintly character; or as a ―kingdom 
activity.‖  And if one believes that satori is in fact something different from Smith‘s faith, 
Hick‘s salvation, or Knitter‘s Kingdom activity, then one might also believe that there is 
religious reality that falls outside of these conceptualizations of religion – and, even, that 
these conceptualizations of religion distort some religious realities.  
But this type of criticism can be leveled against any theology of religions that 
claims to be comprehensive (and I think all do). What I have primarily been interested in 
establishing is whether or not the theologies of Hick, Smith, and Knitter are pluralistic. I 
252 
 
have come to the conclusion that they are because they claim that true religion is 
―ultimately‖ (or permanently) multiform rather than uniform and they use arguments and 
conceptual tools to maintain this position. They argue that although God is one there can 
be no strong identity between God and religion and, so, religions cannot be one like God 
is one; thus, religion is plural. And they use the concept of a religious universal (rather 
than a religious end or essence) to create a universal concept of true religion that is both 
uniform and multiform; that brings coherence to the religious universe without distorting 
its manifold forms.   
Returning then to the question of distortion, the first thing to note is it can be 
supposed that in the minds of our three pluralists, their conceptions of true religion are 
broad and true enough to accommodate all religions without distortion and to judge them 
without error. If we assume that this is the case then, based on the arguments in this 
chapter, we would (I hope) concede that our three pluralists are, in fact, pluralists. On the 
other hand, we might also assume that their conceptions of true religion are not the 
unerring balances that they suppose them to be. Returning to our earlier example, let‘s 
now suppose that satori is 1) an authentic expression of true religion, and 2) that it is not 
an expression of faith as conceived by Smith, a form of salvation as conceived by Hick, 
or a Kingdom activity that promotes ecohuman well-being as conceived by Knitter. In 
this case, I suggest that the reasonable conclusion to draw is not that our representative 
pluralists are not really pluralists, but that they have not properly understood the world‘s 
religious diversity. And, of course, such a criticism would place the onus on the critic to 
explain how things really are – in pluralistic terms or otherwise.  
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That said, it should be acknowledged that the three humanistic pluralists are not 
simply concerned with affirming religious diversity; indeed, it could probably be argued 
that their more ―ultimate concerns‖ are with religious unity and problems of religious 
disunity, and that their interest in religious diversity stems from a desire to affirm a more 
comprehensive religious unity. We see this in Smith‘s impulse toward a wider 
(worldwide) ecumenism; in Knitter‘s desire to save the (whole) world; and, in Hick‘s 
rigorous efforts to validate all of the world‘s great religions. This theme cannot be further 
explored here, but it is perhaps worth bearing in mind as we now move to our next 
chapter where we will look at the work of the three most vocal critics of humanistic 






1. Introduction  
In this section we will examine the work of three Christian theologians: a Catholic 
philosophical theologian (Paul J. Griffiths); an academic Catholic theologian (Gavin 
D‘Costa); and, an academic Protestant theologian (S. Mark Heim). I will call these three 
thinkers ―neo-inclusivists‖ because while each organizes their thinking about religious 
diversity around an explicitly Christian end, each also recognizing the possibility, if not 
the fact, of non-Christians teaching religious truths that Christians need to know. This is 
not characteristic of traditional inclusivism.  Griffiths, D‘Costa, and Heim all claim to be 
open to seeing the truths of other religions on their own terms and, thus, they are highly 
critical of (humanistic) pluralist theologies that insist on reducing different religious 
languages to one language. By claiming that religions are equal by virtue of their 
sameness humanistic pluralists are no longer truly pluralist. The neo-inclusivists claim 
that their own explicitly Christian theologies of religions are more pluralistic because 
they are willing to see that other religions may have truth that Christians do not have and 
need for their own salvation.     
 
2. Paul J. Griffiths’ Defence of Inclusivism and Exclusivism  
Paul J. Griffiths is a philosopher of religion or a philosophical theologian – who has 
taught at the University of Chicago, the University of Illinois at Chicago, and Duke 
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University – and has made several important contributions related to problems of 
religious diversity and interfaith relations.
1
 In his most recent contrition, Problems of 
Religious Diversity, Griffiths, like D‘Costa and Heim, comes to the conclusion that 
religious pluralism is a questionable reality.  
Problems of Religious Diversity, is, on one level, an introduction to the dominant 
questions that arise in the face of religious diversity; a review of possible answers to 
these questions; and, an argument for the positions that the author commends from his 
Catholic Christian perspective.  However, on another level, it can be read as an 
apologetic effort to reinterpret the exclusivist/inclusivist paradigm versus the pluralist 
paradigm and, indeed, to defend exclusivism and inclusivism against pluralism.
2
  
In Problems of Religious Diversity, Griffiths makes the uncommon move of 
addressing the various problems, or questions, that arise in the face of religious diversity 
separately. Griffiths addresses sets of questions related to the following four topics: (1) 
truth, (2) epistemic confidence, (3) the religious other, and (4) salvation – the last of 
which he sees as (to some extent) a combination of elements from the first three sets of 
questions.  
As said, Griffiths‘ work can be seen as apologetic, and thus for each problem he, 
on one hand, defends the exclusivist/inclusivist paradigm and, on the other, criticizes the 
pluralistic paradigm.  In defending the exclusivist/inclusivist paradigm Griffiths makes 
the following points: First, no religions are actually exclusivist with respect to truth. 
Second, knowledge of religious diversity need not lead to epistemic arrogance or a loss of 
                                                          
1
 See especially Griffiths, Christianity Through Non-Christian Eyes; Griffiths,  An Apology for Apologetics; 
Griffiths, Religious Diversity.   
2
  Generally, Griffiths treats inclusivism and exclusivism as though they are variants of a single position.  
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epistemic confidence, but can lead to epistemic uneasiness that can serve as a basis for 
creative tradition-specific thought about religious diversity. Third, mission or teaching is 
in integral part of religion, which can‘t be rejected with the hope that the rest of it can be 
accepted. Fourth, exclusivism with respect to salvation does not necessarily entail a 
commitment to restrictivism, i.e., it is possible to hold the position that it is necessary to 




In criticizing the pluralist paradigm, Griffiths makes the following parallel points. 
First, parity claims with respect to religious truth (a characteristic of pluralism) require a 
circumscription of truth that denudes it of its usual meaning. Second, the loss of 
epistemic confidence, characteristic of pluralists who encounter religious diversity, 
entails abandonment of one‘s religion – or of the central claims of one‘s religion. Third, 
the broad religious tolerance advocated by pluralists, is largely idealistic, insofar as it is 
almost impossible to effect politically. Fourth, pluralism is usually only quasi-pluralistic 
because it necessarily circumscribes the category of religion. 
In this review we will look at how Griffiths deals with the problem of truth and 
the problem of salvation. In dealing with the problem of truth, Griffiths suggests that a 
form of inclusivism, wherein Christians are open to the possibility that other traditions 
teach truths not explicitly taught by the Church, is the best approach. In dealing with the 
problem of salvation, Griffiths comes to the conclusion inclusivism (it is necessary to 
belong to Christianity in a relaxed sense) coupled with a possibilist restrictivism (it is 
possible that not all will be saved) is the best position for Christians to adopt.  
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In dealing with the question of truth, Griffiths distinguishes two types of 
response: those that claim parity with respect to truth and those that claim difference. As 
for making a parity response, Griffith surveys three different perspectives: a Kantian, a 
Wittgensteinean, and a non-religious. Very basically, the Kantian view achieves parity 
with respect to truth by claiming that there is a single religious claim that defines religion 
as such, and that all religions make this same claim (even if they also make many false 
claims and, amongst themselves, many contradictory claims.)
3
 For Griffiths, Kant‘s 
parity claim is most in line with religious pluralism or, at least John Hick‘s, religious 
pluralism. Wittgenstein‘s parity view is achieved by seeing that all religious claims are 
coherent within their own ―form of life‖ and, so, all true in this qualified sense. (45-50) 
Finally, the non-religious view of parity, which is most commonly held by those involved 
with legislation in religiously neutral states, is achieved by limiting the scope of religious 
truth, for example, by saying that all religious claims are equally true insofar as they do 
not conflict with an overriding interest, or law, of the state.
 
 (50-53)  
As for religious responses that say religious claims are different with respect to 
truth, Griffiths identifies two: exclusivism, and inclusivism. In discussing exclusivism 
Griffiths claims that no actual religious communities maintain this position because it 
amounts to saying that no religious community, except one‘s own, makes claims that are 
true. Most religions are open to the possibility that their rivals may have gotten a few 
things right and so are inclusivist with respect to truth. Griffiths goes further by 
identifying different forms of inclusivism: ―necessary inclusivism‖ that says other 
religions must make at least some true claims; ―possibilist inclusivism‖ that says other 
religions may make religious claims that are true; ―closed inclusivism‖ that says all true 
                                                          
3
 Griffiths, Religious Diversity, 37-44; cited in the text by page number herafter.  
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claims made by other religions are already explicitly made by one‘s own religion; and, 
―open inclusivism‖ that says other religions may teach and understand truths not 
explicitly taught and understood by one‘s own religion. Griffiths suggests that possibilist, 
open inclusivism is the best response to the truth claims of other religions. (Necessary 




In advocating possibilist open inclusivism for the Church Griffiths is open to the 
possibility that other religions might have something to teach the Church on their own 
terms – and in this differs from traditional inclusivism where other religions need the 
Church but not the other way around.      
I suggest that this openness to different truths in other religions makes it 
impossible for Griffiths to accept (humanistic) pluralist theologies of religions, since 
these see other religious truths only insofar as they are essentially the same as Christian 
truths: This is what makes pluralist theologies not truly pluralist.  Griffiths makes this 
argument in relation to John Hick‘s broadly Kantian approach to parity with respect to 
religious truth. Griffiths argues that since Hick claims soteriological equality for all 
religions that he ought to have the working assumption that the aggregates of truth, in the 
claims of different religions, are equal. Griffiths rejects this as a general assumption, 
saying that no one (presently) has enough empirical knowledge of all religions to reliably 
make such an assumption. Griffiths does, however, say that there is evidence to suggest 
that truth is not evenly distributed among all religions. He cites the Peoples Temple, Aum 
Shinrikyo, Heaven‘s Gate, and Osho as movements that would qualify as religions 
(according to his definition) but do not possesses an aggregate of truth claims on par with 
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Orthodox Judaism, for example. John Hick would, of course, say the same, thing; 
claiming that parity with respect to truth can only be established among the great ―post-
axial‖ religions (the world religions). But on this point Griffiths notes that Hick‘s position 
is not as pluralistic as it seems:  
It is to these [the great post- axial religions], he says, that the working hypothesis 
of parity with respect to truth ought to be applied. But then the pluralistic 
hypothesis is no longer quite as pluralistic as it seems, for now some actual 
religions are excluded from the claim that the aggregate claims of all actual 
religions are related identically to the fundamental religious claim. (44) 
Griffiths, makes a similar point when discussing the problem of salvation – where 
he defends the ―exclusivist‖ idea that belonging to a home religion is necessary for 
salvation, by softening it with the further idea that this exclusivist claim does not have to 
be tied to ―restrictivism,‖ or the idea that salvation is limited to some.       
In his discussion of salvation Griffiths notes that there are two related, but 
separate, questions that can be addressed. The first asks how one is saved and the second 
asks who is saved, and it is this first question that he says can be coherently answered 
with the responses of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. (142) Griffiths presents the 
exclusivist, inclusivist, and pluralist responses to the question of how one is saved with 
representatives of the three positions – Karl Barth, Karl Rahner, and John Hick 
respectively – but he is also very vigorous in distilling the formal responses.  
According to Griffiths, exclusivism boils down to claiming that belonging to the 
―home religion‖ is necessary for salvation (albeit not necessarily sufficient for it). In 
other words, if one wants to be saved one must belong to the home religion (even if 
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belonging to the home religion won‘t necessarily guarantee one‘s salvation). (150-151) 
Inclusivism is only a variation on this position because it is based on this same 
assumption that if one wants to be saved one must belong to the home religion; however, 
it is different from exclusivism in that it employs a looser sense of what it means to 
belong to the home religion. This view brings into play the notion that one might be 
participating in the home religion while not aware of this fact, and seemingly 
participating in another religion.
 
 (159-160) Pluralism, in marked contrast, rejects the 
basic premise of exclusivism and inclusivism – that one must belong to the home religion 
to be saved – in order to assert the basic truth of pluralism that all religions are able to 
deliver salvation in and of themselves. (142)   
But in rejecting the basic premise of exclusivism and inclusivism, pluralism finds 
itself bound to a problematic position; specifically, that belonging to the home religion is 
not necessary for salvation. Griffiths calls this form of pluralism, which cuts the 
connection between salvation and membership in a religion, negative pluralism and notes 
that it is rare for religious persons to hold this position. (142-143)  
Instead, religious persons are more likely to adopt a positive form of pluralism 
that claims a positive connection between religious membership and salvation, and 
maintains that this connection, whatever it is, is equally present in all religions – despite 
the fact that this usually undermines the diversity that pluralism seeks to honour. (143)  
More specifically, the positive form of pluralism must, in one way or another, make 
selections among the religions – in deciding which ones are equally valid – and therefore 
must remain only quasi-pluralistic. Griffiths, as indicated above, uses the pluralistic 
hypothesis of John Hick to make this point. 
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Griffiths argues that pluralistic theories based on 1) a substantive definition of 
―salvation‖ or the final religious end sought by all religions; and, 2) a claim that salvation 
(that which indicates religious authenticity) is verifiably by evidence.  
For Hick, religion boils down to salvation – religions that effect salvation are 
authentic and those that do not are not. Hick defines salvation as a turn from self-
centeredness to God-centredness, and in making this move he immediately circumscribes 
what can be an authentic religion: An authentic religion is one that turns its adherents 
from self centredness to God-centredness. Hence, all religions are not equal and, hence, 
Griffiths claims that Hick‘s pluralism is only quasi-pluralistic.    
Hick also says that it is possible to determine the authenticity of a religion by (the 
evidence of) whether or not it produces saintly characters: If a religion produces saintly 
characters it is authentic, if it does not it is not. In this move, Hick is simply identifying 
the empirical form of an authentic religion, which provides concreteness to his 
circumscription of what constitutes authentic religion; and, again, for Griffiths, this is 
what makes his pluralism quasi-pluralistic. 
Hick‘s belief with respect to the second point is that all of the ―great world 
traditions‖ produce saintliness with more of less the same degree of effectiveness, but 
faced with a lack of empirical evidence the only thing he can say, for sure, is that there is 
no way of knowing whether one tradition or another is more salvifically effective. 
Griffths agrees with Hick on this point – but not with Hick‘s conclusion drawn from it 
that, therefore, all of the great traditions are equally salvifically effective. Griffiths, 
discerns quite correctly, that the only further conclusion we can draw is that ―we have no 
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idea whether all the great traditions are or are not equally salvifically effective.‖ (149, 
emphasis in original)       
The other question, related to salvation, that Griffiths addresses is that of who is 
saved, and he identifies two responses: ―restrictivism‖ and ―universalism.‖ Restrictivism 
says all will not be saved which can be expressed differently as some will not be saved. 
Universalism, on the other hand, says that all will be saved or, expressed differently, that 
there is no one who will not be saved. Griffiths also discusses these two positions in the 
mode of necessity and the mode of possibility (where they merge into the same position); 
nonetheless, what is most important in this discussion is his point that 
exclusivism/inclusivism need not necessarily be tied to restrictivism.  
In other words, it is possible to hold that belonging to the home religion is 
necessary for salvation, without holding that this means some or all people will suffer 
eternal damnation. Or, it is coherent to be an exclusivist, who says that all must belong to 
the home religion to be saved, while being a universalist, who says that all will be saved. 
This is significant because exclusivism (in its Christian form) is often rejected on the 
ethical grounds that a loving God could not consign to hell human beings who had no 
chance of becoming Christian.(161-168) 
Griffith‘s own suggestion for the best Christian response to the question of 
salvation is as follows: First exclusivism should be affirmed, or it should be affirmed that 
belonging to Christianity is necessary for salvation; however, this should be a relaxed 
sense of belonging since it is difficult to determine just how much explicit Christian faith 
one needs in order to be saved. (Thus, Griffiths favoured position could be called 
inclusivism.) Second, Christians should acknowledge that both restrictivism and 
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universalism are possible answers to the question of who is saved. Universalism is 
possible because of God‘s desire to save all, and restrictivism is possible because human 
beings are always free to accept or reject God‘s universal offer of salvation; thus, any 
affirmation of universalism must acknowledge the possibility of restrictivism. Griffiths 
believes that God gives human beings every chance to be saved – including post mortem 
chances – but does maintain that eventually chances come to an end and so it must be 
possible for some to not be saved. As for answering the question as to whether 
universalism (all are saved) or restrictivism (some are not saved) is the case, Griffiths 
says that he doesn‘t think it‘s possible to know – but he does frown on making negative 
judgements about another‘s spiritual destiny. (165-166) 
By saying that it is not possible for Christians to know for sure if universal or 
restrictivism is the case, we are left with saying that both are possible. And, if 
universalism, must acknowledge the possibility of restrictivism, then Christians must, 
until the end, maintain a ―possibilist restrictivism‖ – that is necessary coupled with 
exclusivism/inclusivism.   
I have said that all of the theorists, in this discussion, employ the idea of ―true 
religion‖; Griffiths is the exception to this. Griffiths (for the purpose of dealing with 
problems of religious diversity) defines religion very broadly as ―a form of life that seems 
to those who belong to it to be comprehensive, incapable of abandonment, and of central 
importance to the order of their lives.‖ (12) Griffiths obviously does not try to distinguish 
between more and less authentic versions of religion based on this definition of religion – 
but, as discussed above, he does speak about varying degrees of truth and falsehood 
across the aggregate of religion‘s claims. Moreover, he says that Christians ought to be 
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open to the possibility of other religions having truths not explicitly known within 
Christianity. Griffiths calls this stance ―open inclusivism.‖  
Griffiths does not say that the religion possessing the greatest amount truth across 
the aggregate of its claims is the ―true religion.‖ Nonetheless, we can assume that, for 
Griffiths and other religious persons, the ―home religion‖ is presupposed to have the 
greatest amount of truth.  Thus, the starting point for Griffiths‘ open inclusivism is the 
relative ―superiority‖ of Christianity, in terms of truth across the aggregate of its claims, 
and from this vantage point it is acknowledged that other religions may serve to deepen 
this truth. So, even though Griffiths does not employ the notion of ―true religion‖ he ends 
up saying something very similar to Christian inclusivists who do: Christianity is the 
truest religion.  
Even if we acknowledge that Griffiths works with a more qualified understanding 
of true religion, than other Christian inclusivists, we can still see that his inclusivism is a 
departure from traditional Christian inclusivism. Traditional Christian inclusivism claims 
that all truth in other religions is derived from Christianity; Griffiths‘ open inclusivism 
claims that other religions may be independent sources of truth (even if this truth is 
eventually incorporated into Christianity). This is a change and would require Christians 
to listen to the truths of other religions on their own terms.   
Griffiths does not identify ―true religion‖ with salvation either. He understands 
salvation formally as the end that all human beings should want, and acknowledges that 
for him this is Christian salvation or the attainment of the beatific vision. As a Christian, 
he also believes the following: 1) that belonging to Christianity (in a loose sense) is 
necessary for salvation, 2) that all human beings will be given the chance to obtain 
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salvation – be it in this life of the life to come, and 3) that it must be possible to refuse 
salvation and, therefore, possible for some to not be saved. Although he does not say so 
explicitly, I will presume that Griffiths sees truth claims as productive of salvation – and, 
therefore, that he believes the truth claims of other religions may make Christian 
salvation more effective.  If this is the case, the need to take other religions seriously is 
amplified.  
As said in the brief introduction to this chapter, acknowledgement by the home 
religion that alien religions might have something to teach it is the hallmark of neo-
inclusivism. This idea is found in Griffiths‘ concept of open inclusivism with respect to 
truth, and seems to have implications for the question of salvation. Nonetheless, Griffiths 
does not develop a full-blown neo-inclusive Christian theology of religions, so for this we 
will turn to two other theorists; namely, Gavin D‘Costa and S. Mark Heim.  
 
3. Gavin D’Costa’s Roman Catholic Trinitarian Theology of Religions    
Gavin D‘Costa is a Catholic theologian who teaches at Bristol University.  In 1986, he 
published a book called Theology and Religious Pluralism in the pattern of Alan Race‘s 
Christians and Religious Pluralism which – despite D‘Costa‘s stated preference for 
inclusivism over pluralism – helped to validate Race‘s typology and his characterization 
of religious pluralism. 
 
A Critique of Humanistic Religious Pluralism  
In 1990, D‘Costa edited and contributed to a volume called Christian Uniqueness 
Reconsidered: The Myth of a Pluralistic Theology of Religions. This book was brought 
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together in direct response to The Myth of Christian Uniqueness and has been seminal for 
all subsequent criticisms of religious pluralism, including D‘Costa‘s 1995 article called 
the ―The Impossibility of a Pluralist View of Religions,‖ wherein he renounces his 
commitment to the traditional threefold typology. Indeed, D‘Costa describes this 
particular article as a public act of self-humiliation because in it he argues that the 
threefold typology –  that he previously embraced, defended, and helped to authenticate – 
is incoherent since both inclusivism and pluralism are logically forms of exclusivism and, 
therefore, nothing called pluralism (or inclusivism) really exists.
4
  
D‘Costa‘s point in this article is a logical one, and is quite simple: He argues that 
there is no such thing as pluralism because pluralists are committed to some form of truth 
criteria whereby they include certain religions within the category of authentic religion 
and exclude others. D‘Costa argues that if pluralists did not use such exclusivist criteria 
they would not be able to distinguish between the ―great world religions‖ and various 
―destructive cults,‖ as they typically do. However, pluralists do, in fact, use exclusivist – 
and religious tradition-specific – criteria to judge the authenticity of various religions 
and, so, they fail to achieve their (apparent) aim of affirming religious diversity as an 
autonomous value.  
D‘Costa sees the ―logical shape‖ of pluralists denying some religions the status of 
being an authentic religion, as identical to that of exclusivists denying the existence of 
truth and salvific efficacy in other religions, and this is why he says that pluralism is 
really exclusivism. Thus, D‘Costa claims that there is a logical category mistake in the 
labelling of pluralism because it shares the same logical structure as exclusivism, and he 
maintains that this argument holds for all forms of so-called pluralism, both Christian and 
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 D'Costa, “Impossibility of a Pluralist View.” 
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non-Christian. D‘Costa would later go on to argue this at length in his book called, The 
Trinity and the Meeting of the Religions – a book that also includes D‘Costa‘s own 
attempt to produce a Catholic trinitarian theology of religions. D‘Costa claims that his 
tradition-specific theology of religions is actually more open, tolerant, and egalitarian in 
its approach to other religions than are ―pluralist‖ theologies of religious pluralism. We 
will now examine D‘Costa‘s trinitarian theology of religions.  
In the first part of The Meeting of Religions D‘Costa argues that John Hick, Paul 
Knitter and Dan Cohn-Sherbok (a Reform rabbi) are all exclusivists, since they propound 
a ―form of Kantian exclusivist modernity‖5 and belong to the ―exclusivist Encyclopaedic 
tradition.‖ (47) As such, they have bought into the Enlightenment‘s unitary view of 
reality, which obliterates all otherness. Here is how D‘Costa characterizes Hick‘s and 
Knitter‘s engagement with religious otherness:  
…in so much as their positions actually advance modernity‘s project, rather than  
Christianity's engagement with difference, they deny or even obliterate difference 
and Otherness. In Hick‘s case, he mythologizes the differences away so that the 
religions can be fitted into his system. In Knitter's case, the religions are all 
judged by allegedly self-evident criteria that are found in the ecosystem. Both 
Hick and Knitter know the full truth and what is ethically required of the religions 
independently of any of the religions.‖  (39) 
After arguing that these representative Christian and Jewish pluralists are really 
exclusivists, D‘Costa turns to look for pluralists in other religious traditions, and so 
examines the ―neo-Hindu pluralism‖ of Radhakrishnan, and the ―‗skilful‘ pluralism‖ of 
the Dalai Lama.  (56; 74) Without going into the specifics of his argument, D‘Costa 
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 D'Costa, Meeting of Religions, 39; cited in text by page number hereafter.  
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concludes that Radhakrishnan and the Dali Lama are also both exclusivists. The defining 
feature of exclusivism, for D‘Costa, seems to be seeing the other in terms of one‘s own 
religiosity, or, not being able to ―affirm another on the other‘s own terms.‖ (91) It is with 
respect to this feature that D‘Costa classifies Karl Rahner – who typifies inclusivism for 
many – as ―clearly and explicitly an exclusivist.‖6 (91)    
Even so, when D‘Costa puts forth his own trinitarian theology of other religions – 
which he also calls exclusivist –  he maintains a residual, pejorative meaning for both 
inclusivism and pluralism. According to D‘Costa, inclusivism and pluralism are 
identifiable by their (wrong) view that other religions are vehicles of salvation in and of 
themselves– pluralists maintaining that these different salvific vehicles are of equal value 
and inclusivists maintaining that the salvific vehicle of the home religion is still superior. 
(99-101) 
 It is in this sense that D‘Costa still refers, for example, to Rahner as an 
―inclusivist‖ and Hick as a ―pluralist.‖   
I, of course, maintain that useful distinctions can be made between exclusivism, 
inclusivism, and pluralism, as outlined in Chapter 3. Using these distinctions, D‘Costa is 
an inclusivist because he rejects the exclusivist idea that there is only one authentic form 
of religion, and because he posits a singular religious end for all religions. Moreover, he 
is a neo-inclusivist because he attributes position value to non-Christian religions in 
realizing the ultimate (Christian) religious end. 
D‘Costa – in an effort to distance his own approach to religious diversity from the 
modernist pluralist approach – describes his approach as ―unashamedly Roman Catholic 
in method, orientation, and accountability.‖ (99) More specifically, D‘Costa claims that 
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 Rahner is an exclusivist because 1) he identifies salvation with the beatific vision, and 2) other religions 
only remain lawful until their historical encounter with Christianity (D'Costa, Meeting of Religions, 91).  
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his approach engages creatively with other traditions while remaining faithful to his own; 
that it is more open, tolerant, and egalitarian than pluralist approaches; and, that it is open 
to criticism from religious others. (99)  
 
A Trinitarian Approach to the Religions 
D‘Costa‘s approach revolves around two main arguments; 1) that non-Christian religions 
are not vehicles of salvation per se, and 2) that the Spirit (or third person of the Trinity) 
may be present in non-Christian religions. The second argument allows for the possibility 
that non-Christian religions will play a vital role in God‘s historical plan for the salvation 
of humanity, and the first argument ensures that this salvific plan will remain singular or 
unified. 
 
Denying Other Religions as Salvific Structures in order to Preserve Eschatological 
Unity. To argue his first point that non-Christian religions are not independent salvific 
structures, D‘Costa makes an exegetical reading of several Papal Declarations and 
documents, primarily 1) The Declaration of the Church to Non-Christina Religions 
(Nostra Aetate, 1965); 2)The Dogmatic Constitution of the Church (Lumen Gentium, 
1964); 3) On the Permanent Validity of the Church’s Missionary Mandate (Redemporis 
Missio, 1991); and, 4) Crossing the Threshold of Hope (1994).  
D‘Costa begins his exegesis by addressing a single question in light of Nostra 
Aetate; namely, ―are non-Christian religions, per se, vehicles of salvation,‖ or, are they 
―mediators of supernatural revelation to their followers?‖(102)  D‘Costa comes to the 
conclusion both pre-Conciliar and post-Conciliar (i.e., before and after/during the Second 
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Vatican Council, 1962-65) Church teachings remain silent on this question – but that 
post-Conciliar theologians have read this silence very differently. More specifically, 
some have read the silence to mean that non-Christian religions are salvific structures, 
and others, such as D‘Costa, have read the silence as precluding this possibility. D‘Costa, 
though belonging to the latter category, doesn‘t see this as preventing an open, tolerant, 
and egalitarian approach to other religions. (101-102)  
D‘Costa begins his argument by ―contextualizing‖ Nostra Aetate’s silence on the 
question of whether non-Christian religions are salvific vehicles, with the aim of showing 
that it is difficult to answer this question positively.   
First, D‘Costa notes that the Church relates to the different religions differently; 
in other words, different religions have different theological and historical value for the 
Church. Judaism has pride of place among other religions since it is the ―root from which 
the church springs‖; (103) Islam is next, since it has obtained a positive knowledge of the 
creator God; and, in last place come Hinduism, Buddhism, and other religions (the primal 
religions of Africa in particular) in which people can be found living a good life. (102)   
D‘Costa links supernatural revelation to salvation – if a religion is the bearer of 
supernatural revelation then it can be seen as a salvific structure. Nostra Aetate 
acknowledges only Judaism as a bearer of supernatural revelation, since the Church 
received the ―revelation of the Old Testament through the people with whom God in his 
inexpressible mercy deigned to establish the Ancient Covenant.‖ (103) But D‘Costa is 
unwilling to see this as an acknowledgement that Judaism is, per se, a vehicle of salvation 
because Jewish Revelation is the ―Old Testament‖ and, therefore, superseded by the 
―New Testament‖; thus, it is only valid insofar as it is appropriated by Christianity or 
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included in Christian scripture. Therefore, if Judaism cannot be recognized as a salvific 
structure, then other religions certainly cannot be since these are not recognized as 
bearers of supernatural salvation in any sense. (103)   
Second, D‘Costa looks at what Nosta Aetate says about the related question of the 
possible salvation of the non-Christian. Nosta Aetate says nothing about whether or not 
non-Christians can be saved, but it can be taken for granted that they can be, since this 
possibility is explicitly stated in Lumen Gentium (another post Conciliar document). 
Lumen Gentium acknowledges the unique place of the Jews but, according to D‘Costa, 
stops short of saying that Judaism is a salvific structure per se.
7
 It also says that through 
the use of reason (i.e., through natural means) one can obtain a knowledge of the creator 
God, and, through God‘s grace, do His will; in other words, one can obtain salvation 
through natural means.  D‘Costa concludes from this that one does not have to 
acknowledge Islam as a salvific structure, since Islamic knowledge of the creator God 
and of God‘s will could be obtained through reason. (103)    
The Council Fathers also affirm that anyone can obtain salvation under the 
following three conditions: 1) a person is ignorant of the gospel of Christ and his Church 
through no fault of their own; 2) a person strives to live a good life; and 3) such positive 
striving is recognized as preparation for the ―full and undiminished truth of the gospel.‖ 
(104) As such, even those who do not believe in a creator God – such as Buddhists – can 
be seen as moving towards salvation.  The third point, here, emphasizes that the truth 
found in other religions is the Truth found in Christ – meaning that the salvation obtained 
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  Presumably, D’Costa takes this acknowledgement of Judaism’s unique place as an acknowledgement 
that Jews can be saved.   
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in other religions is derived from Christianity, which means that other religions are not in 
and of themselves independent salvific structures.(103-104)  
Third, D‘Costa notes that while Nostra Aetate focuses only on the positive aspects 
of other religions, other Church documents record negative qualifications about truths 
found outside of the Church. For example, the Decree on the Church’s Missionary 
Activity (Ad Gents) makes the point that other religions are an admixture of truth and 
error, that can only obtain purification and perfection in Christ. (104-105)  
D‘Costa‘s contextualization is meant to show that the Conciliar documents do not 
give a positive answer to the question of whether or not other religions are salvific 
structures. And though they also do not give an explicitly negative answer, D‘Costa 
argues that the Church‘s silence to this question is a prohibition on ―any unqualified 
positive affirmation of other religions as salvific structures, or as containing divine 
revelation.‖ (105) But, again, he insists that this does not prevent the Church from 
acknowledging the presence of saving grace in other religions, and that they contain 
―much that is good, and holy, and much to be admired and learned by the church.‖ (105)     
D‘Costa, while acknowledging that his own position on this issue has been 
marginalized in the Church, still presses forward by arguing that his reading of the 
Conciliar documents is consistent with later Papal documents on other religions, 
particularly Redemptoris Missio (1991) and Crossing the Threshold of Hope (1994). 
(105)    
Crossing the Threshold of Hope is Pope John Paul II‘s commentary on Nostra 
Aetate. In Crossing the Threshold, the Pope reiterates the position of Nostra Aetate that 
the Church rejects nothing that is ―true and holy‖ in other religions – but this document 
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also spells out some of the things that are not true and holy in other religions. For 
example, he is critical of Buddhism‘s ―negative soteriology‖ and of Islam‘s ―reduction‖ 
of the Divine Revelation that is given in the Old and New Testaments – even though he is 
also willing to acknowledge the religiosity of certain aspects of both Buddhism and 
Islam. (107)   
D‘Costa isn‘t particularly interested in whether or not the Pope is right in his 
judgements, but he does take the fact he makes such judgements as an indication that he 
does not take other religions to be salvific structures as such – if he did there would be no 
basis for his criticisms of these other religions. (106-107) And, this, of course, supports 
D‘Costa‘s reading that the Church does not affirm other religions as salvific structures. 
For D‘Costa, Redeptoris Missio makes this point even more definitively.  
In Redemptoris Missio, Pope John Paul II sees the natural human quest for God as 
related to the Holy Spirit. It is the grace of God, through the Holy Spirit, that is (within 
history) leading all men and women to the Truth of Christ. But, according to D‘Costa, 
this grace is not ―the fullness of sanctifying and redeeming grace found in Christ‘s 
eschatological Church.‖ (107) In other words, God‘s grace brought through the Holy 
Spirit is necessarily fulfilled in the eschatological Church (i.e., oneness with the Father 
through oneness with the Son). By insisting that the grace of God brought by the Spirit to 
other religions is fulfilled in Christ, D‘Costa is saying that there cannot be authentic 
religious quests ―apart from Christ, the trinity, and the Church.‖ (107)This, of course, 
means that no religion, except for Christianity, is a salvific structure. In short, D‘Costa 
takes the Pope‘s vision of Christianity as the fulfilment of all religions, in Redemptoris 
Missio, as proof that other religions cannot be salvific structures in and of themselves.       
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It seems to me, that in rejecting the idea of other religions being salvific 
structures, D‘Costa is not only concerned with faithfulness to tradition, but also with 
preserving the unity of the Church‘s eschatological vision. Thus, I don‘t see D‘Costa so 
much opposed to the idea that other religions are different means to the same salvation, 
but to the idea that they offer different forms of salvation. He might reject the idea that 
religions provide different means to the same end on empirical grounds, but he rejects the 
idea that they are salvific structures per se, or offer different salvations, on ideological 
grounds. The acknowledgement that other religions are salvific structures would 
undermine the unity of D‘Costa‘s eschatological vision of salvation that centres around 
the concepts of Christ, the triune God, and the church.  
Apart from preserving the unity of the Church‘s eschatological vision, D‘Costa 
has a secondary concern; namely, taking religious others seriously on their own terms.  
For D‘Costa, pluralists fail in this regard – they domesticate difference by seeing the 
other in terms of the self – and this is the main reason why D‘Costa sees his ―trinitarian 
exclusivism‖ as more open, tolerant, and egalitarian than pluralist theologies of religions. 
D‘Costa uses the idea that the Holy Spirit (the third person of the Trinity) may be present 
in other religions to take seriously the truths of other religions, and we will now examine 
this part of D‘Costa‘s theology.  
 
The Presence of the Holy Spirit in Other Religions Demands Taking Them Seriously. The 
possibility of the presence of the Holy Spirit in other religions (or in other human 
cultures) is explicitly acknowledged in the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the 
Modern World (Guadium et Spes). (109-110) As said above, it is this idea that D‘Costa 
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uses to argue that other religions have truths (that they can teach to the Church); however, 
this idea can also be used to argue that other religions are independent salvific structures, 
so D‘Costa begins by arguing against this idea.    
In making his argument, D‘Costa rejects the ways in which both humanistic 
religious pluralists (such as Paul Knitter) and metaphysical religious pluralists (such as 
Raimundo Panikkar) use the idea that the Holy Spirit is present in other religions.  
Paul Knitter, according to D‘Costa, suggests that the Church‘s acknowledgement 
that the Spirit is present in other religions might lead Christians to abandon their 
―Christological fixation‖ which, in turn, would lead to better interfaith dialogue. Knitter‘s 
idea, here, is that the Spirit functions as a common reality (equally) present in all 
religions – including Christianity. D‘Costa rejects this idea because ―it is clear that the 
Spirit cannot be disassociated from Christ‖ (110) – by which D‘Costa obviously means 
that the Spirit must be understood as leading to Christ.  D‘Costa doesn‘t discuss 
Panikkar‘s concept of the Spirit but, instead, makes his point with respect to Panikkar‘s 
―Logos Christology.‖ According to D‘Costa, Panikkar conceives the Logos as a universal 
revelation, and takes Jesus Christ to be one instance of such revelation.  This move is 
illegitimate, in D‘Costa‘s eyes, because it makes Biblical history irrelevant to salvation 
history. (110)   
In these cases, and others, D‘Costa criticises pluralist theologians for not working 
within the legitimate parameters set by the Conciliar documents (and, more generally, the 
Catholic tradition). For D‘Costa, it is illegitimate to exclude or conflate concepts that are 
a part of the tradition, and specifically he says that any acknowledgement of the presence 
of the Spirit in other religions must come with ―a tacit acknowledgement that in a 
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mysterious and hidden manner, there too is the ambiguous presence of the triune God, the 
church, and the kingdom.‖ (111) In other words, other religions are necessarily a part of 
the same (singular and Christian) salvific process.  
As for making a contribution to the Christian theology of religions – within 
legitimate parameters – D‘Costa questions the ―unilateral‖ way in which the Church has 
understood Christianity as the ―fulfilment‖ of other religions, and other religions as 
preparation for the gospel. He wonders if the Church might not open itself up to the truths 
of other religions in the same way that it has opened itself up to the truths of Western 
secular (scientific) culture. Guadium et Spec recognizes, not only, the positive aspects of 
modernity as possible preparation for the gospel – but also (in D‘Costa‘s words) ―that 
such cultures may therefore have elements which will challenge and even change 
elements within the church, in its structure, formulations, and practice.‖ (111) In other 
words, if the Church can acknowledge that it might be challenged and changed by the 
truths of Western secular culture then it can, similarly, acknowledge that it might be 
challenged and changed by the truths of other religions. 
Understanding other religions as preparation for the gospel, in this more 
―dialectical‖ way would prevent the church from domesticating the other – because the 
other would be recognized as possibly having things to teach the church on its own terms. 
Yet, D‘Costa remains cautious by making the point that the Church has never sanctioned 
western modernity as a legitimate alternative worldview, and by insisting that the 
recognition of truth in other religions would have to take place in real time, or ―on the 
basis of the historical experiences of the local churches.‖ (112)     
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To further develop this theme, D‘Costa turns to John Paul‘s Redemptoris Missio, 
which he says acknowledges the work of the Spirit in other religions in ―important 
structural and cultural dimensions,‖ meaning that the Spirit is affecting and shaping not 
only individuals, but also ―society and history, peoples, cultures, and religions.‖ (113)  
But despite this acknowledgement, that the Spirit is shaping concrete realities, including 
the concrete realities of other religions, John Paul does not confer independent legitimacy 
on other religions; legitimacy is always granted within the confines of the triune God, 
Christ, and the Church. This is very significant, for D‘Costa, and the point on which he 
sees both pluralism and inclusivism moving beyond the legitimate parameters of 
tradition.
8
 (113-114)   
But, despite the above qualification, D‘Costa thinks that Redemptoris Missio can 
be read such that Christian fulfilment is understood as a two way street:  
…if one were to retain and utilize the category of fulfillment in a very careful 
sense, then it is not only the other religions that are fulfilled in (and in one sense, 
radically transformed) their preparatio being completed through Christianity, but 
also Christianity itself that is fulfilled in receiving the gift of God that the Other 
might bear, self-consciously or not. (114) 
D‘Costa develops this theme more fully by looking at ways in which the Spirit – 
acting both within and outside the Church – works to make the Church more ―Christ-
shaped.‖ (114)Drawing on a passage from Redemptoris Missio, that speak of the work of 
the Sprit both inside and outside of the church, D‘Costa emphasizes three important 
                                                          
8
 Again, D’Costa says there is no such thing as pluralism and inclusivism, but obviously he maintains the 
following “secondary” definitions: pluralism says there are multiple salvific structures (religions) and these 
are all equally effective; inclusivism says that there are multiple salvific structures but one of these is 
superior to all others.    
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points. First, if the Spirit works inside the church to make Christians more Christ-like, 
then it must have the same function in other cultures and religions. Second, if it is 
possible that the Spirit is doing transformative work in other religions then the church 
must be critically and reverentially open to what other religions have to say.
9
  Third, the 
discernment of the Spirit in other religions must bring the Church to greater truth or more 
truthfully into the presence of the triune God.‖ (115) In other words, the Church must 
acknowledge the possibility of the Spirit in other religions, must listen to what the Spirit 
is saying in these other religions, and must allow itself to be transformed by the Spirit as 
discerned in other religions.  D‘Costa summarizes his position in the following strong 
terms:  
…if the Spirit is at work in the religions, then the gifts of the Spirit need to be 
discovered, fostered, and received into the church. If the church fails to be 
receptive, it maybe unwittingly practicing cultural and religious idolatry. (115) 
For D‘Costa, this trinitarian openness to the truth of other religions – i.e., this 
hearing what others have to say on their own terms, and being open to the possibility of 
being internally transformed by this – is greater than the openness of pluralists. D‘Costa 
reflects on how his theology is more open than pluralistic theologies, and more tolerant 
and egalitarian as well – even though he acknowledges that openness, tolerance, and 
equality mean different things for him than for pluralists.    
As for openness, D‘Costa says that pluralists are not really open because they 
already know what they are going to find in other religions prior to real historical 
engagement with other religions. D‘Costa says that his Catholic trinitarian doctrine of 
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 D’Costa’s view is that the church must first listen to other religion’s auto-interpretations, even though 
the final word on these religions belongs to the Christian hetero-interpretation.   
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God is only ―eschatologically ‗closed‘‖ meaning that Christianity can always remain 
open to change from without, within history. In other words, until Christ leads all to the 
Kingdom of God, Christians must remain open to the possibility that the Spirit in other 
religions is leading to greater truth about Christ, and there is no way to predetermine what 
this truth will look like. As D‘Costa puts it: ―there can be no a priori knowledge of what 
other religions may disclose: the surprises, beauty, terror, truth, holiness, deformity, 
cruelty, and goodness that they might display‖; thus ―…positive or negative judgments 
are then a posteriori and must be accounted for.‖ (133) For D‘Costa, taking the auto-
interpretation of other religions seriously means that the church is open to ―genuine 
change, challenge, and questioning.‖ (133)  
D‘Costa is trying to make the point that since Christian truth is closed only 
eschatologically that, in history, the Church‘s openness to truth in other religions is 
practically open-ended. What D‘Costa does not examine, however, is the extent to which 
Christianity‘s particular end-time vision (and concept of God) determines what it is able 
to discern as truth. (It is always the prerogative and obligation of the Church to discern 
what is true in other religions.) It would certainly seem that these have something to do 
with, for example, John Paul‘s, negative evaluation of the ―negative soteriology‖ of 
Buddhism.   
In any case, D‘Costa interprets openness in terms of taking history seriously, or of 
hearing what religions actually have to say within history, and maintains that his 
trinitarian orientation fosters such openness. Moreover, he says that although this 
seriousness about history and about the truths of other religions is relatively new for the 
Church (Post Vatican II) and quite novel, it is also an authentic development with real 
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implications for the Church‘s mission. As for tolerance and equality D‘Costa interprets 
the former as civic religious rights or ―the right to be free from civic coercion in the 
practice of one‘s religion,‖ and the latter as the human dignity that belongs to all human 
beings as result of being made in the image of God. (137) Both of these concepts are, of 
course, compatible with the teachings of the Catholic Church. Nonetheless, neither 
openness, nor tolerance, nor equality is about acknowledging other religions as 
independent salvific structures – all religions are working within the same universal 
(Christian) framework.  
Thus, Gavin D‘Costa‘s trinitarian theology of religions is clearly inclusivist since 
there is only one form of true religion, or only one form of salvation for all. But he is a 
neo-inclusivist because he attributes to other (non-Christian) religions possible positive 
value in leading humanity to the single (Christian) religious end sought by all.  
 
4. S. Mark Heim’s Protestant Trinitarian Theology of Religious Ends   
In 1995, another critic of religious pluralism – S. Mark Heim – came to a conclusion very 
similar to D‘Costa‘s; specifically, that pluralists are really inclusivists. Mark Heim is a 
Baptist theologian who teaches at Andover Newton and has been actively involved in 
ecumenical and interfaith activities for many years. His views on religious diversity are 
found primarily in an unintended trilogy of books including: Is Christ the Only Way?; 
Salvations: Truth and Difference in Religion; and, The Depth of the Riches: Towards a 





A Critique of Humanistic Pluralism  
In Salvations, Heim offers a thorough-going critique of pluralistic theologies of religions 
in general, by critiquing the work of three representative pluralists: John Hick, Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith, and Paul Knitter. He argues that it would become evident that pluralists 
are really inclusivists if they would come clean and make explicit arguments for why 
their views of religion are better than others – instead of falsely presuming that their 




  He says this because he thinks that the supposedly universal religious norms 
established by religious pluralists will show themselves to be capitulated forms of 
Christianity created in light of modern, Western philosophical, historical, and social 
criticisms; in other words, these norms will show themselves to be particular forms of 
religion, meaning that pluralistic theories of religion are no different in this respect than 
inclusive theories of religion. 
John Hick provides an example, for Heim, of a pluralist who reinterprets 
Christianity (and religion) in light of Western philosophical criticisms of Christianity 
(and religion) – particularly Kant‘s distinction between noumenal reality and phenomenal 
reality, and his claim that noumenal reality can never be known in and of itself, but only 
as perceived and conceived through phenomenal forms. Hick uses this insight to claim 
that it is impossible to know God or the Real (to use his preferred term) as such and that 
all religious perceptions and conceptions of the Real are necessarily limited by historical 
and cultural conditions. However, given this condition it is still possible to distinguish 
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 For a useful discussion of the seeming impossibility of constructing a theory of religions that is not 
simply a further expression of one particular type of religion, see Owen, Attitudes Towards Other 
Religions. Also, see my discussion of this problem in the Conclusion.   
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authentic from inauthentic responses to the Real (or true perceptions and conceptions of 
the Real from false ones): Authentic responses lead to salvation and inauthentic responses 
do not.  
Hick defines salvation substantively as turning from self-centredness to God-
centeredness and says that we can see the evidence of salvation in moral behaviour and 
saintly character. So, for Hick, religions are different, culturally limited, responses to the 
Real that lead to a God-centred life that bears positive moral fruits: This is Hick‘s meta-
theory of religion, that serves as the basis for his theory of religious diversity. And his 
theory of religious diversity is that the world‘s great religious traditions are equal because 
– as far as he can tell – these religions produce good people with about the same degree 
of effectiveness.  
Heim, on the other hand, suggests that Hick‘s meta-religion is a particular form 
of Christianity accommodated to Western philosophical criticisms of religion – that needs 
to justify its claim to universality as much as any religion that serves as the basis for an 
inclusivist or exclusivist theory of religion. 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith provides an example of a pluralist who reinterprets 
Christianity (and religion) in light of modern Western historical criticisms of Christianity 
(and religion) – particularly the view that religious phenomena are historical phenomena 
that can only be explained in terms of other historical phenomena, and not in terms of 
Divine causation. Smith‘s way of accommodating this principle of the historical study of 
religion is to introduce a dualistic definition of religion; thus, Smith‘s well known 
definition of religion as faith and cumulative tradition.  In this definition, faith is a 
universal quality or an existential attitude found in all religions: it is ―a quiet confidence 
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and joy which enables one to feel at home in the universe and to find meaning in one‘s 
own life, a meaning that is profound and ultimate.‖11 Cumulative tradition on the other 
hand is the cultural form that expresses faith, and this manifests in bewildering religious 
diversity not only from one religion to another but also within the same religion.   
Given this distinction, Smith is happy to let the historian of religion explain 
tradition or the externals of religion via the methods of modern history of religion. And, 
more than this, Smith is of the view that the historian of religion – the higher type who 
deals comparatively with the meaning of faith – has newly discovered the unity of all 
religions on the level of faith. Thus, Smith‘s meta-theory of religion is that religion is 
constituted of faith and cumulative tradition – and his theory of religious diversity claims 
that all of the world‘s great religions are on par – because they are all expressions of 
faith.  
Heim, in contrast, suggests that Smith‘s meta-religion or normative form of 
religion is a particular form of Christianity that in its ―cumulative tradition dimension‖ 
accommodates itself to Western historical criticisms of Christianity (and religion) and in 
its ―faith dimension‖ bears an uncanny resemblance to an existential form of Protestant 
Christianity stemming from Kierkegaard.  And here, as with Hick, the very particular 
nature of religion proposed by Smith – that does not allow for the possibility of different 
types of religion – leads Heim to the conclusion that pluralists are no different from 
inclusivists. 
Paul Knitter, according to Heim, provides an example of a pluralist who 
reinterprets Christianity (and religion) to accommodate modern Western social criticisms 
of Christianity (and religion) – specifically criticisms by feminists, liberationists, and 
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 W.C. Smith in Heim, Salvations, 46.  
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social scientists who have criticized Christianity (and religions) for fostering social evils 
such as patriarchy, economic exploitation, and so forth. In fact, he notes that Knitter goes 
so far as to make such social justice issues the sole criteria by which religions are judged 
to be authentic; thus, religions that support and perpetuate human injustice are judged to 
be inauthentic and religions that promote social justice are judged to be authentic. 
Moreover, Knitter conceives of salvation collectively as the attainment of a just social 
order – or to use Christian language, of the ―Kingdom of God,‖ but he sees this as a 
future accomplishment that the world‘s religious traditions – along with the marginalized 
voices of the oppressed – will struggle to bring into being.  
Knitter‘s meta-theory of religion, then, is that religion is that which brings about a 
just social order – and his pluralistic theory of religious diversity is that the religions of 
the world are equal insofar as they are equally committed to this universal norm.  
For Heim, though, Knitter‘s meta-religion is a particular form of Christianity (or 
religion) based on Western notions of social justice, that may be willing to entertain other 
notions of social justice but is unwilling to give up the idea that commitment to social 
justice is the essence of religion. Thus, Knitter who judges the validity of other religions 
against the singular standard of his meta-religion is also an inclusivist. 
In the second part of Salvations, Heim began to construct his own ―more 
pluralist‖ theology of religions, and this work culminated in a further work called The 






A Trinitarian Theology of Religious Ends  
Heim calls his own theology of religions inclusivist, but his work has created some 
conceptual confusion since it resembles deep pluralism/metaphysical pluralism.  I 
maintain that Heim‘s theology is inclusivist since it posits a single highest religious end 
(Christianity), and neo-inclusivist because it attributes positive value to other (non-
Christian) religions in attaining the highest single religious end.  We will now examine 
Heim‘s theology of religions.    
All religions struggle with presenting a vision of God and means whereby God 
and human beings can be in communication and eventually come to a final goal of 
intimate communion. Judaism and Islam basically present a God, most 
transcendent to his creation, who communicates through word revelations about 
his nature, the purpose of creation, and the nature of human beings through his 
appointed prophets. Such communications are gathered up in the Hebrew Bible 
for the Jews and in the Koran for the Muslims.  
The Far Eastern religions, especially Hinduism and Buddhism, stress primarily 
the immanence of God in all creation, especially the fulfilment of human striving 
to be found in the advaita experience of non-duality. The human person finds 
completion in total immersion in the Absolute Being. 
Christianity‘s strength consists in maintaining the antinomy of ―both/and.‖ God is 
both transcendent to his creatures and also immanently indwelling in his human 
children in intimate personal relationships. The Good News is that God is love 
and love unites but also differentiates.
12
     
                                                          
12
 Maloney, Pseudo-Macarius, 1.  
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The above passage in taken from George A. Maloney‘s introduction to his translation of 
Pseudo-Macarius, but could have been written by Mark Heim, or even Paul Tillich. It 
expresses Christianity‘s strength as being able to strike a balance between transcendence 
and immanence; between unity and diversity; between God and human beings. The logic 
of the Trinity strikes the same kind of balance, wherein the three persons of the Trinity 
maintain their particularity and yet are one. It is the structure and logic of the Trinity that 
Mark Heim employs in his theology of religions. The structure of the Trinity means that 
there are different dimensions of God that can be related to (necessarily differently) – and 
these different relationships constitute different religious ends. The logic of the Trinity – 
which unifies or integrates the three persons of the Trinity without reducing them or 
destroying their particularity – is, then, used by Heim to argue that the highest religious 
form of religion (Christianity) is the one that unifies without reducing the different 
religious ends. In Heim‘s theology, different religions (or different religious ends) 
function analogously to the three persons of the Trinity – but whereas the three persons of 
the Trinity are simultaneously differentiated and united in the idea of the Trinity, it is 
different religious ends that are unified in Christianity‘s ultimate end of communion.  
Nonetheless, there is a link between these two: Communion is the unifying and identity 
preserving relationship between the three person of the Trinity – and communion is also 
(in Christianity) the unifying and identity preserving relationship between the different 
religious ends found in various religious traditions.    
Thus, Heim would claim that his theology of religions maintains the integrity and 
ultimacy of different religious ends – in the same way that the doctrine of the Trinity 
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maintains the integrity and ultimacy of the three different persons of the Trinity.  Let us 
now consider a portion of Heim‘s argument in the Depth of the Riches. 
Heim claims that God is triune and, therefore, has distinct dimensions. The fact 
that God has distinct dimensions means that God can be related to in different ways. 
Salvation is communion with each distinct dimension of God:  
Salvation is precisely communion with God across the breadth of these complex 
dimensions of God's nature, a communion whose fullness requires participation in 
relation with other persons and with creation. Humanity realizes its deepest 
encounter with the plenitude and diversity of the divine nature through this web of 
communion, this shared relation with God.
13
  
But salvation, understood in this way, is not only the Christian religious end; it is 
also a means for Christians to understand other religions. For Heim, the communion of 
the triune God is the same as the communion of salvation. This is significant because 
Heim will argue that Christian salvation unifies, without reducing, all authentic 
relationships with God (i.e., God related to under different dimensions), in the same way 
that the concept of the triune God, unites without reducing the three persons of the 
Trinity. Heim says that to encounter God under one dimension is to encounter the same 
one God who can be encountered under multiple dimensions – but that encounter under 
one dimension doesn‘t demand encounter under all. These singular encounters with only 
one dimension of God constitute different religions, or different religious ends and, again, 
Christian salvation constitutes communion with God across all dimensions. This means, 
for Heim, that Christian salvation and other religious ends, are all grounded in the triune 
God. (209) 
                                                          
13
 Heim, Depth of the Riches, 209; cited in the text by page number hereafter.   
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Heim describes three different types of relation with God, or three encounters 
with different dimensions of God: one marked by ―impersonal identity,‖ a second by 
―iconographic encounter,‖ and a third by ―personal communion.‖ There are two 
variations of impersonal identity and two variations of iconographic encounter. Personal 
communion is singular and amounts to the integration of all of the different relations with 
God, or different religious ends. (210) 
The two variations of impersonal identity are used by Heim to account for 
Buddhism and Hinduism. The first variation is grounded in the ―emptiness‖ of the triune 
God, wherein sharp dividing lines between autonomous entities are transcended. The 
second variation is grounded in the realization that the divine persons are completely 
immanent in one another. (210) 
Heim speaks about how the relationships between the divine persons of the triune 
God are ―‗externalized‘ in terms of the economic interaction between God and creatures.‖ 
(210) Heim‘s way of thinking about this is to see the same sort of relationships that 
obtain between the persons of the triune God carried over to relationships between God 
and creatures.  Thus, differences in the ways human beings relate to God mirror 
differences in the ways that the persons of the Trinity relate to one another – or, the 
relations within the Trinity, are ―economically expressed‖ as analogous to the 
relationship between God and human beings.   
Heim says that the first variation, economically expressed, has to do with God‘s 
withdrawal from the world, and that this allows for insight into both the insubstantiality 
of existence and the emptiness of God: The realization of the divine under this dimension 
is the Buddhist nirvana. The second variation, economically expressed, has to do with 
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God‘s immanence in the world, or ―God‘s sustaining presence in creation, in, with, and 
under the natural order. If this insight is pursued, in and of itself, it leads to the realization 
of God or the dissolution of the self into the Self. (211) Heim is clearly thinking of the 
Hindu end of non-dualism here.  
But, even though Buddhist nirvana and Hindu non-dualism are authentic religious 
ends – or real encounters with the divine life under a particular dimension – Heim insists 
that these ends are not the same as Christian salvation.  
Having effectively located Buddhist and Hindu ends within the life of the triune 
God, Heim considers the second dimension of the triune life; namely, the iconographic. 
As with the first dimension, Heim begins by describing the relationship between the 
persons of the Trinity under this dimension, before extending it to the relationship 
between God and human beings.  Here, each of the three persons of the Trinity 
experiences the others as a distinct and unique character. Expressed externally, this 
means that human beings experience God as a distinct and holy other. Heim says that 
there are two variations of this encounter of God as a distinct other. In the first variation, 
the divine other is experienced as law, order or structure; Heim cites the Buddhist dharma 
and the Tao of Taoism as examples of this. According to Heim, such law or structure 
expresses the common will of the triune God – and single-minded conformity to the will 
of God produces distinct religious fulfilments. Again, Heim insists that such fulfilments 
are authentic even though they are not the same as Christian salvation. (211)  
The second variation of the iconographic dimension of the triune God focuses on 
encounter with God as a personal Being. As with the first variation, the idea of law and 
morality are also strong here – but they appear in a more personal key, or, ―in the context 
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of command, promise, trust, and faith.‖ (211) Heim cites Islam as an excellent example 
of such personal faithfulness in relation to a personal God – but, here too, insists that this 
is not the same as Christian salvation. (211) 
Finally, Heim discusses the third – integrating and culminating – dimension of the 
triune life; namely, communion. And, as before, Heim starts by describing what 
communion looks like within the triune God. In the communion of the triune God, there 
is integration without reduction; unity and diversity:  
This unity is such as to leave each one‘s unique particularity intact. Because 
God‘s nature is constituted by the communion of three persons, that nature 
maintains within it distinct and irreducible dimensions. (211-212)     
Such communion is expressed externally in a relationship between God and 
creatures wherein creatures recognize that the different dimensions of God 1) maintain 
their own personal integrity and 2) achieve coequality. Heim suggests that there are two 
ways to imagine this. First he identifies this with ―traditional polytheism‖ and ―some 
postmodern theological perspectives.‖ (212) According to this view, different 
relationships within the triune God (even though not rightly understood as such) are seen 
as diverse and unconnected ways of relating to God. Heim finds such perspectives 
problematic because they resist integration within the one divine life:  
That reality itself is seen to have a number of incommensurable forms, and no 
intrinsic principle of unity. More than one dimension of divine life is recognized, 
but there is no way to understand them as dimensions of one divine life.
14
 (212) 
                                                          
14
 In this passage, Heim criticizes the sort of “ultra-pluralism” that Hick criticizes Heim for advocating.  The 
conclusion I draw from this, is that Hick has misread Heim’s position.  
291 
 
Different religious perspectives, here, are merely associated with one another – 
they are not in communion. For Heim, this (pluralistic) perspective does not amount to 
another distinct religious end; it is simply an affirmation that there are a number of 
different, unrelated religious ends. This is where Christianity comes into play; it is the 
second possible vision for relating human beings to a complex divine reality. (212) It is a 
means of integrating, into one unified perspective, various religious ends – and, as such is 
the ultimate religious end.  
This second vision is Christian and explicitly trinitarian; here the complex divine 
reality is seen as a ―communion of persons,‖ and, again, Heim sees this as offering a 
pattern for understanding religious diversity:  
The variety of human relations with God then in principle may find integration, 
communion in difference being the very means, the necessary means, to fully 
relate with a God who is a communion of distinct persons. (213)     
In other words, the pattern of communion or ―unity in distinction‖ that obtains in the 
triune God is also the pattern for integrating the various different ways of relating to God.  
Christian salvation is the integration of the various different ways of relating to 
God, and as such a unique religious end. By entering into communion with Christ, 
Christians enter into the communion of the divine life or the various dimensions of the 
divine life that are related to differently in different religions: ―Salvation is a relation with 
God in which humans connect with these varied dimensions of the divine life in a unified 
way.‖ (213) Nonetheless, even though Heim insists that various religious ends have an 
―integral unity in God,‖ and that this is realized through Christian salvation, he also 
insists that integration (i.e., Christian salvation ) cannot be forced on religious others, and 
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that the constituent elements of salvation (other religious ends) have their own ―reality 
and stability.‖ (213)  
 Heim sees the impersonal dimension of the divine life as ―basic,‖ the personal 
dimension as ―a further addition,‖ and communion or ―trinitarian complexity‖ as a 
―culmination.‖ (213) And, yet, he is reluctant to see a simple spiritual hierarchy, since it 
is possible to have a good understanding of a ―higher dimension‖ without a parallel 
understanding of a ―lower dimension‖ – think of moralistic traditions that suppress 
mystical elements. And, the same goes for Christianity. Even though it is ultimately 
cumulative and integrative, this does not mean that it has a superior understanding of all 
the dimensions it subsumes; indeed, traditions with exclusive focus on one particular 
dimension of the divine life are likely to have a better understanding of this than 
Christians. Thus, ―Christians need humble apprenticeship to other religions in regard to 
dimensions of the triune life that those faiths grasp with profound depth.‖ (213) In this 
regard, Heim is similar to our two other neo-inclusivists who believe that Christians 
might need to pay attention to other religions, but Heim turns this possibility into an 
imperative.  
Heim says that it is typical for religious traditions to focus on only one dimension 
of divine reality – and says that this is also true of Christianity which focuses on 
communion. But he adds that communion is an unique focus insofar as it inherently 
includes the other ways of relating to the divine life as other – and it bestows coequality 
on these other religious ends.  Even so, communion (or Christian salvation) has 
―characteristic dangers and limitations.‖ For Heim, the great danger for Christians is to 
lose touch with the other concrete religious ends that are integrated in Christian salvation 
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– to see Christianity as standing over and against these others instead of as that which 
reconciles them in the fullness or their otherness. (213)  
Heim sees this ―composite‖ view of salvation impacting Christian dialogue and 
mission in two ways. On one hand, it means that Christians will have to pay attention to 
what other traditions have to teach – and even be attentive to their criticisms of 
Christianity. On the other hand, it means that Christians will share their Christian witness 
with others; a witness that is a ―distinctive affirmation that these varied dimensions with 
God can cohere in coequality and mutuality‖ and a confession of how this comes about. 
(214) In other words, Heim sees Christianity teaching others an authentic form of 
religious pluralism, wherein the different religious ends are preserved and regarded as 
equal. 
Heim‘s view – of various religious ends as coequal – is explicitly Christian and 
trinitarian, and this prompts him to ask about the state of religious others who refuse to 
have their own religious ends subsumed within this Christian vision. Heim‘s view is that 
these others should be seen as attending to their own religious ends – and, not as those 
involved in alternative means to the same salvation, or those on their way to Christian 
salvation. (216)  In rejecting the view that non-Christians provide means to the same 
salvation, Heim is rejecting humanistic religious pluralism. Heim rejects this position 
because he sees salvation as Christian; as a singular (albeit complex) religious end that is 
not the same as other religious ends.   
It is easy to distinguish Heim‘s position from humanistic religious pluralism, but 
not so easy to see how he is not simply seeing other religions as stations on the way to 
Christianity. Heim actually sees this way of thinking more typical of other religions, who 
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are also aware of the different dimensions of the divine life and have their own ways of 
reconciling these: ―Usually this involves an explanation that one of these dimensions is 
ultimately real and the others represent prefigurations or cruder approximations on the 
path from misunderstanding toward that truth.‖ (216) This is the classic expression of 
inclusivism, and one that Heim sees his more pluralistic trinitarian inclusivism moving 
away from. It moves away from traditional inclusivism by integrating different religious 
elements in an egalitarian, rather than hierarchical, way – and, by preserving rather than 
reducing religious differences:  
The distinctive Christian feature is not simply recognition of these dimensions. It 
is trinitarian communion as the pattern of their integration. The particular claim is 
that these dimensions can be coordinated with co-equality. When brought together 
through communion, each of these relationships is not only affirmed as valid, but 
maintained as rooted in a real dimension of the divine life itself, with its own 
particularity They become one, but each remains itself. This is the trinitarian 
pattern, encompassing the various relations as all grounded in the divine nature, as 
all real, without recourse to reduction or dissolution. (216-217)  
Although Heim identifies communion as one of the three ways relating to God, 
and sees Christian salvation as a unique religious end he also comes close to voiding 
Christianity of any particular content by seeing it simply as a way of uniting other 
religious ends. Christianity becomes the equivalent of the trinitarian way of thinking 
about God – the concept of the trinity does not add more content to the divine but 
provides a way of thinking about various aspects of the divine as different but equal:  
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The peculiar thing about the Trinity is not that it adds or multiplies types of 
relations with God beyond those that might be found individually somewhere in 
other religions. The Trinity is striking in its stubborn refusal to subtract from these 
relations, its refusal to unify by reduction or absorption. If there is a unique added 
relation – communion – its hallmark is its peculiar recognition of the individual 
particularity of the others. (217) 
This is somewhat confusing because the concept of communion serves a dual 
function in Heim‘s thought; it is both a particular type of relationship with God 
(alongside the impersonal and the personal) and it is a way of unifying these different 
relations (in the same way that the concept of the trinity unites the three persons of the 
triune God). In contrast, the impersonal and personal relationships with God don‘t 
function in this dual capacity; in other words, they are not also ways of unifying the 
various ways of relating to the divine – even though Heim says that traditions focused on 
the personal and impersonal dimensions of God do have their own particular ways of 
making sense of other possible relationships with God. Generally, Heim sees these 
traditions as judging others in terms of what they are, and thus being incapable of 
incorporating others as they are.
15
 Thus, for example, from an impersonal perspective 
personal relations with God are seen as less ultimate realizations of God; and, from a 
personal perspective, impersonal relations with God are impossible or unreal. (217) 
Interestingly, Heim frames the impersonal and personal accounts of the spiritual 
universe as ways of truncating the Trinity from different directions. (217) Presumably, 
what Heim means by this is that the impersonal religions try to dissolve all otherness or 
all personhood within the Trinity, and that the personal religions try to deny the 
                                                          
15
 This is the same criticism that Heim makes of pluralists.   
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complexity of the divine and the immanence of God in ―others.‖ And this, it seems to me, 
shows the limitation of Heim‘s pluralism.  
To say that other theologies truncate the Trinity is another way of saying that 
these theologies – in themselves – are bad, truncated versions of the Trinity. Thus, Heim 
is not only criticizing the theologies of religions held by impersonal and personal 
religions, he is also criticizing their theologies and, so, it cannot be said that he 
incorporates these theologies in their fullness into his theology of religions. Alternative 
concepts of God can only enter Heim‘s vision as dimensions of the Trinity – and this 
necessarily alters them.   
But even if Heim is more successful than I think he is at incorporating other 
perspectives, as they are, into his own trinitarian perspective, it is clear that his end point 
is singular rather than plural; thus, his theology of religions is not pluralist. Heim‘s 
position is a form of Christian inclusivism because it sees other religions participating in 
Christian truth, and it is a strong form of Christian neo-inclusivism because it sees 
Christianity in need of the truths of other religions.  
 
5. Conclusion   
Paul Griffiths, Gavin D‘Costa, and S. Mark Heim can all be classified as Christian neo-
inclusivists. They are inclusivists because they, implicitly or explicitly, posit a single 
ultimate religious end (in which different religions participate), and they are neo-
inclusivists because they ascribe, possible or actual, positive value to other religions or 
other religious ends. They are also unanimous in criticising (humanistic) pluralists for not 
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being authentically pluralist and for doing violence to the particularity of different 
religions.  
Paul Griffiths does not offer a full-fledged theology of religions – but his theology 
seems to be organized around the universality of Christian salvation, and includes an 
acknowledgement that non-Christians may contribute positively to the attainment of 
Christian salvation – even for Christians. This acknowledgement that non-Christians 
might have truth that Christians need for (Christian) salvation is the hallmark of Christian 
neo-inclusivism.  
In Gavin D‘Costa‘s theology, we see the possibility that other religions may have 
truth that Christians need envisioned very clearly; indeed, D‘Costa incorporates the 
religiosity of other religions into his Christian theology by seeing in religious others 
manifestations of God. Specifically, he acknowledges the possibility that the Spirit (the 
third person of the triune God) may be working within other religions to lead them to 
Christ, and may even teach things to Christians that they do not yet know explicitly about 
Christ. All of this is incorporated within Christian eschatology – wherein the Spirit leads 
humanity to the truth of Christ and Christ leads humanity to the Father or the kingdom 
wherein God is all in all – but, even so, there is a theoretical possibility that other 
religions might have something to teach Christians on their own terms. I suggested above 
that D‘Costa‘s Christian vision of the ultimate religious end is sure to limit what truths, 
coming from other religions, will be heard and incorporated into Christianity; 
nonetheless, a principled recognition that others may have truths that Christians do not 
have, is a significant step away from saying that non-Christians can only have truths 
explicitly known by Christians; this is the step from inclusivism to neo-inclusivism.  
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Mark Heim, makes the strongest claim regarding the validity of other religions. 
He does not stop at saying that other religions may have truths that Christians need; he 
says that other religions have the truths that Christians (and all others) need for salvation. 
Christian salvation unifies, without reducing, the very truths or religious ends that other 
religions have realized. Indeed, this is the unique thing that Christianity brings to religion 
– a way of unifying religious ends without destroying their particularity. As such, 
Christians are dependent on knowing the religious ends that are realized in other 
religions; otherwise they could not properly integrate them. And, in this respect, 
Christianity must humbly acknowledge that other religions may (and probably will) have 
a better understanding of the particular religious ends that Christianity aims to unite. 
Other religions may know these ends better than Christians because they are focused 
(almost) exclusively on one particular end. But, in the end, the final and ultimate 
religions end is Christian communion, wherein God is known under all possible 
dimensions.  
Thus, in the end, Heim is an inclusivist, because religious fulfillment is singular – 
fulfilment is the attainment of Christian salvation or communion. And, yet, Heim‘s 
ultimate religious end is complex – and, he claims, is able to enfold multiple religious 
ultimates or ends as they are.  
The complexity, or inherent diversity, of Heim‘s ultimate religious end makes his 
theology of religions difficult to classify. Nonetheless, I maintain that his position is best 
understood as inclusivist (rather than pluralist) because the ultimate end, though complex, 
is singular; it is an end that can be achieved or realized by one and all. In the next 
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chapter, we will examine theories of deep or metaphysical pluralism that are pluralist, to 
the end, and claim that there is no single unifying perspective.    
I also maintain that Heim‘s theology is a straight forward example of neo-
inclusivism because his theology of religions ascribes positive value to other religions – 
other religions have knowledge (of God) that Christians do not have, but do need for 
(Christian) salvation.  Moreover, unlike Griffiths and D‘Costa, Heim claims that 
Christianity‘s need of other religions is not just a possibility but an actuality – without the 
other religious ends there is no Christian end, because the Christian end is the unification 
of these particular ends.  
If the message of humanistic pluralists is ―you‘re just like us,‖ the message of 
neo-inclusivists is ―you‘re not like us, but you (may) have something to teach us.‖ But 
neo-inclusivists are not willing to hear the message that others may have something to 
teach us, but if we want to learn it then we have to become like them. This would be the 
upshot of a deep or radical religious pluralism, and we will now examine theories that 




Metaphysical Religious Pluralism 
 
1. Introduction  
In this chapter, we will examine three versions of metaphysical religious pluralism: John 
Cobb's Whiteheadian complementary pluralism, Stephen Kaplan's pluralistic model based 
on holography and some of David Bohm‘s insights into the nature of reality, and three of 
my own arguments for religious pluralism, one of which is based on the mathematical 
and metaphysical insights of George Spencer-Brown. Interestingly, each of these versions 
of metaphysical pluralism grounds itself in the speculative philosophy of  a ―hard 
scientist‖ – Whitehead and Spencer-Brown are mathematicians and Bohm is a physicist.  
Theories of metaphysical religious pluralism reject the unitary metaphysics 
common to exclusivism, inclusivism, and humanistic pluralism, in favour of a pluralistic 
metaphysics. These theories, unlike humanistic pluralism, are able to accept the idea of 
strong identity between religion and Ultimate Reality; indeed, I believe, that the argument 
of metaphysical pluralism is dependent on a concept of ―divine religion.‖  The argument 
of these theories is that religions are deeply different because Ultimate Reality is itself 
deeply different; religions reflect these deep differences and can never overcome them 







2. John Cobb’s Metaphysical Religious Pluralism  
We will begin this chapter with an examination of John Cobb's Whiteheadian 
complementary pluralism, as seen through the eyes of David Ray Griffin.
1
 In Chapter 3, 
we examined Griffin's critique of identist pluralism. For Griffin, identist pluralism is 
superficial because it can only affirm the validity of multiple religious traditions by 
positing a religious commonality; thus, it nullifies the very religious pluralism that it 
seeks to authenticate. Following Heim, Griffin sees the better approach to religious 
diversity as trying ―to find a fruitful way of combining recognition of truth or validity 
and difference across the religions."
2
 In other words, a better religious pluralism would 
validate different religions with respect to their differences. Griffin sees John Cobb's 
Whiteheadian complementary pluralism, a form of pluralism that Cobb has been 
developing since 1967,
3
 as an example of this better kind of religious pluralism.   
Griffin calls Cobb‘s pluralism ―Whiteheadian‖ (because it adopts Whitehead‘s 
metaphysics) and, therefore, introduces Cobb‘s pluralism by presenting Whitehead‘s 
metaphysics and thoughts about religious diversity. Whitehead sees Buddhism and 
Christianity as ―the two Catholic religions of civilization.‖4 But he also sees both 
religions as being in a state of decay, as a consequence of remaining mutually exclusive 
with respect to their own truths, and as a result of a powerful new tradition – science.  
                                                          
1
  I have decided to let Griffin speak for Cobb (and Whitehead) because Griffin’s representation of Cobb 
constitutes a clear expression of “deep religious pluralism.” Furthermore, I will make no distinction 
between Cobb’s pluralism and Griffin’s pluralism. For Cobb’s own writings on religious pluralism see 
especially Cobb, Transforming Christianity. For a comprehensive bibliography of Cobb’s writings on 
religious pluralism see Center for Process Studies, “Process Thought and Pluralism.”  
2
 Heim quoted in Griffin, “John Cobb's Pluralism,” 51. 
3
 Dating Cobb’s pluralism from 1967 is, perhaps, Griffin’s way of legitimising this form of religious 
pluralism.  
4
 Whitehead quoted in Griffin, “John Cobb's Pluralism”, 40. 
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Whitehead sees science as belonging to the same category as Buddhism and 
Christianity because it now plays the part of theology insofar as it suggests a cosmology; 
and, ―whatever suggests a cosmology suggests a religion.‖5 Whitehead says that 
Christianity and Buddhism, i.e., religion, has lost its power to science because it has not 
been willing to flexibly adapt to the world. Nonetheless, he cautions that science is not a 
replacement for religion, and suggests that religion without science will remain 
superficial, and science without religion will remain crude. His ideal is that religious 
doctrines should be modified in light of the insights of science and vice versa.
6
 
Griffin believes, and presumably so does Cobb, that Christianity needs to 
incorporate into itself the ―universal truth‖ of modern science; however, he cautions that 
it must be circumspect with regard to what parts of the scientific worldview it takes as 
universal truth.
7
 Griffin points out that Whitehead himself rejected a number of scientific, 
so-called, universal truths; specifically 1) the mechanistic theory of matter, which makes 
divine influence in the world impossible; 2) the idea that all perception is through the 
sensory organs, which rules out all possible moral and religious experience; and, 3) 
Darwinian evolution which argues that evolution proceeds without any divine influence.  
Griffin, likewise rejects these ideas but says there are many true scientific ideas; 
some factual, others more philosophical. Of the more philosophical truths, Griffin 
emphasises the doctrine of naturalism, which says there can be no supernatural 
interruption of the world's normal causal processes. Whitehead affirms the possibility of 
                                                          
5
 Ibid., 41. 
6
 Griffin, “John Cobb's Pluralism,” 41; cited in text by page number hereafter. 
7
 Griffin’s appropriation of modern science, in this context, is limited to “naturalism” and he does not 
discuss the limits of scientific claims apart from saying that these need to be appropriated cautiously from 
a religious perspective. For a discussion of questions about the validity of scientific claims about reality 
and Ultimate Reality, see Khun, Structure of Scientific Revolutions.   
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divine influence in the world, but rejects the possibility of the cause and effect structure 
of the world being interrupted by divine influence. Thus, Griffin sees Whitehead's 
metaphysics as a form of a naturalistic theism and draws the conclusion from this that 
Whitehead accepts naturalism as a universal truth of modern science.  
Griffin makes it clear that the naturalism accepted by Whitehead is not the 
naturalism that ―has passed, since the time of Darwin, for the ‗scientific worldview‘.‖ 
(43) This form of naturalism is based on sensationalism, atheism, and material, and 
Griffin calls this naturalism SAM. Griffin calls the naturalism that he, Cobb, and 
Whitehead support, naturalism PPP. The first P in this designation stands for Whitehead's 
prehensive doctrine of perception. Unlike, sensationalism, the idea of prehensive 
perception says that all sensory perception is derived from deeper ―nonsensory 
prehension.‖ The second P stands for panentheism. Panentheism is Whitehead's attempt 
at a compromise between traditional religious theism and scientific atheism; it says that 
there is no omnipotent being with the power to determine all events in the world, but that 
there is divine being that influences the world. The third P stands for panexperientialism 




Griffin emphasises the differences between these two types of naturalism because 
he recognises that pluralism has grown out of Western liberal religious thought, or 
enlightenment thinking, and thus is prone to the dangers of naturalism SAM – or, what 
Raimundo Panikkar calls the ―modern Western myth‖ that includes belief in 
individualism, social Darwinism, and the neutrality of technology.  Griffin argues that 
neither naturalism SAM nor the modern Western myth belong to pluralism as such; the 
                                                          
8
 For a further explanation of panexperientialism, see Oord “Of Meontic Freedom & Panexperientialism.” 
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only two modern ideas that belong to religious pluralism are 1) naturalism PPP and 2) the 
rejection of an authoritarian mode of determining truth.  Since pluralism is based on 
naturalism it is based on a universal truth (or proposition) uncovered by modern science; 
indeed, Griffin blends epistemological motifs by saying that naturalism is a truth revealed 
by modern science:  
I would argue that pluralism (in the generic sense) is based on a distinctively 
modern revelation of a universal truth, revealed primarily through modern science 
and reflection thereon – the truth of naturalism NS (which the divine spirit, as the 
spirit of truth, has led us to see). (44) 
He further adds to this sense that scientific and religious truths are on the same 
epistemological plane by saying that every great tradition – including the enlightenment 
that begat naturalism – is based on some insight or revelation into the nature of 
things.(44) 
With this move, Griffin grounds pluralism – both identist and deep – in the 
modern scientific universal truth of ontological naturalism. This means it is impossible to 
ground an understanding of religious diversity (and religion altogether) in a supernatural 
occurrence – and this authenticates both epistemic naturalism and naturalistic theism, i.e., 
efforts to explain religious diversity, and God, without recourse to supernatural 
revelation.  
Having argued that naturalism (as opposed to supernaturalism) is the only 
legitimate way for moderns to think about religion, God, and, of course, religious 
diversity, Griffin turns his attention to the particulars of Whitehead's naturalistic theology 
because this is the basis of Cobb's complementary religious pluralism.  
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Whitehead makes a distinction in his naturalistic theology between God and 
creativity. Creativity is the term that Whitehead uses for what is typically called the 
Godhead in Christian theology, and what Aristotle called Prime Matter. Griffin describes 
it as the ―twofold power to exert efficient and final (or self-) causation‖ which means it is 
the creative ground of all things but has no ground itself. Moreover, this twofold power 
of being is embodied in both God and a ―world of finite actualities.‖  The idea that 
creativity is embodied in both God and the world, or the idea that both originate in 
creativity, is significant because it means that God is not a causal force that can alter 
other causal forces in the world. According to this view, God is the great example of 
embodied creativity not an exception that is able to interrupt parallel embodiments of 
creativity in the world of finite actualities:  ―‗God is not to be treated as an exception to 
all metaphysical principles‘ but as ‗their chief exemplification‘.‖9 Thus, Whitehead and 
Griffin reject the Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo (creation out of nothing) because 
it suggests that God creates being out of nothingness (understood as simply nothing 
rather that creative emptiness) and therefore can alter the course of being at will – and 
their position is that God cannot interrupt the normal causal processes of the world. 
Griffin, in contrast, sees the world emerging out of creativity as naturally and necessarily 
as God:  
Because creativity is embodied in the world as naturally and necessarily as it is 
embodied in God, there can be no divine interruptions of the principles normally 
involved in the causal processes between finite beings. Those causal principles, 
being simply the principles inherent in creativity as such, are metaphysical 
principles, inherent in the very nature of things, including the nature of God. (45) 
                                                          
9
 Whitehead quoted in Griffin, “John Cobb's Pluralism,” 43. 
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This distinction between creativity and God – apart from serving as a justification for 
naturalism and naturalistic theism – is also central to Cobb‘s version of pluralism insofar 
as he uses these different aspects of Ultimate Reality to account for deep religious 
differences. 
Griffin prepares the way for Cobb‘s pluralistic hypothesis, grounded in a 
pluralistic metaphysics, by showing the problems inherent to John Hick's pluralistic 
hypothesis which is grounded in a unitary metaphysics.  
Hick argues that the concept of Ultimate Reality as personal (God, Allah, 
Yahweh, etc.) and the concept of Ultimate Reality as impersonal (Emptiness, the 
Absolute, nirguna Brahman, etc.) are different perceptions and conceptions of the same 
singular, transcendent reality; indeed, these are the two primary ways that human beings 
have related themselves to ultimate reality. Hick, according to Griffin, also says that 
religious experience is cognitive (i.e., connected to perceiving and conceiving of God) 
and that no one experience (i.e., perception and conception) of Ultimate Reality is 
superior to any other. Hick reconciles all of these ideas by saying that no experience of 
Ultimate Reality is an experience of Ultimate Reality in itself, or as such, and, therefore, 
no experience (i.e., neither of the dominant ways of perceiving and conceiving God) is 
more correct than any other. But, for Griffin, this is the same as saying that each is 
equally mistaken, and this is relativism; indeed, he says that this relativism flows directly 
from Hick‘s unitary metaphysics.10  (45) 
What Griffin wishes to emphasize is the quandary of identist pluralism; namely, it 
cannot make a strong connection between Ultimate Reality and religion because this 
leads to the conclusion that religion is one. If God is one and religion is God, then 
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 For Griffin the charge of “relativism” seems to automatically invalidate a theory of religious diversity.     
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religion must also be one. The identist solution to this problem is to cut the tie between 
religion and God, but this makes religion relative or merely human; it is no longer 
something ultimately true that one could commit to whole-heartedly.  
Apart from raising the ―spectre of relativism,‖ Griffin finds Hick‘s solution to be 
empirically problematic because he believes that the impersonal and personal experiences 
of Ultimate Reality are radically different. And, even though Hick never makes the claim 
that personal and impersonal experiences of Ultimate Reality are the same, Griffin and 
Cobb find it meaningless to say that deeply different religious experiences are 
experiences of the same reality. (46-47)    
For Cobb, the evidence of deeply different experiences of Ultimate Reality call 
for a different hypothesis, and Griffin identifies three components of this hypothesis. 
First, Cobb says that the totality of reality is very complex and exceeds what we can 
know about it. On this point, Cobb is similar to Hick but Hick uses this insight to 
disqualify all claims to religious ultimacy, whereas Cobb uses it to suggest that present 
knowledge of Ultimate Reality can be greatly expanded. Second, at times people have 
learned things about Ultimate Reality that are actually about Ultimate Reality itself. The 
upshot of these two conditions is that religion or human knowledge about Ultimate 
Reality is dualistic; on one hand, it is characterised by error and distortion, and, on the 
other, by penetrating and profound insights into the actual nature of Ultimate Reality 
itself. Third, emptying/emptiness (or the impersonal experience of ultimate reality) 
identifies one important aspect of ultimate reality, while God (or the personal experience 
of ultimate reality) identifies another. In other words, the experience of God in 
Christianity and the experience of emptiness and Buddhism are not different experiences 
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With respect to the third point, this ties in with Whitehead‘s distinction between 
God and creativity, and more generally to his pluralistic metaphysics. Cobb's thesis is that 
there are at least two ultimate realities, and Griffin uses this insight to bifurcate the 
spiritual universe as follows:  
One of these [ultimates], corresponding with what Whitehead calls ―creativity,‖ 
has been called ―Emptiness‖ (“Sunyata”) or ―Dharmakaya‖ by Buddhists, 
―Nirguna Brahman‖ by Advaita Vedantists, ―the Godhead‖ by Meister Eckhart, 
and ―Being Itself‖ by Heidegger and Tillich (among others). It is the formless 
ultimate reality. The other ultimate, corresponding with what Whitehead calls 
―God,‖ is not Being Itself but the Supreme Being. It is in-formed and the source 
of forms (such as truth, beauty, and justice). It has been called ―Amida Buddha,‖ 
―Sambhogakaya,‖ ―Saguna Brahman,‖ ―Ishvara,‖ ―Yahweh,‖ ―Christ,‖ and 
―Allah.‖ (47) 
The positing of two ultimate realities offers a simple solution to the problem of two 
radically different types of religious experience; both can be thought of as equal in the 
sense that both equally coincide with ultimate reality.  
For Griffin, religious pluralism is intimately connected to interreligious dialogue, 
and so he discusses the implications of this idea of two ultimate realities for interreligious 
dialogue. More specifically, he says that it leads to recognition of two different types of 
interreligious dialogue. One, which he calls the dialogue of purification, is dialogue 
between those attending to the same ultimate; for example, Christians, Jews, Muslims, 
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and theistic Hindus. The other, which he calls the dialogue of enrichment, is between 
those focused on different ultimates; for example Christians and Buddhists. In the 
dialogue of enrichment one's own religious vision is expanded, and the idea of 
complementarity is important to this process. (47)  
Cobb suggests that the idea of complementarity replace the idea of a common 
ground as the basis for interreligious dialogue. Thus, the goal is not to see how the 
different traditions are really saying the same thing but to see that they are saying 
different but complementary things. He suggests that contradictory statements can 
usually be overcome by understanding that they are answers to different questions; and, 
here different questions and answers stem from focus on different aspects of ultimate 
reality. (48) 
But even though Cobb‘s metaphysics has focused primarily on the distinction 
between creativity and God – because his main interest has been in trying to reconcile 
theistic Christianity with nontheistic Buddhism – the metaphysics or naturalistic theism 
that he adopts is actually tripartite. The third aspect of Ultimate Reality is ―the cosmos, 
the universe, the totality of [finite] things.‖ (49) Cobb links these three aspects of 
Ultimate Reality with the three types of religion that Jack Hutchison called ―theistic, 
acosmic, and cosmic.‖ (49) Religions that focus on God are theistic, religions that focus 
on creativity are acosmic, and religions that take the cosmos as sacred are cosmic.  These 
cosmic religions, such as certain forms of Taoism and Native American spirituality, are 
as true as theistic and acosmic religions because they too are related to something 
ultimate: ―By recognizing the cosmos as a third ultimate, we are able to see that these 
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cosmic religions are also oriented toward something truly ultimate in the nature of 
things.‖ (49)  
Of course, these different religions can only be seen as equally ultimate if the 
different aspects of Ultimate Reality are taken as equally ultimate; so, Griffin moves 
forward by defending this idea. This defence is especially important here because while 
the idea that God and the Godhead are both ultimate has precedents within Christian 
theology, the idea that the cosmos is equally ultimate does not.  Griffin begins his 
argument by acknowledging that the Christian doctrine of creation out of nothing 
precludes the possibility of seeing the cosmos as ultimate. But this is not a problem 
because Whitehead‘s naturalistic theology allows for this possibility – and, for Cobb and 
Griffin, naturalistic theology has more legitimacy than supernaturally revealed theology. 
The Whiteheadian argument used here is that, although any cosmic reality is contingent, 
the fact that there is cosmic reality is not. The cosmos is ultimate not by virtue of what it 
is but by virtue of the fact that it is.
11
 Thus, for Griffin, the world becomes a divine 
manifestation in much the same way that scientific insight becomes religious revelation:  
What exists necessarily is not simply God, as in traditional Christian theism, and 
not simply the world understood as the totality of finite things, as in atheistic 
naturalism, but God-and-a-world, with both God and worldly actualities being 
embodiments of creativity. (49) 
Moreover, the different aspects of ultimate reality, though distinct are not 
separable: Griffin quotes Cobb, as follows, to make this point:  
                                                          
11
 Ludwig’s Wittgenstein’s concept of the mystical expresses a similar idea: “6:44 Not how  the world is, is 
the mystical, but that, it is” (Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 187).  
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I would propose that without a cosmic reality there can be no acosmic one, and 
that without God there can be neither. Similarly, without both the cosmic and 
acosmic features of reality there can be no God.
12
 
At this point, the naturalistic metaphysical thinking of Griffin and Cobb resembles 
that of Christian Trinitarian apologists, and appropriately Griffin turns his attention to 
defending this theology against possible charges of polytheism. Cobb defends his 
pluralistic metaphysics against the charge of polytheism by arguing that the three 
ultimates do not exist on the same level; God or the Supreme Being, is not the same as 
the cosmos or the many finite beings, and this is not the same as Being Itself (i.e., 
creativity) which is embodied in God and finite beings. Being Itself is not another God 
alongside God, and has no reality apart from its embodiments in the Supreme Being and 
finite beings; in other words, God and creativity are not comparable and so it makes no 
sense to speak about superior and inferior realities. (49-50) 
This line of reasoning works well with respect to God and creativity, but not so 
well with respect to the cosmos. Cobb acknowledges that among actualities, God is 
ultimate, which means that the world of finite being is not equal to God. This is useful for 
distancing Cobb‘s metaphysics from pantheism, but it compromises his ability to affirm 
the ultimacy of cosmic religions.  Griffin doesn‘t face this problem head on and I can 
suggest three possible reasons for this. One, he is satisfied that the ultimacy of the 
cosmos is established by the fact that it is. Two, he sees no way to reconcile the claim 
that God is superior in the world of actualities with the idea that God and the cosmos are 
equally ultimate. Three, he is more troubled by the idea of his theology being equated 
with pantheism, wherein God is just another being alongside other beings, than he is with 
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 Cobb quoted in Griffin, “John Cobb's Pluralism,” 49. 
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the idea of Native American religions and certain forms of Taoism being regarded as 
equal to the great world religions grounded in God and creativity. In any case, Griffin 
feels the need to distinguish between the Supreme Being and other beings, and does so 
with Whitehead‘s concept of God as ―worldsoul‖:  
As the ―worldsoul,‖ understood as ―a unity of experience that contains all the 
multiplicity of events,‖ God is ―the being that includes all beings.‖ (50) 
In any case, Griffin is satisfied that a ―pluralistic ontology‖ that includes Being 
Itself/Creativity, God/ the Supreme Being, and cosmos/universe can be used to 
authenticate a wide variety of religious experiences. Religious differences can be 
explained in terms of concentration on different features of ultimate reality. If Creativity 
is the focus of religious life acosmic religion will result; if the Supreme Being is the focus 
of religious life theistic religion will result; and, if the universe is the focus of religious 
life cosmic religion will result. Cobb, however, notes that pure forms of religion rarely 
obtain; religious language often blurs the distinctions between the different aspects of 
Ultimate Reality and religious traditions often relate themselves to more than one of the 
three ultimates. He says that this is particularly true of theistic Christianity which has 
been heavily influenced by acosmic Neo-Platonic sources, and is thus a unique blend of 
theism and acosmism. (50) But in cases of both pure and mixed pedigree the pluralistic 
ontology, or the idea of three ultimates, allows for an understanding and appreciation of a 
wide variety of religious traditions:  
Cobb‘s view that the totality of reality contains three ultimates, along with the 
recognition that a particular tradition could concentrate on one, two, or even all 
three of them, gives us a basis for understanding a wide variety of religious 
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experiences as genuine responses to something that is really there to be 
experienced. ―When we understand global religious experience and thought in 
this way,‖ Cobb emphasizes, ―it is easier to view the contributions of diverse 
traditions as complementary.‖ (51) 
This ontology allows to Cobb to overcome the common problem of inclusivist 
and identitist pluralist theories of religious diversity that collapse all of religious diversity 
into one form of religion. Cobb‘s pluralism is able to assert that different religions are 
true with respect to their differences. This is the heart of deep religious pluralism or 
metaphysical pluralism and ―helps those who accept it to acknowledge the deep 
differences among religious traditions without denying that each has its truth.‖13 
Griffin continues his presentation of John Cobb‘s pluralism by contrasting it with 
the ―semi-pluralism‖ of Schubert M. Ogden. Griffin calls Ogden a semi-pluralist because 
Ogden acknowledges the possibility that there might be true religions other than 
Christianity, but does not acknowledge that there actually are true religions other than 
Christianity. (52) Griffin uses this comparison to highlight four different aspects of 
Cobb‘s pluralism; specifically, 1) its pluralistic metaphysics, 2) its understanding of ―true 
religion,‖14 3) its norm, and 4) its sensitivity to the current pluralistic situation.    
To begin, Cobb and Ogden clearly have a different understanding of ultimate 
reality. Although Cobb affirms a tripartite or pluralistic metaphysics he is, more 
generally, of the view that Ultimate Reality is ―indefinitely complex,‖ and that a full 
understanding of it is a work in progress that can be aided by interreligious dialogue. 
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 Cobb quoted in Griffin, “John Cobb's Pluralism,” 51. 
14
  In Part 1, I said that all exclusivists, inclusivists, humanistic pluralists, and metaphysical pluralists adopt 
the notion of “true religion,” even if the meaning of true religion changes when used by the respective 
parties. Griffin’s contrast of Cobb’s understanding of true religion with Ogden's provides a nice example of 
this.     
314 
 
Ogden, on the other hand, speaks of one ultimate reality, and identifies this with God; 
moreover, he links salvation directly with this one ultimate, and therefore there is only 
one salvation. Cobb‘s pluralistic metaphysics leads to the possibility of multiple 
salvations, and Ogden's unitary metaphysics limits salvation to one form.  
The idea of true religion plays a central role in Ogden's main work on religious 
pluralism called  Is There Only One True Religion or Are There Many? In this work, 
Ogden claims that ―every religion, at least implicitly, claims to be the true religion.‖15 
Griffin points out that the use of the definite article (the) predetermines things from the 
start, and makes the question as to whether there is one true religion or many nonsensical 
– if Christianity is the true religion, then how could there possibly be others? 
Nonetheless, Griffin delves deeper into this issue by trying to understand exactly what 
Ogden means by ―true religion.‖ (53-54)  
Ogden distinguishes between formally true and substantially true religions. A 
formally true religion represents the meaning of human existence, and other religions 
must agree with it in order to be true religions. Religions that agree with the formally true 
religion may be said to be substantially true. Griffin says that when a religion claims to 
be the true religion – as Ogden says all religions do – then it must be claiming to be the 
formally true religion. And this means that other religions can, at best, be substantially 
true. The true religion stands as the formal norm by which all other religions, if any, are 
determined to be substantially true religions. (54)  
Cobb rejects the idea that Christianity, or any one religion, can be understood as 
the formally true religion. He does this by rejecting the foundational idea that God could 
reveal to a particular religious community complete and infallible religious truth. This 
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 Ogden quoted in Griffin, “John Cobb's Pluralism,” 53.  
315 
 
means, for Cobb, that there is ―no basis for the assumption that Christianity‘s 
understanding of reality expresses the whole truth about the essential structure of reality.‖ 
(55) Even so, Cobb would not object to Ogden's idea that it is of the very nature of 
religions to claim to be the formally true religion, and the norm by which other religions 
can be judged. Granting religions their claim to formal truth avoids relativism, and is 
consistent with the idea that other religions are ―expressing different but complementary 
universally valid truth, so that this religion would be normative with respect to that part 
of the full truth that it has seen.‖ (55) This is a significant qualification; formal religious 
truth relates only to a part of Ultimate Reality and so cannot claim to be the whole of 
religious truth. Formal religious truth is multiple. Ogden, of course, didn't mean this; for 
him, a claim to be the formally true religion means being the one and only formally true 
religion, and the norm by which others can be judged as substantially true. Thus, even if 
Ogden were to affirm the truth of religious pluralism, he would be an identist pluralist 
because he is only willing to see other religions as true insofar as they conform to the 
formally true religion of Christianity. (55-56)  
Griffin suggests that Ogden may be open to Cobb's pluralism insofar as he seems 
open to the idea that some philosophy could serve as the norm for making reasoned 
judgements about the truth of the various religions.  Griffin says that this is (arguably) 
what Cobb does in employing Whiteheadian philosophy as the norm for understanding 
religions. In other words, Whitehead's concept of Ultimate Reality as creativity, God, and 
cosmos is a universal norm by which all religions can be understood.
16
  Griffin says that 
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 In “Beyond ‘Pluralism’" Cobb suggests a “relative norm” for all religions; namely, the capacity to expand 
to its comprehension of reality while remaining faithful to its heritage.  As far as I know, Cobb has never 
explicitly identified Whitehead’s concept of Ultimate Reality as a norm for all religions; but Griffin is right 
that an argument for this can be made.  
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Cobb would not object to this idea, on one hand, because Whitehead's metaphysics is a 
―Christian natural theology‖ and, on the other, because this metaphysics is a deep 
Christian theology because it is informed by the truths of other religions, particularly 
Indian and Chinese. (56-57)   
Finally, Griffin shows that Cobb‘s religious pluralism is different from Ogden's 
insofar as Ogden‘s is insensitive to the current pluralistic religious situation. For Cobb, a 
religion needs to be true to its heritage, but it also needs to be ―fitting to its situation.‖17 
And, one part of the current situation is the existential reality of religious diversity and 
the fact that many Christian theologians find religious pluralism to be an appropriate 
response to this diversity. Cobb suggests that this new situation demands a more modest 
claim from Christians, with respect to the truth of their religion. Griffin suggests that it is 
more appropriate for Christians to see their religion as a formally true religion rather than 
the formally true religion –and, even that this is ―more appropriate to their founding 
events.‖ (58) He also adds that many Christians have already come to this conclusion 
implicitly (that Christianity is a true religion rather than the true religion); however, Cobb 
provides a new way to explicitly express this view, without the relativism that 
characterizes identist pluralism.  
With this Griffin ends his comparative analysis, and closes his presentation of 
Cobb‘s pluralism by showing how Cobb is able to articulate a theory of religious 
pluralism that is not relativistic.  
Griffin adopts Alan Race‘s definition of (debilitating) relativism as ―the view that 
all religions are equally true, and therefore equally false.‖ Several pluralists have 
accepted that relativism is a necessary part of pluralism, because there is simply no 
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 Cobb quoted in Griffin, “John Cobb's Pluralism,” 58. 
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logical way to affirm the absoluteness of one religion while asserting its ―rough parity‖ 
with others.
18
  He notes that Hick tries to overcome relativism by establishing an ethical 
norm, but undermines this norm by refusing to attribute anything to Ultimate Reality as 
such. According to Griffin, this makes Hick‘s definition of salvation, as alignment with 




Cobb was aware that his own deep pluralism could be seen as ―an unqualified 
relativism‖; a situation in which different religions would simply keep to themselves with 
their own ultimate truths.  Cobb rejects this situation, and says that it is not acceptable to 




Griffin frames Cobb‘s non-relativistic pluralism by contrasting it with John 
Hick‘s relativistic pluralism. The heart of the difference between Cobb‘s pluralism and 
Hick‘s pluralism, is that Cobb distinguishes between God and creativity and sees both as 
aspects of ultimate reality, and Hick sees God and creativity (or God as personal and God 
as impersonal) as different ways of conceptualizing the same singular ultimate reality. 
From Cobb's perspective, Hick demands that both Christians and Buddhists dissolve 
everything unique about their own perspectives in order to see that they are perspectives 
of the same thing. (60)  
Griffin notes, in defence of Hick, that he does try to avoid dissolving God into 
emptiness (or emptiness into God) by seeing both God and emptiness as phenomenal 
conceptions of the same transcendent Real. Griffin also, however, points to an earlier 
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 See, for example, Langdon Gilkey’s “Plurality and its Theological Implications”; Dianna Eck, Encountering 
God. 
19
 For an alternative reading of Hick, on this point, see, Chapter 4, “Is Hick a Pluralist?”.   
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time in Hick‘s career when he more or less said that Advaita Vedanta has understood 
something more profoundly than Christianity and the theistic traditions; namely, the 
distinction between God as such (nirguna Brahman) and God as known to human beings 
(saguna Brahman).
20
  But later, according to Griffin, he would try to overcome this 
favouritism by seeing impersonal concepts of the Real, such as nirguna Brahman, as 
simply that – conceptions of the Real as impersonal that are no more the Real itself than 
conceptions of the Real as personal. But Griffin says that what Hick says about the Real 
itself remains remarkably similar to what he says about nirguna Brahman (and Sunyata). 
The implication of this, for Griffin and Cobb, is that everything distinctive about the 
biblical concept of the Real as personal deity is lost. Griffin comes to this conclusion by 
assuming that what Hick says about the Real as such is really the same thing as a nirguna 
Brahman and Sunyata, and that Hick takes the Real as such to be a higher reality than 
God as experienced. Finally, Griffin criticizes Hick‘s position because it denies that 
personal and impersonal conceptions of the Real have counter-parts in the Real as such. 
For Griffin, the complete dissociation of the Real as such from religious constructs of the 
Real makes it impossible to forge a strong link between morality and religion, which 
Hick does try to do by saying that authentic concepts of the Real lead to moral fruits. (60-
61)  
For Griffin, Cobb‘s Whiteheadian pluralism overcomes these problems, but 
before discussing Cobb‘s solution I want to argue that Griffin has misunderstood an 
aspect of Hick‘s theory – even though this would not change his more general criticism 
of Hick‘s pluralism. Hick does not subordinate Christianity to Advaita and Buddhism; he 
subordinates all religions to his concept of the Real. And even if what Hick calls the Real 
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is very similar to nirguna Brahman and Sunyata, Hick denies that Hindus and Buddhists 
actually have direct experiences of these as they claim to.  
 In God and the Universe of Faiths (1973) Hick does suggest that Advaitins 
understood something very important that Westerners missed; the distinction between 
God as entirely transcendent and God as knowable. In Hinduism, the unknowable aspect 
of God is known as nirguna Brahman and the knowable aspect of God is known as 
saguna Brahman:  
Theologically, the Hindu distinction between Nirguna Brahman and Saguna 
Brahman is important and should be adopted into western religious thought. 
Detaching the distinction, then, from its Hindu context we may say that Nirguna 
God is the eternal self-existent divine reality, beyond the scope of all human 
categories, including personality; and Saguna God is God in relation to his 
creation and with the attributes which express this relationship, such as 
personality, omnipotence, goodness, love and omniscience.
21
   
As for overcoming the implication that Hinduism represents a higher 
understanding of Ultimate Reality than Christianity, Hick, at this point says that both 
traditions see God as impersonal (unknowable) and personal (with knowable attribute):  
It will be a sufficient reminder of the strand of personal relationship with the 
divine in Hinduism to mention Iswara, the personal God who represents the 
Absolute as known and worshipped by finite persons. It should also be 
remembered that the characterisation of Brahman as satcitananda, absolute being, 
consciousness and bliss, is not far from the conception of infinitely transcendent 
personal life. Thus there is both the thought and the experience of the personal 
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divine within Hinduism. But there is likewise the thought and the experience of 
God as other than personal within Christianity. Rudolph Otto describes this strand 
in the mysticism of Meister Eckhart.
22
 
In Problems of Religious Pluralism (1983), however, Hick‘s thinking shows some 
significant changes. First, the distinction between God as unknowable and God perceived 
and conceived is recognized, by Hick, as the foundation of his theory of religious 
diversity and as something which finds widespread recognition in all the world's religious 
traditions:  
In Hindu thought it is the distinction between nirguna Brahman, the Ultimate in 
itself, beyond all human categories, and saguna Brahman, the Ultimate as known 
to the finite consciousness as a personal deity, Ivara. In Taoist thought, ‗The Tao 
that can be expressed is not the eternal Tao‘ (Tao-Te Ching, 1). There are also 
analogous distinctions in Jewish and Muslim mystical thought in which the Real 
an sich is called en Soph and al Haqq. In Mahãyana Buddhism there is the 
distinction between the dharmakda, the eternal cosmic Buddha-nature, which is 
also the infinite Void (ünyatã), and on the other hand the realm of heavenly 
Buddha figures (sambhogak4ya). and their incarnations in the earthly Buddhas 
(nirmãzakãya). This varied family of distinctions suggests the perhaps daring 
thought that the Real an sich is one but is nevertheless capable of being humanly 
experienced in a variety of ways. This thought lies at the heart of the pluralistic 
hypothesis which I am suggesting.
23
 




 Hick, Problems of Religious Pluralism, 39-40. 
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Second, Hick stops identifying the unknowable aspect of the Real as such with the 
impersonal; now, the impersonal is one particular way of perceiving and conceiving the 
Real. In fact, it is one of the two great ways by which human beings have typically 
related to the real; the other being the Real as personal.  Following are some tradition 
specific examples of the Real conceived as the personal:   
 
Thus the Real as personal is known in the Christian tradition as God the Father; in 
Judaism as Adonai; in Islam as Allah, the Qur‘anic Revealer; in the Indian 
traditions as Shiva, or Vishnu, or Paramätmã, and under the many other lesser 
images of deity which in different regions of India concretise different aspects of 
the divine nature. This range of personal deities who are the foci of worship 




And here are some examples of Real conceived as impersonal:  
Here the general concept, the Absolute, is schematised in actual religious 
experience to form the range of divine impersonae — Brahman, the Dharma, the 
Tao, nirvana, sunyatã, and so on — which are experienced within the Eastern 
traditions. The structure of these impersonae is however importantly different 
from that of the personae. A divine persona is concrete, implicitly finite, 
sometimes visualisable and even capable of being pictured. A divine impersona , 
on the other hand, is not a ‗thing‘ in contrast to a person. It is the infinite being—
consciousness—bliss (saccidãnanda) of Brahman; or the beginningless and 
endless process of cosmic change (pratitya samutpãda) of Buddhist teaching; or 
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again the ineffable ‗further shore‘ of nirvãna, or the eternal Buddha-nature 
(dharmakaya); or the ultimate Emptiness (sunyatã) which is also the fullness or 
suchness of the world; or the eternal principle of the Tao.
25
 
This represents a shift for Hick, and creates the problems of distinguishing The 
Real as such from the impersonal concepts of the Real which Hick had hitherto conflated. 
Griffin is not convinced that Hick ever succeeds in doing this and, therefore, believes that 
Hick takes impersonal concepts of God to be higher than personal ones.  This is not 
accurate, and Hick makes his position very clear in An Interpretation of Religion (1989) 
where he interprets mystical union with God (satchitananda) as a manifestation of the 
Real to human consciousness – not an experience of the Real itself. Thus, this experience 
is understood as a form of religion related to saguna Brahman – not nirguna Brahman 
(which Hick continues to identify with the Real as such):        
In advaitic Hinduism, then, the Real is experienced through inner union with the 
spiritual reality of the ãtman which we become conscious of being as we 
transcend our separating ego. And in this mystical experience we, now merged 
into the unitary ãtman, discover our true nature as satchitananda. In offering this 
proposal from the standpoint of the pluralistic hypothesis I am treating the trans-
personal reality of satchitananda, experienced in moksha, and the personal reality 
of Ishwara, experienced in bhakti, as alternative manifestations of the Real to our 
human consciousness. Thus in this formulation the Real an sich is equated with 
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In other words, the experience that Hindus may think of as an experience of 
nirguna Brahman is really an experience of saguna Brahman. Hick similarly reinterprets 
Nirvana for Budhists; it is not transcendence of the ego such that Void (ultimate reality) 
is attained, but an experience of the Real in an egoless way:    
From the point of view of a pluralistic hypothesis Nirvana is the Real experienced 
in an ineffable ego-lessness, unlimited and internal which can be entered by the 
moral and spiritual path to God by the Buddha.
27
 
Hick does similar work with the concept of Sunyata or Emptiness. Hick says that, 
for the most part, Buddhist‘s use the term Sunyata in the same way that he uses the term 
the Real in the pluralist hypothesis.
28
 But Hick parts way with Buddhists when they claim 
the possibility of achieving satori or an ―unmediated mystical experience of the Real.‖29 
Hick denies this possibility because the Real itself is always beyond human 
consciousness; in other words, if it is experienced by a human being then it is not an 
immediate experience of the Real. But even though it is predetermined, for Hick, that 
satori cannot be a direct experience of the Real, he offers an argument to prove this point 
based on empirical evidence. The evidence is that different mystical traditions have 
different ultimate experiences: Zen Buddhists experience satori, Christian mystics 
experience the visio dei, Hindus become jivanmukti, etc. Hick concludes from this that 
none of these mystical traditions produce direct experience of the Real because, 
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otherwise, they would be having the same experience. Hick doesn‘t consider the 
possibility that they are all directly experiencing the Real but are using different terms to 
describe this experience. In any case, Hick‘s final conclusion is that all such, so-called, 
direct experiences of the Real as such are not this at all but really experiences related to 
manifestations of the Real:  
This lends considerable support to the hypothesis that even the profoundest 
intuitive mysticism of the mind operates with culturally specific concepts and 
what is experienced is accordingly a manifestation of the real rather than the 
postulated real an sich.
30
   
In short, Buddhists who are related to the impersonae of the Real are not really 
experiencing what they think they are experiencing, in the same way that Hindus who are 
related to the impersonae of the Real are not really experiencing what they think they are 
experiencing. 
Thus, I do not agree, with Griffin that Hick, like some Buddhists and Advaitins, 
subordinates the personal God to the formless ultimate; Hick submits both to his concept 
of the ineffable Real to ensure that no religion is absolute.   
Returning to Cobb, his solution to this problem is to say that particular religious 
experiences correlate directly to Ultimate Reality itself; in other words, Emptiness is an 
experience of Ultimate Reality itself, just as relationship with God is an experience of 
Ultimate Reality itself. Moreover, these differences stem from differences in Ultimate 
Reality itself, not from different human ways of constructing a uniform and ineffable 
ultimate reality. Thus, Cobb‘s pluralism avoids the sort of relativism that Hick‘s does not.  
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But it does raise the question as to whether Whiteheadian Christian pluralists are 
―imperialistically imposing‖ their norm, i.e., their pluralistic metaphysics, on others and 
thereby undermining the pluralism they seek to affirm.  
To address this question Griffin first looks at how it is addressed by Marjorie 
Suchocki, a colleague of Griffin and Cobb at the Claremont School of Theology. 
Suchocki asks if it is possible to reject the idea of using one religion as a norm to judge 
all others, and still avoid a relativism wherein each religion is governed by its own norm 
and there is no normative critique of religious norms (relativism).  Suchocki approaches 
this problem with a practical solution; namely, by positing a norm that legitimately 
judges all religions. In this respect, Suchocki is doing something very much like 
Troeltsch did 100 years earlier; but the historically derived norm that Suchocki suggests 
is justice. Suchocki suggests using justice as a norm, even though it may not receive 
global assent, would not be an imposition on other religions because the eschatological 
visions of the ―perfect mode of existence‖ in all religions shows justice to be an ―internal 
norm within each religion.‖31 But Suchocki seems less than convinced by her own 
solution; as Griffin puts it: ―She admits, however, that this solution does not completely 
overcome the charge but only ―mitigates‖ it, because ―the norm is hardly culture-free.‖ 
(62)  
Cobb‘s problem with Suchocki‘s solution is that even if all religions contain a 
vision of justice, they certainly do not all regard justice as the most important thing – and, 
therefore, would not accept justice as a universal norm. Griffin concludes from this that it 
would be imperialistic to assert justice as a norm for all traditions.  Griffin's solution here 
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is similar to his solution with respect to Ogden's concept of the true religion; speak of 
justice as a norm for judging religions rather than the norm:  
It would, therefore, be imperialistic for Suchocki to propose ―justice that creates 
well-being‖ as “the fundamental criterion of value and the focus of dialogue and 
action among religions‖ (emphases added).  However, this problem could be 
overcome, without lapsing into relativism, by changing the definite articles in this 
statement to indefinite ones. (63)    
For Cobb this move is necessary but he says it doesn't require Christians to 
abandon their ultimate commitment to justice; instead, it requires them to see emptiness 
as equally important. Thus, the solution to the arrogance of exclusivism and inclusivism 
is not to deny the ultimacy or universal validity of one's own religious truth – i.e., the 
solution is not relativism – but to affirm other truths as also universally valid. (63) And, 
of course, this follows the same pattern as recognizing God and emptiness as 
complimentary truths about the same pluralistic ultimate reality.  
Griffin asks if Cobb‘s solution is not avoiding imperialism by simply positing a 
more subtle form of relativism; after all, what's the difference between saying, like 
Troeltsch, that all religions are true within their own cultural spheres, and saying that all 
religions are true because they are related to different aspects of ultimate reality? Cobb 
says that his solution would indeed be relativism if it held that the different truths 
obtained, by relating to different aspects of ultimate reality, could not be appropriated by 
everyone. This situation, according to Cobb, would stimulate the ―corrosive acids of 
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relativism‖32 because it would undermine the sense of completeness that each religion has 
about itself, and the total commitment that this generates. (64)  
Cobb, of course, rejects the idea that the truths of religious communities are 
exclusive. Still, he recognizes the potential problem created by acknowledging that one's 
own (Christian) faith is just one among others; and, more especially, that one's own 
(Christian) religious goal of ―the indivisible salvation of all world‖ is aided by religious 
truths that, at present, are better known in other religions than in Christianity.
33
 This 
acknowledgement or recognition, according to Cobb,  is what makes him pluralist.
34
 (64) 
This, of course, is not a recognition shared by all pluralist. John Hick, for example, does 
not say that other religions have truth that Christians need, but that other religions have 
different varieties of the same sort of truth that Christianity has.
35
  
According to Griffin, Cobb‘s solution to this problem involves recognizing two 
things about Christianity; 1) that it is a living, continually changing, movement, and 2) 
that Christians should not be devoted to any particular form of religion but to ―the living 
Christ.‖ This, says Cobb, does relativize all particular forms of Christianity but not ―the 
process of creative transformation by which it lives in which it knows as Christ.‖36 By 
identifying Christianity with an evolving process Cobb makes it permissible for 
                                                          
32
 Cobb quoted in Griffin, “John Cobb's Pluralism,” 63. 
33
 In this respect, Cobb’s position is indistinguishable from Heim’s, and similar to D’Costa’s.      
34
 As already discussed, Cobb expanded and generalized this idea to suggest that the capacity to expand 
its comprehension of reality while remaining faithful to its heritage is a norm for all religions.    
35
  This is why Gavin D’Costa believes that his Christian trinitarianism theology of religions provides a 
better framework for Christians to appreciate the truths of other religions than does religious pluralism.  
This seems valid, at least, with respect to Hick’s pluralism: D’Costa needs the world religions to better 
understand the truth revealed by Christ; Hick doesn’t need the other religions for anything (except 
perhaps to keep Christians company in the new world religions’ fraternity). A question for  D’Costa 
though: Are other religions distorted by seeing them as manifestations of the Spirit, whose main function 
is to illuminate the wisdom of the Son? There are parameters around what the others can reveal in 
D’Costa’s theology.          
36
 Cobb quoted in Griffin, “John Cobb's Pluralism,” 64. 
328 
 
Christians to incorporate the truths of other religions into Christianity, and by doing this 
effectively pushes the issue of the fullness of Christianity‖ into the future:  
The fullness of Christianity lies in the ever-receding future. One can be a whole-
hearted participant in the present movement as long as one believes that the 
particular limitations to which one is now sensitive can be overcome.
37
  
The present task of Christians, then, is to turn Christianity into a ―global 
theology‖ by incorporating into it the truths of other religious traditions; and, according 
to Cobb, this is a process that Christians have barely begun. Cobb also hopes the other 
traditions will engage in the process of ―globalizing‖ their theologies, from the starting 
points of their own traditions. As such, the different religious traditions will move 
towards ―greater semblance,‖ although particularities will remain as each tradition 
employs the pluralistic strategy, of incorporating the truths of others into its ultimate 
truth, from its own particular vantage point. Thus, the pluralistic enterprise will be quite 
different for Buddhists, Jews, Christians, and so on. (65) According to Griffin, if such a 
situation obtains there will be ―pluralism without relativism in all of the universalist 
traditions.‖ (66)  
This pluralistic situation, however, is not permanent; it is a situation that in the 
fullness of time will give way to a singular understanding of Ultimate Reality and the 
―indivisible salvation of the whole world.‖ In the end, Cobb‘s position, soteriologically 
and epistemologically, is unitary rather than pluralistic. Cobb's final position is, therefore, 
similar to what Mark Heim calls ―picture-puzzle pluralism.‖ In picture-puzzle pluralism, 
each tradition specializes in particular knowledge about God, and in the end, come 
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together to form a complete picture of God.
38
 Again, Cobb postulates the existence of 
religious plurality up until the end, but in the end all come together to produce a single 
vision of God (epistemological unity) that leads to an indivisible salvation (soteriological 
unity).  
Thus, in the end, Cobb is not a pluralist even though he holds onto the idea of 
pluralism right up until the end; he is a pluralist until unitary fulfillment is achieved. In 
this regard he is very similar to neo-inclusivists such as Mark Heim – except for the fact 
that Cobb doesn‘t insist on religious fulfillment being Christian. I suggest that Cobb, in 
the end, reduces diversity to unity because he equates permanent religious diversity with 
relativism; nonetheless, Cobb‘s initial argument for religious pluralism is a form of deep 
pluralism or metaphysical pluralism, although his second argument is for the ideal of 
religious unity.  
We will now examine two further versions of metaphysical pluralism that are 
more radically pluralist insofar as they maintain pluralism, even in the end.   
 
3. Stephen Kaplan’s Metaphysical Model for Religious Pluralism 
Stephen Kaplan's pluralistic hypothesis is found in his work called, Different Paths, 
Different Summits: A Model for Religious Pluralism. The title of this book is a play on 
the well-known metaphor for religious diversity that says there are different paths but 
only one summit, which is a way of saying that religions may be different, but are 
ultimately the same because they have the same goal. In this way of looking at things, 
religious diversity is transcended when all arrive at the same goal or the same summit. 
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Kaplan, with his metaphor of different paths and different summits is making a different 
claim; that, even in the end, religious diversity obtains.  
According to Kaplan, the metaphor of ―different paths, one summit‖ is the 
normative metaphor for religious pluralists, but one that the critics of religious pluralism 
find ―deceptive.‖ The critics see pluralism as ―crypto exclusivism‖ (see D‘Costa above) 
or ―crypto inclusivism‖ (see Heim above) since they ―envision a single and final 
universal end‖ or one summit.39 Kaplan considers possible options in the face of this 
critique: 1) abandon pluralism in favour of more religiously authentic versions of 
exclusivism and inclusivism; 2) accept pluralism just because it is more politically correct 
or more suited to the times; 3) abandon the quest for a religious universal in favour of 
relativism; 4) abandon the idea of religion altogether because religious truths are relative. 
Kaplan suggests that there is at least one option better than all of these; namely, his 
ontological and soteriological pluralism. (2)   
I have argued that humanistic pluralists do not say that there is a single and final 
universal end for all religions; instead, they posit a religious universal that can be 
expressed in a diversity of ways. Thus, humanistic pluralists never collapse, or bring to 
an end, religious diversity in the same way that inclusivists do. Nonetheless, the pluralism 
affirmed by humanistic pluralists is, as noted by Griffin, relatively superficial; it is akin to 
the diversity between different brands of cars or toothpaste. But, more seriously, the 
universalism of humanistic religious pluralism demands conformity that can require a 
significant change in a religious tradition‘s understanding of what it is all about (Think of 
John Hick‘s demand that Zen Buddhists give up their notion of experiencing Sunyata 
directly, and accept that they are really involved in a culturally mediated experience of 
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the Real as impersonal.)  In humanistic pluralism, religions are accepted as true religions 
only in so far as they are expressive of the same religious universal. Consequently, 
Kaplan's quest for a pluralism that allows one to affirm the truth of multiple religions, 
with respect to their differences, is a valid goal in the sense that it is something that has 
not yet been achieved.  
Kaplan's proposal is that there can be, within one metaphysical universe, different 
ontological natures; in other words, there can be different states of being within one 
ultimate reality. Moreover, these different ontological natures provide an opportunity to 
achieve different soteriological ends, which means different forms of salvation or 
liberation can be worked out in relation to the different states of being within (the same) 
ultimate reality. Or, to employ Kaplan's metaphor, there are different paths and different 
summits. The particular model that Kaplan proposes as a means for understanding 
Ultimate Reality does not, however, allow one to see an endless number of 
salvations/religions as true. Kaplan uses his model, very specifically, to argue for the 
equal ultimacy of three different forms of salvation; specifically he argues for the 
equality of ―a theistic salvation, a monistic non-dualistic liberation, and a process non-
dualistic liberation.
40
 (2)  
Like many other forms of religious pluralism, Kaplan understands true religion as 
one that delivers salvation (which he sees as a multiform reality). For Kaplan, soteriology 
is concomitant with the ontological structures of ultimate reality; thus, his pluralism is 
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grounded in the claims that religions make about Ultimate Reality and the soteriological 
experiences they claim to have in relation to ultimate reality.
41
 (3) 
Kaplan sees the primary virtue of his pluralism as being that it allows a person to 
affirm the truth of their religion, without this being an implicit affirmation of the 
falsehood of other religions. This means that affirming the truth of religious others does 
not mean abandoning (or even toning down) one‘s own truth; the only thing that needs to 
be abandoned is the positive claim that others are wrong. This is a virtue with practical 
implications because, according to Kaplan, maintaining the truth of one's own religion is 
very important to religious persons. (3)   
Kaplan recognises the difficulties inherent to his project of constructing and using 
a model to show that the I-thou relationship of theism, the dissolution of the self into the 
Self of monistic non-dualism, and the realization of no-self in process non-dualism are 
equally true. For one, there is the logical problem of affirming mutually exclusive truths 
about the same ultimate reality
42
; for another, there is the problem of the model used to 
account for different religious concepts of Ultimate Reality being seen as just another 
concept of Ultimate Reality itself, and thus being in competition with the religious 
concepts.
 
 (3)  
Cobb‘s religious pluralism faces the second problem but not the first. With 
respect to the second problem Griffin identifies Cobb‘s Whiteheadian tripartite 
metaphysics as a naturalistic Christian theology that can be appropriated by other 
traditions; it is a theology made for the modern world since it is grounded in a universal 
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truth of modern science applicable to the new pluralistic situation. In this respect Griffin 
and Cobb are atypical of pluralists (John Hick in particular) who claim that their 
pluralism is a ―metatheory‖ that stands above particular religions. In turn, such pluralists 
have been criticized from opposite directions – from one side they are accused of being  
crypto-Christian, and from the other of being anaemically Christian. Griffin boldly faces 
this  criticism by claiming that his naturalistic theology is simply a better Christian 
theology that is  more suited to the present (scientific and pluralistic) age. Griffin, 
however, does not face the epistemological problem that Kaplan tries to overcome; he 
never attempts to validate pluralism on epistemological grounds.
43
 Or, at least, not 
beyond arguing that  the three aspects of Ultimate Reality are equal and, therefore, 
acosmic, theistic, and cosmic religions are equal.  But in the end, knowledge of Ultimate 
Reality becomes singular, and all religious persons attain the same singular knowledge in 
the same way; religion becomes one even though Ultimate Reality is tripartite.  Kaplan 
offers a solution to this epistemological/logical problem (indirectly) by seeing the 
plurality of religious truth as an expression of ontological and soteriological plurality. 
Kaplan summarizes the logical problems he tries to resolve as follows:  
How can some individuals achieve salvation in an I-Thou relation while others 
overcome all such relations – all such duality? How can there be two different 
ways of overcoming duality—a non-duality of Being and a non-duality of 
becoming? How can Ultimate Reality be both Being – undivided and unchanging 
–and becoming – constantly changing – at the ―same time‖ and in the ―same 
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place‖? And furthermore, how can Ultimate Reality be both non-dualistic 
(nonrelational) and dualistic (relational) at the ―same time‖ and in the ―same 
place‖? How can there be three different ultimate realities supporting or 
underlying three different soteriological possibilities? How can three different 
visions of salvation/liberation with their three concomitant and allegedly mutually 
exclusive views of Ultimate Reality be simultaneously possible and equally 
ultimate? (5-6) 
Kaplan‘s solution for overcoming this logical problem is a model based on 
holography and some of David Bohm‘s metaphysical insights. This model allows one to 
see religious pluralism in terms of different paths to different summits, and even 
transcends this metaphor because it does not require the summits to be visualized as 
spatially distinct domains.
 
 (6)  
Kaplan makes two significant qualifications or declarations with respect to his 
project. First, he says that the truths about Ultimate Reality that he is trying to validate as 
equal, are actual claims found in the history of religions; in other words, he is not simply 
making these up to fit into his model. Second, he says that he has no way of knowing 
whether or not these particular claims about Ultimate Reality are true. But this isn't 
Kaplan's concern. His concern is to find a way to validate the truth of different religious 
truth claims and soteriologies  – or, discovering a way whereby ―we can conceptualize 
how more than one of these truth claims can be simultaneously possible and equal, but 
yet not the same.‖ (6) Clearly his motive in this effort is to overcome the negative effects 
of exclusivism and inclusivism, and not to promote a pluralistic commitment to different 
religions.   
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As for the problem of using a model, Kaplan‘s initial response is to suggest that 
the problem is not with models as such, but with the particular pluralistic models that 
have been put forth so far. None of the models proffered by pluralists has overcome the 
conceptual problem of affirming different truths as equally valid – and this is the unique 
feature of Kaplan‘s model for religious pluralism. This, of course, doesn‘t explain how 
Kaplan‘s model is not a meta-theology that would have to be accepted by the three types 
of religion that he says are ultimate, and, therefore how it is not the ultimate religious 
perspective itself – or, at least not directly. But, by saying that this perspective demands 
the affirmation of multiple ultimate truths it says that there is no ultimate singular 
perspective. What this perspective demands is not a wider recognition of the same sort of 
singular truth in others, but a wider recognition of religious truth itself; it is not about 
recognizing one‘s truth in others but about also recognizing (or not denying) the truth of 
others.  This is a different goal than the goal set by humanistic pluralists and, hence, 
Kaplan‘s model is necessarily different. 
 
A Holographic Model of Religious Pluralism  
To see how Kaplan's holographic model can be used to understand Ultimate Reality and 
religious pluralism, it is necessary to understand both holography (the model) and the 
specific religious diversity that the model is meant to account for. On the other hand, one 
does not have to understand either, as well as Kaplan does, to appreciate his project – and 
to reflect on its value. In other words, it is relatively easy to imagine a project like 
Kaplan‘s (the construction of a conceptual model to explain Ultimate Reality and 
different but equally true soteriologies) and to think about the implications of the model, 
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if successful. Nonetheless, we will try to understand Kaplan‘s specific model as best we 
can before proceeding to further analysis.  
Holography is a way of producing three dimensional optical images on an 
imageless film. The fact that the film of holography is imageless makes it different from 
photography, where what is on the film (the negative) corresponds directly with both the 
object and the final picture. (This is not the case with holography.)  Holography produces 
three-dimensional images that consequently cannot be displayed on flat surfaces (pieces 
of paper, computer screens, walls, etc.) the way two-dimensional photographic images 
can be. But holographic images, unlike photographic images, allow the viewer to change 
viewing angles in order to see different aspects of the recorded object – the way one can 
in real life. The hologram is the medium on which the information needed to reproduce a 
3D image is recorded (a super high resolution film). The film records ―interference 
patterns‖ but, as indicated, these inference patterns do not in any way resemble the object 
or the final image.
 
 (7) 
Holographic interference patterns are produced with a laser beam (the light source 
in holography). In photography, the film records the varying intensities of light reflecting 
off the object; the hologram, likewise, records this, but also the ―phase relations‖ of the 
light reflecting off the object. The laser that is used to create the hologram is first aimed 
at a device that splits the laser beam into two beams: 1) the reference beam which is 
directed towards the film; and, 2) the object beam which is directed at the object and 
reflects from the object back toward the film. At the hologram, or the film, the two beams 
converge to create the aforementioned interference patterns. Kaplan describes these as 
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being ―like waves created in a pool of water into which two stones are thrown.‖ (7)  And, 
again, there is no image captured on the film; just waves.     
To reconstruct an image of the object, a laser beam (that is the same frequency of 
the one used to construct the hologram) is directed toward the film. In other words, 
another reference beam is aimed back at the now encoded film, and this decodes the film 
to create a three-dimensional optical image (or the conditions that allow one to see this). 
When this is done the image appears suspended in space and has the same qualities of our 
ordinary visual world; there is height, width, and depth, and when we change positions 
we see the object from a different angle. (7-8)  
Kaplan provides a delightful example that shows the life-like characteristics of 
holographic images and, how these images appear different when viewed from different 
angles. The image he describes is of two things; a magnifying glass that is placed six 
inches in front of a computer panel with silicon chips. From one angle this is what you 
see. But if you shift perspectives to look through the magnifying glass you will see a 
corresponding part of the computer panel magnified. And, if you shift again to look 
through the magnifying glass from a different angle, you will see a different part of the 
computer panel magnified. If you shift focus again, to look past the magnifying glass, 
rather than through it, nothing is magnified; you see the magnifying glass in front of the 
computer panel as before. Of course, if you reach out to touch the objects they are not 
there; only their image is there. Then if you step to the side, so that you are parallel with 
the image, the image disappears; and, if you step back further the image disappears and 
you see only the film with its interference patterns.  So, in this example, the hologram 
allows you to see two images that are not really there, and even to see one image 
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magnified by another, when neither is really there – and all of this is produced on a film 
without images. (8-9)  
Kaplan suggests that the hologram might be used as a useful model for 
understanding religious pluralism; and, specifically for affirming the truth of different 
ontological and soteriological perspectives. But to appreciate the model it is not 
necessary to understand all of the technical details of holography, as much as it is to 
understand some of the unique features of holography, and in this regard Kaplan 
emphasizes three. First, the hologram or the film that records interference patterns does 
not have the same characteristics as the objects recorded on it or the images that can 
potentially appear; most importantly, it does not show the subject-object dichotomy that 
characterizes our regular spatial and temporal world. The film enfolds the potential to 
represent this world of subjects and objects but does not in itself have these. Second, the 
film ―exhibits redundancy.‖ As Kaplan describes it, each piece of the hologram (the film) 
can reproduce the entire image, while the entire hologram produces only one image:  
Concretely illustrated, one can tear a hologram into four parts, for example, and 
each part will reproduce the entire holographic image. Recall, the film has no 
images; rather, only interference patterns are recorded on the film and they are 
spread throughout the film. (9)  
This means that the sum of the parts equals the whole, while the parts in 
themselves also equal the whole. Third, a single hologram can record multiple scenes, 
which is done by changing the angle at which the laser hits the film, or the frequency of 
the laser used to encode the film. In this situation, two domains can be identified and 
differentiated; one that can be called the explicate domain and the other the implicate 
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domain.  The explicate domain refers to both the filmed objects and the reproduced 
images; the implicate domain refers to the film, with its unique characteristics. (9-10) 
The ideas of the explicate and implicate domains are key to understanding 
Kaplan‘s model because these are the domains that Kaplan suggests have correspondents 
within ultimate reality; thus, Kaplan‘s metaphysics and ontology mirror his 
understanding of the explicate and implicate domains that obtain in the holographic 
situation. This means that whenever he is talking about characteristics of the implicate 
and explicate domains within respect to holography, he is also talking about 
characteristics of ultimate reality. Bearing this in mind, Kaplan explains the explicate 
domain, as it relates to holography, as the domain with which we are already intimately 
familiar; it is the world in which objects stand in relation to other objects: ―Distinctness, 
difference, duality and relationship of the chief characteristics of the explicate domain.‖ 
(10) In contrast, the implicate domain (the film), is one in which each part is enfolded 
into all the other parts; there are no subjects and objects with relations between them: 
―the non-duality of subject and object, and of part and whole, is the appropriate language 
of the implicate domain.‖ (10) 
If we recall the three truths that Kaplan seeks to affirm as equally true – the I-thou 
relationship of theism, the dissolution of the self into the Self of monistic non-dualism, 
and the realization of no-self in process non Dualism as equally three – we can see how 
he is going to use holography as a model for religious pluralism: The I-thou relationship 
of theism is connected to the explicate domain, and the two non-dualistic salvations are 
connected to the implicate domain. (10)  
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But before spelling this out in more detail Kaplan explains three presuppositions 
about his holographic model. All of these presuppositions make Kaplan‘s model more 
useful for affirming multiple religious truths. First, it is presupposed that the implicate 
and explicate orders logically demand one another, i.e., you can‘t have one without the 
other:  
In this model there would be no implicate domain without something explicate to 
implicate, and there would be no explicate domain without the implicate domain 
from which it unfolded. Therefore, this model presupposes that neither domain is 
ontologically prior or more important, in any way, than the other. (11)    
The first presupposition establishes equality between the domains, and the next 
two support this idea by showing how the domains are equal – temporally and spatially.  
The second presupposition is that the two domains exist simultaneously; in other words, 
neither domain temporally precedes the other, and, consequently neither can exist 
independent of the other. The third presupposition is that the two domains are ―mutually 
interpenetrating‖ meaning there is no separation between the two domains. Here the 
implicate domain is taken to be ―coextensive with the totality of existence – whether that 
of Being, Emptiness or both Being and Emptiness.‖ (11) Because the implicate domain is 
the totality of existence there is no place separate for the explicate domain to unfold, 
except within the implicate domain, and this implies that there is no absolute spatial 
distinction between the two domains. (11)   
Each of these presuppositions is put forth for the same reason; to establish the 
equality of the explicate and implicate domains. This is necessary because it is on the 
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ground of metaphysical equality that Kaplan tries to establish the ontological and 
soteriological equally of religious experience, or the truth of religious pluralism.         
We will now examine how Kaplan understands the monistic non-dualistic 
position, the process non-dualistic position, and the theistic positions by utilizing this 
understanding of the implicate and explicate domains, and the relationship between two.  
For Kaplan, Advaita Vedanta typifies monistic non-dualism. Monistic non-
dualism says that there is only one reality or one Being that is everywhere and 
everything. This one Being (Brahman) is identical to atman or the true nature of every 
individual. From this perspective, the distinctions that are typically made between subject 
and object, self and other are an illusion. Salvation or liberation comes in the form of 
recognizing this illusion, and realizing the great truth that one‘s own self (atman) is 
identical to God (Brahman). Thus, the great truth is that there is only one reality or that 
reality is not dualistic: The self and God are not two, but one.  Kaplan suggests that the 
implicate domain of holography can be used as a model to understand this non-dualistic 
realization of God, most simply because there are no subjects and objects in the implicate 
domain, in the same way that there are no subjects and objects in the non-dualistic 
realization that atman is Brahman. But to appreciate the full power of the model one 
needs to imaginatively identify with the being of this domain. As such, one does not 
stand outside of the implicate domain to notice that it (as something separate) has a non-
dualistic quality; instead, one realizes (because everything is coextensive with the 
implicate domain) that the one observing the non-duality of the implicit domain is also a 
part of this non-duality. Kaplan also suggests that the redundant quality of holography 
can be used to understand, analogously, the concept of the individual self or atman being 
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identical to Brahman. In holography, each part of the film can be used to represent the 
whole; similarly, then, each individual person can ―represent‖ Brahman. (12)    
To understand the other type of non-dualism – process non-dualism – Kaplan, 
again, focuses on the implicate domain of holography. This time, though, his aim is not to 
show that everything is the same non-dual reality, but to show a ―dynamic web of 
interrelationships that exhibit neither subject nor object.‖ (13) The hologram shows this 
in the series of interference patterns that emerge as a consequence of converging light 
sources. Kaplan, speaking analogously, says that the process non-dualist looks at this 
pattern differently than does the monistic non-dualist. The monistic non-dualist reifies 
―the interference patterns into a static film like nature.‖ (For the religious non-dualists 
this means reifying the interference patterns as God or the Self.) In contrast, the process 
non-dualist views the interference patterns as a dynamic process; ―as an ongoing process 
in which the explicate entities are unfolding and enfolding.‖ (13) The important thing 
about this idea of explicate realities unfolding and enfolding in the ongoing dynamic 
process of the implicate domain, is that this dynamic process is taken as coextensive with 
all and, therefore, ultimate; in other words, to experience this process is to experience the 
ultimate. (13)  
Kaplan continues by explaining that from this second non-dualistic perspective 
the implicate domain is seen as the all-pervasive condition from which all things appear, 
but it does not in itself show how things appear. Thus, the implicate domain lacks 
specific things, or subjects and objects, but is not simply nothing (in the sense of mere 
absence); it is the interference patterns. On the other hand, the implicate domain cannot 
be called ―something‖; it is, rather empty of all things. As Kaplan puts this, ―it is without 
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particularly, without subject and object. It is empty of anything that looks like a self-
nature. (In this sense, we can say it is emptiness.)‖(13-14)        
With the implicate domain of holography understood as a dynamic process that is 
ultimately ―empty,‖ Kaplan  moves on to show how this can serve as a model for 
understanding the process non-dualism of a tradition such as Yogacara Buddhism. The 
Yogacarin believe that reality is constantly changing and consequently no thing has a 
fixed nature, i.e., there is no self or no atman. Similarly, all things are without a fixed 
nature, i.e., there is no unchanging Being, or no Brahman. Reality is best understood as 
―dynamic web of interrelationships that lack the duality of subject and object – that lack 
particularity.‖ (14)  Reality is ultimately empty and, thus, Yogacara Buddhists, use the 
term Emptiness or Sunyata to refer to ultimate reality.  Continuing to apply the model, 
Kaplan explains that Sunyata is no more mere nothingness, than the interference patterns 
of the implicate domain are mere nothingness. Sunyata is, like the interference patterns, 
the dynamic pattern from which all things arise. Or, more accurately, the interference 
patterns are like the relative nature of all things (paratantra nature) – which are said to be  
Sunyata. Paratantra nature holds the causes and conditions of all things (like the 
interference patterns). Kaplan describes paratantra nature as what appears, rather than 




This maneuver or insight, to see what appear to be subjects and objects as 
emptiness, allows the Yogacara Buddhist to see the self as emptiness – and, this 
recognition of the self as emptiness is liberation/salvation, also called Nirvana. (14)  In 
                                                          
44
 Consider, again, Wittgenstein’s description of the mystical as that the world is rather than what the 
world is. Here Kaplan describes emptiness as a what as opposed to a how, but I think he means “what” in 
the sense of “what can be.”   
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the end, the Buddhist and the Advaitin come to the same point – a realization of non-
duality. Or, in terms of the model, to a realization of the implicate domain. The difference 
between the two, is that they come to this point by recognizing different features of the 
implicate domain. The Buddhist recognizes its dynamic nature, and the Advaitin 
recognizes its all-encompassing or inclusive nature.  Nonetheless, the important thing is 
that both are equally true because both are saying something true – but different – about 
the implicate domain, or (the same aspect of) ultimate reality. 
  Finally, Kaplan uses his holographic model to account for theistic positions; 
specifically, ―classical‖ theism and (Whiteheadian) panentheism. In this case, the model 
is used to establish truths about the relationship between the implicate and explicate 
domains, in order to establish truths about the relationship between God and humanity, as 
conceived in theistic religious traditions.  
Kaplan highlights two aspects of the relationship between the implicate and the 
explicate domains in holography, that make it a useful model for understanding theism. 
First, is the fact that the implicate and explicate domains simultaneously exist, which 
means that both domains are ultimate. The important thing to take from this, is that at 
least one explicate domain can be taken as ultimate, and this is important because theism, 
in this model, pertains to the explicate domain only; specifically, to the relationship 
between different explicate domains. Second, in holography, the implicate domain has 
the capacity to enfold and unfold multiple explicate domains, shown by the fact that one 
holographic film can record multiple explicate scenes. (15) What Kaplan is suggesting 
here is that both God and humanity can be represented by the explicate domain; as such 
both come from the implicate domain, and both stand in a subject-object dichotomy. 
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Moreover, because the explicate and implicate domains exist simultaneously they are 
equally ultimate, and, so, the relationship between the different explicate domains can be 
taken as ultimate.    
Kaplan identifies the following essential features of theism: 1) the self or 
individual person is real; 2) the person is fulfilled in relationship to God (who both 
creates and sustains the person); 3) the one who guarantees personhood or individuality 
(God), is a person or individual; 4) God must be an individual because, otherwise, God 
could not stand in relationship with human beings and, therefore, God must be explicate: 
―Particularity, individuality, and relationship are the essential characteristics of the 
theistic view. They are also essential characteristics of the explicate domain.‖ (15)   
Kaplan says that the great questions for theists is how can the world relate to a 
transcendent God, and how can human beings best actualize this relationship – and, he 
discusses two theistic answers. First, there is classical Western theism which makes a 
radical separation between God and the world, and yet paradoxically affirms that God 
interacts with the world. Second, there is panentheism, which says that God dwells in all 
things, but paradoxically God is also transcendent. For Kaplan, classical theism focuses 
more on God's transcendence, and panentheism focuses more on God's immanence, but 
both face the same problem; namely, where is God who transcends the world? (15-16) 
Kaplan thinks that holography can help solve this problem. 
The main feature of holography that helps shed light on the relationship between 
God and human beings is the fact that more than one explicate domain can be enfolded 
within the same implicate domain. What follows from this is that God's explicate domain 
can be understood as radically different from the world‘s explicate domain, even though 
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both are enfolded in the same implicate domain. Thus, both are separated by the fact that 
they are of different explicate domains, but both can stand in relation to one another 
because they are enfolded in the same implicate domain.  This allows us to analogously 
understand how God can be simultaneously apart from the world of humanity and also a 
part of it.  
Kaplan solves this theological quandary, by positing a metaphysical reality 
beyond both world and God in which both dwell; namely, the implicate domain in which 
both the explicate realities of God and world are unfolded. Kaplan says that classical 
theists have tended to focus on the explicate domain(s) only have and paid little attention 
to the implicate domain; they have focused on God as the Great Being who stands in 
relation to other beings, and not very much on God as the all pervading reality. In 
contrast, Kaplan seems to suggest that panentheists have a broader vision since they see 
that both God and world come from the implicate domain, and that these two explicate 
realities are distinct. In any case, Kaplan is willing to conflate these two views because 
the main thing he wants to stress is that theistic views are radically different from non-
dualistic views. They find salvation in a personal relation with God – in an I-thou relation 
in which all parties are explicate.‖ (17)     
Thus, Kaplan‘s model presents three views of ultimate reality, and their three 
resulting soteriologies, as equally true. More specifically, the model argues for the 
equality of the I-thou relationship of theism, the dissolution of the self into the Self of 
monistic non-dualism, and the realization of no-self of process non-dualism. Kaplan does 
not say, however, that his holographic model is limited to three true views of ultimate 
reality, or that the holographic model can account for all true views of ultimate reality. 
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He simply says that it works for these three types of religion; if it can work for more this 
would have to be shown, and if it can‘t account for some other type(s) of ultimate 
religion then a different model would have to be developed. (19)   
We have just reviewed Kaplan‘s introductory summary to his pluralistic model. 
The main text spells out the model more explicitly (Chapter 4) and shows how the model 
works by applying it to specific cases of religious diversity (Chapter 5). To determine 
whether or not Kaplan‘s model really works as a way of conceiving three religious 
soteriologies as equal, it would be necessary to carefully review this material. We will not 
do this here. I am willing to grant that Kaplan has constructed a model that works, i.e., 
that he has constructed a model that lets us conceive of different (and real) soteriological 
options as equal with respect to their differences: I am more interested in discussing the 
implications of Kaplan‘s model if it does, in fact, work. Most especially, I want to ask 
questions about what sort of pluralism Kaplan has constructed; what is accomplishes and 
how; what sorts of demands it makes on those who adopt it, etc. Thus, we will now turn 
to questions such as these, and will begin this process by looking at some of Kaplan‘s 
own responses to some anticipated questions.   
  
Questions and Issues Related to Kaplan’s Model  
Although Kaplan affirms three views of Ultimate Reality as true, he does not accept what 
those who hold these views have to say about each other; in other words, he accepts what 
religions say is true but rejects what they say is false. This may seem like arbitrary cherry 
picking but Kaplan argues that it is not, and he says that this position is the 
―epistemological foundation‖ of his religious pluralism. He argues that religious 
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traditions have not been pluralist in the past and, therefore, have necessarily 
conceptualized other soteriological options as non-ultimate. In other words, the rejection 
of others is tied to a non-pluralistic framework; if this framework is dropped in favour of 
a pluralistic framework then the rejection of others can also be dropped. Fortunately, the 
truth claims made by the traditions are not tied to a non-pluralistic framework; these 
claims can be carried over into a pluralistic framework. (17-18)    
The problem that Kaplan is really dealing with is a logical one; it is whether or 
not the logic of a holographic model can replace Aristotle‘s law of non-contradiction. 
Following Aristotelian logic, any religion that takes itself to be ultimate, will conclude 
that any religion that is different from it will be non-ultimate.  In practice, this will mean 
every religion, because no religion will be at the same time and in the same respect the 
same as the ultimate religion.  Kaplan is asking religious traditions to abandon a 
particular form of logic and the conclusion that is drawn from it (i.e., that all other 
religions are non-ultimate) in favour of a different logic with a different conclusion (i.e., 
that there are different ultimately true religions).  And the question is whether or not 
religious traditions would be willing to do this; would they be willing to abandon their 
conclusions that other religions are soteriologically inferior by abandoning the 
(Aristotelian) logic that leads them to this conclusion? Or, positively expressed, would 
they be willing to embrace Kaplan‘s logic and the pluralistic conclusion that this would 
lead them to?  
Kaplan says that real commitment to a real religious path is necessary in order to 
realise an ultimate religious end; he also says that it requires choice. But Kaplan is not 
just saying that one must choose some specific religious path in order to have an 
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authentic religious experience – Schleiermacher and Rahner say as much – he is saying 
that one must choose because there is always a choice to be made. One must choose 
between the ontological options available:   
In this model, individuals can strive for that which they want and they can achieve 
that which they seek. There is more than one ontological option. One‘s ultimate 
―state of existence‖ is not metaphysically dictated; it is not ontologically limited. 
One‘s ultimate ―state of existence‖ is a matter of choice. This form of religious 
pluralism is metaphysical democracy. (19)  
Traditionally the only religious choice to be made is between truth and error. 
Kaplan‘s pluralism, rooted in a holographic-like metaphysical structure, demands a 
further choice; between truth and truth. The forms of humanistic pluralism that we have 
examined emphasize diversity, but not choice; perhaps, this is because the diversity they 
emphasize isn‘t much different? As in any democracy, the choices available in Kaplan‘s 
pluralistic democracy are of equal value, meaning that whichever ultimate state of being 
one chooses it is equally an ultimate state of being. 
Like Griffin and Cobb, and unlike Hick, Kaplan is suggesting that religious 
diversity obtains because Ultimate Reality is diverse; in other words, there is actually 
diversity to be experienced in an experience of ultimate reality. (159) 
 The advantage of Kaplan‘s approach – as discussed above in connection with Cobb‘s 
pluralism – is that it is not necessary to tell religious practitioners that they are not really 
experiencing what they think they are experiencing. For example, one does not, like John 
Hick, have to tell Advaitins or Zen Buddhists that they are not really having an 
unmediated experience of the Real because the metaphysical foundation of a pluralistic 
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theory demands it. As Kaplan puts it, ―Here each tradition can have its own cake, not 
some generic cake that no one wants, knows or experiences. In this model, having one‘s 
own cake does not entitle one to belligerence. It does not entitle one to shove that cake in 
someone else‘s face. Each can have its cake and eat it, too.‖ (161) 
It is one thing to say that different religions have different perceptions of different 
ultimate realities, and that these experiences lead to (or are) different soteriologies that 
are equally and ultimately true, but what about other religious differences such as moral 
differences and different moral systems? How, for example, can it be said that the idea of 
a personal God who serves as moral judge can be equally true to the idea of karma? Or 
how can it be said that the idea of reincarnation, and the idea of only a single birth, are 
equally true? Kaplan‘s short answer is that these issues are not relevant to his particular 
project. His longer answer is that he is not dealing with ideas that are bound to particular 
religions or geographical regions. In this, he is saying that his project deals with trans-
religious realities – since there is theistic salvation in Eastern religions, and there is non-
dualistic salvation in Western religions – and that one would still need to reconcile these 
even if one could come to some concordant conclusion about karma versus God‘s 
watchful eye, or whether we have one birth or multiple births. In other words, as 
important as these issues may be, the ontological issues still persist independent of these, 
and these are Kaplan‘s main concerns. (162-163)        
Kaplan also discusses a number of theological issues. The first theological issue 
that he addresses is related to the question of whether or not religions can affirm their 
own soteriological truth without affirming other soteriological options as false. It is a 
question related primarily to theists who claim that God is responsible for the salvation of 
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all individuals. It is the question of whether or not God can really be affirmed as the Lord 
of all if God is only responsible for those who want theistic salvation. Such an idea 
suggests that God is limited to a particular people and not, therefore, the universal God of 
all; Jews, Christians, and Muslims have all rejected this henotheistic concept of God. 
Certainly these traditions have, at times, limited salvation to those who actually do 
belong to them, but in this they are expressing the conditions that God place‘s on human 
salvation, not the limitations of God‘s ability to save. Kaplan‘s pluralism places a 
limitation on God‘s salvation – not by saying that not everyone could choose it – but by 
saying that there are other soteriological choices. The question then becomes – does God 
demand that all people seek theistic salvation only? And, moreover, would this infringe 
on God‘s universal power and sovereignty? In answer to these questions Kaplan employs 
an argument typical of humanistic pluralism by implying that a ―loving God‖ would not 
make such a demand; that a loving God would ―want individuals to overcome the 
limitations of existence in any possible way.‖ (164) This argument, of course, 
presupposes that ―overcoming the limitations of existence‖ is an acceptable way to 
express the ultimate religious end, and that theistic salvation(s) and non-dualistic 
liberations are equally valid tokens of this type.          
The possibility of non-dualistic liberation, as opposed to theistic salvation, raises 
another issue stemming from the fact that the individual immortal soul of salvation does 
not remain individual and ―immortal‖ in liberation. The Buddhist realization of no-self or 
Emptiness requires a transcendence of the I-thou dichotomy that is the foundation of 
theistic salvation. Thus, Kaplan asks, ―is it conceivable to imagine that immortal souls 
would not remain immortal?‖ (165) Kaplan answers this question in the same way by 
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suggesting that a gracious God would allow human beings to overcome the limitations of 
human existence in any way possible.  
But despite this possible answer, Kaplan's final response is that he does not know 
the answers to such questions, and that this doesn't really matter because it does not affect 
his task of developing a model that allows one to see different soteriologies as equally 
and ultimately true. 
Another problem connected with theism is the problem of determining who or 
what is God – since there seem to be so many different Gods.  Kaplan follows Hick, to a 
point, in dealing with this problem. Hick sees the various Gods as different perceptions 
and conceptions of the Real that have arisen in religions that have traditionally conceived 
of the Real as personal. Kaplan is fine with this idea, and can accommodate it within his 
holographic model. But he rejects the idea that the various personas of the Real have a 
status secondary to the Real itself. For Kaplan, of course, the Real is identified with the 
implicate order and the implicate order does not have an ontologically higher status than 
the explicate order.  
The last theological problem that Kaplan addresses is in regard to the notion of 
incarnation, which is found predominantly in Christianity and Hinduism. Kaplan argues 
that his model can handle the idea of incarnation, but only if it is not tied to exclusivist 
and inclusivist theologies of other religions. He cites Raimundo Panikkar‘s incarnational 
theology as one that would be compatible with his pluralistic model, and indeed, Kaplan 
finds Panikkar‘s way of reconciling the ultimacy of Christian truth with other religious 
truths strikingly similar to his own holographic proposal. To illustrate this he uses 
Panikkar‘s idea of seeing the whole from one perspective: When one does this one is 
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truly seeing the whole but this does not mean that there are other perspectives from which 
the whole can be perceived (that are just as true).  Nonetheless, Kaplan‘s main point is 
that his model stands with or without theistic notions of the incarnation.  
The final question that Kaplan addresses is, perhaps, the most important one; it is 
the question of the relationship between those choosing different soteriological options. 
He addresses this question by addressing the more specific question of whether or not it 
is possible for the same individual to realize more than one ultimate end, and by 
discussing the conditions under which this could be achieved. Starting with saved theists, 
he asks what would happen if they tried to realize a non-dualistic ultimate (as ultimate). 
Would they be forced to renounce their feeling of dependence on God or even their very 
idea of God? And, if they did shift their attention away from God to the non-duality of 
Being or the emptiness of all reality would they still be theists? Similarly, would non-
dualists, who shift away from realizing the one Self or the not-self (Emptiness), in order 
to realize the ultimate experience of the I-thou relationship, still be non-dualists?  
On this point, Kaplan departs from Cobb and Griffin and affirms religious 
diversity as a permanent condition, not one that is eventually overcome in 
epistemological unity, by saying that such shifts would entail a change in soteriological 
perspective. Thus, Kaplan‘s position is that it is possible to experience one ultimate, and 
then another, but one cannot experience both at the same time because they are 
independent realizations of different ultimate realities:  
It seems that each Ultimate Reality can be realized independently of the other 
ultimate realities and each remains soteriologically distinct. This would imply that 
the final state of different individuals could be different. Having followed 
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different paths and having achieved different ultimate goals, different individuals 
can end up in different places—there are different paths to different summits. 
(169) 
In this pronouncement, Kaplan affirms an even deeper pluralism than Cobb and Griffin. 
Diversity is a condition that cannot be overcome; a choice must be made.  
 
A Comparison of John Cobb’s Pluralism and Stephen Kaplan’s Pluralism 
The general problem that Cobb and Kaplan address is how to affirm the truth of multiple 
religions with respect to their differences. Both authors are convinced that traditional 
forms of religious pluralism have failed to do this; these forms of pluralism allow for 
only a superficial recognition of religious plurality by seeing all religions as particular 
expressions of a religious universal. Moreover, the common aim of Cobb and Kaplan is 
to affirm a pluralistic situation without resorting to relativism; in other words, they are 
struggling to affirm what seems to be a logical possibility – multiple ultimate religious 
truths or multiple ultimate religious states of being.   
The other commonality of the two theorists is that they both use a pluralistic 
metaphysics to legitimate a religiously diverse situation, i.e., to affirm that this situation 
is pluralistic in the sense of having multiple, equally valid but different religions.  
Despite these commonalities, these two forms of metaphysical pluralism also 
have significant differences. First, the two authors start with different theories of religion 
or different understandings of true religion that lead to different levels of commitment to 
religious pluralism; second, they aim to solve different problems; third, they focus on 
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different pluralistic contexts; fourth they use different methodologies to construct 
different metaphysical structures.  
 
Different Theories of Religion and Different Commitments to Pluralism. The different 
understandings that Cobb and Kaplan have of true religion go a long way in explaining 
the pluralistic problem they try to address, the particular solution they come up with, and 
their end commitment to religious pluralism, thus, we will start our comparison here.  
Cobb says that different religions focus on different aspects of ultimate reality; 
Kaplan says that his model allows one to imagine the realisation of different ultimate 
states within ultimate reality. Although these may seem like small differences, they 
reflect a profound difference in the two pluralisms. Cobb‘s pluralism is epistemological 
and Kaplan's is ontological; in other words, true religion for Cobb is knowledge of 
Ultimate Reality and true religion for Kaplan is a state of existence. For Kaplan one's 
ultimate state of existence is salvation, and so his approach could more fully be called 
ontological and soteriological.   
This leads to what is perhaps the most significant difference between the two 
theories: Kaplan maintains a radical pluralism, while Cobb‘s seems to renounce pluralism 
in the end. What I mean by this is that Kaplan maintains that religious diversity 
(ontological diversity) is a permanent condition, while Cobb maintains that religious 
diversity (epistemological diversity) is eventually overcome in a singular state of 
knowledge. For Cobb religious diversity is, in the end, overcome by unified human 
knowledge of ultimate reality; for Kaplan human experience must always conform to the 
landscape of pluralistic ultimate reality. For Cobb religion is about appropriating other 
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truths in order to expand one's own truth; for Kaplan, religion is about existential 
ontological choice.  
Is not entirely clear if Cobb believes in final religious fulfillment or not. What is 
clear is that he holds either one or the other of the following two positions: 1) religious 
fulfillment is possible through the attainment of complete knowledge of God; or, 2) 
complete knowledge of God is impossible, but human beings should continually strive 
for ever more accurate knowledge of God, or ever higher religious fulfillment. Speaking 
of the fulfillment of Christianity Cobb says that: ―The fullness of Christianity lies in the 
ever receding future. One can be a wholehearted participant in the present movement as 
long as one believes that the particular limitations to which one is now sensitive can be 
overcome.‖45 Whether fulfillment ever comes to an end is not clear, but Cobb certainly 
imagines Christianity coming to (relatively more) complete knowledge of God, and so 
overcoming its present state of incomplete knowledge.  
Cobb assumes that knowledge is singular and is averse to the very idea that one 
could be shut out from particular human knowledge about God, as this would create a 
relativistic situation.
46
 In other words, knowledge is continuously moving to a single 
point that transcends plurality. 
This raises questions about the depth of Cobb's pluralism. Does he believe that 
pluralism is in the end, overcome by complete knowledge of God? Or, does he maintain 
that pluralism is a permanent condition because it is impossible to have complete 
knowledge of God – even though one should try to overcome pluralism as much as 
possible through a unified knowledge of God? In either case, Cobb tends toward an 
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affirmation of religious unity rather than religious plurality; in the former, unitary 
knowledge of Ultimate Reality is an attainable goal, and in the latter unity is an ideal 
goal. On the other hand, the practical religious situation in both scenarios is pluralistic – 
either because pluralism cannot be overcome or because it will not be overcome for a 
very long time. 
Perhaps Cobb could be called a ―practical metaphysical pluralist,‖ but still an 
―ideal inclusivist.‖ Understood as inclusivism, Cobb's position is very similar to Mark 
Heim's. In both theories different religious traditions provide radically different 
knowledge of God that is an essential component of complete knowledge of God. But 
these two forms of ―Christian inclusivism‖ are very different in at least one respect; 
namely, that in Heim‘s theory ultimate knowledge of God is Christian, and in Cobb‘s 
theory it is not necessarily Christian. Indeed, for Cobb, ultimate religious fulfillment may 
require the renunciation of Christ:    
In faithfulness to Christ must I be open to others… I must be prepared to give up 
even faithfulness to Christ. If that is where I am led, to remain a Christian would 
be to become an adolater in the name of Christ. That would be blasphemy.
47
  
For Heim, the truths of other traditions are united in the Christian truth of 
communion with God; for Cobb, the truth of all religions, including Christianity, are put 
together to compose a complete picture of God. (Picture-puzzle pluralism.)  If ―complete‖ 
knowledge of God remains Christian in any sense for Cobb, it is a radically transformed 
Christianity. Nonetheless, Cobb seems more inclined to a vision in which the various 
religious traditions – the cosmic and the theistic and the acosmic – come together to 
create something new that is not identified with any particular religion, and this 
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effectively overcomes the problem of seeing one particular religion as superior to all 
others.  Thus, even if Cobb is in an ideal inclusivist, rather than a practical pluralist, his 
inclusivism is unique in that true religion is not tied to any particular religion.    
As for why Cobb‘s theory of religious pluralism tends towards inclusivism I 
suggest that this is connected to his epistemological approach to the idea of true religion, 
and specifically to two common ideas about knowledge: 1)  that the principle of non-
contradiction is valid, and, 2) that knowledge is universal.  
Cobb has no way of overcoming the principle of non-contradiction at the level of 
true religion or religious knowledge. Or rather, he is not satisfied with his own solution 
that different religions are equally true because they focus on different aspects of ultimate 
reality. Cobb does use this solution in order to say that different religions have equally 
valid religious truths, but then he assumes that these different truths can be brought to a 
single point of knowledge. For Cobb, this means that they can be understood in the 
singular as complementary. Cobb's idea of complementarity does not overcome the 
principle of non-contradiction; it brings contradictions into a unified field where they can 
be held simultaneously as different parts of one truth. The unified field of religious truth 
is capable of holding all truth; indeed, truth outside must be brought within it, and what 
cannot be brought within it must be false. In other words, religious truth or true religion is 
universal. This is why Cobb cannot accept the possibility of other truth, and this is why 
he is not as radically pluralist as Kaplan. For Cobb, to maintain pluralism, by refusing to 




For Kaplan, true religion is salvation and salvation is an ultimate state of 
existence. His approach is soteriological and ontological rather than epistemological. The 
significance of this, for Kaplan, is that pluralism is the ―natural state,‖ and this is a state 
that cannot be overcome. This is drawn from the fact that one cannot experience different 
states of existence at the same time, in the way that one can synthesize pieces of 
knowledge into a greater knowledge. For Kaplan, one can be in an ultimate religious 
state, but one cannot at the same time be in another ultimate religious state. To attain this 
other ultimate religious state, one would have to leave one's current state. In other words, 
the particularity of existence, guarantees the particularity or plurality of religion. Kaplan's 
work, then, is not to argue that there is religious plurality, but to argue that there is 
religious pluralism, in the sense of the equally ultimate religions (that are, of course, 
different).  
Thus, these two different theories of religion lead to different perceptions about 
the problem of religious diversity, and different ideas about how this can be solved.  
 Different Objectives. The main objective of Cobb‘s pluralism is the achievement of 
greater religious truth, i.e., greater knowledge of God. This is a two-step process for 
Cobb. First, he finds a way to acknowledge that religions other than Christianity have 
truth about ultimate reality. Then, having established, that there is truth outside of 
Christianity, Cobb works to integrate these different truths into a more comprehensive 
truth about God. In the first movement, Cobb authenticates deep religious pluralism; in 
the second movement, he seeks to overcome religious pluralism in a unified perspective. 
But both movements are enacted for the same purpose of coming to greater religious 
truth. This is consistent with Cobb's vocation as a philosophical theologian. 
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The main objective of Kaplan's pluralism seems to be a more amicable religious 
plurality. Again, for Kaplan religious plurality is a given condition, and there is no way to 
overcome this. What can be overcome, however, is the conclusion that being in one 
ultimate state, means that others in different religious states are in a false or less ultimate 
state. Kaplan says that traditionally these have gone together, but that there is no reason 
that they must go together. And he has found a way to think about or to conceive of one's 
own religious state as ultimate, while thinking about other religious states as equally 
ultimate. This is not the same as relativism. In relativism everyone is required to see their 
truth as less; in Kaplan‘s vision everyone is required to see more truth.  Why is this 
desirable? Presumably, it is desirable because a world in which religious persons 
maintain their own truth but acknowledge the truth of others (pluralism) is better than a 
world in which the affirmation of one‘s own truth requires a positive rejection of 
another‘s truth (exclusivism and inclusivism), or a world in which all must renounce their 
own truth to some extent (relativism). This objective is consistent with Kaplan‘s vocation 
as a philosopher of religion.     
Different Pluralistic Contexts. Cobb and Kaplan are trying to reconcile different 
pluralistic contexts (because each sees the totality of human religiosity differently). It 
could be said that both theorists are trying to validate the pluralistic situation that they are 
able see. Cobb aims to reconcile three types of religion; the acosmic, the theistic, and the 
cosmic. His primary focus though has been the reconciliation of the truths of (theistic) 
Christianity and (acosmic) Buddhism.  Kaplan aims to reconcile three types of religion; 
one Self non-dualism, no-self non-dualism, and theism; and, he focuses on Advaita 
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Vedanta, Yogacara Buddhism, and Christian mysticism as representatives of these 
positions.   
 
Different Metaphysical Structures Built Using Different Methods.As said above, the 
common solution that Cobb and Kaplan employ for the problem of religious pluralism is 
a pluralistic metaphysics; but because both are trying to authenticate different pluralistic 
situations both construct a different pluralistic metaphysics. Cobb‘s metaphysical 
construct is built to understand acosmic, theistic, and cosmic religions as equally true; 
Kaplan's metaphysics is built to understand monistic non-dualism, process non-dualism, 
and theism as equally true.  
Cobb and Kaplan also construct different sorts of metaphysical structures, or they 
approach their task with different methodological tools. Cobb's metaphysics is a 
naturalistic or philosophical theology, and Kaplan's metaphysics is a philosophical model 
or a philosophy of religion.  
Cobb‘s metaphysics or philosophical theology is meant to express the truth about 
ultimate reality; it is a meta-religious perspective that is fuller and richer than the 
particular theologies that are used to construct it. Cobb‘s metaphysics is pluralistic; it has 
different but equally ultimate realities; however, Cobb provides no way for thinking 
about different but equally valid truths – including religious truths – in and of themselves. 
Cobb's substantial argument for different but equally ultimate truth takes place at the 
level of his pluralistic metaphysics. His claim that there are different but equally ultimate 
religions is made by referring religion to ultimate reality; religions are different and 
equally ultimate because they focus on different aspects of Ultimate Reality that are 
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equally ultimate. In other words, he shows how different aspects of Ultimate Reality are 
different but equally ultimate, and then uses transitive logic to argue that religions are 
likewise equal and ultimate. Cobb‘s pluralism involves commitment to this particular 
pluralistic theology.   
Kaplan's metaphysics functions differently. He claims to know nothing about the 
truth of Ultimate Reality or ultimate states of being realised within, or in relation to, 
ultimate reality. The only thing he claims, is that he has a pluralistic metaphysical model 
that allows one to see different religious claims about ultimate states of being as equally 
true. By looking at Kaplan's pluralistic metaphysical model we can see a pluralistic 
situation – i.e., a situation in which there are equally true ultimate states of being – even 
if we have no knowledge of the situation that the model is meant to represent, and even if 
the situation doesn't actually exist.  
Kaplan is like someone who has constructed a model of Toronto's skyline to show 
that the CN tower is the tallest building in Toronto. Anyone who looks at this model can 
see that the CN tower is the tallest building in Toronto, even if they have never seen 
Toronto's actual skyline, and even if Toronto's skyline is imaginary. Cobb, in contrast, is 
like someone who has built a model of the CN tower only; he may say that his model is 
of the tallest building in Toronto, but one could not see this without referring the model 
back to Toronto's actual skyline. In other words, without reference back to Cobb‘s 
pluralistic theology (i.e., actual knowledge of ultimate reality) one cannot see religious 
pluralism; but with Kaplan‘s model one can see (something like) religious pluralism even 
if his metaphysics does not have an actual referent, or is not grounded in actual ultimate 
reality.   
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Cobb takes his pluralistic metaphysics from Alfred North Whitehead. In 
Whitehead's pluralistic metaphysics Ultimate Reality consists of creativity, God, and 
cosmos, and Cobb uses these different states of Ultimate Reality to confer equality and 
ultimacy on acosmic, theistic, and cosmic religions respectively. Cosmic religions focus 
on creativity, theistic religions focus on God, and cosmic religions focus on the cosmos. 
In this metaphysical structure the three different aspects of ultimate reality, though 
different, are equally ultimate; thus, acosmic, theistic, and cosmic religions are different 
because they are related to different aspects of ultimate reality, and they are ultimate and 
equal, because these different aspects of Ultimate Reality are ultimate and equal. Again, 
Cobb‘s metaphysics provides no means for seeing the equality of acosmism, theism, and 
cosmism in themselves; they are only seen as equal because they reflect the equality of 
ultimate reality, conceived as creativity, God, and cosmos. In other words, the ability to 
see the equality and ultimacy of the different religions is gained by being able to see 
ultimacy and equality in creativity, God and the cosmos; if you can‘t see it there you 
won‘t see it in the religions.   
Kaplan uses holography and insights by physicist David Bohm about the 
implicate order and the explicate order, to construct a pluralistic metaphysical model. In 
the holographic model there are two domains – the explicate domain and the implicate 
domain. The implicate domain is all pervading or coextensive with all being, meaning 
that it is ultimate; however, because it exists simultaneously with the explicate domain, 
and cannot exist without the explicate domain, the two domains are equal. This means 
that the explicate domain is also ultimate. Or, more accurately, it means that there is at 
least one explicate domain that is equal to the implicate domain, since the implicate 
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domain can enfold more than one explicate domain.  These assumptions about the 
implicate and explicate domains are then applied to holography, where the hologram (or 
the interference patterns that are recorded on the holographic film by laser beam lights) is 
taken as the implicate domain, and the filmed scene and resultant image are understood 
as the explicate domain. So, if we accept the idea that the implicate and explicate 
domains are both necessary for the holographic situation then we can accept that the 
recorded film, the filmed object, and the resultant image are all ―equal‖ and ―ultimate.‖  
Kaplan then draws on a number of unique features of holography which allow us 
to imagine ―different states of being.‖ A hologram is unlike the scene that it records and 
the image that it produces, in that it contains no subject-object dichotomy – there is no 
picture, just interference patterns that appear on the film when the reference laser beam 
and object laser beam converge. In other words, the implicate domain of holography is 
non-dualistic. In this respect it is the opposite of the explicate domain which is the 
domain of subjects and objects – of separate persons.  The hologram is also unique in that 
any part of the holographic film is capable of reproducing the whole scene that is 
recorded on the film. And, finally, holography is unique in that multiple explicate 
domains can be enfolded in the same.  
The implicate domain in holography which is non-dualistic and yet enfolds all 
things allows us to imagine a state of being in which there is only one Being that is not 
ultimately other than anything else (because all arises within it). The interference patterns 
that give rise to dualistic images, but are themselves empty of all content, allow us to see 
the implicate domain as ―emptiness.‖ This allows us to imagine a state of being in which 
all being ultimately dissolves into emptiness. Both of these perspectives are ultimate 
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because both are truths about the nature of the implicate order; the implicate order is both 
the only Being, and emptiness. Finally, the fact that different explicate domains can be 
enfolded in the same implicate domain allow us to imagine how human beings can be 
related to God but still be infinitely different from God. They can relate because they are 
both explicate and because they are both enfolded in the same implicate domain; and, 
they are different because they belong to profoundly different explicate domains.   
If we see that the hologram enfolds both the scene that it captures and the image 
that it is able to project – or, that it is coextensive with all being, we can say that it is (in a 
sense) the one ultimate condition or being. If we see how the hologram enfolds all 
images, but is in itself devoid of all images, we can say (in a sense) that it is empty. These 
can be taken as two different but coequal truths about the same reality. Finally, if we 
understand that different holographic images are enfolded in the same hologram, we can 
say that the images are different but related. Moreover, if we understand that the 
implicate and explicate domains of the holographic situation are equal or that they are 
both ultimate, we can say that this truth about the different explicate domains (that they 
are different but related) is an ultimate truth. Thus, with respect to the holographic 
situation the following claims are equally and ―ultimately‖ true: 1) the implicate domain 
is the one ultimate condition (in which all else is enfolded); 2) the implicate domain is 
empty because while it gives rise to all subjects and objects it is itself void; 3) different 
explicate domains are intimately related to each other (even though they may be deeply 
different) because they are enfolded in the same implicate domain.  
By accepting Kaplan‘s argument, one is able to see these three different truths 
about the holographic situation as ―equally ultimate‖ – and, one can see this independent 
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of any religious content. But, as shown above, Kaplan wants us to use this model as a 
way of imagining parallel truth claims made by different religious communities. 
Specifically, he wants us to see the Advaitin realization that there is only one Being who 
is not separate from anything else, the Buddhist realization that all being is ultimately 
Emptiness, and the Christian experience of communion with God as different but equally 
true states of being. Kaplan wants us to think of these religious states of being as similar 
to the equally ultimate truths that can be ―realized‖ in the holographic-like metaphysical 
structure that he creates.  
Even if one is not entirely convinced that Kaplan's model works, or cannot really 
understand how it works, it is easy to imagine a successful model along similar lines. 
Such a model would allow one to see three different states as equally ultimate, and the 
ultimate states within the model would run parallel to religious states, claimed to be 
ultimate, by actual religious communities; specifically the states realizing the one Self, of 
realizing no-self, and of attaining communion with God.  
In any case, Cobb‘s method is that of a naturalistic theologian who claims 
knowledge about ultimate reality, and Kaplan‘s is that of philosopher who constructs a 
model to show how we might analogously think about equally ultimate soteriologies.      
We will now examine another version of metaphysical pluralism that makes three 
distinct but complementary arguments for religious pluralism.      
 
4. Three Complementary Arguments for Religious Pluralism   
In the Introduction and in Chapter 2, I mentioned that I had produced a version of 
metaphysical pluralism called Understanding Religious Unity and Diversity in Terms of 
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“Non-Dualism,” Divine Unity,” and “Trinitarianism” Together: A Tripartite Theory, 
Philosophy, and Theology of Religions. I will now present a truncated version of the three 
arguments I developed in this work that aimed to show that religions grounded in the 
God-concepts of non-dualism, divine unity, and trinitarianism are equally true. Before 
doing this, though, a few preliminary remarks about the particular problem I was trying to 
solve and the main influence on my solution are in order.  
The problem that I sought to resolve in Understanding Religious Unity and 
Diversity was an existential one. It was grounded in my feeling (at the time) that three 
different religious communities, or religions, embodied radically different, but equally 
valid, truths about ultimate reality. These three religions were Adidam, the Baha‘is Faith 
and (a Tillichian interpretation of) Christianity.      
Adidam revolves around the teachings of an American-born Guru who last 
assumed the title of Adi Da Samraj (1939-2008).  Adi Da‘s spiritual path is dedicated to 
realizing the non-dualistic truth that there is only God, or transcending the ego so that one 
may ―dissolve‖ into God. Adi Da claims to be a perfect God-Realizer and that his goal is 
to transmit his perfect state to all sentient beings. The Baha‘i faith revolves around the 
teachings of an Iranian-born Prophet who assumed the title of Baha‘u‘llah (1817-1892). 
Baha‘u‘llah‘s spiritual path centres on belief in, and obedience to, the laws of God‘s 
Manifestation, such that one may manifest the qualities (names and attributes) of God in 
oneself (as these are perfectly revealed in God‘s Manifestation). Baha‘u‘llah claims to be 
a Manifestation of God and that his spiritual laws constitute the means for all human 
beings (in the present age) to fulfil their highest spiritual destiny. But even though 
Baha‘u‘llah claims to be the Manifestation of God‘s names and attributes he denies that 
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he is the Essence of God, and insists that these two realities are profoundly distinct. The 
Essence of God is in itself one and unknowable – and what can be known about God is 
attained through knowledge of the (singular reality) of God‘s Manifestation. In other 
words, the great truth is that God is one, and nothing but God is God. According to 
Tillich, Jesus, the Christ, represents the ―New Being‖ insofar as he was able to maintain 
his unity with God under the conditions of existence. As such, he represents a perfect 
blend of humanity and divinity – or ―concrete spirit‖ – and the way to this state (i.e., 
salvation) for all human beings.  
Each of these ―perspectives‖ makes a very different claim about God and about 
the relationship between God and humanity. In Adidam, God is the only reality (non-
dualism) and the ultimate destiny of all human beings is to realize that they are God and 
dissolve into this great Reality. In the Baha‘i Faith, God is one and completely other 
(divine unity) and the ultimate aim for all human beings is to become God-like by 
manifesting the qualities of God, while recognizing that they can never become the great 
One. In Christianity, God is a complex relational being (trinitarianism) and the ultimate 
aim for all human beings is to participate in, or commune with, this complex Ultimate 
Reality by blending one‘s humanity and divinity.  
In short, each religious perspective delivers a contradictory message about a 
human being‘s ultimate state: 1) you are God; 2) you are not God but manifest God‘s 
likeness, 3) you are related to God. At different times each of these perspectives seemed 
true to me, and at such times the implication seemed to be that if one perspective was true 
than the other two perspectives had to be false – or, at least, less true.  Moreover, this 
view seemed to be consistent with each perspective‘s theology of religions.  
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From Adi Da‘s perspective, non-dualism is the ultimate religious perspective and 
thus he recognizes non-dualistic traditions such as Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta as 
higher forms of religion. At the other end of the spectrum are the dualistic traditions 
(such as the exoteric forms of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam); these traditions are only 
nominally religious. In the middle, are the qualified forms of non-dualism that are found 
in theistic mystical traditions (in the mystical streams of Judaism, Christianity and Islam 
and the theistic streams of Hinduism); these are authentic religions but have not gone far 
enough in realizing the complete identity between God and all else.  
From the Baha‘i perspective, divine unity is the ultimate religious perspective and 
thus religions that maintain the purest form of this message are most highly regarded. 
Thus, Baha‘is regard Islam as the purest religion among past divine revelations/religions. 
Next come Christianity, even  though it has corrupted the original message of divine 
unity with its doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation - and Judaism, even though it is 
tainted by not recognizing the ―more recent‖ Manifestations of God. Furthest away from 
the pure message of divine unity are the non-dualistic traditions of the Far East such as 
Hinduism and Buddhism, which are generally regarded as hopelessly old and corrupt.  
The theology of religions in Adidam and Baha‘i value religions in an inverse 
proportion. 
The Christian theology of religions offered by Tillich seems to strike a middle-
ground between these two perspectives. Like the complementarianism of Cobb, it claims 
that the more ―mystical‖ traditions such as Hinduism and Buddhism and the more 
―ethical‖ traditions such as Judaism and Islam (and with qualifications Christianity) are 
more or less equal insofar as they capture elements of truth or true religion. But, in the 
370 
 
end, these religions are fulfilled in the highest form of religion which unites these 
mystical and ethical elements.  Tillich would originally identify this unification of the 
mystical and the ethical with Christ as the New Being, and then with his Pauline theology 
in philosophical form, or more specifically his concept of the religion of the concrete 
spirit – but, in both cases, other forms of religions are fulfilled in Christianity.  
In Understanding Religious Unity and Diversity I set myself the task of arguing 
that all three of the above conflicting theologies are true. The most difficult part of this 
task was the logical problem of thinking about three contradictory statements about the 
same thing as equally true. How can we logically claim that the following statements are 
all equally true? 1) Ultimate Reality is radically identical to all else, 2) Ultimate Reality is 
radically separate from all else, and 3) Ultimate Reality is radically related to all else. To 
solve this logical problem I turned to the work of mathematician George Spencer Brown, 
who had already done much to shape my way of thinking about religious diversity.        
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Spencer-Brown completed two complementary 
works 1) Laws of Form and 2) Only Two cam play This Game. Spencer-Brown describes 
Laws of Form as ―an account of the emergence of physical archetypes, presented as a 
rigorous essay in mathematics.‖48 Only Two can play This Game is, to some extent, a 
translation of the insights of Laws of Form into metaphysical/religious language. 
Spencer-Brown claims that ―Form‖ necessarily emerges from ―Void,‖ and that 
every form is necessarily a ―trinity.‖ Thus, ―ultimate reality‖ consists of two orders, the 
―Zero Order of Being‖ (Void) and the ―Unity of Order of Being‖ (Form).  He says that in 
traditional religious/metaphysical language the Zero Order of Being is referred to by such 
names as Nirvana (by Buddhists), the Godhead (by Christians), the unnameable Tao (by 
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Taoists), and so on.  And, as for the Unity Order of Being this is traditionally referred to 
as God: ―It is known to eastern doctrine, as it is to western, as the Triune God or Trinity. 
In western books of magic it is called the One Thing. In China it is called the nameable 
Tao. In Tibetan Buddhism it is called the densely-packed region.‖  (124)       
For Spencer-Brown, the cultures of the world can be divided into two large 
camps; the Western and the Eastern. He identifies Western culture with ―the mode of life, 
at least nominally Christian, of civilized residents in Russia, Europe, occupied parts of 
Africa, Iceland, North and South Americas, New Zealand, the Philippines, and occupied 
parts of Australia.‖ (10) And he identifies Eastern culture with ―Buddhist, Confucianist, 
Taoist, and Hindu civilizations.‖ As for the rest or the other cultures – the most notable 
other being ―Islam‖ – he says that these stand ―somewhere between.‖ (10) 
For Spencer-Brown, the main identifying characteristic of a culture is 
identification with one or the other of the two great ―Orders of Beings.‖ Western culture 
is predominantly identified with the Unity Order of Being and Eastern culture is 
predominantly identified with the Zero Order of Being.
49
 Nonetheless, Spencer-Brown 
does not see the two cultures as mutually exclusive and, indeed, his ideal is a culture 
which is able to see things from both perspectives. (9-14) 
Thus, Spencer-Brown uses his bipartite metaphysics to sort out two different 
cultural/religious perspectives; moreover, he legitimates the equal truth of these two 
different perspectives by grounding them in the two Orders of Ultimate Reality.  I was 
attracted to Spencer-Brown‘s approach of explaining cultural and religious diversity in 
terms of different aspects of Ultimate Reality, but obviously could not use his bipartite 
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To overcome this problem I re-examined Spencer Brown's metaphysics, and his 
conclusion that the Unity Order of Being is necessarily a trinity (or tripartite structure). 
And, I came to the conclusion, that ―the Trinity‖ cannot stand for the Unity Order of 
Being only, because once Something appears in Nothing, there is no other place for 
Nothing to be, apart from within Something; in other words, Nothingness must be 
enfolded within the Trinity. This means that the totality of Ultimate Reality is the Trinity 
(and not just the First Thing as distinct from Nothingness). In other words, Ultimate 
Reality is tripartite.
51
   
With this insight that Ultimate Reality is tripartite I moved forward with the 
writing of Understanding Religious Unity and Diversity in Terms of “Non-Dualism,” 
“Divine Unity,” and “Trinitarianism” together: A Tripartite Theory, Philosophy, and 
Theology of Religions. This work consists of two parts.  
In Part One, I outline three theories of religious ―inclusivism‖: The theories of 
non-dualism (typified by Adidam); of divine unity (typified by Baha‘i); and, of  
―trinitarianism‖ or ―divine relationship‖ (typified by a Tillichian version of Christianity). 
In Part Two, I argue that the non-dualism ―scheme‖ can be used to accurately 
account for Adidam, Buddhism, and Hinduism; that the divine unity scheme can be used 
to accurately account for Baha‘i, Babism, Islam, and Zoroastrianism; and, that the divine 
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relationship scheme can be used to account for Judaism, Christianity, and all other 
expressions of the religion of divine relationship. Then, I argue that none of these 
theories, alone, can account for the totality of religious diversity because, when applied 
universally, they distort the self-understanding of several of these religions. Finally, I 
argue that together these three schemes can accurately account for all religions. To do 
this I make three separate arguments for the equal ultimacy of each founding truth or 
perspective of the three ―inclusivist‖ schemes.    
More specifically, I use three different methodologies, or three different 
epistemological modes, to make the same argument. The first argument is scientific or 
historical, the second is metaphysical, and the third is theological. The overall argument 
presumes an epistemological hierarchy in which empirical knowledge is transcended by 
metaphysical knowledge, and metaphysical knowledge is in turn transcended by religious 
knowledge (or direct knowledge of ultimate reality). However, even if this presumption is 
rejected, the three (complementary) arguments can stand on their own merit and don‘t 
require this presupposition. Each argument tries to prove the same thing – that non-
dualism, divine unity, and divine relationship are equal truths about the same ultimate 
reality, from different points of identity within ultimate reality.   
In the first mode, I make an argument based on empirical observation of religious 
history, and a comparative analysis of this material. More specifically, I argue that the 
concepts of Ultimate Reality in Adidam, Baha‘i, and Christianity are the same, but the 
three religions disagree about the nature of the relationships within the ―divine 
economy,‖ and about their ultimate place within this. Each claims a different point of 
374 
 
identity within Ultimate Reality and this, I suggest, leads to different truths about the 
(same) ultimate reality.   
In the second mode, I develop a metaphysical model that can be applied 
analogously to the truths of non-dualism, divine unity, and divine relationship to show 
how these truths, though different, are equally true. This metaphysical model is not based 
on observation of anything in the empirical world, but strictly on mathematical insight 
about the structure of existence and a projection of this insight onto Ultimate Reality. I 
call this a philosophy of religions.      
In the third mode, I argue that ultimate religious knowledge – or true knowledge 
of Ultimate Reality – is obtained through identification with one of the three aspects of 
Ultimate Reality. And further, that although one cannot be identified with more than one 
aspect of Ultimate Reality at one time, one must be able to recognize those identified 
with other aspects of ultimate reality. Indeed, the ultimacy of one‘s own perspective is 
shown by the capacity to recognize ultimacy in religious others. I call this a theology of 
religions.        
I will now reconstruct the sorts of arguments I put forth in Understanding 
Religious Unity and Diversity.    
 
A Theory of Religious Pluralism 
Here I will construct a theory of religious pluralism based on data collected from the 
history of religions, or claims that different religions make about themselves. More 
specifically, it will be cased on claims about the nature of Ultimate Reality and the 
ultimate religious state made in Adidam, Baha‘is and Christianity. This theory claims no 
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knowledge about whether or not any of these claims are true, but it does make an 
argument that these different claims, though different, are (or at least could be) equally 
true.   
The first part of this theory is a thesis that Ultimate Reality is a tripartite structure 
constituted of Void, Creative Distinction/Creativity, and Form. This is a generalized 
conclusion drawn from the existence of parallel claims about Ultimate Reality being 
tripartite made in Adidam, Baha‘i, and Christianity.  Again, the generic terms we will use 
for these are different aspects of Ultimate Reality are – Void, Creativity, and Form. Void 
is the source condition of all else; Creativity is the power that creates Form (or Being) out 
of Void
52
; Form is the first (divine) appearance. Following are the actual theologies from 
which this generalized theology is constructed:     
Adidam has a very clear concept of Ultimate Reality as tripartite. In this case, the 
three elements are Consciousness Itself, Universal Spirit Energy, and Divine Form (or the 
Centre of the Cosmic Mandala). Consciousness Itself or Consciousness is the empty 
ground of all that arises; Universal Spirit Energy is a modification of Consciousness that 
creates all apparent beings within Consciousness; Divine Form or the Centre of the 
Cosmic Mandala (a brilliant white five-pointed star) is the first form of Consciousness 
and becomes further modified as all other words. The specific form of the generic Void-
Creativity-Form in Adidam is Consciousness-Universal Spirit Energy-Divine Form.
53
   
According to Baha‘i theology, Ultimate Reality consists of three elements: the 
Unknowable Essence of God, the Most Great Spirit of God, and Universal Matter. The 
Essence of God is the ground and source condition for all else; the Most Great Spirit, also 
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called the Primal Will of God and the Manifestation of God, is the creative element in the 
Godhead that brings forth being out of nothingness; Universal Matter is the first created 
form and the primal matter from which all other created forms are made. This concept of 
Eternal Reality as Divine Essence, Primal Will, and Universal Matter clearly mirrors the 
generic concept of Ultimate Reality as Void-Creativity- Form; thus, Baha‘is also affirm 
that Ultimate Reality is tripartite.
54
  
The Christian case is, on one hand, the easiest and, on the other, the most difficult 
to see as having a concept of Ultimate Reality that can be understood as Void-Creativity-
Form. It is easy because Christians obviously take Ultimate Reality to be tripartite, as 
shown by its trinitarian concept of God. What is difficult is that the concepts of Void, 
Creativity, and Form don‘t exactly match up with the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The 
Father as ―Super Essential Godhead‖ or as ―the God beyond the God of theism‖ can be 
identified with Void. Similarly, the Son as the Eternal Logos can be identified with 
Creativity. But the Holy Spirit as First Form is a stretch even though the two can be 
correlated insofar as both pertain to God in existence. Here, I take creative theological 
license (for the first time) and identify the Holy Spirit (of Christian doctrine) with the 
First Form of God because both are connected with existence. And, thus, affirm that the 
Christian Trinity lines up with the generic concept of Ultimate Reality as Void-
Creativity-Form.  
We have now established that there are consistent concepts of Ultimate Reality, as 
tripartite, in Adidam, Baha‘i, and Christianity; they are consistent in that the three aspects 
of Ultimate Reality in the three different theologies have the same functions or are 
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described in the same way. Thus, we can generalize as follows: Void is the original 
ground of all Reality: Daists call this Consciousness Itself; Baha‘is call this the 
Unknowable Essence of God; and Christians call this the Super Essential Godhead or 
God the Father. Creativity is the act that creates Form from Void: Daists call this 
Universal Spirit Energy; Baha‘is call this the Most Great Spirit of God, the Primal Will of 
God, or the Manifestation of God; Christians call this the Logos or God the Son. Form is 
the First Existence that appears as a result of the First Creative Act within Void: Daists 
call this Divine Form or the Centre of the Cosmic Mandala; Baha‘is call this Universal 
Matter; and, Christians call this God the Holy Spirit.   
Because of these parallels we can now deduce that these concepts all refer to the 
same ultimate reality. But if this is the case then why do these religions make very 
different claims about, or have very different experiences of, the exact nature of the 
constituting elements of Ultimate Reality? In order to answer this we need to know how 
Daists, Baha‘is, and Christians actually do experience Ultimate Reality, and what they 
say is true about it.  
Daists claim that the three elements of Ultimate Reality are identical, or more 
specifically that the apparently other elements of Ultimate Reality are identical to 
Consciousness Itself. Baha‘is claim that the three elements of Ultimate Reality are 
radically distinct, or more specifically that the other elements of Ultimate Reality are 
radically distinct from the Unknowable Essence of God. Christians claim that the three 
elements of Ultimate Reality are radically related, or more specifically that the other 
elements of Ultimate Reality are related to God the Father.  
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Since the third element of Ultimate Reality in all three religions extends to the 
world these same truisms extend to the world. Since the Divine Form is God or 
Consciousness Itself, human beings are also God, and so the great truth of Daism (and 
other non-dualistic religions) is that there is only God. Since Universal Matter is not God, 
human creatures are not God, and so the great truth of Baha‘i (and other religions of 
divine unity) is that only God is God. Since the Holy Spirit is related to the Father, human 
beings are related to the Father as expressed in the great truth that God is all in all, or as 
expressed in the idea that all human beings are children of God. 
Now, we will try to answer the question of why they come to these different 
conclusions about Ultimate Reality. Our thesis is that each religion comes to a different 
conclusion because each assumes a different identity within (the same) Ultimate Reality. 
More specifically, we can say that the identity experience of Daists is rooted in 
identification with Void/Consciousness Itself; the difference experience of Baha‘is is 
rooted in identification with Creativity/The Most Great Spirit of God; and, the relational 
experience of Christians is rooted in identification with Form/The Holy Spirit.  And, like 
our empirically derived theory of Ultimate Reality, these claims are made on the basis of 
actual claims made by Daists, Baha‘is, and Christians.  
Adi Da says that he is Consciousness Itself (Void). Bahá‘u‘lláh (the founder of 
the Baha‘i Faith) says that he is the Most Great Spirit of God (Creative Distinction). 
Christianity is, again, problematic. Christians identify Christ with the Logos or Creativity 
and not with Form, as expected. So, again, I will take creative theological license and 
argue that Christ is better identified with (Divine) Form on account of Christianity‘s 
doctrine of Christ‘s Incarnation in human form, its doctrine of bodily resurrection, the 
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Pauline ideal of becoming a spiritual body, the Synoptic ideal of the Kingdom of Heaven 
on earth, and the lack of Divine Law in Christianity (which would be prominent in a 
Logos-based religion). Given these different points of identity within ultimate reality, the 
different experiences and conceptions of Ultimate Reality are understandable.      
Thus, we can say that each religion is having the particular experience that it is 
having because it is grounded in a different aspect of ultimate reality, and is even having 
the experience it should be having.  
Finally, with reference to this claim – that these different religions make different 
truth claims about Ultimate Reality because they are identified with different aspects of 
Ultimate Reality – we can make the further claim that the identity experience of Daists, 
the difference experience of Baha‘is, and the relational experience of Christians are all of 
equal value because they are grounded in one of the three inherently equal elements of 
Ultimate Reality.    
Putting together all of the elements of this theory we can say the following: 
Adidam, Baha‘i, and Christianity, are equal ways of being religious because they are 
grounded in one of the three inherently equal elements of the same tripartite Ultimate 
Reality. Adidam, grounded in Void, realizes the identity between all elements of Ultimate 
Reality, and the corollary that all human beings are identical to God. Baha‘i, grounded in 
Creative Distinction, recognizes the differences between all elements of Ultimate Reality, 
and the corollary that all human beings are distinct from God. Christianity, grounded in 
Form, sees the relationship between all elements of Ultimate Reality, and the corollary 




A Philosophy of Religious Pluralism  
Now I will try to prove the same thing from a different epistemological mode. This mode, 
similarly, does not require a religious identity, and its argument is not deduced from 
empirical knowledge about particular religions. Indeed, this argument could be made 
without knowing anything about any actual religions and without being at all religious. 
On the other hand, this argument can be used to complement the theoretical argument just 
made – the argument that there are three different but equally ultimate forms of religion 
resulting from identification with different aspects of ultimate reality.     
Aristotle‘s principle of non-contradiction says that it is not logically possible to 
say of something that it is, and is not, this thing in the same respect and at the same time. 
But things are more complex than Aristotle supposed.    
Mathematician George Spencer-Brown, in his Laws of Form, says that all things 
come into being when a space is severed or taken apart, in order to create two separate 
states.
55
 Prior to such an act of severance, or act of distinction, nothing can be indicated; 
thus, things necessarily emerge from no-thing (or form emerges from void).
56
 Moreover, 
Spencer-Brown says that all things are necessarily tripartite. This is so because we cannot 
create anything without co-creating what it is not, and these two states plus the boundary 
between them constitute the three elements of any thing, no matter what. The easiest way 
to represent this is through some sort of closed curve, like a circle. Here, an inside is 
separated from an outside – so the inside, the outside, and the line that divides them, 
represent the three elements of the thing.
57
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Thus, ―nothingness,‖ or ―void,‖ or ―unbroken space,‖ or ―emptiness‖ is the 
original source condition for all things; an ―act severance,‖ or an ―act of distinction,‖ is 
the creative act that makes something out of nothing; and, ―things,‖ or ―form‖ obtain 
when a creative act is made in unbroken space. This could be represented by a blank 
canvas (no-thing) the brush strokes of an artist (act of distinction), and the resultant 
picture (some thing). And, as discussed above, all some-things are necessarily tripartite.   
Another interesting thing about things is that they can‘t be seen unless you stand 
apart from them. You can demonstrate this to yourself by creating something (i.e., by 
drawing a circle, a starfish, the gingerbread man, or whatever) and standing apart from it. 
When you start to visualize your circle as an object – perhaps as a ball or a groundhog 
hole – pay attention to what you are doing, and you‘ll notice that your circle becomes an 
object only when your attention becomes continuous with its ground or with what is 
outside of it; in other words, you can‘t see the circle as an object unless you identify with 
its outside. You can also demonstrate this to yourself by noticing that you can have no 
experience of a building as an object unless you stand outside of it (and look at it) – while 
inside the building you experience it as space. And, as for things we can see, we can see 
that the three elements of these things are necessarily related; we can‘t imagine one 
element without the others. Try to visualize the figure of the thing you have drawn 
without its ground, or try to visualize the ground without the figure: it can‘t be done. 
Thus, from the outside, where we can see things, the three elements of a thing appear as a 
relational unity or as a ―triunion.‖  
True as this may be, this is not the only way that we can experience the elements 
or aspects of a thing. In the same way that we can identify ourselves with the outside of a 
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thing, we can also imaginatively identify ourselves with its inside, or with the dividing 
line between inside and outside. Let us now do this, starting with the act or line of 
distinction. 
If we imagine that we are the line that distinguishes an inside from an outside in 
our drawing, we are obviously no longer in a position where we can see a figure-ground 
picture with necessarily related elements. (It‘s necessary to be outside to see this.) From 
this perspective, we can look either at the inside or at the outside (but not at both at once) 
and so we experience and conceptualize the inside and outside as radically separate 
states. You can demonstrate this to yourself by sitting in a window sill that is large 
enough that you can‘t see both the inside and the outside at the same time, but have to 
turn to see either one or the other. From this vantage point, the inside and outside are 
clearly separate spaces because you can‘t see them together. So, from the perspective of 
the ―line of distinction,‖ the only conclusion that makes sense is that inside and outside 
are different, and this is the case because this is the element of a thing that literally 
creates separate states.   
Finally, if we move our attention to the inside of some-thing, we once again 
experience this thing differently. Here our attention is not outside looking at an object, 
and it is not on the dividing line between inside and outside recognizing separate states; 
in this case, we are identified with an interior space and from this point of view we can 
realize that the space we are identified with would not substantially change if the line that 
enclosed it was modified in some way, or even if it disappeared. This can also be 
demonstrated with a house/building example. If we are inside our house we experience 
this thing as space, and this space could be modified by moving walls, and so forth, 
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without altering our overall sense of being spatially located within it. But even more 
radically, our feeling of identification with space would not be altered even if the walls of 
our house fell down. We might suddenly get hotter or colder but we would not loose our 
sense of being spatially located or spatially present – what would happen, in this case, is 
that our space would simply expand. This is the case because our house was originally 
constructed within a space that did not disappear when it was modified by the builders 
who put up walls to construct an inside (and therefore, outside) space within it. Given this 
phenomenon, it is possible to affirm that there is no difference between the inside and the 
outside of a thing, because these differences are arbitrarily made within the same 
unbroken space (or condition of no-thing) that continues to underlie all apparently 
separate states. But, perhaps, a better example of how we experience inside and outside 
states as identical is found in the case of driving a car. Our car is something that we 
experience as an object when we view it from the outside (as evidenced by the fact that 
some of us admire our car); our car also creates separate spaces (as evidenced by the fact 
that many of us stop singing when we get out of our car); but, we also drive our car and 
we do this on the premise that the space we occupy inside the car is absolutely identical 
with the space that is outside of it (and this is why cars have windows). Without this 
conviction that the spaces inside and outside of our car are identical we could not drive, 
and so our car would be reduced to a fetish or a place for singing alone. Nonetheless, the 
point here is that it is possible to realize that a thing‘s inside and outside are identical.  
I have now shown that it is possible to coherently hold the views that the elements 
of a thing are radically related, radically different, or radically identical – and this would 
seem to contradict Aristotle‘s principle of non-contradiction. But Aristotle didn‘t 
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recognize the tripartite nature of things and so was in no position to see how different 
elements of a thing could be viewed differently from different perspectives within it, and 
so his principle of non-contradiction can be irrelevant for identifying possible 
contradictory claims about things. This is certainly the case with respect to the claims that 
the elements of a thing are related, distinct, or identical as discussed in the cases above. 
Thus, Spencer-Brown‘s insight into the emergence and nature of things opens up new 
possibilities for dealing with apparently contradictory claims about things.   
This, of course, raises the question as to whether or not Spencer-Brown‘s insights 
into the emergence and nature of things (that seem to have enlightening ramifications 
when talking about houses and cars) have any bearing on complex ―things‖ such as 
people or God. Spencer-Brown thought that they did, and so describes his Laws of Form 
as a rigorous essay in mathematics that demonstrated the emergence of physical 
archetypes, or of how a universe comes into being. Moreover, in his companion to Laws 
of Form, called Only Two can play This Game, he attempts to reconcile the great 
religious and cultural divide between the East and West on the basis of his mathematical 
metaphysics.  
I also think that Spencer-Brown‘s mathematical insights have metaphysical 
implications and that these can be used to reconcile seemingly irreconcilable religious 
experiences, and will now try to use them to this end. 
In his Laws of Form, Spencer-Brown has (at least) two mathematical insights with 
metaphysical implications: 1) things necessarily emerge from no-thing, or form emerges 
from void; 2) all things are tripartite. In Only Two can play This Game Spencer-Brown 
explicates the metaphysical implications of these mathematic insights, using one to 
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explain the great religious and cultural divide between East and West and the other to 
explain the Christian Trinity. Spencer-Brown believes that the patterns he sees, and 
represents mathematically, are divine archetypes that explain the origins of the universe 
(or of any universe as he would put it).
58
 Thus, Nothingness or Void is the great original 
condition from which the First Existence or Form (or God) emerges.  
As mentioned earlier, Spencer-Brown calls these, the two original orders of being: 
the Zero Order of Being and the Unity Order of Being, and he authenticates Eastern and 
Western ways of being religious by virtue of being grounded in one or the other of these 
original orders of being. The East is the way it is religiously and culturally because it is 
grounded in the Zero Order of Being, and the West is the way it is religiously and 
culturally because it is grounded in the Unity Order of Being. Spencer-Brown also uses 
his other insight – that all things are tripartite – to explain the Christian Trinity. He argues 
and demonstrates that if all things are tripartite then the First Thing or God (which 
emerges from Void) must also be tripartite.
59
   
I will now produce a philosophy of religions, in much the same way that Spencer-
Brown did, by assuming that mathematical insights have metaphysical implications, and 
that religious diversity can be accounted for in terms of metaphysical diversity. Where I 
differ from Spencer-Brown, is that I make a broader interpretation of his insight that all 
things are tripartite, and use this to account for greater religious diversity.    
Spencer-Brown sees triplicity as an attribute of Form, and Form as a state distinct 
from Void. I think this is a mistake because if Form emerges from Void as a result of an 
Act of Distinction made in Void, then Form must necessarily enfold Void and the Act of 
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Distinction within Itself; indeed, if Form emerges, then Void and Distinction can only 
persist as elements within It. For example, if we create a form by drawing a distinction (a 
line in the shape of a circle) in void (on a blank page), the blank page (void) no longer 
persists as a blank page but only as it is now modified by the line of the circle (the 
distinction). Similarly, the distinction does not persist as something in and of itself but 
only as that which gives shape to form. Thus (in metaphysical terms), once Form 
emerges, Void-Distinction-Form are bound together and stand as all that is the case, or as 
the totality of Reality. In other words, the ―First Thing‖ must be the totality of reality or 
Ultimate Reality and, indeed, this is why it is tripartite. (This is why I take Form to be an 
element of the ―First Thing‖/Ultimate Reality and not as a synonym for it.)     
Starting from the premise that the First Thing is Ultimate Reality altogether, we 
can now affirm a number of truths about Ultimate Reality. Here, I will follow Spencer-
Brown‘s lead and claim that we know these truths about Ultimate Reality because we 
know certain truths about things in general. First, we know that Ultimate Reality is a 
tripartite structure consisting of Void, Creative Distinction, and Form, because we know 
(from Spencer Brown‘s work) that all things are tripartite and identically constituted. The 
other truths we know about Ultimate Reality are likewise drawn, analogously, from what 
we know about things in general. We know that the three elements of Ultimate Reality 
can be identified with, and we know that such identification allows the different elements 
of Ultimate Reality to be experienced as identical, different or, related. More specifically, 
we know that identification with Void allows us to experience the elements of Ultimate 
Reality as identical; identification with Creative Distinction allows us to experience the 
elements of Ultimate Reality as different; and, identification with Form allows us to 
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experience the elements of Ultimate Reality as related. And, because the three elements 
of Ultimate Reality are of equal value we can affirm that these three different experiences 
of Ultimate Reality are also of equal value.  
This can be boiled down to a simple pluralistic philosophy of religions that states: 
Ultimate Reality is a tripartite structure, whose constituting elements of Void, Creative 
Distinction, and Form can be experienced as identical, different, or related by identifying 
respectively with Void, Creative Distinction, or Form; and these experiences are of equal 
value since the three elements of Ultimate Reality are of equal value.   
This pluralistic philosophy of religions has been constructed without any 
reference to actual religions. I have projected a conceptual understanding of things in 
general to create a conceptual understanding of Ultimate Reality. In this conceptual 
model I have also created different but equally true claims about Ultimate Reality, and 
accounted for these in terms of different perspectives within Ultimate Reality. But, of 
course, the theory can be applied to actual religions and when this is done the power of 
the theory is more fully realized.  
Thus, we can argue that the claim of identity between the aspects of Ultimate 
Reality, as realized from the point of view of the Void, is a description of non-dualism as 
realized in religious traditions such as Adidam, Buddhism, and Hinduism. We can argue 
that the claim of difference between the aspects of Ultimate Reality, as realized from the 
point of view of Creative Distinction, is a description of divine unity as recognized in 
religious traditions such as Baha‘i, Islam and Zoroastrianism. And, we can argue that the 
claim of relatedness between the aspects of ultimate reality, as seen from the point of 
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view of Form, is a description of divine relationship as experienced in religious traditions 
such as Christianity and Judaism.  
 
A Theology of Religious Pluralism   
I will now switch epistemological modes, again, to try to make the same argument in a 
different way. I will call this mode ―theological‖ or religious. This argument, unlike the 
other two, is entirely dependent on being religious, or the ability to imagine being 
religious, which I will define, for starters, as identification with (an aspect of) Ultimate 
Reality. 
I will begin this theology of religions by looking at how Daists, Baha‘is, and 
Christians typically see things theologically, and then consider how they would need to 
alter their visions in order to be theologically pluralistic.  
Theologically, truth is seen, recognized, or realized in oneself when one is 
identified with Ultimate Reality – or, more commonly for religious people, when they 
encounter One who is identified with Ultimate Reality. For Daists this One is Adi Da, for 
Baha‘is this One is Baha‘u‘llah, for Christians this One is Jesus Christ, and so on. 
In Adidam, Baha‘i, and Christianity, to recognize and acknowledge the state of 
the One identified with Ultimate Reality (by recognizing that they are identified with 
Ultimate Reality) is the first requirement of being a devotee, a believer, or a follower. 
Daists must see and acknowledge that Adi Da is Consciousness Itself; Baha‘is must see 
and acknowledge that Baha‘u‘llah is the Manifestation of God (for this Age); and 
Christians must see and acknowledge that Christ is the Son of God.  
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But one does not become a true devotee, believer, or follower until one also 
commits to practicing the disciplines, obeying the laws, or following the life prescribed 
and exemplified by the One recognized as identified with ultimate realty. Daists are 
obliged to conform their lives to the life-level disciplines, and the devotional and 
meditative practices that are given by Adi Da. Baha‘is are expected to obey both the 
social and spiritual laws revealed by Baha‘u‘llah. And, Christians are expected to imitate 
Christ by following the example of his perfect and blameless life.  
In Adidam, Baha‘i and Christianity the reason for conforming to the disciplines, 
obeying the laws, or living a godly life, is so that one can become like the One who is 
identified with Ultimate Reality. Daists try to become identified with Consciousness 
Itself, just as Adi Da is indentified with Consciousness Itself. Baha‘is try to manifest 
perfectly in themselves all of the names and attributes of God, just as Baha‘u‘llah 
manifests perfectly in himself all of the names and attributes of God. Christians try to live 
a life in relation to God and so become children of God like the Son of God, Jesus Christ. 
In all three religions, the One identified with Ultimate Reality has a unique divine status, 
but the devotees are still trying to attain the state of this One, even though they can never 
surpass it. Attaining the ultimate end of the devotee, believer, or follower is liberation, 
spiritual perfection, or salvation.  
In Adidam, Baha‘i, and Christianity the opposite of seeing and acknowledging the 
One who is identified with Ultimate Reality, is not seeing (i.e., spiritual blindness) and 
not acknowledging (i.e., rejecting and denying) the great One‘s divine state.   
Those who deny the God-Realizer, the Manifestation of God, or the Son of God 
will, of course, not take up the discipline that leads to liberation, the law that leads to 
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spiritual perfection, or the way of life that leads to salvation. The subsequent destiny for 
those who make this choice is bondage to worldliness, the hell of self, or damnation.  
Adi Da claims that his religion is the ―only complete way to realize the unbroken 
light of real God,‖ and that Adidam is the ―true world-religion.‖60 Baha‘u‘llah says that 
He reveals the universal religion of God for this age, and Baha‘is claim that Baha‘i is the 
―emerging global religion.‖61 Christ says that he is the way and the truth, and that there is 
no other way to the Father except through him (JN 14:6), and Christians have long been 
convinced that God‘s salvation through Christ is meant for all human beings, or all 
human beings who accept Christ.     
Nonetheless, in the world view of Daists there are not only worldlings and Daists; 
there are also those involved in authentic religious practices that lead to lesser 
realizations of God.
62
 In the world view of Baha‘is there are not only believers and 
deniers; there are also those who adhere to the teachings of previous Manifestations of 
God.
63
 In the world view of many Christians there are not just the saved and the damned; 
there are also religions that contain partial truth, and perhaps even partial truth that is 
necessary to fully understand Christian truth.
64
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But, in the end, Daists believe that one‘s ultimate spiritual destiny is realized as a 
Daist; Baha‘is believe that one‘s highest spiritual potential is realized as a Baha‘i; and, 
Christians believe that universal salvation is dependent on Christ. Consequently, all three 
religions are missionary religions, with universal aspirations. 
Given these conditions it would seem impossible for a Daist, a Baha‘i, or a 
Christian to be a genuine pluralist. From their perspectives the non-religious are 
worldlings, deniers of God, or pagans – and, the truly religious are less truly religious.  
Still, we can imagine what it would be like for Daists, Baha‘is, and Christians to 
be theologically pluralistic and the implications of this.  
First, all three religions would have admit that the three elements of their tripartite 
metaphysics are equal; second, they would all have to admit that it is possible to identify 
with each of the three different aspects of Ultimate Reality, which in practical terms 
would mean recognizing religious others grounded in different aspects of ultimate reality.  
In the Daist case, this would involve seeing Consciousness Itself, Universal Spirit 
Energy, and the Divine Form as equal.  And, it would involve seeing and acknowledging 
other religions identified with the two other (equal) aspects of Ultimate Reality (that it is 
not identified with). In other words, it would require Daists to not only see and recognize 
Adi Da‘s divine state but also the divine state of the divine Others identified with 
Universal Spirit Energy, and Divine Form. For example, it might require that Daists 
recognize Baha‘u‘llah and Christ as divine Others, who are as equally authentic as their 
divine One (Adi Da).    
In the Baha'i case this would involve seeing the unknowable Essence of God, the 
Manifestation of God, and Universal Matter as equal. And in practical terms, it might 
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involve seeing Adi Da as identified with the Essence of God, and Christ as identified with 
Universal Matter – and, consequently, as different but equally authentic divine Others.  
In the Christian case this would involve seeing the three persons of the Trinity as 
equal –something that Christians already do – but, then, also identifying the other two 
Persons of the Trinity with actual religious Beings equal to Christ. In practical terms, this 
might involve identifying Adi Da and Baha'u'llah with the other Persons of the Trinity. 
(Or, perhaps, it would involve recognizing the Buddha and Muhammad as the other 
Persons of the Trinity.)  As discussed above, Christianity presents a difficult case because 
Christ is usually identified with the Logos or the creative power that brings being out of 
nothingness. Spencer-Brown's solution to this problem is to identify the Holy Spirit with 
Void or the Godhead within God, the Father with the realm of omniscience wherein the 
potentialities of all worlds are enfolded (i.e., the Logos), and the Son with the first 
appearance or First Existence that is ―cleft into and projected out of‖ the Void. This 
conforms better to my understanding, of Ultimate Reality as Void, Creativity, and Form, 
and if Christians adopted this view they could more easily see Christ as Divine Form – 
and Others as Divine Void and Divine Creativity. In any case, the theology of religions I 
am suggesting here would require, of Christians, this sort of religious recognition of other 
divine Beings.   
Such recognition, however, would not involve being multi-religious in the sense 
that one would recognise three divine Beings and follow the three different ways 
prescribed by them. A distinction would have to be made between (at least) two different 
types of divine recognition; between subjective recognition and objective recognition. 
Subjective recognition is made by subjectively identifying oneself with the divine state of 
393 
 
One identified with Ultimate Reality – and demands that one become more and more like 
this One by doing the practice, obeying the laws, or living the life that they prescribe.  
Objective recognition is made by objectively knowing the divine state of the (two) divine 
Others who are identified with the aspects of Ultimate Reality that one is not trying to 
identify with – and demands that one honour, respect, and let be those religious others 
trying to attain the liberation, spiritual perfection, or salvation offered by these divine 
Others.  
Thus, a pluralistic theology of this kind would entail, on one hand, seeing and 
recognizing, in the sense of subjectively identifying with and trying to become more like, 
a chosen divine One; and, on the other hand, seeing and recognizing, in the sense of 
objectively knowing, two divine Others. In the latter case, one would not try to become 
like these Others, but one would necessarily acknowledge and honour them as divine. 
Moreover, those actively engaged in subjectively identifying with the ultimate realities of 
these divine Others would be recognized as participating in authentic religious paths.  
Obviously, such an imagined pluralistic theology would impact missionary work 
in Adidam, Baha‘i, and Christianity. Each religion would have to modify its sense of 
universal mission. Each religion could continue to bring its offer of liberation/spiritual 
perfection/salvation to all persons because all persons would be capable of accepting 
them. In other words, all persons could attain liberation in Adidam, all persons could 
attain spiritual perfection in Baha‘i, and all persons could attain salvation in Christianity.  
Moreover, each religion would have an obligation to bring its offer to all persons because 
all persons would have an obligation to objectively know the (two) divine Others, that 
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they choose not to identify with – and to honour and respect, as equal, those who choose 
a different path.    
In such a pluralistic situation, religious persons would not insist that others 
become like them. An offer to become a part of one‘s religion would be made, but those 
choosing another religious path would be honoured in their choice and peacefully left to 
follow this path. Simultaneously, those on each path would learn objectively, or from the 
outside, about the aspects of God subjectively identified within the (two) other authentic 
religions – and would confess to the authenticity, or divinity, of the divine Others who 
have founded these other religions. In short, one would try to subjectively become one 
aspect of Ultimate Reality by following one‘s own religion while simultaneously learning 
objectively about the two other aspects of Ultimate Reality as shown in (the) other (two) 
ultimate forms of religion.         
A pluralistic theology – or really a tripartite theology – of this sort could only be 
generated by actually identifying with one aspect of Ultimate Reality, and objectively 
recognizing that two Others are identified with two different aspects of Ultimate Reality. 
By recognizing one aspect of Ultimate Reality subjectively and two aspects of Ultimate 
Reality objectively, a religious person could come to the conclusion that Ultimate Reality 
is tripartite and that there are three equally valid religious options.  
Thus, it is possible to envision religious pluralism theologically or religiously. We 
will now summarize the main elements of my pluralistic arguments as compared with the 




The Three Complementary Arguments Compared with Cobb’s Pluralism and Kaplan’s 
Pluralism   
Cobb, Kaplan, and, I all try to articulate a pluralism that is not relativistic; we each try to 
make the seemingly impossible claim that there are multiple ultimately true religions. 
Moreover, we all employ a pluralistic metaphysics as a means to this end. There are, 
however, differences in the three approaches. We each work with a different theory of 
religions that determines how pluralistic we actually are. We each have different aims for 
our arguments. We each account for different pluralistic situations. And, we each 
construct different metaphysical structures using different methods.     
 
Different Theories of Religion and Different Commitments to Pluralism. Cobb's 
understanding of true religion is epistemological, and Kaplan's understanding of true 
religion is ontological. My understanding of true religion – or the understanding I employ 
in the imagined theology of religions – is both epistemological and ―ontological.‖  
For Cobb, true religion is knowledge about God, and Cobb assumes that 
knowledge is universal, in the sense that everyone can know everything that can be 
known. This epistemological understanding means that Cobb is not a pluralist in the end 
– his ideal is complete and unitary knowledge of God that is shared by everyone. 
For Kaplan, true religion is an ontological state, a state of being identified with a 
different aspect of Ultimate Reality. Kaplan assumes that the differing ontological 
grounds of different soteriologies (i.e., religions) leads to fixed and hard religious 
differences that cannot be overcome at this level; one cannot have the same ultimate 
religious experience as another. The only option in this situation is to try to conceptually 
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or philosophically bridge the different truths realized from the different and unbridgeable 
ontological states.      
In the pluralistic theology that I envision, I employ a dualistic understanding of 
true religion, and this might be described as a dualistic epistemology or a combined 
epistemology/ontology.  True religion is both recognition of Ultimate Reality as 
subjectively realized in oneself, and recognition of Ultimate Reality as objectively shown 
by others. I employ hard lines the way Kaplan does insofar as I say that one cannot 
subjectively identify with more than one aspect of Ultimate Reality at one time. But I 
soften these lines, as does Cobb, by saying that one can objectively know about the other 
(two) aspects of Ultimate Reality by objectively knowing the other religions. But the 
lines are not blurred completely as they are for Cobb, since different religious 
subjectivities cannot be unified. My final theological vision remains pluralistic.  
  
Different Objectives. Cobb‘s main objective is to construct a truer and more complete 
theology/religion. Thus, he needs a metaphysical structure that can accommodate 
maximum truth.  Kaplan wants to find a way to overcome problems created by religious 
exclusivity and inclusivity (religious inspired violence) – and, he believes that these 
problems can only be resolved by acknowledging multiple truths, since religious diversity 
is a permanent condition. My theology of religions (and complementary philosophy of 
religions and theory of religions) looks for a way to authenticate one‘s own religious 
experience while simultaneously authenticating the religiosity of others – and to have the 




Different Pluralistic Contexts.Cobb, Kaplan and I try to authenticate different pluralistic 
situations. Cobb is interested in authenticating acosmic, theistic, and cosmic religions. 
Kaplan is interested in authenticating monistic non-dualism, process non-dualism, and 
theism. I aim to reconcile non-dualism, the religion of divine unity, and trinitarianism (or 
the religion of divine relationship).  
In practical terms, Cobb is concerned with reconciling the truths of Buddhism and 
Christianity (while recognizing the need to include Native American religions in the 
mix). Kaplan is concerned with reconciling the ontological states of Advaitins, Yogacara 
Buddhists, and Christian mystics.  I am, most practically, concerned with reconciling 
Adidam, the Baha‘i Faith, and a Tillichian version of Christianity. 
 
Different Metaphysical Structures Built Using Different Methodologies. Each of our 
metaphysical structures is built specifically to account for different pluralistic contexts 
and are, therefore, different. Cobb employs a Whiteheadian metaphysics consisting of 
creativity, God, and, cosmos; these different aspects of Ultimate Reality correspond 
respectively with the acosmic, theistic, and cosmic types of religion. Kaplan employs a 
holographic-like metaphysical structure that employs David Bohm's metaphysical 
concepts of the implicate and explicate domains. The implicate domain shows the 
ontological possibilities of monistic non-dualism in process non-dualism, and the 
implicate domain(s) show(s) the ontological possibility of theism.  
I build three complementary pluralistic metaphysical structures. The first is 
constructed by studying and generalizing the tripartite theologies of Adidam, Baha‘i and 
Christianity. The second is constructed by projecting George Spencer-Brown‘s 
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mathematical insights about the emergence of physical existence, onto a concept of 
Ultimate Reality. The third pluralistic metaphysical structure is constructed by imagining 
that it is possible to subjectively identify with one aspect of Ultimate Reality and 
objectively recognize, or know, two other aspects of Ultimate Reality – and, thus, 
(directly) see Ultimate Reality as tripartite.  
Cobb's metaphysics is a naturalistic or philosophical theology and claims to refer 
to Ultimate Reality. Kaplan's metaphysics is a philosophy of religion, or a metaphysical 
model that shows Ultimate Reality without direct reference to actual metaphysical reality. 
My three metaphysical structures are all different: The scientific tripartite metaphysical, 
or theory of religions, is an analytical generalization based on actual theological claims 
about the structure of ultimate reality; it is not based on any direct knowledge of Ultimate 
Reality itself. The mathematical-metaphysics, or philosophy of religions, claims 
knowledge about Ultimate Reality by virtue of mathematical knowledge about the 
structure of physical existence (based on the assumption that Ultimate Reality is an 
archetype of physical existence). The theological tripartite metaphysics, or theology of 
religions, is based on a real or imagined claim that one can directly recognize Ultimate 
Reality as tripartite by recognizing one aspect subjectively and the other two aspects 
objectively.   
 
5. Conclusion  
To conclude this chapter, I will highlight the main features of my three pluralistic 





The Argument of Religious Pluralism  
Each of my three arguments tries to show that it is possible to hold the view that three 
very different types of religion are equally true. The theory argues this indirectly by 
saying that the different religions must be equally true because they are related to 
different aspects of Ultimate Reality. (This is basically Cobb‘s argument.) The 
philosophy argues this analogously by showing how it is possible to think about different 
truth claims, about the same thing, as equally true – and, then, saying that we can do 
likewise for different religious truth-claims about Ultimate Reality. (This is basically 
Kaplan‘s argument.) This argument is particularly significant in that it succeeds in 
overcoming the logical quagmire created by Aristotle‘s principle of non-contradiction. 
The theological argument says that it is possible to actually recognise that there are three 
aspects of Ultimate Reality because a person can subjectively recognize one of these in 
their own religion (or religious being), and can objectively recognize the other two in two 
other religions. Neither Cobb nor Kaplan propose or envision a pluralistic theology of 
this kind.     
Saying that there are different types of religion that are equally true could also be 
expressed in the following terms: The ultimate form of religion is plural or multiform. 
This is a claim made by humanistic and metaphysical pluralists alike, so we cannot say 
that it is a unique characteristic of metaphysical pluralism. What is unique to pluralistic 
metaphysics is the means of validating this claim; namely, a pluralistic metaphysics 
coupled with a concept of divine religion. Although each of my pluralistic arguments is 
made in a different mode, each is also dependent on a pluralistic metaphysics. In all of 
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the arguments, the different religions are equal because they participate in the same 
pluralistic Ultimate Reality.   
Each of my arguments also assumes strong identity between religion and Ultimate 
Reality or the concept of divine religion. In each argument, religion is understood as 
identification with one of the three aspects of Ultimate Reality; thus, religion is diverse 
because it shows the diversity of Ultimate Reality. We see this same type of argument in 
Kaplan‘s model, and in Cobb‘s pluralism. In Kaplan‘s model, religion is experience of 
one (of three possible) dimensions of Ultimate Reality – and, this ontological 
understanding of religion means the following: 1) there is religious diversity (because 
Ultimate Reality is diverse); 2) religious diversity is permanent because Ultimate Reality 
is (obviously) ultimate.  Cobb, of course, also assumes strong identity between Ultimate 
Reality and religion (otherwise the diversity of Ultimate Reality would have no bearing 
on the diversity of religion) even though his position is complicated (and his pluralism is 
compromised ) by his views that religion is unitary, albeit never complete, knowledge of 
Ultimate Reality. Nonetheless, I maintain that strong identity between Ultimate Reality 
and religion is also a main characteristic of metaphysical pluralism; indeed, it is a 
necessary premise of the argument of metaphysical pluralism.   
The combination of a pluralistic metaphysics and strong identity between 
Ultimate Reality and religion, ensures that religious plurality is deep, enduring, and 
permanent.   
 
Further Characteristics of Metaphysical Pluralism   
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Having discussed the argument of metaphysical religious pluralism I will now discuss 
two other identifying characteristics of metaphysical pluralistic theories: 1) that they are 
―non-distorting‖ conceptual frameworks; 2) that they encourage positive inter-religious 
relationships.    
In saying that metaphysical pluralistic theories are non-distorting conceptual 
frameworks, I mean that they do not require religions to define themselves or their 
ultimate ends in terms that do violence to what they are, or what their actual ends are (the 
way that humanistic pluralistic theories seem to). For example, a Baha‘i could continue to 
believe that only God is God, that Baha‘u‘llah is a Manifestation of God bearing the most 
potent Revelation in human history, and that the goal of life is to seek moral perfection 
and become God-like – while also holding the view that this is their perspective within 
Ultimate Reality and that non-dualists and trinitarians hold different but equally valid 
views from their perspectives within Ultimate Reality. This does not require an 
abandonment of one‘s own position, just an acknowledgement of the positions of others 
within a wider framework. Kaplan makes a similar claim when he says that the only thing 
he requires religions to give up is their view that other religions are wrong; he calls on 
religions to embrace more truth. Cobb, likewise, tries to see the truth of other religions, as 
they are, with his notion of ―complementary pluralism.‖ 65    
   The claim that metaphysical pluralistic theories encourage positive inter-faith 
relationships might be taken as ironic by humanistic pluralists (such as Knitter) and neo-
inclusivists (such as Heim) who foresee the danger of radical isolation in this approach. 
David Griffin tries to quell this fear with the notion that deep or complementary pluralists 
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would certainly need to dialogue with religious others in order to gain a more complete 
picture of Ultimate Reality, and, of course, Cobb makes things even more comfortable, 
by supposing that these pictures would be visible to everyone.
66
 Kaplan, doesn‘t address 
this issue explicitly, but necessarily maintains the possibility of acknowledging the truth 
of others, while dwelling in the separate state of one‘s own religious being. And, 
following, is an account of how things might appear in a religious universe where my 
theology of religions is in play:          
In this scenario there will be mutual recognition among the monotheist, non-
dualistic, and trinitarian religions – and this will be more than peaceful isolation. This 
will be the case because belonging to a ―home religion‖ (by virtue of being subjectively 
identified with one aspect of ultimate reality) would not preclude one from obtaining 
objective knowledge about Ultimate Reality from religious others (subjectively identified 
with one of the other aspects of Ultimate Reality). Indeed, this will be a prerequisite for 
maximizing one‘s experience and understanding of Ultimate Reality. This theology will 
also allow one the possibility of covering all of the religious ―bases‖ (by identifying with 
different aspects of Ultimate Reality at different times); however, it maintains that it is 
impossible to be identified with all three aspects of Ultimate Reality at the same time, 
making a lived super-religious state impossible.  
 In all accounts, the metaphysical pluralists are saying that it is necessary to 
maintain the authenticity of your own religion – but also to recognize different religious 
truth in others. The call is not for isolation, or conversion – but, for recognition of and 
relationship with the other as other.    
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I will now close with some arguments for the comparative usefulness of the fourfold 
typology I have proposed, and some reflections on the possible future of the idea of 
religious pluralism.  
 
1. Defence of the Fourfold Typology 
The conceptual distinctions I have made in this dissertation allowed me to produce a 
fourfold typology or taxonomy of theories of religious diversity; this was then applied to 
several cases of late twentieth century religious diversity theorizing. I believe this 
typology is useful for accurately classifying these theoretical efforts, and so am 
necessarily critical of other typologies and efforts to distinguish between theories of 
religious diversity.  
 In the course of this work, I have hinted at, and sporadically expressed, my 
dissatisfaction with these differing typologies and differing conceptual distinctions used 
to sort out theories of religious diversity. But, now, I will proceed with a more systemic 
critique of these other classifying options, in order to indirectly defend my own 
distinctions. 
 In The Absoluteness of Christianity, Ernst Troeltsch made a distinction that I 
contend is still relevant to this discussion about classifying theories of religious diversity. 
This distinction is between religion understood as a (particular) form and religion 
understood as a philosophical idea (or an ―essence‖). I think this distinction is still useful 
for distinguishing between religious ―exclusivism‖ and religious ―inclusivism,‖ 
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particularly if we say that inclusivists understand the ultimate form of religion as an idea 
of religion in the shape of a religious essence or religious end.  
 This new ―inclusivist‖ way of thinking about religions, that Troeltsch largely 
identifies with Hegel and Schleiermacher, introduces a new element into thinking or 
theorizing about religious diversity; namely, the element of relative versus absolute 
religion. Troeltsch rightly noted that before this new way of seeing religion, the idea of 
―absolute religion‖ had no real meaning, since this idea only makes sense in contrast to 
―relative religion‖ – and relative and absolute cannot be distinguished unless there is an 
ultimate religious ideal or an idea of the ultimate form of religion (i.e., the essence of 
religion) to judge these against. Prior to this abstraction, or idealization, of religion there 
was no way of seeing many relatively true religions opposed to one absolutely true 
religion; there was religion and non-religion.  In this latter case, true religion is identified 
with a particular form of religion, and consequently whatever is different from this form 
is false ―religion.‖  This is religious exclusivism.  
 By the end of the nineteenth century, Troeltsch was of the view that neither the 
supernatural apologetic (exclusivism), nor the evolutionary apologetic (inclusivism) was 
an appropriate way of classifying Christianity in relation to other religions. By the end of 
the twentieth century, Troeltsch‘s view was evidently shared by most other religious 
diversity theorists in the Christian West, as evidenced by the fact that late twentieth 
century theorizing about religious diversity is characterized by an attempt to move past 
religious exclusivism and traditional forms of religious inclusivism.
67
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 This present work adopts Troeltsch‘s distinction between religion understood as 
form and religion understood as idea (essence or end) as the main dividing line between 
exclusivism and inclusivism, but then moves on to make further distinctions. The first, 
and most significant, distinction it makes is between religious inclusivism and religious 
pluralism. The starting point of this distinction is the assumption that both inclusivists 
and pluralists reject the exclusivist understanding of religion as a particular form of 
religion, and embrace the notion that religion is rightly understood as an idea – for 
inclusivists and metaphysical pluralists this idea of religion is a religious end or essence, 
and for humanistic pluralists it is a religious universal. Thus, when inclusivists and 
pluralists speak of an ―ultimate form‖ of religion, or of ―true religion‖ they are referring 
to an idea about religion, as such, and not any particular religion; more specifically, they 
are referring to a religious essence, a religious end, or a religious universal. And, it 
maintains that both inclusivists and pluralists, whether explicitly or implicitly, always do 
affirm the idea that there is an ultimate form of religion or true religion.    
 But, from this common ground of true religion, inclusivists and pluralists make 
different claims about its nature; inclusivists claim that the ultimate form of religion is 
uniform (has one form) and pluralists claim that it is pluriform (has multiple forms).
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This distinction seems simple enough but, as far as I can tell, has never been used to 
distinguish inclusivism from pluralism in typologies or taxonomies of theories of 
religious diversity.  
 The second major distinction this work makes pertains to religious pluralism, and 
similarly starts from a common ground. In this case, the common ground is the claim of 
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all pluralists that the ultimate form of religion is multiform or plural. And, here, the 
distinction made is based on the argument that different types of pluralists use in order to 
come to the conclusion that the ultimate form of religion is multiform and not uniform. 
Humanistic religious pluralists come to this conclusion by denying the possibility of 
strong identity between Ultimate Reality (presumed to be unitary) and religion – and, 
then, positing a religious universal, or ideal form of religion that is inherently multiform. 
Humanistic pluralists employ a humanistic concept of religion (i.e., a concept of religion 
conceptualized as humanly ―constructed‖) to avoid the logical conclusion that religion 
would be one if there was strong identity between religion and (the one) God; and, it 
employs a religious universal to conceptualize an ultimate form of religion that is 
inherently multiform.  
 Metaphysical pluralists are likewise concerned with the possibility that religion 
would necessarily be one if Ultimate Reality is one and there is strong identity between 
Ultimate Reality and religion. The solution of metaphysical pluralism to this problem, 
however, is not a humanistic concept of religion, but a pluralistic metaphysics. In this 
case, strong identity between Ultimate Reality and religion (i.e., a ―revelatory‖ concept of 
religion or a concept of religion as divine) is upheld, but this is coupled with a divine 
metaphysics to lead to the conclusion that religion, like Ultimate Reality, is pluralistic or 
multiform.  
 For metaphysical pluralism, the conclusion that religion is multiform is a one 
stage argument: Ultimate Reality is multiform; religion is, or reflects, Ultimate Reality; 
therefore, religion is multiform. For humanistic pluralism, the conclusion that religion is 
multiform is a two stage argument. In the first stage, it is not affirmed that (the ultimate 
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form of) religion is multiform, but it is denied that (the ultimate form of) religion is 
uniform: Ultimate Reality is one; religion is not identical to Ultimate Reality; therefore, 
religion is not (like Ultimate Reality) one. In the second stage, it is claimed that, despite 
the fact there is no one and only divinely revealed religion, there is a religious universal 
which (only) has reality in its multiple expressions; in other words, the ultimate or 
universal form of religion is multiform.  
 Thus, humanistic religious pluralism combines the assumption that Ultimate 
Reality is one with a humanistic concept of God, in order to conclude that religion is not 
one and only; and then employs the idea of a religious universal to come to the 
conclusion that the ultimate or universal form of religion is multiform. On the other hand, 
metaphysical religious pluralism assumes a concept of religion as divinely revealed (or, 
minimally, a concept of religion wherein Ultimate Reality is reflected in religion); and, 
then employs a pluralistic metaphysics to draw the conclusion that the ultimate form of 
religion is necessarily multiform because Ultimate Reality is multiform.     
 Putting this all together, there are four different theories of religious diversity: 
Exclusivism: true religion is embodied in a single existential form; all other forms of 
―religion‖ are false. Inclusivism: there are many relatively true religions and possibly one 
absolutely true religion, but the ultimate form of religion (as essence or end) is singular or 
uniform. Humanistic religious pluralism: The ultimate form of religion (as a universal) is 
multiform because no religion is identical to Ultimate Reality, and because the religious 
universal is real only insofar as it is instantiated in particular forms of religion. 
Metaphysical religious pluralism: the ultimate form of religion (as essence or end) is 
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multiform because religion is a manifestation or reflection of Ultimate Reality, and 
Ultimate Reality is multiform.            
 The work of the late twentieth century religious diversity theorists examined in 
this dissertation have been classified using the above fourfold typology. Now, we will 
take a critical look at how different typologies, or different concepts for distinguishing 
different theories of religious diversity, would handle this same context. This critique will 
focus on the ideas of neo-inclusivists (collectively); Perry Schmidt-Leukel‘s reworked 
version of Race‘s threefold typology in The Myth of Religious Superiority; David Ray 
Griffin‘s distinction between identist and differential pluralism in Deep Religious 
Pluralism; and, Paul Knitter‘s fourfold typology in Introducing Theologies of Religions.  
 
Neo-Inclusivism: Stopping the Conversation.  
Mark Heim, Gavin D‘Costa, and (to a lesser extent) Paul Griffiths have argued that 
pluralists are really no different from other religious diversity theorists. They reject 
Hick‘s notion that pluralists theorize from the high ground of meta-theory, which allows 
them to assert the plurality of religion without getting involved in the particular religions 
themselves. For D‘Costa, all religious diversity theorists are in the same boat; they are all 
exclusivists. Likewise for Heim; all theorists are inclusivists. 
 Interestingly, Paul Knitter has adopted this notion that all religious diversity 
theorists are working on the same plane and, so, faced with the same limitations:    
So we‘re always including the other in what we hold to be true and valuable, in 
what we already are. We don‘t just look at others from where we stand; we also 
understand them and evaluate them from where we stand. We may not like that, 
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but there‘s really nothing we can do about it. Not to include others in where we 
stand would require us to somehow stand in some neutral place that would not so 
―prejudice‖ us. But in this case, ―neutral‖ would mean ―culture-less,‖ or 
―nonhistorical,‖ or religion-less. Really, it would mean ―beyond this world.‖ It 
would mean finding that often-mentioned Archimedian standing place, in space, 
outside of any limiting or biasing cultural viewpoint. Unless you‘re an angel, such 
a standing spot just doesn‘t exist.69 
 If the above passage is an accurate summation of the point that the neo-inclusivist 
critics of religious pluralism are trying to make, in saying that all diversity theorists are 
exclusivists or inclusivists, then I am in agreement with them; even though I would 
express things differently. I would say that every religious diversity theorist 
imaginatively constructs a religious universe, or a world-view of religions. John Hick 
does this just as much as Mark Heim does, and as much as I do. But it also seems to me 
that neo-inclusivists use this insight inappropriately; as a way of dismissing the 
constructive theoretical work of pluralists and validating their own constructive efforts.  
They seem to reason that, if pluralists are really just as bad as they are, then they are 
justified is criticizing the ―lame,‖ ―uninteresting,‖ ―un-Christian‖ and ―not really 
pluralistic‖ theories of the pluralists – and in producing better, more Christian, and even 
more pluralistic theories of religious diversity.   
 But what gets lost in this rhetoric is any careful analysis of how pluralistic 
theories differ from non-pluralistic theories, let alone how different pluralistic theories 
differ from one another. In other words, neo-inclusivists use the insight that pluralists are 
also constructing world views, or religious universes, to justify their own constructive 
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efforts but not to look at how their own religious universes are different from others. In 
this respect, they are conversation stoppers.    
 It seems that neo-inclusivists, primarily, use the insight that all theorists construct 
world-views to say something like ―you‘re doing the same thing as I am – only I‘m doing 
it much better.‖ From my perspective, this insight is better used as a starting point for 
further inquiry into the sorts of spiritual universes that are being envisioned, and how 
these differ from one another; indeed, this dissertation is a product of such a disposition 
and such inquiry. Thus, I am sympathetic to this critical insight, of the neo-inclusivists, as 
a starting point for classifying theories of religious diversity but not as the bases of an all-
embracing – and consequently vacuous – class called ―exclusivism,‖ ―inclusivism,‖ or 
whatever else that effectively stops the taxonomic conversion.    
 
Perry Schmidt-Leukel: Missing the Unity in Religious Pluralism    
The most obvious criticism that I could make of Perry Schmidt-Leukel‘s threefold 
typology is that it is missing a type; namely, metaphysical pluralism.  I am, of course, 
critical of Schmidt-Leukel on this point but I see this problem rooted in a more 
foundational flaw within his typology; specifically, that it doesn‘t make an adequate (or 
complete) distinction between inclusivism and pluralism.  
 Schmidt-Leukel‘s line of distinction between inclusivism and pluralism is that 
while both claim that there are multiple religions, inclusivism says that there is a 
―singular maximus‖ (a singular ultimate form of religion) and pluralism says that there is 
no singular maximus. My line of distinction is, again, that inclusivism says the ultimate 
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form of religion is uniform, and pluralism says the ultimate form of religion is multiform 
or plural. 
 The obvious question to ask here is whether or not Schmidt-Leukel‘s singular 
maximus, means the same things as my ―ultimate form of religion.‖ There are two 
different ways of reading this situation: 1) we mean different things by our terms 
―singular maximus‖ and ―ultimate form of religion‖; 2) Schmidt-Leukel‘s ―singular 
maximus‖ means the same thing as my ―ultimate form of religion.‖70 I will now discuss 
both of these scenarios because, I believe, both show taxonomic limitations that stem 
from Schmidt-Leukel‘s way of distinguishing between inclusivism and pluralism.   
 If we mean different things by these terms then this is what I think we mean:  By 
singular maximus, Schmidt-Leukel means a uniform religious end or essence that is 
(necessarily) best realized in one religion; and, by ultimate form of religion, I mean a 
unitary religious essence, religious end, or religious universal, which is either uniform or 
multiform.   
 According to these definitions, I agree with Schmidt-Leukel that religious 
inclusivism affirms the idea of a singular maximus and pluralism rejects it.  Thus, with 
respect to pluralism, I agree that no pluralists say that there is a uniform religious end or 
essence that is best realized in one religion.  Nonetheless, I suggest that this is not a very 
useful distinction for identifying or classifying theories of religious pluralism, since other 
positions – relativism, for example – also say that there is no uniform religious end or 
essence that is best realized in one religion. Not to mention the fact that this negative 
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 I will, of course, not discuss the possibility that my “ultimate form of religion” means the same thing as 
Schmidt-Leukel’s “singular maximus” – because it doesn’t.   
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definition of pluralism eliminates the context for further differentiating the concept of 
religious pluralism.  
 Consequently, I think that the idea of a ―singular maximus‖ should give way to 
the broader concept of the ―ultimate form of religion‖ which captures both the idea of a 
―singular maximus‖ (a uniform essence, end, or universal), and a ―plural maximus‖ (a 
multiform essence, end, or universal).  The idea of the ultimate form of religion – 
understood as an ultimate unity in the form of an essence, end, or universal that is either 
uniform or multiform – provides a means for distinguishing between inclusivism and 
pluralism, and for further differentiating religious pluralism.    
 If, on the other hand, Schmidt-Leukel‘s ―singular maximus‖ means the same thing 
as what I mean by the ―ultimate form of religion‖ then an even more serious taxonomic 
problem arises. In this case, Schmidt Leukel‘s position would be that pluralists say there 
is no ultimate form of religion, or no ultimate religious unity in the form of an essence, 
end, or universal that is either uniform or multiform.  In my view, all forms of pluralism 
clearly say that there is an ultimate religious unity (as essence, end, or universal) that is 
inherently multiform. And, accordingly, no pluralists – be they humanistic or 
metaphysical – would be classified as pluralists using Schmidt-Leukel‘s distinction.    
 The first of these two scenarios is probably more accurate but the taxonomic 
problems that arise in both cases stem from the same root; namely, Schmidt-Leukel‘s 
failure to identify the deeper common ground of pluralism and inclusivism, and to 
positively define pluralism.
71
 For Schmidt-Leukel, the common ground of pluralism and 
inclusivism is the affirmation of many religions. I contend that the common ground of 
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 Schmidt-Leukel does give a positive definition for pluralism, but this is identical to the initial claim made 
by religious inclusivists.    
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pluralism and inclusivism is not this, but the whole idea of ―the one and the many‖ that 
came into being when exclusivism gave way to inclusivism, or when religion as form 
gave way to religion as idea. Moreover, I content that it is ―the one‖ of this polarity that 
serves as the locus of the difference between inclusivism and pluralism. Said differently, 
both inclusivists and pluralists affirm the reality of ―the one,‖ and their differences arise 
with respect to the nature of ―the one.‖ Inclusivists say it is uniform; pluralists say it is 
multiform. And, when pluralists say that ―the one‖ is multiform they are introducing an 
idea of multiplicity that is entirely different from the idea of ―the many‖ that arises as the 
opposite of ―the one‖ in inclusivism.72   
 Thus, if I were to limit myself to one criticism of Schmidt-Leukel‘s typology it 
would be that he misses, or doesn‘t acknowledge, ―the one‖ or the religious unity that is 
the ground of every form of religious pluralism.          
 I will now conclude this part of the critique with one further point that is not 
related to taxonomy. I simply want to suggest that Schmidt-Leukel‘s polemical attitude 
towards Christian inclusivists may also be grounded in his failure to see that every form 
of religious pluralism is grounded in a religious unity.   
 For Schmidt-Leukel, pluralism is clearly a better option than inclusivism; 
pluralism is about peaceful coexistence with other religions, while inclusivism is an 
obnoxious affirmation of the superiority of one particular religion. Consequently, 
Schmidt-Leukel is highly negative towards Mark Heim‘s inclusivism, describing it as an 
inclusivism ―of the less generous sort,‖ in which the non-Christian religions lead their 
inhabitants to ―…a new, post-modernist kind of pre-modern limbo.‖73  
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 I will discuss this further in my critique of Knitter’s fourfold typology below.  
73
 Schmidt-Leukel. “Exclusivism, Inclusivism, Pluralism,” 27. 
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 I don‘t disagree with Schmidt-Leukel‘s classification of Heim as an inclusivist, 
but I am a little puzzled by the negative evaluation of Heim‘s theorizing.  I am puzzled 
because Heim‘s theorizing is so highly conciliatory and in line with the aims of religious 
pluralists; particularly, the aim of recognizing truth in other religions. Thus, I can only 
attribute Schmidt-Leukel‘s ―ungenerous‖ view of Heim to what, I believe, is Schmidt-
Leukel‘s erroneous view of the differences between inclusivism and pluralism that misses 
the common ground shared by these two views.   
   
David Ray Griffin: Obscuring the Unity in Metaphysical Pluralism and the Diversity in 
Humanistic Pluralism  
For Griffin, religious pluralism, in the generic sense, involves a twofold affirmation – the 
first, negative affirmation, rejects absolutism or the idea that only one‘s own religion 
provides saving truths; the second, positive affirmation says that other religions do 
provide their adherents with ―saving truths and values‖74  
 From this common ground, Griffin goes on to distinguish two different types of 
pluralism; identist and differential/deep. Identist pluralism says that all religions are 
oriented towards the same religious object (God, Ultimate Reality, etc), and promote the 
same end (the same type of salvation). In other words, all religions have an identical 
ontology and soteriology. Differential pluralism, in contrast, says that different religions 
promote different ends, or different salvations as a consequence of being related to 
different religious objects (different Ultimate Realities). Differential pluralism is 
pluralistic soteriologically and (possibly) ontologically.
75
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 Griffin, “Religious Pluralism,” 3. 
75
 Ibid., 24. 
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 Griffin, I think, is unwilling to say that all forms of differential pluralism affirm a 
pluralistic ontology because he wants to include Mark Heim – who he claims is 
soteriologically pluralistic (by virtue of saying that different religions have different 
ends) but ontologically identist (by virtue of affirming the Trinity). I think this is based 
on a misreading of Heim, whose is also, in the end, ontologically ―identist‖ since he 
claims that the ultimate end is Christian salvation.        
 In any case, the dividing line between identist and differential or deep pluralism is 
clear – at least with respect to soteriology. Identist pluralists say that all religions are 
moving towards the same end or the same sort of salvation; differential pluralists say that 
different religions are moving towards different ends or different sorts of ―salvation.‖  
But, on the ontological point, Griffin‘s position is, I believe, inconsistent. He says that 
identist pluralists claim that religions are oriented towards the same religious object (the 
same Ultimate Reality), and that differential pluralists claim that religions may be 
oriented towards different religious objects (different Ultimate Realities).  I will move 
forward by assuming that differential pluralists make the stronger claim, that religions are 
soteriologically different by virtue of being oriented towards different Ultimate Realities. 
 The notion I want to challenge, here, is that identists say religions are related to 
the same Ultimate Reality, and differentialists say religions are related the different 
Ultimate Realities. I suggest that the ontological positions of identist pluralists (such as 
Hick) and differential pluralists (such as Griffin/Cobb) are better expressed as follows: 
identists say that all religions are related to the same Ultimate Reality and claim that this 
Reality is singular; differentialists say that all religions are related to the same Ultimate 
Reality, and claim that this Ultimate Reality is plural. Thus, it is not the case that identists 
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have the same ontology and differentialists have different ontologies; it is that identists 
have (the same) unitary ontology/metaphysics and differentialists have (the same) 
pluralistic ontology/metaphysics.  
 Consequently, I don‘t find Griffin‘s twin criterion of distinguishing identist and 
differential pluralism, on the basis of one claiming that all religions point to the same 
religious object and the other claiming that different religions point to different religious 
objects, at all useful. Moreover, I believe Griffin‘s way of framing the ontological claim 
of differential pluralism (i.e., that different religions point to different religious objects or 
different Ultimate Realities) obscures an important dimension of metaphysical pluralism; 
namely, that the starting point for differentialists is an Ultimate Reality. Allow me to 
discuss this briefly before critiquing Griffin‘s second twin criterion. 
  When Griffin/Cobb adopt Whitehead‘s tripartite metaphysic – composed of 
Creativity, God, and Cosmos – they are saying that Ultimate Reality altogether, in total, 
as a unit, is tripartite. In other words, unity is the basis of their pluralistic metaphysics. 
And, when it becomes clear that the basis of Griffin/Cobb‘s differential pluralism is not 
the seemingly innocuous claim that different religions are oriented to different religious 
objects, but is a full-blown and very specific metaphysics, some unsettling questions 
come to mind: Is Whitehead‘s tripartite metaphysics some sort of ultimate metaphysics 
and, perhaps, an ultimate religious perspective in itself? Is it not something that all other 
religions would have to submit themselves to?  I don‘t know the extent to which Griffin 
has dealt with this issue, but we know that he does think that different religions could 
adopt Whitehead‘s metaphysical categories without undue distortion.76   
                                                          
76
 I will take up this issue, more substantially when I discuss the likelihood of pluralism succeeding in the 
Christian West.  
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 In any case, the point I wish to make is that Griffin‘s way of distinguishing 
between identist and differential pluralism tends to bury this issue. Thus, I think that it is 
better to say that both identists and differentialists employ the idea of a common Ultimate 
Reality; but identists maintain that this Ultimate Reality is strictly unitary, and 
differentialists maintain that it is plural. By using this distinction, the notion that 
differential pluralists make metaphysical claims that are of a different order than other 
religious diversity theorists will not arise. Now, we will turn to look at Griffin‘s twin 
soteriological criterion.     
   Griffin suggests that in some forms of differential pluralism (his own for 
example), a pluralistic ontology is the ground for a pluralistic soteriology.  He does not, 
however, explicitly link an ―identist‖ – or what I would rather call a ―unitary‖ – ontology 
with an identist soteriology; nonetheless, I think he implies that there is a link.  
 I, again, claim that a pluralistic metaphysics is a necessary component of 
metaphysical pluralism, and that a unitary metaphysics is a necessary component of 
humanistic pluralism.  But my reason for saying this is that these belong to the arguments 
of humanistic pluralism and metaphysical pluralism, which are both aimed at the 
conclusion that the ultimate or universal form of religion is multiform.  In the case of 
metaphysical pluralism, a pluralistic metaphysics is combined with a concept of divine 
religion, to arrive at the positive conclusion that religion, like Ultimate Reality, is plural. 
In the case of humanistic pluralism, a unitary metaphysics is combined with a concept of 
human religion to arrive at the negative conclusion that no religion, is one and only, like 
God is one and only. But, then, in order to make the positive affirmation that there are 
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many true religions, humanistic pluralists posit a religious universal as the 
ultimate/universal form of religion, and in all cases this universal is inherently multiform.  
 Thus, I oppose the simplistic way in which Griffin conceptualizes the common 
―soteriology‖ in all forms of identist pluralism. First because the ―identical thing‖ 
affirmed by identists (apart from their unitary metaphysics) is not necessarily 
soteriological. Consequently, I suggest it is better to understand the commonality in 
identist pluralism, with a broader concept such as the ultimate or universal form of 
religion, or true religion. Second, and more importantly, because the ―identical thing‖ – 
or the ultimate form of religion – in all forms of identist pluralism this is not strictly 
unitary, it is a unity that is also inherently plural. This is the case with Smith‘s concept of 
faith, Hick‘s concept of salvation, and Knitter‘s concept of eco-human well being. Each 
of these concepts is a religious universal that is only visible when it is instantiated in its 
many and different (but equally authentic) forms. By not recognizing this, Griffin misses 
the depth of diversity that is present on all forms of identist or humanistic-universalist 
religious pluralism.  
 As for Griffin‘s criterion that differential pluralists claim that different religions 
have different ends I, of course, would rather express this in terms of differentialists 
claiming that the ultimate form of religion is multiform – as opposed to singular. This 
distinction allows us to distinguish between theories of religious diversity that appear to 






Knitter: Conflating the Relative Many and the Ultimate or Universal Many  
 As mentioned earlier, Paul Knitter‘s fourfold typology in Introducing Theories of 
Religions appears to be similar to the fourfold typology I have proposed in this 
dissertation. Knitter‘s replacement model, summarized in the phrase, ―only one religion,‖ 
is a new name for exclusivism; the fulfilment model, summarized as ―the one fulfills the 
many‖ is a new name for inclusivism; the mutuality model, summarized as ―many true 
religions called to dialogue‖ is a new name for pluralism. The acceptance model, 
summarized as ―many true religions: so be it‖ is a new type. Similarly my fourfold 
typology consists of exclusivism, inclusivism, traditional pluralism (now called 
humanistic-universalistic pluralism) – and a new fourth type called metaphysical 
pluralism.  
 Continuing, the two typologies also produce similar results: Karl Barth‘s theology 
of religions is a form of the replacement model/ exclusivism; Karl Rahner and Gavin 
D‘Costa typify the fulfillment model/inclusivism; Paul Knitter and John Hick are 
mutualists/humanistic-universalistic pluralists. Knitter and I, however, classify Mark 
Heim‘s theology of religions very differently; I classify Heim‘s theology as neo-
inclusivist, and Knitter uses Heim‘s theology to exemplify the acceptance model. This 
suggests that what I call metaphysical pluralism and what Knitter calls the acceptance 
model are not the same thing. 
 The first thing to note, here, is that my category of metaphysical religious 
pluralism is based on the work of Kaplan, Griffin/Cobb, and my own earlier efforts to 
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articulate an authentic theory of religious pluralism.
77
 None of this work was available to 
Knitter, when he wrote Introducing Theologies of Religions. Consequently, we should 
expect metaphysical pluralism and the acceptance model to be very different types. I will 
now try to show how they are different, and argue that Knitter‘s typology involves a 
conceptual error that makes it difficult to accurately classify theories of religious 
pluralism.  
 In this part of the critique, I will continue with a theme that I began to discuss in 
relation to Schmidt-Leukel‘s threefold typology; namely, his inability to see the implicit 
unity in every form of religious pluralism. Knitter seems to notice this (to some extent) in 
the case of the mutuality model, wherein the religions are envisioned as working together 
for greater common understanding and well-being. But, in the case of the acceptance 
model, there is no hint of unity; the religions are simply different, and so be it.  
  In seems to me that Knitter, like Leukel-Schmidt, fails to see a higher (or 
secondary) level of abstraction that is present in pluralistic theories of religious 
diversity.
78
 In Introducing Theologies of Religions, Knitter sees the fulfilment model 
employing the concept, or logic, of the ―one and many.‖ I, likewise, associate this way of 
thinking with inclusivism. Moreover, following Troeltsch, I see this way of thinking – in 
terms of the one versus the many, the absolute religion versus relative religions, the 
consummate religion versus the preliminary religions, and so forth – stemming from the 
new way of thinking about religion that began in the eighteenth century, i.e., as an idea 
(essence or end) rather than a particular form.  
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 Cobb’s pluralism was available to Knitter – indeed Knitter edited Cobb’s Transforming Christianity  – 
but, I suggest that Cobb’s pluralism doesn’t take shape as a coherent theory until it is summarized and 
conceptualized (as differential pluralism) in Griffin’s Deep Pluralism.    
78
 I don’t think Knitter is at fault here, though, because this higher level of abstraction is most obvious in 
metaphysical pluralism.   
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 The common base of Knitter‘s mutuality model and his acceptance model is the 
claim that there are many true religions. Knitter, however, does not distinguish this use of 
―many‖ from the many that are fulfilled in the one, in the fulfilment model. I think this is 
a conceptual error, and that these two concepts are completely different.  
 In my typology, I claim that inclusivism and pluralism, alike, employ the idea of 
the ultimate form of religion – conceived as essence, end or universal. Consequently, I 
say that all forms of pluralism employ the eighteenth century idea of the one ultimate 
form of religion, that allows for a distinction between the one absolutely true form of 
ultimate religion and the many relatively true forms of ultimate religion. But, from this 
starting point, pluralists try to conceptually manipulate the idea of the one, or the idea of 
the of ultimate form of religion. Or, more specifically, they try to pluralize the idea of the 
one ultimate form of religion. This manipulation of ―the one‖ is very obvious in the case 
of metaphysical pluralism where we see talk of multiple ultimate religious perspectives, 
or multiple ultimate religious truths. It is less obvious in the case of humanistic-
universalistic pluralism but, I maintain, still present. It is less obvious because humanistic 
pluralists are unwilling to pluralize ultimate religion by pluralizing Ultimate Reality and, 
therefore, need to disconnect religion from unitary Ultimate Reality. But, then, 
humanistic-universalistic pluralists recuperate the idea of the one true religion, or the one 
ultimate form or religion, by introducing the ideas of a religious universal. This religious 
universal is only visible in its various authentic expressions, and so this idea of a religious 
universal supports the idea that there are many universally true religions. But, in this 
case, the many universally true religions, are not the same as the many relatively true 
religions of religions inclusivism; they are ―the one‖ reconstituted and pluralized.  And, 
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of course, the many forms of the ultimate form of religion, in metaphysical pluralism, is 
not the same as the relative many either.     
 I suggest that if we fail to see this higher or secondary level of abstraction that is 
taking place in all forms of religious pluralism – i.e., this effort to pluralize ―the one‖ or a 
particular idea of ―true religion‖ – that we will not be able to properly identify theories of 
religious pluralism. We will be prone to classifying any theory that claims there are many 
religions as pluralist, and to thinking that pluralism amounts to saying that all religions 
are true.
79
   
 
2. The Future of the Idea of Religious Pluralism  
The aim of this dissertation has been to make clear the meaning of religious pluralism 
and other theories of religious diversity, and not to make judgements about the relative 
values of these differing theories.  But, now, I will close with some reflections related to 
value, by asking three questions about the possible future of religious pluralism: 1) does 
religious pluralism have a future in the Christian West?; 2) does religious pluralism have 
a future outside of the Christian West?; and, 3) is the idea of religious pluralism 
conceptually exhausted, or at an end? My reflections on these questions are not meant to 
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 To be fair, Knitter’s phrase “many true religions” implies that the mutuality model and the acceptance 
model are based on the pluralisation of the one true religion – and, consequently, that he is not making a 
conceptual mistake of conflating the relative many with the ultimate or universal many. Nonetheless, by 
not explicitly distinguishing between the relative many and the ultimate or universal many, Knitter leaves 
pluralism open to the sorts of misunderstandings I have mentioned here.  I also suggested that Schmidt-
Leukel does not notice the secondary abstraction wherein pluralist try to pluralize the one, since he sees 
pluralism as the claim that there is no singular maximus, and so the positive claim of pluralism is identical 
to the positive claim of inclusivism, i.e., that more than one religion (but not necessarily all religions) 
mediates salvific knowledge of ultimate reality. In this case, the distinction between the relative many and 
the ultimate or universal many is completely lost.  As for why Knitter does not see Heim’s theology as a 
version of the fulfillment model I have only one suggestion: He misread Heim, and didn’t see that Heim 
does conceive Christian salvation as the ultimate (unitary albeit complex) form of religion; see my analysis 
of Heim in Chapter 5. And, perhaps, he did this because he didn’t have a more full-fledged version of 
metaphysical pluralism to contrast it with.              
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provide definitive answers but, rather, to initiate some conversations that now might be 
more fruitful in light of our present understanding of religious pluralism.   
 
 Does Religious Pluralism have a Future in the Christian West? 
By asking if the idea of religious pluralism has a future in the Christian West, I am asking 
if it is likely that pluralism will become a popular, if not dominant, way of 
conceptualizing religious diversity amongst Christians and Westerners in the future.    
 I will begin by discussing, generally, two reasons why I think that pluralism may 
gain in popularity: 1) because it articulates and already perceived reality; and, 2) because 
it is consonant with the widely accepted value of religious tolerance.    
“Pluralism” is Already Widely Recognized.  The weight of historical evidence seems to 
suggest that there are many religions that function is similar ways and, so, in this respect 
can be regarded as equal.  The concept of ―world religions‖ gives voice to this 
perception, and since the early twentieth century this idea has become imbedded in 
popular and academic religious discourses.
80
 In some respects, theories of religious 
pluralism may be thought of as an attempt to make bring the ubiquitous – yet fuzzy – idea 
of world religions into sharper focus; and, indeed, to convert it into a respectable 
theological idea.  The degree to which pluralistic theologians have succeeded in this task 
is still historically undetermined; nonetheless, the idea of world religions seems to have 
created a widespread and enduring perception that there are, in reality, world religions, 
and I suspect that this will continue to be supportive of pluralistic theories of religious 
diversity.    
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 Again, see Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions, especially Chapter 9.  Also, consider the 
dramatic shift in the approach to studying religion in the second half of the twentieth century; see, for 
example, Sharpe, Comparative Religion.  
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The Intolerability of Religious Intolerance.  The Holocaust and 911 stand as enduring 
testaments to the evil of religious intolerance, and religiously inspired and directed 
violence.
81
  Or, they have helped shape a wide-spread view that religiously inspired and 
directed violence is ethically wrong and needs to be eradicated from society.  This view, 
as indicated, makes a causal connection between intolerant attitudes towards religious 
others and religious violence. For some (pluralistic theorists in particular), theories of 
religious exclusivism (and to a lesser extent theories of religious inclusivism) produce 
intolerant attitudes towards religious others and, therefore, are a cause of religious 
violence. And, consequently, a goal of religious pluralists is to construct (non-exclusivist 
and non-inclusivist) theories of religious diversity, which will foster more tolerant 
attitudes towards religious others and, thereby, contribute to more peaceful interfaith 
relations.    
Whether or not any extant, or future, theory of religious pluralism will lead to 
more tolerant religious attitudes and, therefore, less religiously inspired and directed 
violence cannot yet be determined.  What I think we can say, though, is that intolerance 
of religious tolerance has become something of a societal norm in the West and, 
therefore, theories of religious diversity that aim to produce tolerant attitudes towards 
religious others will flourish (more than those that don‘t).  
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 It is seemingly difficult to make direct, historical, causal links between religious exclusivism and 
violence; for example it seems difficult to argue that Christian exclusivism contributed directly to the 
Holocaust.  Nonetheless, it could be argued that Christian exclusivism contributed implicitly to the 
Holocaust by not supplying Christians with a resource to actively oppose the Holocaust, the way that 
theories of religious pluralism might have.  Although, he does not employ the language of “religious 
exclusivism” Jacob Katz, shows how anti-Jewish religious (i.e., Christian) ideas gave way to more secular 
notions of anti-Semitism in the late 18
th
 century, and how these climaxed in the Holocaust; see, Katz, 
From Prejudice to Destruction. I find Katz’s argument convincing.   Of course, for some pluralists, e.g. Hick, 
Knitter and Griffith, the direct between an exclusivism and violence is clear and obvious.         
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That said, we will now discuss some of the barriers that extant theories of 
religious pluralism have faced, or are sure to face, as they try to become ―normative‖ 
ways of conceptualizing religious diversity.  I will begin by discussing two problems 
common to both humanistic and metaphysical pluralism, and will then discuss some 
problems specific to each type. 
         
Common Problems for Religious Pluralism I: Religious Authority. One obvious barrier to 
the success of both types of religious pluralism is religious authority. What I mean here is 
that theories of religious pluralism are unlikely to succeed, in religious communities, if 
their claims contradict the claims of religious authorities. Religious communities have 
people, institutions, and books that are invested with the power to make authoritative 
statements of truth (within their communities). Thus, there are ―authorities‖ within 
religious communities that have authoritative things to say about the sorts of things that 
pluralistic theorists make claims about. To cite some examples, that are important for our 
discussion, religious authorities make authoritative statements about the nature of God; 
about the station of their founder; about the nature of religion; and, about the relationship 
between their own religious community and other religious communities.
82
  
 According to the requirement of my own theology of religions, the members of 
the Christian, Daist, and Baha‘i communities are obliged to recognize each other‘s 
respective founders.  But, if we reflect on this possibility in light of statements made in 
the authoritative texts of each tradition, it becomes apparent that the views commended in 
this theology are not authorized in the sacred texts of these traditions.   
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 Somewhat ironically, a general lack of religious authority might also stall the progress of religious 
pluralism. Thank you to Paul Allen of Concordia University’s Theology Department for this insight.  
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I claimed, for example, that Daists could subjectively recognize Adi Da as divine 
and consequently commit to his religious disciplines in order to become God-realized. 
And, moreover, that they could – and indeed should – simultaneously, objectively 
recognise Baha'u'llah and Christ as divine Others and, thereby, obtain objective 
knowledge about the two other aspects of Ultimate Reality (i.e., Universal Spirit Energy, 
and Divine Form in Daist terms) that Adi Da is not identified with. Also, as a 
consequence of these objective recognitions, they should honour and respect not only 
Baha‘u‘llah and Jesus Christ but also Baha‘is and Christians. They should allow these 
others to follow their own path to ultimate religious truth, while 1) sharing with these 
others what they themselves subjectively know about Ultimate Reality and, 2) learning 
objectively from these others what they subjectively know about Ultimate Reality. I also 
constructed parallel scenarios wherein Baha‘is are obliged to acknowledge the truth of 
Daists and Christians, and Christians are obliged to learn from Daists and Baha‘is.  
However, the authoritative texts of Daists, Baha‘is, and Christians have different 
things to say that are not consonant with these requirements.   
Adi Da does not say that Baha‘u‘llah is Universal Spirit Energy or that Christ is 
Divine Form.  He does, however, say that he is Consciousness Itself, and, by extension, 
because there is only One Reality, that he is also Spirit Energy and Divine Form.
83
  He 
has also said that Jesus Christ is a fifth stage God-Realizer, and that Baha'u'llah (and 
Muhammad) are not true God-Realizers.
84
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 In the late 1980s, Adi Da began to encourage his devotees to meditate on his “bodily (human) Form,” 
his Spiritual (and Always Blessing) Presence,” and his “Very (and Inherently Perfect) State.”(Da, The Love 
Ananda Gita).  This was a way for Adi Da to say that he is Consciousness itself (his State); Spirit Energy (his 
Presence), and Divine Form (his bodily Form).    
84
 For Adi Da’s representations of Jesus, see Da, The Basket of Tolerance. This evalution of Baha’u’llah was 
communicated to me by the leadership of the Adidam commnity, in a private coversation.  
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Baha‘u‘llah does not say that Adi Da is the Unknowable Essence of God 
(obviously) or that Jesus Christ is Universal Matter. He does say that he is the Most Great 
Spirit of God that generates all matter and is the only means by which one can know the 
Unknowable Essence of God. He also says that all true religions are founded by a 
Manifestation of God, and that there will not be a further Manifestation of God for at 
least one thousand years from the start of his own dispensation (1844).
85
 Thus, by 
revelatory definition Adi Da is a false prophet. Moreover, Baha‘u‘llah has said that he is 
the ―Son returned in the glory of the Father‖ meaning that his own revelation succeeds 
Christ‘s revelation.86  
Christian scriptures, of course, do not address my particular claim but there are 
two biblical passages (Acts 4.12 and John 14:6) which strong imply the impossibility of 
Christians recognizing ―divine Others.‖ Here, I could argue that these passages are only 
meaningful within the context of Christian salvation, but then I would be challenging 
interpretive authorities within the church; a different form of the same problem.  
In any case, my general point is that pluralists are making claims in fields with 
established authorities and, indeed, they are sometimes making claims that contradict the 
claims of these authorities. I suggest that this will present an enduring problem for the 
success of pluralistic theories 
 
Common Problems for Humanistic and Metaphysical Pluralism II: Just Another World 
View?  Another problem common to both humanistic and metaphysical pluralism is the 
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perception that they are merely attempts to replace one world view with another – usually 
an authentic religious one with a pseudo-religious philosophical one.  
 I will now discuss this complex issue in the context of my own version of 
metaphysical pluralism.  
This version of metaphysical pluralism is grounded in a tripartite metaphysics. 
Within this metaphysics, the metaphysics of non-dualism, divine unity, and trinitarianism 
are affirmed as true; or, as the three possible truths of tripartite Ultimate Reality. More 
specifically, they are the three truths of Ultimate Reality that are obtained through 
identification with one of the three aspects of Ultimate Reality.   
As such, none of these truths, individually, is the truth of Ultimate Reality 
altogether; each is an ultimate truth, but only from one perspective within tripartite 
Ultimate Reality. Only the truths of non-dualism, divine unity, and trinitarianism, 
together, constitute the whole truth of Ultimate Reality. Am I, then, proposing a ―meta-
religion‖ that will integrate multiple religious truths into one?  
Not exactly. What I have envisioned is a pluralistic vision of ultimate religious 
truth. Again, here is how I did this:      
 The ultimate form of religion is realized ontologically and epistemologically by 1) 
subjectively identifying with one aspect of Reality in order to see or experience the truth 
of Ultimate Reality from this perspective; 2) objectively recognizing (i.e., recognizing 
from the outside) those identified with the other two aspects of Ultimate Reality, and 
objectively recognizing the (different) truths about Ultimate Reality that they reveal. The 
metaphysical conclusion drawn from this pluralistic experience and cognition of Ultimate 
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Reality is that Ultimate Reality is tripartite, which in this case would also lead one to the 
conclusion that religion is also tripartite, i.e., pluralistic.     
 But this conclusion can only be arrived at by virtue of subjectively identifying 
with one aspect of Ultimate Reality, and objectively recognizing the other two aspects of 
Ultimate Reality, as revealed in religious others. To be more specific, it is only possible 
to arrive at the conclusion that Ultimate Reality is tripartite from the subjective religious 
base of non-dualism, divine unity, or trinitarianism. Thus, the tripartite metaphysics is 
envisioned as inherent to non-dualism, divine unity, and trinitarians, not foreign elements 
added to these.   
 There is a critical element in this vision that is directed at the religions of non-
dualism, divine unity, and divine relationship. The criticism is that none of these 
―ultimate religions‖ have seen the whole truth of Ultimate Reality that is inherent to their 
own religious perspective and, indeed, is only possible from their own religious 
perspective. More specifically, they are not recognizing what the other two forms of 
ultimate religion reveal about Ultimate Reality. When they add this objective knowledge 
of Ultimate Reality to their own subjective knowledge of Ultimate Reality, then they will 
have attained complete knowledge of Ultimate Reality, or the truly ultimate form of 
religion. They will have realized what is inherent in their own perspective.  
 But, again, the ultimate form of religion is inherently pluralistic; there is not one 
form of the ultimate form of religion but three. And, moreover, to realize any one of these 
three ultimate religious perspectives would be to realize the tripartite/pluralistic nature of 
the ultimate form of religion.  
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 So in answer to the question of whether or not this pluralistic theory/theology 
functions as an ultimate religious perspective I would say that, the way I have envisioned 
things, the realization of the (inherently) tripartite ultimate form of religion would 
necessarily result in a pluralistic theology of religions.  From any one of the ultimate 
religious perspectives it would be realized that Ultimate Reality is tripartite, and this 
combined with the assumed view that religion reveals Ultimate Reality, would lead to the 
pluralistic conclusion that religion is ultimately tripartite or pluralistic. Thus, this 
pluralistic theology is not conceived as an ultimate form of religion, in itself, but it is the 
theology of religions that emerges when the ultimate form of religions, conceived in this 
particular way, is realized.                 
 But do all theories, philosophies, and theologies of religions function in this way? 
I think that they do insofar as they are all conclusions about ―true religion‖ or ―the 
ultimate form of religion‖ based on claims or assumptions about the nature of Ultimate 
Reality and the nature of religion.  These three together might be thought of as a 
―spiritual universe‖ or a ―religious world-view.‖  
 So, yes, I do see pluralistic theories as alternative religious world-views; and 
specifically, as religious world views that clash with the world-views of inclusivistic 
theories on the specific issue of whether the ultimate form of religion is singular or plural. 
At present, it seems to me, that inclusivism is the predominant world view within 
Christianity. Is this likely to change in favour of pluralism?  
  To answer this latter question, I suggest that it is necessary to look at all of the 
components of (the two types of) religious pluralism – and not just the conclusion of 
pluralism that what is ultimately religious is pluriform.   
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 For example, for Christians to accept John Hick‘s religious pluralism they would 
have to accept the following components or claims: a unitary metaphysics; a humanistic 
concept of religion; that the universal form of religion is turning from self-centredness to 
Reality-centredness; that their religion is one particular, unique and authentic, instance of 
this universal form of religion; that some other religions are, equally authentic forms of 
the universal form of religion; that the universal form of religion is inherently multiform, 
or true religion is inherently pluralistic. If a Christian could accept all of this they would 
be a Christian pluralist. Moreover, if a Muslim or a Buddhist could accept all of this, they 
would respectively be Muslim and Buddhist pluralists.  
  The situation is the same with my metaphysical pluralism. In this case, it is 
necessary to accept the following claims: that Ultimate Reality is tripartite; that it is 
possible to identify with different aspects of Ultimate Reality; that identification with 
Ultimate Reality produces three different, but equally and ultimately valid, truths of 
Ultimate Reality – specifically, the truths of non-dualism, divine unity, and trinitarianism.  
Thus, if a Christian and a Baha‘i were willing to make all of these claims a part of their 
theology they would respectively be a Christian metaphysical pluralist and a Baha‘i 
metaphysical religious pluralist.      
 Therefore, even if there is acknowledgement, across the board, that all theories of 
religious diversity are visions of a conceptual spiritual universe – such that pluralists 
would stop claiming conceptual high-ground and inclusivist would stop saying that 
pluralist theories are inauthentic – the foundational problem persists: whose world view?       
 In light if this, I will now discuss some type-specific problems that humanistic-
universalistic pluralists and metaphysical pluralists may face in trying to get Christian 
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theologians, Western philosophers, and Christians to adopt their pluralistic theories in 
total.  
 
Problems for Humanistic Pluralism I: Religion as a Human Construct? Humanistic 
pluralism is based on a radical departure from traditional religion; specifically, from the 
notion that there is strong identity between Ultimate Reality and religion, and identity 
which bestows deep divinity on religion. Yes, humanistic pluralism affirms that there is 
Transcendent Reality, and the religious universal that it posits is certainly related to this; 
but, there is a significant difference between fashioning a human conception of Ultimate 
Reality and participating in the life of Ultimate Reality which, in Christianity, usually 
takes the form of communion within the Triune God.  
 Humanistic pluralism demands that religions renounce any literal understanding 
of religious concepts or doctrines that express strong identity between religious reality 
and Ultimate Reality; for example, the Incarnation and the Trinity. The backlash of neo-
inclusivism suggests that this might not be an easy, or agreeable, thing for Christian 
theologians to accept. And what of the generality of Christians; are they likely to 
renounce the idea that Christ is God in a real and tangible way for them? If Christian 
theologians won‘t renounce literal understandings of doctrines that express identity 
between Christ and God, and if the generality of Christians won‘t let go of the idea that 
Christ is God, then humanistic pluralism is unlikely to succeed as a theology of religions.        
 
Problems for Humanistic Pluralist II: Religious Universals? While less literalist 
Christian theologians and Western philosophers may applaud humanistic religious 
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pluralism for its move away from the idea that religion is divine revelation, I suspect that 
those from this camp will not approve of the universalistic element in humanistic-
universalistic pluralism.
87
 Indeed, neo-inclusivists are also highly critical of this element 
within humanistic pluralism, and claim that these universals are identical to the 
―universals‖ or religious essences that real Christian theologians propose – except for the 
fact that they aren‘t, Christian, truly pluralistic, and so forth. I have made my position 
clear: the universals of humanistic pluralists are pluralistic; and the essences of 
inclusivists are not.  
But even if these universals are (rightly) understood as pluralistic at least two 
important questions remain. One: are any of the universals proposed by humanistic 
pluralists actually right? – have they rightly identified the universal form of all authentic 
religions. Two: are there religious universals at all?  
These questions flag potential problems for the likelihood of success for theories 
of humanistic pluralism, because if there is not acceptance of their proposed universals 
then these can‘t do their work of validating the existence of multiple forms of true 
religion.    
        
Problems for Metaphysical Pluralism I: Ultimate Reality as Plural? In the same way that 
a concept of religion as humanly constructed is a radical departure from traditional 
religion, so is the concept of Ultimate Reality as plural. Some Christians, of course, have 
a similar idea with the Trinity and some have even used the Trinity to authenticate the 
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truth of other religions.
88
  But, I suspect that most Christians, like Gavin D‘Costa, would 
object to the way that metaphysical pluralists ―chop up‖ ―the Trinity‖ for the purpose of 
claiming that there are multiple ultimate religious truths. Christians assert that Ultimate 
Reality is trinitarian; not tripartite. Conversely, as a metaphysical pluralist, I claim that 
Ultimate Reality is not trinitarian but tripartite. Nonetheless, the relevant point is that the 
idea of Ultimate Reality as tripartite is unacceptable to most Christian theologians; in 
fact, it is not even acceptable to humanistic-universalistic pluralists, who are also trying 
to conceptualize the idea of true religion as multiform.  
 The idea that Ultimate Reality is multiform is foundation to metaphysical 
pluralism; therefore, if this idea is not likely to get off the ground in the Christian West 
then neither is the idea of metaphysical pluralism.   
 
Problems for Metaphysical Pluralism II: Ultimate Reality? I suspect that, even though 
most traditional Christian theologians would object to the idea of a pluralistic Ultimate 
Reality, they would be comfortable with its idea of revelatory religion, and even its 
metaphysical speculations. Or, at least, they would be comfortable with the efforts of 
metaphysical pluralists to produce a concept of Ultimate Reality, if not their results. But I 
also suspect that the theologians and philosophers who object to the very idea of religious 
universals would also object to the very idea of constructing realistic concepts of 
Ultimate Reality, i.e., the very idea of metaphysics.  And, obviously, metaphysical 
pluralism will not become very successful if it is widely accepted that metaphysical 
constructs are meaningless.   
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 I will now move on to discuss the likelihood of religious pluralism succeeding 
outside of the Christian West.       
 
Does Religious Pluralism have a Future Outside of the Christian West?  
As discussed earlier, The Myth of Religious Superiority, (the vanguard publication of 
humanistic religious pluralism) and Deep Religious Pluralism (the vanguard publication 
of metaphysical religious pluralism) both seek to be multi-faith. Thus, in The Myth of 
Religious Superiority we see religious pluralism from Hindu and Sikh perspectives, 
Buddhist perspectives, Jewish perspectives, Christian perspectives, and Muslim 
perspectives. And, in Deep Religious Pluralism, we see examples of Buddhist, Chinese, 
Christian, Hindu, Islamic, and Jewish versions of deep religious pluralism.   
Some see this move as a Western imposition.  In response to this accusation, I 
would say that the notion of imposition is meaningless unless there is a social structure 
that allows religious pluralists to impose their views on others. I don‘t see any such a 
social structure, especially outside of academic institutions; as far as I can tell, religions 
are free to accept or reject theories of religious pluralism at will. Moreover, I think it is 
reasonable and appropriate for pluralists to hope and expect that the religions they 
authenticate, as true religions, will adopt their theories of religious pluralism; indeed, 
unless the many true religions adopt a pluralistic view, theories of religious pluralism are 
of little practical consequence.     
 With that said, I see no reason for not inquiring into the possibility that the genius 
of religious pluralism belongs to the Christian West, and that this might make it even 
more difficult for theories of religious pluralism to succeed outside of the Christian West. 
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Consequently, I will now reflect on the possibility that the very idea of religious 
pluralism – the idea that there are true religions, or multiple forms of true religion – is 
relatively unique to the Christian West.  
More specifically, I want to explore the notion that the idea of religions as unique 
and separate entities is largely Western.
 89
 If this is the case, then, the related idea of, 
unique and separate, true religions – i.e., the idea of religious pluralism – might not even 
make sense outside of the Christian West.   
This is not to suggest that there are no religious cultures, outside of the Christian 
West, interested in the idea of religious pluralism; or, that different religious cultures 
don‘t have ideas about religious diversity that parallel the idea of religious pluralism in 
significant ways. Instead, it is to suggest that other religious cultures may not gravitate 
towards the Western Christian idea of religious pluralism because they employ 
significantly different understandings of religion.
90
 
As a means of probing this question, we will briefly examination the theologies of 
religions of the two non-Christian ―types‖ of religion that I tried to authenticate as 
equally true within Christianity in my theory of metaphysical religious pluralism; namely, 
the non-dualistic theology of religions of Adidam, and the divine-unity theology of 
religions of the Baha‘i Faith. 
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Non-dualistic theology of religions is grounded in the affirmation that God is non-
dualistic, or the idea that there is only God. Because there is only God, it is impossible to 
be outside of or unrelated to God; thus, everyone and indeed everything is in a religious 
state. This completely blurs the Western idea that religion is something set apart from 
other phenomena that are non-religious. Here, in the same way that there is only God, 
there is only religion. The goal of religion from this perspective is to realise this truth 
perfectly, or to realise the non-duality of God.  Religions – or really ways of life – that do 
not result in the perfect realisation of the non-duality of God, are not building blocks of 
ultimate truth; rather, they are simply errors that must be transcended. Nonetheless, they 
are not fatal errors deserving of condemnation or punishment; indeed, these ―errors‖ are 
to be respected, honoured, and tolerated because they are serving some individual on 
their path to the ultimate non-dualistic realization of God. The idea that there are equally 
true different types of religion is foreign to this way of thinking; as is the idea that 
―different types of religions‖ have their own inherent value as components of truth or as 
co-means to an ultimate end. But this way of thinking is conducive to a broadly tolerant 
view of all other sentient beings who are likewise on the path to God. In this respect it is 
almost infinitely more tolerant than Christian theories of religious diversity that are 
limited to extending tolerance to the ―great world religions.‖  
Divine unity theology of religions is grounded in the idea that God is an 
unequivocal unity – no trinity and no tripartite structure is allowed here. The one and the 
unknowable essence of God is completely transcendent, and God is only knowable 
through the manifest aspect of God, known as the Manifestation of God. In this theology, 
religion is identified completely with the reality of the Manifestation of God. The 
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Manifestation of God reveals to humanity, at different points in its history, the laws and 
ordinances of God – which, when followed, allow human beings to draw nearer to God in 
likeness. In other words, the Manifestation of God, who is the manifestation of all of the 
―names and attributes‖ of God, shows human beings how to, likewise, attain these names 
and attributes, to the degree that they are capable; specifically, the Manifestation of God 
reveals the laws and ordinances that, when followed, allow human beings to manifest the 
names and attributes of God in themselves. Each time a Manifestation of God appears in 
human history, He or She reveals different laws and ordinances, on account of the 
differing spiritual and social needs of the age. Moreover, the spiritual and social life of 
humanity is progressive and, so, the laws of a ―new‖ Manifestation of God ―fulfill and 
abrogate‖ the laws of the previous Manifestation. But the reality of each Manifestation of 
God is the same divine Reality; different Manifestations have different names and 
different missions but they are in reality identical. Thus, there is only one religion - the 
religion of the Manifestations of God or the religion of God. In this theology, all past 
Manifestations of God must be recognised and honoured as such; to belittle a past 
religious dispensation on account of its outdated laws, is to belittle the reality of the 
current religious dispensation because both have come from the same great Being. 
Moreover, it is believed that the current religious dispensation will eventually be 
abrogated by God‘s new Manifestation in the future. Thus, there are not different types of 
religion, but only the same religion that is continually renewed by God. In this theology, 
all of the Manifestations of God (more or less, the founders of the ―great world 
religions‖) must be accepted; to reject one is to reject all. This requires a reverent and 
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non-critical response to the followers of all other divinely revealed religions and, thus, 
engenders real tolerance on a practical level.       
I suspect that, on first glance, most humanistic and metaphysical religious 
pluralists would identify and dismiss both of these theologies as forms of inclusive. 
Moreover, I suspect that most neo-inclusivists would identify these theologies as 
inaccurate forms of inclusivism that don't capture the rich diversity of religions in the 
same way that they do. But I suggest that the differences run deeper than this.  Neither 
the non-dualistic theology of religions nor the divine unity theology of religions, accept 
the idea that there are different equally true types of religion, or different true types of 
religion that contribute to the attainment of true religion.   
In the non-dualistic theology, everything, literally everything, is a religious path 
that leads to the same ultimate end. This non-dualistic theology certainly shares the idea 
of an ultimate religious end with Christian inclusivism; and it does seem that it should not 
matter what the particular religious end is, so long as it is ultimate. But the religious ends 
are different, and this contributes to a different understanding of the religious experiences 
that lead up to the ultimate end. In the non-dualistic theology, the non-dualistic 
realization of God leads to the dissolution of all reality into the Reality of God; in 
trinitarian forms of Christian inclusivism, the end is communion with the Triune God, or 
some philosophically constructed version of this. The non-dualistic theology leads to the 
ideas, on one hand, that all religions are dissolved into God, and, on the other, that 
because nothing is really different from God, that all phenomenal reality is religious: 
There is only religion. The trinitarian theology leads to the ideas, on one hand, that 
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different aspects of God are recognisable in the ultimate fulfilment, and, on the other, that 
religions contribute to understanding these different aspects of God.  
In some sense, it is possible to collapse both of these ideas into the idea of 
religious inclusivism.  Still it should be recognised that the ―trinitarian inclusivism‖ leads 
to the possibility of recognising different types of true religion (even if in the end these 
become components of true religion), while ―non-dualistic inclusivism‖ does not. But 
non-dualistic inclusivism allows for a very broad and tolerant view of all other religious 
traditions, while trinitarian inclusivism does not.  
In the theology of divine unity, there are no distinct, religious paths; all different 
religions are recognised as previous forms of the exact same religion. From this 
perspective, it is possible to think in terms of the ―great world religions‖ in a way that 
pluralists and neo-inclusivists have become accustomed to. Moreover, there is not the 
diffuse sense of religiousness everywhere that there is in the non-dualistic theology; here, 
religion has definite borders. But in this theology, the borders between religions are 
simply not present in the same sense. Here the claim is that if all religions are direct 
revelations from the same one God then there must be only one religion. Metaphysical 
religious pluralists, of course, have problems with this idea because they suggest that 
religion is grounded in the different aspects of the same pluralistic Ultimate Reality. 
Christian inclusivists preserve this same idea in the notion that the ultimate religious end 
or absolute religious essence combines or unifies different aspects of God or elements of 
religious truth. There is a sharp logical distinction in play here. The theology of divine 
unity identifies religion with the manifest aspect of God, but not with other ―aspects of 
God,‖ even though it recognises something like these in its conceptions of ―the Essence 
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of God‖ and ―Universal Matter.‖ In contrast, the trinitarian theology identifies ultimate 
religious fulfilment with the unification of the different aspects of God. As stated above, 
the trinitarian theology leads to the ideas, on one hand, that different aspects of God are 
recognisable in the ultimate fulfilment, and, on the other, that religions contribute to 
understanding these different aspects of God. In contrast, the theology of divine unity  
leads, on one hand, to the idea that all religions are grounded in the same Ultimate 
Reality, and, on the other, that there are no deep religious differences or even different 
religions: There is only one religion.  
Here, too, it is possible to collapse both of these ideas into the common idea of 
religious inclusivism. But it should be kept in mind that the grounding of religion in 
different dimensions of the one Ultimate Reality is different from grounding religion in 
the one and only means for accessing Ultimate Reality, and this potentially leads to very 
different ways of thinking about religious diversity.        
 ―Trinitarian inclusivism‖ allows for an acknowledgement of the value of 
religious differences at a very deep level, while ―divine unity inclusivism‖ does not seem 
to. But divine unity inclusivism circumvents the whole problem of acknowledging the 
validity of the ―individual religions‖ by never giving this idea a foothold in reality, while 
trinitarian inclusivism first flames the fire of religious diversity and then to douse it with 
the water of Christian unity.
91
    
As far as I can tell, the idea that there are different types of religions, that are 
equal, is simply not present in this non-dualistic theology of religions, or in this divine 
unity theology of religions. The predominant idea about religious diversity in the non-
dualistic theology, is that everything is religion or that there is quite literally only 
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religion. The predominant idea about religious diversity in the divine unity theology is 
that all religions are manifestations of the same religious reality, or that there is quite 
literally only one religion. The idea that everything is religion and therefore all paths 
should be respected, and the idea that there is only one religion and therefore all divine 
religions should be revered are ideas of religion that don‘t seem to come into play in the 
West. In the Christian and Western discussion of religious diversity it is generally 
assumed that there is a strong boundary line between what is religious and what is not 
religious, and that there is an equally strong boundary between those entities that are 
taken to be religions.  Non-dualists do not think in terms of the former assumption, and 
divine unitarians do not think in terms of the latter assumption. Thus, neither is so 
interested in affirming the unique truth of other religions, on one hand, because all 
religions (meaning all reality) will ultimately dissolve into God and, on the other, because 
there is really only one religion. In other words, why bother reconciling differences that 
are not permanent, and bother reconciling differences that are not real?  
 
Is the Idea of Religious Pluralism at an End?   
A title that I considered for this dissertation was The Meaning and End of Religious 
Pluralism. I considered this title because my original plan was to show what religious 
pluralism means and, then, argue that religious pluralism is at its conceptual end. 
Obviously, I decided to forgo the argument that religious pluralism is at its end, but will 
now close this work by discussing this possibility. 
Humanistic pluralism, as I have conceived it, denies the possibility that religion 
can be identified with the divine, and so employs a humanistic concept of religion. 
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Religion is a human response to Transcendence but is not Transcendence itself.  
Humanistic pluralism does this because it also employs a unitary metaphysics or the idea 
that God or Ultimate Reality is one – and the combination of the idea that religion is 
identical to God (in some strong sense) and the idea that God is one necessarily leads to 
the logical conclusion that religion is also one.  
Metaphysical pluralism also tries to avoid the conclusion that religion is one – but 
instead of employing a humanistic concept of religion, it does so by using a pluralistic 
metaphysics. It says that religion may be ―divine‖ or ―revelatory‖ in the sense of strong 
identity between Ultimate Reality and religion but that this doesn‘t lead to the conclusion 
religion is one, because Ultimate Reality is itself pluralistic and therefore religion reflects 
this pluralistic reality.  
But are these the only possibilities such that we can say religious pluralism is a 
claim that the ultimate form of religion is multiform, necessarily grounded in either a 
humanistic concept of religion or a pluralistic metaphysics (or, redundantly, both)? In 
other words, do these two (non-redundant) possibilities bring to an end pluralistic 
theorizing?  
If the concepts of humanistic religion and divine/revelatory religion are fully 
disjunctive; if the concepts of a unitary metaphysics and a pluralistic metaphysics are 
fully disjunction; and if it is necessary for a religious person to hold either one position, 
or the other, for both of these disjunctive sets – then, yes, they do bring pluralistic 
theorizing to an end. In other words, if one must hold either a humanistic or a 
divine/revelatory concept of religion and one must hold either a unitary metaphysics or a 
pluralistic metaphysics, then one can only come to religious pluralism in the following 
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ways: 1) by holding a unitary metaphysics and a humanistic concept of God; 2) by 
holding a pluralistic metaphysics and a divine/revelatory concept of religion; or, 3) 
(redundantly) by holding a humanistic concept of religion and a pluralistic metaphysics. 
There are no other logical possibilities.  
It seems to me that all of the theorists discussed in this dissertation presuppose 
that a religious person must hold either a humanistic or divine/revelatory concept of 
religion, and either a unitary or pluralistic metaphysics – and if this is the case then the 
solutions proffered by these theorists are predictable and, for them, there are no other 
possible solutions short of dropping these claims, or presuppositions, about the nature of 
Ultimate Reality and religion.  
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